Findings Of Fact Upon consideration of the oral and documentary evidence adduced at the hearing, the following relevant findings of fact are made: The Respondent, Mark Clinton Russell, is currently eligible for licensure and licensed in the State of Florida as an insurance agent and was so licensed at all times material to this proceeding. At all times material to this proceeding, Medical Underwriters of Sarasota, Inc. (Underwriters), was an incorporated insurance agency organized under the laws of the State of Florida, and Respondent was the vice-president. The Principal Financial Group (PFG) is the parent corporation of a number of insurance-related entities with whom Respondent had contractual relationships beginning in November 1985 and ending in May 1993. Principal, formerly known as Bankers Life Company, is an Iowa corporation licensed to sell group and individual life and health insurance products in Florida. Principal has two strategic business units -- Individual and Group -- each of which is administered and operated with separate goals, leadership, and procedures. The Individual business unit is responsible for the sale of insurance products to individuals, while the Group unit is responsible for the sale of insurance products to groups of people. Also affiliated with PFG is Principal Marketing Services, Inc. (Principal Marketing), and Princor Financial Services Corporation (Princor). Principal Marketing is a general agency for competing life and health companies which was formed to permit Principal agents to sell competitors' insurance products on those occasions when a Principal product was not available for a particular, prospective insurance client. Princor is a securities broker dealer and, through its agents, offers securities such as annuities and mutual funds for sale to the public. Respondent began his association with PFG in 1985 when he executed "UMEG Employers" and "GME 1495" contracts with Principal, which was then known as Bankers Life Company. These contracts, which were subsequently re-executed in 1987, permitted Respondent to sell group life and health insurance policies as an agent of Principal. Further, on those occasions when Respondent sold a Planned Employee Program group policy, he would receive a Planned Employee Program Group Commission Agreement for each sale. In January 1989, Respondent executed additional contracts with Principal: a Special Brokerage Agency Personal Production Contract, DD 714; Brokerage General Agency Agreement; and a Special Brokerage Agency Management Agreement. These contracts permitted Respondent to sell insurance products from Principal's Individual business unit, for which he would earn sales and renewal commissions. The contracts also permitted Respondent to recruit, appoint, and manage agents to sell Principal insurance products. As a consequence of his recruitment and management work, Respondent was entitled to certain management compensation and override commissions. The Special Brokerage Agency Personal Production Contract, DD 714, provides that Principal will not advance commissions on future premium deposits. However, as will be shown in later Findings of Fact, Principal did not always abide by this provision. Respondent was the insurance agent of record for Principal at Underwriters at all times material to this proceeding. Also in 1989, Respondent became a licensed securities broker and executed a Registered Representative's Agreement with Princor. Further, Respondent executed a Marketer Contract and a Management Contract for Manager with Principal Marketing. These contracts permitted Respondent to sell insurance products of other companies and to earn override commissions on the sales of insurance agents appointed and managed by him. During his association with the PFG companies, Respondent regularly received a number of commission statements that purported to account for commissions, overrides, compensation, credits, advances, and debits due from or to the companies. On the 8th and 20th of each month, the Principal Group business unit sent Respondent a Group and Pension Compensation Statement. On the 15th and 30th of each month, the Principal Individual business unit would send Respondent an Agent's Statement. Although all group policy information is input into the company's computer system by Group personnel only, some sales and renewals of group policies appear on the Agent's Statement and some appear on the Group Statement. Because group policy information appears on both statements without any apparent rhyme or reason, the Group Compensation and Agent's Statements are confusing and difficult to read. Respondent also received Commission Statements from Principal Marketing and Princor -- each of which were sent twice a month -- and a Management Compensation Statement, which was sent once a month. In addition, along with the statements that reflected his personal earnings, Respondent received commission statements twice a month for each of the approximately 45 Principal brokers appointed by him. Respondent was licensed with other life and health companies and received commission statements from them as well. Because of the volume of commission paperwork sent to him by Principal, and the time it would have taken to do so, neither Respondent nor anyone else in the office reviewed the statements for accuracy. Respondent trusted Principal to pay him properly and to accurately account for the monies due him. Respondent's commission statements and checks were sent to him by express, next day delivery. Respondent would have an idea about the size of the compensation check that he expected to receive from Principal and upon receipt of the check would confirm that it was "in the ballpark." Respondent's compensation statements and checks were received at work by the office administrator, who would confirm that the check received was approximately what Respondent expected, file the commission statements in three ring binders, and either deposit the commission check or give it to Respondent to deposit. So far as is relevant here, Principal's Individual business unit began with Diana McGovern, who was employed by Principal as a Commission Specialist in the Agency Services Department from January 1990 until June 1992. In her capacity as a Commission Specialist, McGovern dealt directly with Principal agents and brokers, including Respondent, in Florida and six other southern states. McGovern's duties and responsibilities required her to answer brokers' questions regarding compensation statements and issue special checks for advances that would be repaid out of present or future commissions. Immediately superior to McGovern was Bruce Woods, who served as the Supervisor of Agency Services. Woods reported to Tom Herman, a junior officer of Principal who served as the officer in charge of Agency Services. Herman reported to Principal's Brokerage Vice-President, which is sometimes referred to as a Regional Vice-President or RVP. Since 1989, Respondent has had a number of RVPs. Initially, when Respondent first contracted with the Principal Individual group unit, Bill Gordon was his RVP. Gordon was succeeded by Gayle Thompson, who was followed by Russ Miller, who was Respondent's RVP from March 1991 through December 1992. At that time, Bill Moren assumed the position as Brokerage Vice-President of Principal. On the Group side of Principal, the organization began with Kathy Bianchi, who served as Principal's Compensation Technician. In that role, Bianchi dealt with Principal brokers, including Respondent, who were also Old Northwestern or Roger's Benefit Group agents. Among other duties, Bianchi was responsible for sending certain agents' commission statements and compensation checks by express delivery. In January 1991, Jan Henderson assumed Bianchi's position as Compensation Technician and began dealing with Respondent. Henderson's supervisor, or Team Leader, was Kelli Ellis. Ellis reported to the assistant manager, Deb Henman, who in turn reported to the manager, Betty Jo Dickson (who had previously served as the assistant manager before being promoted to Manager of the department). Respondent also had dealings with Principal's Management Compensation Department -- most notably with Russ Griffin, an officer of Principal, and his executive secretary, Juanita Schuster. In 1989, Respondent began to request and receive checks from Principal before they were due and payable in the normal course of Principal's issuance of commission statements and compensation. The term "advance" was frequently used by Principal officers and employees to describe sending monies to Respondent both with and without a positive commission balance. The words "advance," "early check," or "special check" were used interchangeably by Dickson and others. Respondent did receive -- with the express and repeated approval of officers at Principal -- advances of monies when he had no "positive balance" in his commission account and these advances were repaid from commissions he was to earn in the future. In April 1989 -- over three years before receiving the funds here at issue -- Respondent called Bianchi and told her that he was in a jam and needed some money. He asked that Principal send him by overnight delivery an advance of $2000. Bianchi said "Okay" and told Respondent that if there was a problem, she would call him back and, if not, that he could expect the check "in the next couple of days". The advance arrived by overnight express. During 1989, Respondent requested and received from Bianchi four additional advances against commissions. In January 1990, Respondent requested and received yet another advance from Bianchi. Although unknown at the time by Respondent, the 1989 and January 1990 payments from Bianchi were expressly approved by Betty Jo Dickson, then serving as Bianchi's supervisor and Assistant Manager. At some point, however, Dickson believed that Respondent's requests for advances were becoming abusive. As a consequence, Dickson placed a computer message in the Principal computer system which appeared whenever a Compensation Technician accessed Respondent's compensation account. The message read: "If Mark Russell should ever call for an advance let Betty Jo [Dickson] or Deb Henman know." After the message regarding Respondent was placed into the computer, Dickson spoke directly to Respondent -- who had called asking for another advance. Dickson advised Respondent that she felt he had abused the system and that there would be no further early checks. Respondent tried to persuade Dickson to approve the requested advance but was unsuccessful. Despite her threatened prohibition, Dickson thereafter approved -- about a year later -- a request by Respondent for an advance. In all, Dickson expressly approved a number of advances to Respondent and, despite the supposedly required positive balance to do so, her approvals came without any inquiry as to Respondent's then-current balance with Principal. In any event, by November 1991, Dickson's Principal Group unit had advanced over $20,444 to Respondent. In 1989, Respondent also spoke with and requested advances from Diana McGovern. McGovern was Bianchi's counterpart in Principal's Individual business unit. As a commission specialist, McGovern sent special checks -- which she defined as money sent in advance against future commissions or renewals -- to Principal brokers on a daily basis. McGovern had earlier been advised by her trainer, Rhonda Nelson, and by Tom Herman, the Principal officer responsible for her department, that there were no guidelines for issuing a special check and that she should simply use her best judgment in deciding whether to issue a special check. McGovern soon began dealing with Respondent, who she knew had a substantial block of group business with a good persistency. When McGovern first started working with Respondent she would not advance money unless there was a positive balance in Respondent's commission account; however, as she had been instructed, McGovern soon felt she could trust Respondent and would advance monies to him without the necessity of a positive amount on his statement. Soon, McGovern was sending Respondent advances at least once a month, sometimes twice. On occasion, McGovern did not feel that she could advance money to Respondent and, despite Respondent's persistence in requesting an advance, McGovern refused to do so. Several times when met with a "no" from McGovern, Respondent went over her head and spoke with Bruce Woods who, on occasion, would overrule McGovern's decision and authorize an advance. On two or three occasions, after Woods failed to approve Respondent's request for an advance, Respondent went to Wood's supervisor, Tom Herman, an officer of Principal, who would authorized the advance. Unlike Principal's Group business unit, there was never any message on the computer screens of the Individual business unit notifying McGovern or anyone else that approval was required before advancing any money to Respondent. McGovern only needed to obtain approval to issue a special check if the amount requested exceeded $10,000. By early 1992, McGovern's department had advanced by special check over $127,860 to Russell. Prior to May 1992, Respondent received numerous advances authorized by and provided to him by officers of Principal. Two advances -- totalling $5,164 -- were requested from and approved by Bill Gordon in July 1990, who was then serving as the President of Principal Marketing. Additional advances were requested from and approved by Russ Griffin, an officer of Principal in the Management Compensation division of Principal's Individual business unit. Griffin's department was responsible for generating and sending to Respondent his monthly Management Compensation Statement. Between June and November 1990, Griffin advanced $133,453 to Respondent. In addition, Griffin's executive secretary, Juanita Shuster, sent Respondent two advances totaling $30,500. In all, Griffin's Management Compensation Department advanced Respondent $163,953 prior to May 1992. Part of this amount included a single advance -- with the knowledge and apparent approval of Gayle Thompson (Respondent's RVP) and Griffin-- of $93,000 to allow Respondent to close on a house he purchased. This advance, as well as others from Principal's Management Compensation department, were made despite the fact that Respondent did not then have a positive balance with the company and could not repay the advance for some time. Thompson had earlier advanced $15,000 to Respondent in July 1990. In all, by April 21, 1992, Respondent had requested, received, and repaid in excess of $330,000 of monies advanced by Principal. There was no evidence that Respondent had been advised by any of Principal's employees or officers that these requests were inappropriate or questionable in any respect or that his privilege to request advances had been terminated . Sometime around April 1991, Respondent's RVP, Russ Miller, visited Respondent in Sarasota to discuss Principal's desire that Respondent expand his business. It was Respondent's understanding from Miller that Principal wanted to build a brokerage business and that his business needed to expand or Principal would sever its relationship with him. As a consequence, Respondent began to expand his business by renting a substantially larger office, hiring additional agents and office staff and purchasing office equipment. Miller returned to Sarasota a year later, in April 1992. While in Sarasota, Miller reviewed Respondent's business plan, which Respondent had forwarded to Miller prior to his arrival. The business plan specified Respondent's anticipated need for advances and that any future renewal commissions would be used as the source of repayment for those advances. Respondent advised Miller that in order to continue the expansion, the Respondent would need advances from Principal. It was Respondent's understanding from Miller that since he had obtained advances in the past, that future advances should not create a problem. As a consequence, when Respondent required an advance immediately after Miller's April 1992 visit, he called Henderson -- the commission technician in charge of Respondent's group renewals and compensation. In May 1992, Respondent began requesting and receiving advances from Henderson, who had replaced Bianchi as Respondent's compensation technician in Principal's Group Business Unit. Thereafter, Respondent requested and received, between May 1992 and May 1993, $329,043.09 of additional monies from Principal - - forwarded by Henderson. It is these funds and how they were requested and obtained by Respondent which are at issue in this proceeding. There is no dispute that Respondent requested the money from Henderson, that Henderson forwarded the money to the Respondent and that the Respondent received the money. Respondent did not offer or promise Henderson anything in return for her sending him the money, and Henderson did not receive any money or benefit whatsoever from anyone for diverting Principal's funds to Respondent. Likewise, Respondent did not threaten, coerce or improperly encourage Henderson to send him money. Respondent's requests of Henderson to send him funds were never made with the intention that Henderson wrongfully divert funds from Principal. Likewise, Respondent did not know, and there was no reason for Respondent to have known, that Henderson was wrongfully diverting Principal's funds. Respondent did not tell Henderson or suggest to Henderson how she was to accomplish the transfer of the money to Respondent. Although Henderson's computer instructed her to advise Betty Jo (Dickson) or Deb Henman should Respondent call for an advance, Henderson did not seek permission before advancing Respondent money. Henderson had no knowledge that Respondent had in the past received advances on future commissions without a positive balance in commissions at the time he received the advance. Likewise, Henderson was not aware that these advances had been approved by a person or persons in the Principal organization with authority to approve such advances. It is clear that Henderson misunderstood Respondent's request of her to advance him money, and as a result she devised a method of adding money to Respondent's commission statement and forcing the computer to pay Respondent unearned money. Henderson's sole, expressed reason for diverting funds from Principal was to "help" Respondent and she was willing to devise and go to the lengths that she did because she felt that she "was in a dead end job" that "wasn't going anywhere" and about which she "didn't care". Since Respondent had received advances on unearned commissions in the past that were approved by someone in authority at Principal, there was no reason for Respondent to suspect that the money received through Henderson was being improperly diverted to him. Likewise, since Respondent did not thoroughly check his commission statements, there was no reason for him to have noticed how Henderson accomplished the diversion of Principal's funds to him. Respondent had sufficient reasons to assume that advances sent to him by Henderson had been approved by Principal. In the latter part of May 1993, Henderson's diversion of funds was discovered when she inadvertently input a code to the system that brought Respondent's commission statement to the attention of Henderson's team leader, who noticed that payments were being credited to terminated accounts. Henderson was identified as the source of the payments because of her computer sign-on code, which she made no effort to conceal when diverting funds to Respondent. After an investigation by Averell Karstens, Principal's Chief Fraud Investigator, Henderson was confronted and terminated from her employment. When confronted, Henderson admitted improperly sending money to Respondent Shortly thereafter, Principal called the FBI and the United States Attorney's Office regarding the conduct of Henderson and what they suspected to be the conduct of Russell. Henderson pled guilty to multiple counts of mail and wire fraud and testified before a federal grand jury regarding her conduct at Principal. Subsequent to learning of Henderson's improper diversion of Principal's money, Respondent's commissions statements and financial dealings with Principal were gone over with by Principal to determine what monies had been improperly obtained by Respondent. The results of this intensive and extensive investigation confirmed that Principal's complaint concerning monies allegedly provided improperly to Respondent are limited to the payments made to Respondent by Henderson between May 1992 and May 1993, totalling $329,043.09. Subsequently, Respondent's agency agreements with Principal were terminated. A complaint alleging theft and other fraudulent acts was filed by Principal with the U. S. Attorney's office. Respondent's clients were taken from him and all rights of future commissions were terminated by Principal. Despite a detailed investigation by the FBI and the U. S. Attorney's office and, a federal grand jury investigation, Respondent has never been charged or convicted of any illegal activity relating in any way to Henderson's diversion of funds from Principal. In an attempt to recover what Principal considers unauthorized payments to Respondent, Principal has filed a civil lawsuit in the Circuit Court of Sarasota County, Florida. Respondent has filed a civil lawsuit against Principal, Princor and Principal Marketing in the Iowa District Court For Polk County alleging breach of contract, defamation, interference with prospective business advantage and intentional infliction of emotional distress. The Respondent is seeking a monetary award in this case. At the time of hearing in the instant case, both of the civil cases were still pending. Although Respondent admits that the $329,043.09 is unearned, he has not repaid Principal this sum because he is awaiting the outcome of the two aforementioned civil actions. However, Respondent also admits that he no longer has the funds and would have to borrow the money should he be required to repay Principal. There is insufficient evidence to show that Respondent knowingly requested Henderson to wrongfully divert to him payments totaling $329,043.09 belonging to PFG. Furthermore, there is insufficient evidence to show that Respondent received and retained the diverted funds knowing that he had no right to the monies.
Recommendation Based upon the foregoing findings of fact and conclusions of law, it is recommended that the Department enter a Final Order which dismisses the amended complaint against Russell. DONE AND ORDERED this 2nd day of December, 1994, in Tallahassee, Florida. WILLIAM R. CAVE, Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 2nd day of December, 1994. APPENDIX TO RECOMMENDED ORDER, CASE NO. 94-810 The following constitutes my specific rulings, pursuant to Section 120.59(2), Florida Statutes, on all of the proposed findings of fact submitted by the parties in this case. Petitioner's Proposed Findings of Fact: Each of the following proposed findings of fact is adopted in substance as modified in the Recommended Order. The number in parentheses is the Finding(s) of Fact which so adopts the proposed finding(s) of fact: 1(1); 2(2); 3(6,7,8); 4(8); 5(9); 6(19); 21(51,52,53); 23(55); 24(42); 25(60); 26(57); 27(42,43); and 35(60). Proposed findings of fact 8 through 20, 29, 31, 32, 33 and 36 are rejected as not being supported by evidence in the record, notwithstanding Henderson testimony. However, there may be portions of each proposed finding of fact that are adopted as modified in Findings of Fact 41 through 49, otherwise they are rejected as not being supported by evidence in the record. Proposed findings of fact 7, 22, 28 and 34 are neither material nor relevant to this proceeding. The first sentence of proposed finding fact 30 is rejected as not being supported by evidence in the record. The second sentence is adopted in Finding of Fact 8. Respondent's Proposed Findings of Fact: 1. Proposed findings of fact 1 through 70 are adopted in substance as modified in Findings of Fact 3 through 61. Otherwise, they are rejected as not being supported by evidence in the record or recitation of testimony or unnecessary. COPIES FURNISHED: James A. Bossart, Esquire Department of Insurance and Treasurer 612 Larson Building Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0333 Alan F. Wagner, ESquire Wagner, Vaughan & McLaughlin, P.A. 601 Bayshore Boulevard Suite 910 Tampa, Florida 33606 Tom Gallagher, State Treasurer and Insurance Commissioner Department of Insurance and Treasurer The Capitol, Plaza Level Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0300 Bill O'Neil, General Counsel Department of Insurance and Treasurer The Capitol, PL-11 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0300
The Issue Whether Petitioner, Rebecca Hernandez ("Hernandez"), is entitled to the $22,943.81 her late mother, Darlene Rice ("Rice" or "Mother"), paid to buy into the Florida Retirement System Pension Plan ("Pension Plan"), as well as other monies transferred from Rice's Investment Plan account to the Pension Plan account, or is Hernandez only entitled to the $2,654.17 in employee contributions that Rice paid into the Pension Plan while an active member of that plan.
Findings Of Fact Based on the evidence presented and the record as a whole, the following facts were established: Darlene Rice was a Broward county teacher and member of FRS beginning September 1, 2011. Sometime in 2016, she became interested in transferring from the FRS Investment Plan to the FRS Pension Plan and actively began to investigate that option. Petitioner, Rebecca Hernandez, is the daughter of Rice and is entitled to Rice's benefits from FRS as determined by the Order of Summary Administration entered by the Circuit Court of Broward County, Florida, on October 2, 2018. Prior to transferring from the Investment Plan and as a part of her investigation, Rice contacted the FRS guidance line, on numerous occasions to seek guidance and inquire about the process to transfer into the Pension Plan. Resp. Ex. 20. The calls were recorded.3 More precisely, on March 7, 2017, Rice called the FRS guidance line to obtain information and ask questions regarding her contemplated transfer 3 The undersigned listened to all nine audio recordings. from the Investment Plan to the Pension Plan. On this call, the representative informed Rice that if she terminated FRS employment prior to having eight years of service, she "could not really recover anything." Resp. Ex. 20. During another call to the FRS guidance line, Rice was told that if she left the Pension Plan before vesting, monies she paid to "buy in" would be lost. Rice also acknowledged during one call that if something happened to her, she understood she would lose everything.4 Ultimately, after multiple telephone consultations and discussions with the FRS guidance line, Rice made the decision to transfer plans and buy into the Pension Plan. To do so, Rice was required to complete and submit a 2nd Election Retirement Plan Enrollment Form dated March 7, 2017. Resp. Exs. 2 and 16.5 On March 9, 2017, the Department sent a letter to Rice, confirming her 2nd Election into the Pension Plan. Resp. Ex. 16. The letter included the following: You have elected to move from the FRS Investment Plan and buy into the FRS Pension Plan. The effective date of this election is April 1, 2017. This is your final Plan Choice Election under the Florida Retirement System. You must remain in the FRS 4 The undersigned reasonably infers that this comment was based on what she had been told during previous phone calls to the FRS guidance line. The extensive information and consultation provided to Rice by the FRS guidance line was commendable, useful to her, and no doubt, very well intended. The representatives were patient and thorough with Rice. Regardless, their general admonitions and advice to Rice do not carry the force of law, nor do they necessarily dictate the outcome of this case. Rather, as will be explained, the correct decision in this case is derived by identifying and interpreting the applicable FRS laws and rules to the facts. 5 The top of the form notified her that "before using your 2nd Election, be sure you understand the impact of changing from one plan to another." By signing the form, at Option 2, Rice also acknowledged language that stated "I want to use my existing Investment Plan account balance and possibly other personal resources to 'buy' into the Pension Plan." Other disclosures were also made to her on page 3 of the form. Pension Plan until your retirement from FRS- covered employment. As a member who is switching from the FRS Pension Plan using the available balance in your FRS Investment Plan account. If your account is not sufficient to cover the cost of the buy-in, you will need to submit personal funds. * * * If you terminate employment prior to vesting in the Pension Plan benefit (less than 6 or 8 years) you are only entitled to receive: A refund of your contributions paid into the Pension Plan since April 1, 2017 (the effective date of your 2nd election). * * * If you feel that this retirement Plan election was made in error, you may be able to cancel it … Failure to notify us no later than 4:00 PM EST on the last business day of the month following your election month will void your right to cancel this election. Rice's election to transfer from the Investment Plan to the Pension Plan was slated to become effective on April 1, 2017. On April 18, 2017, Rice was informed by the Department that it received her notification of her second election and the accrued liability (costs) to transfer to the Pension Plan was $58,366.00; $35,422.19 was liquidated from her investment account and transferred to the FRS Trust Fund and $22,943.81 was the out of pocket cost to her to complete the transfer. Resp. Ex. 7. On June 6, 2017, the Department sent a letter to Rice confirming receipt of her personal payment of $22,943.81, which finalized her transfer to the Pension Plan effective April 1, 2017. Resp. Ex. 8. Less than a year later, on March 17, 2018, Rice passed away unexpectedly. Her death certificate listed a pulmonary embolism as the primary cause of death. Pet. Ex. 8.6 Rice did not have at least eight years of service credit in FRS at the time of her passing. After her mother's passing, Hernandez was contacted by the FRS guidance line to discuss the process and survivor benefits related to the Pension Plan.7 Naturally, Hernandez was shocked and dismayed when the representative informed her that she was only entitled to the total contributions her mother made while she was working and in the Pension Plan. He also regrettably informed Hernandez that she was not entitled to recover the buy-in costs paid by her mother, nor was she entitled to the balance she had in the Investment Plan when the transfer was made. During this telephone discussion, Hernandez lamented that she and her mother had made the decision together to transfer her from one plan to the other. On June 28, 2018, the Department sent a formal letter to Rice's daughter, Hernandez, acknowledging her mother's death and notifying her that since her mother did not have eight years of service, the benefit available to Hernandez was limited to a refund of retirement contributions in the amount of $2,654.17. Resp. Ex. 9. At Hernandez's request, the Department manually calculated the amount Rice paid into the FRS. When Rice transferred to the Pension Plan, the Department's system, which is called the Integrative Retirement Information System ("IRIS"), only showed the accumulation of the contributions that she paid into the Pension Plan after the transfer, since her contributions in the Investment Plan had already been liquidated for the transfer. Resp. Ex. 1. 6 The cause of her death is mentioned primarily to show that her death was unexpected. The undersigned infers from the evidence, particularly the CD recordings, that Rice had no forewarning or suspicions regarding her health when she made the transfer. 7 The date of this phone call is not in the record. Kathy Gould ("Gould"), the Department's Bureau Chief of Retirement Calculations, testified that the manual calculation revealed that a total of $16,042.58 was contributed by Rice since her participation began in the FRS. Based on the calculations and figures provided, her total contributions had two components: (1) $13,388.41 while Rice was in the Investment Plan and (2) $2,654.17 while Rice was in the Pension Plan. In addition to a return of these sums, Petitioner also seeks the return or refund of the "buy in" fee--$22,943.81--Rice paid to transfer to the Pension Plan. Testimony of Kathy Gould Gould's team handles the calculation of costs involved with transfers from the Investment Plan to the Pension Plan. She testified that there are two plans under the FRS, the Pension Plan and the Investment Plan. At all times related to Rice's tenure under the FRS, the funds for the FRS retirement plans came from employer and employee contributions. Employee contributions are currently three percent of salary. In the Pension Plan a member vests after eight years of service. If a member dies before the member vests, it was her position that the beneficiary would be eligible to receive the accumulated contributions. She referred to the applicable statute, section 121.091(7), Florida Statutes. Conversely, the State Board of Administration administers the Investment plan, and is separate from Respondent. A member vests after only one year in the Investment plan. Exhibit 1 was a screenshot of Rice's profile in the IRIS. This is a computer database that contains the Department's membership information. Rice's total employee balance as reflected in Respondent's Exhibit 1 was $2,654.17. This includes only Rice's payroll contributions while a member of the Pension Plan. Rice's "personal payment" to buy into the Pension Plan was $22,943.81. Gould explained that if a member of the Investment Plan left after only five months, the member would be entitled to receive the employee's contributions only. Tr. pp. 55-56. This would not include the employer's contributions. After one year, an employee is fully vested in the Investment Plan and would be entitled to all contributions made, both employee and employer, if employment was terminated while still in the Investment Plan. The payment that Rice made to buy into the Pension Plan was in the form of a personal check, not a deduction from her payroll. Respondent's Exhibit 21 is an email Gould prepared for the Department's legal counsel. Gould analyzed Rice's reported salaries while she was a member of the Investment Plan and multiplied them by three percent to provide the total amount that Rice had paid into both plans. This totaled $16,042.58. This was the amount from Rice's first payroll through her last payroll while in the FRS. The amount was the total of both the Investment Plan and the Pension Plan. Gould admitted that there are essentially two types of contributions into the FRS, employer contributions and employee contributions. She acknowledged that the $22,943.81 Rice paid to transfer to the Pension Plan was not an employer contribution. Rice was not in the Investment Plan when she died. When she died, Rice was participating in the Pension Plan. As a result, Gould admitted that the state would pay out any benefits utilizing the statutes relating to the Pension Plan. The calculation of the buy-in amount performed by the Department in Rice's case was done on the "calculator" provided by their actuary, Milliman. Testimony of Matthew Richard Larrabee Matthew Larrabee ("Larrabee") was called by the Department. He is a pension actuary with Milliman and specializes in governmental pension plans. He discussed the Department's use of a "calculator" that is designed by Milliman. It is provided and created to allow agency staff to determine actuarial pension calculations without relying upon a certified actuary. The actuarial accrued liability ("AAL") determined by the calculator, establishes the "buy-in" or purchase price for a member that chooses to transfer from the Investment Plan to the Pension Plan. The components of the buy-in cost to transfer from the Investment Plan into the Pension Plan consist primarily of the projected monthly annuity amount, the state multiplier percentage for the employee's position, the years of service, and the member's pay level. There is also an assumption of projected pay increases and the life expectancy of the member. Age is also a factor in the formula. The funds collected and related to the transfer into the Pension Plan are deposited into a commingled, legally restricted pension trust. Respondent's Exhibits 4, 5, and 6 were prepared by the Department's staff at different date intervals using the Milliman calculator. These exhibits represent output sheets produced by the calculator, which was developed by Milliman under Larrabee's supervision. The sheets are accurate. They show different actuarial accrued liability amounts based, in part, on age.8 The final calculation in Respondent's Exhibit 6 is for a transfer date of April 2017 for Rice. The calculated actuarial accrued liability was $58,366.00. Larrabee explained that this calculation is a sound estimation or valuation of the financial present value of the total future retirement benefits for a given member--in this case, Rice. 8 Different dates are notated on the calculator sheets based on differing dates being considered for the effective transfer date by Rice when the individual sheet was run. The actuarial accrued liability calculation and resulting "buy in" amount is premised on the fact that the actuaries do not take into account a potential refund feature, such as the return of funds sought by Hernandez.9 Larrabee went on to explain that if potential refunds, such as those requested by Hernandez, were accounted for in the actuarial calculations, the cost to "buy in" would only be "modestly higher." This is because the mortality rates for people like Rice in their 50's or 60's are "quite low." As a result, the added costs to cover such an infrequent contingency, if that were an option, "would be low." Allison Olson Allison Olson ("Olson") is the Director of Policy, Risk Management and Compliance for the State Board of Administration ("SBA"). Her duties include the review and determination of compliance with contracts and policies by outside vendors for the FRS Investment Plan. She also reviews complaints that are received from Investment Plan members. The Investment Plan is a defined contribution plan, similar to a traditional 401(k). The SBA is a separate agency from the Department. A member has an option of making an election, as part of their initial choice, to be a member of the Investment Plan. Vesting for the Investment Plan occurs after one year of service. Then the member owns the contributions in their account. Under the Investment Plan, each account is funded by employer contributions as well as a mandatory three percent monthly employee contribution. Members in the FRS with questions about their accounts may consult with representatives on a financial guidance line managed by the SBA vendor.10 9 No evidence was offered to explain why this type of feature was not built into the actuarial calculation, or why it was not offered as an option to potential transferees. 10 As previously noted, Rice took advantage of this service on numerous occasions. The Department offered into evidence Respondent's Exhibit 14, an FRS Investment Plan Summary Plan Description (sometimes referred to as an "SPD"). However, this SPD was not issued until July 2018. Because it was issued after Rice passed away and there was no proof she ever received it or a prior version, it was excluded as evidence and not considered based on the objection of Petitioner.11 Garry Green Gary Green ("Green") is the Chief of Research and Education for Respondent. He handles the administrative aspects of the actuarial contract and services provided by Milliman. The liquidation of an investment plan account is the sale of all assets that the member has in the account. It includes all money, both employer and employee contributions. After applying to transfer from one plan to another, an employee has 60 days to "roll in" her "buy in" money, or to cancel the transfer. The money a member pays to buy-in to the Pension Plan, is deposited into the pension trust fund with all the other assets of the trust fund. His view was that if the member is not vested in the Pension Plan, the contributions used to "buy in" are not refundable. Respondent's Exhibit 6 calculates the actuarial accrued liability of $58,366.00. It is a calculation of the total cost to buy in to the Pension Plan. He explained that it is not a statement of the liquidated assets from Rice's Investment Plan or any funds owed to Rice. 11 It should be noted that, aside from notices she received in the enrollment forms she signed or guidance from FRS guidance line representatives, there was no proof presented by Respondent that any of the mandatory educational components required by section 121.4501(10)(a)-(g), Florida Statutes, entitled "Education Components," were complied with, or offered to Rice. This is particularly significant in this case since material "must be prepared under the assumption that the employee is an unsophisticated investor." § 121.4501(10)(e), Fla. Stat. Additional Facts Established by Discovery Petitioner's Exhibits 9-1 and 9-2 establish that Rice contributed $16,042.58 in employee contributions into the FRS. $2,654.17 was into the Pension Plan and $13,338.41 was while Rice was a member of the Investment Plan. The Department admitted that Rice paid $22,943.81 of her personal funds on or before June 6, 2017, to transfer from the Investment Plan to the Pension Plan. Request for Admission No. 19. The Department admitted that Petitioner is entitled to receive $2,654.17, the amount of contributions after Rice was in the Pension Plan. Request for Admission No. 21. The Department admitted that it received the Order of Summary Administration and Death Certificate. Requests for Admission Nos. 25 and 26. The Department admitted that Rice contributed at least $13,388.41 into the Investment Plan. Request for Admission No. 29.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that the Department of Management Services, Division of Retirement, pay to Rebecca Hernandez, Darlene Rice's daughter and beneficiary, the sums of $2,654.17, $13,388.41, and $22,943.81, totaling $38,986.39, plus the appropriate statutory rates of interest which have accrued from October 2, 2018, the date of the circuit court's Order of Summary Administration, to the date of payment. DONE AND ENTERED this 21st day of September, 2020, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S ROBERT L. KILBRIDE Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 21st day of September, 2020. COPIES FURNISHED: Gayla Grant, Esquire Department of Management Services 4050 Esplanade Way, Suite 160 Tallahassee, Florida 32399 (eServed) Larry Allan Karns, Esquire Spink, Shrouder & Karns, P.A. 9700 Griffin Road Cooper City, Florida 33328 (eServed) Nikita S. Parker, Esquire Department of Management Services 4050 Esplanade Way, Suite 160 Tallahassee, Florida 32399 (eServed) David DiSalvo, Director Division of Retirement Department of Management Services Post Office Box 9000 Tallahassee, Florida 32315-9000 (eServed) William Chorba, General Counsel Office of the General Counsel Department of Management Services 4050 Esplanade Way, Suite 160 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0950 (eServed)
The Issue The issues are whether any Petitioner has proved by clear and convincing evidence that he timely submitted a request to purchase "Additional Accrual Service" (AAS) credit to the Board of Trustees (Board) of the City of Hallandale Beach Police Officers' and Firefighters' Pension Plan (Plan) in writing or at a public meeting and whether the Board prohibited such Petitioner from purchasing the requested AAS credit.
Findings Of Fact At all material times, Respondent has maintained city police and fire departments.3 Respondent sponsors the Plan to provide defined benefits, mostly on retirement, to members of the Plan, who are current and former city police officers and firefighters. Respondent primarily documents the Plan in ordinances that it enacts from time to time--as relevant in this case, in 2008 and 2011.4 Changes to the Plan may result from negotiations between Respondent and the police and firefighters unions, and the collective bargaining agreement may document the new provision until it is enacted by ordinance. The relevant agreement is the Collective Bargaining Agreement between Respondent and the Hallandale Beach Professional Fire Fighters Metro Broward Local 3080 District 10 for October 1, 2005 through September 30, 2008, as executed on October 3, 2006 (CBA).5 The Plan and the funds associated with the Plan are "under the exclusive administration and management" of the Board.6 The "responsibility for the proper effective operation of the … Plan and for making[7] the provisions of this Ordinance is vested in [the] Board."8 The 3 Subsequent to the timeframe at issue, the city fire department merged with the Broward County fire department. 4 For most of the time in question, the relevant Plan was documented in City of Hallandale Beach Ord. Nos. 2008-29 and 2011-11. Provisions material to this case were unchanged in the 2011 ordinance. References to the "Plan" are to the 2011 ordinance due to its superior formatting and ease of use. All references to "section" or "§," such as "section 8.08," are to the Plan, as codified by the ordinance, unless the reference is to Florida Statutes. 5 Presumably, Respondent negotiated identical language in the collective bargaining agreement with the police union, but this contract is not part of the record. 6 § 2.01. 7 "Making" probably means "implementing," because Respondent, not the Board, "makes" or enacts ordinances. 8 § 3.01. Board consists of one trustee elected by the police, one trustee elected by the firefighters, two trustees appointed by Respondent, and a fifth trustee, who is selected by the other four trustees and appointed by Respondent.9 The Plan authorizes the Board "to take such action as may be necessary to carry out the provisions of the Plan and all decisions of the Board … , made in good faith, … shall be final, binding and conclusive on all parties."10 The Board may "establish and maintain communication with [Respondent's] departments and other agencies of government as is necessary for the management of the … Plan," but the Board must "determine all questions relating to and process all applications for … benefits."11 However, "[i]f an action of the Board has an impact on [Respondent's] contribution the action must be approved by the City Commission. [Respondent] retains the right to obtain independent actuarial services to determine financial impact." Despite this exception to the Board's administrative authority, only the Board, not Respondent, is a fiduciary of the Plan, so as to be subject to the obligation "to discharge its responsibilities solely in the interest of the members and beneficiaries of the Plan for the exclusive purpose of providing benefits to the members and their beneficiaries and to defray the reasonable expenses of the Plan."12 As authorized by the Plan,13 the Board retained, at all material times, the services of independent counsel, actuarial firms, and pension services 9 § 3.02. See also §§ 175.061(1)(b)2.; 185.05(1)(b)2., Fla. Stat. Chapter 175 applies to a city pension plan for firefighters, and chapter 185 applies to a city pension plan for police officers. 10 § 3.09. 11 § 3.11(f) and (g). 12 § 3.10. This section continues: "The [Board] shall exercise those fiduciary responsibilities with the care, skill, prudence and diligence under the circumstances then prevailing that a prudent person acting in a like capacity and familiar with such matters would use in the conduct of an enterprise of a similar character and with similar aims." 13 § 3.12. companies to assist in the administration of the Plan. Board counsel and a representative of the pension services company routinely attended Board meetings. The Plan's primary retirement benefit, which is payable for the remaining life of the member, but not less than ten years,14 is based on a formula that, for a vested member,15 multiplies the member's final average compensation by the member's credited years of service by the applicable annual accrual rate, which is typically 3.2%.16 For instance, the lifetime benefit payable to a member earning annual compensation of $50,000 with 20 years of service at an accrual rate of 3.2% would be $32,000 annually or $2667 monthly.17 The Plan's funding is more complicated and requires the services of an actuary to calculate the assets and liabilities of the Plan, which are held by a trust.18 For a fully funded plan providing a defined benefit, the assets--the 14 § 6.04. 15 The vesting period for the Plan is generally ten years. §§ 1.31, 1.32, and 8.01. 16 § 6.02. 17 The annual benefit is the product of $50,000 x 20 x .032. 18 For an excellent discussion of the responsibilities of an actuary in determining the proper funding of a pension plan, see Vinson & Elkins v. Comm'r of Int. Rev., 99 T.C. 9, 15-16 (1992), which cites the following legislative history concerning the treatment of actuaries in The Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974: In estimating pension costs, actuaries must make assumptions (“actuarial assumptions”) about a number of future events, such as the rate of return on investments (“interest”), employees' future earnings, and employee mortality and turnover. Actuaries also must choose from a number of methods to calculate future plan liabilities. The amounts required to fund any given pension plan can vary significantly according to the mix of these actuarial assumptions and methods. As a result, the assumptions and methods used by actuaries are basic to the application of minimum funding standards for defined benefit pension plans. [citations omitted] contributions of the plan sponsor; the contributions of members; for a local pension plan for police officers and firefighters, the plan's share of state excise taxes that are imposed on insurers19 or local excise taxes that may be imposed on local insurance premiums;20 forfeitures, usually of the sponsor's contributions on behalf of members whose service terminated prior to vesting;21 and the expected investment returns on these contributions and forfeitures, from receipt until payout--will provide adequate funds for the plan's trust to pay all liabilities, or benefits, when due. The benefits include projections and estimates of how many members will become vested; the retirement benefits due based on the members' final compensation levels, years of service, and form of benefit--disability, early retirement, normal retirement, and enhanced retirement benefits, such as from additional accrual rate or additional years of service; and the remaining life expectancies of members when they start receiving retirement benefits.22 19 §§ 175.1215 and 185.105, Fla. Stat. 20 §§ 175.101 and 185.08, Fla. Stat. 21 The Plan seems to preclude a forfeiture of the sponsor's contributions on behalf of even an unvested member. Section 8.03 provides that "[e]very member shall have the right to receive, in lieu of all benefits under the plan, a return of the member's accumulated contributions." If the member terminates with less than five years' service, the member is entitled "to a return of the contributions" without interest. If the member terminates with more than five years' service and elects a lump-sum "return of contributions," the member receives interest. Section 1.01 defines "accumulated contributions" as "the sum of all amounts deducted from a member's compensation or picked up on behalf of a member." Section 4.01 states that Respondent "shall pick-up, rather than deduct from each member's pay," specified percentages of pensionable earnings, so the pick-up amount appears to be Respondent's contribution on behalf of a member. As discussed below, this case presents another category of forfeitures--members' payments for additional accrual rate that cannot be applied due to insufficient years of service at the time of retirement. 22 See, e.g., Vinson & Elkins, 99 T.C. at 13 ("The amount estimated to fund a defined benefit plan is calculated by the plan's actuary and is determined based upon actuarial assumptions about a number of future events, such as rates of return on investments, the benefit commencement date, future earnings, and member mortality, among other things."). This case involves an optional enhanced retirement benefit in the form of additional accrual rate. As noted below, eligible members have previously been able to purchase additional accrual rate, but this case concerns a pricing change that went into effect for police officers hired after January 1, 2006, and firefighters hired after January 1, 2007.23 Section 8.08 authorizes such persons to purchase up to five years' additional accrual rate--so as to add 3.2% accrual rate to the Plan's 3.2% accrual rate, for a total 6.4% accrual rate--for each year of service that the member completes from his or her 16th through 20th years of service or, if fewer than five years' accrual rate is purchased, for the purchased number of years constituting the final years of service within the 16th through 20th years of service.24 Taking the example in paragraph 6, if a member purchased five years' additional accrual rate and retired with 20 years of service, the benefit would be $40,000 annually or $3333 monthly.25 In this illustration, the enhanced retirement benefit would increase the member's monthly benefit by $666 and would produce a retirement benefit, at 20 years' service, that would be the equivalent of the retirement benefit, at 25 years' service, without the additional accrual rate purchase.26 23 The difference of one year reflects the one-year difference in the commencement date of each union's collective bargaining agreement. 24 Section 8.08 does not so clearly limit the member purchasing fewer than five years' additional accrual rate to the corresponding number of years in the member's 16th through 20th years of service, but the parties seem to share this interpretation. Thus, it appears that a member purchasing three years' additional accrual rate would be required to apply the additional rate to the member's 18th through 20th years of service. 25 The 3.2% accrual rate for the first 15 years at $50,000 would produce an annual benefit of $24,000, and the 6.4% accrual rate for the final five years at $50,000 would produce an annual benefit of $16,000. 26 The total annual benefit of $40,000, as calculated in the preceding footnote illustrating the effect of five years' additional accrual rate, is identical to the total annual benefit of a 3.2% accrual rate for 25 years at $50,000. Section 8.08 imposes three conditions on the purchase of additional accrual rate. The member must have been employed as a police officer or firefighter with Respondent for at least one year, the member "must exercise this option within [90] days after completion of probation," and the member "shall contribute the full actuarial cost of the benefit for each of year enhanced multiplier purchased," which the member may pay over ten years or prior to entry into DROP,27 whichever occurs first. During the time in question, it appears that probation ran one year from the date of hire. Section 8.07 authorizes an eligible member to purchase additional years of service based on prior years of service with certain employers, such as the military or other law enforcement agencies. Section 8.07 limits this "buyback" of prior service to four years' qualifying service and requires a member to pay 8.4% of the member's current annual compensation for each year of prior service purchased. Section 8.07 allows a member five years to pay the purchase price and limits a member to the purchase of no more than a total of five years' additional accrual rate and additional years of service. Nomenclature problems render some of the minutes of Board meetings discussed below difficult to understand. The problem starts with "AAS," which misleadingly refers to "service," not rate, so as to encourage the reference to the purchase of additional accrual "rate" as the purchase of "service," which properly applies only to the purchase of additional years of service. The confusion is compounded by the use of the term, "buyback" to apply to the purchase of additional accrual rate, as well as to the purchase of additional years of service. The sense of reacquisition in the term, "buyback" limits its use to the purchase of additional years of service, because a member is not reacquiring anything when she purchases additional accrual rate. The Plan appropriately describes the purchase of additional years of service as a "buyback," but does not use this term to describe the purchase of 27 DROP is the Deferred Retirement Option Program. additional accrual rate, although the Plan elsewhere uses "buyback" to refer to the purchase of both additional years of service and additional accrual rate.28 Distinguishing between these two enhanced benefits was less important for police officers hired on or before January 1, 2006, and firefighters hired on or before January 1, 2007. For them, each year of additional accrual rate cost 8.4% of compensation and payment of the purchase price was limited to five years--the same terms that applied and apply to the purchase of each year of additional service. Another common feature between the two optional benefits is their monetary value to the member. At all material times, for identically situated members, the purchase of an additional year of accrual rate has resulted in the same increased benefit as the purchase of an additional year of service.29 Respondent introduced the 2005 and 2006 changes to end its subsidy of members' purchases of additional accrual rate,30 but obviously chose not to end its subsidy of members' purchases of additional years of service--an option that is obviously available only to new hires with qualifying past employment. Calculating the full actuarial cost of additional accrual rate should not have been inordinately difficult. Compensation levels for the members would have been relatively easy to project due to the nature of their 28 § 1.01 ("Accumulated contributions shall … include buy-back amounts paid under sections 8.07 and 8.08."). 29 Assume that the members are the same age, retire on the same date with 20 years of service, commence benefits at retirement, and earned $50,000 at all times during employment with Respondent. As noted above, the annual retirement benefit for such a member who did not purchase additional accrual rate or additional years of service would be $32,000. The purchase of one year of additional accrual rate would raise the member's annual retirement benefit to $33,600: ($50,000 x 19 years x .032) + ($50,000 x 1 year x .064). The purchase of one year of additional year of service also would raise the member's annual retirement benefit to $33,600: ($50,000 x 21 x .032). 30 Minutes of Board meeting on Aug. 27, 2007. employment with expected raises based mostly on years of service. Normal retirement under the Plan is the earlier of 25 years of service or 52 years of age with at least ten years of service, and there is no mandatory retirement age.31 A member's age at retirement would not have been difficult to project due to the necessity that, for additional accrual rate, a member must work at least through her 16th through 20th years of service and the knowledge of the age of a member at the time of her employment. A member's age at retirement is especially important because a lifetime enhanced monthly benefit of, say, $666 is far more costly to the Plan, for a member who is 52 years old at retirement than for a member who is 70 years old at retirement, given the large difference in remaining life expectancies between these two retirees. With this information, coupled with standard mortality tables and an assumed investment return, an actuary could readily determine the sum required to support the enhanced monthly benefit payment. Estimating the contribution required to generate the sum determined in the preceding paragraph also should have been straightforward. If a member paid the contribution in a lump sum, the main task would be settling upon a reasonable investment return from the contribution until payout, more than 19 years later. If a member paid the contribution by installments over ten years, the investment return would apply to each payment, upon receipt, as payments made in the first year would produce more total investment return than payments made in the tenth year. As detailed below, two issues emerged that interfered with the rollout of the revisions to the purchase of additional accrual rate. The first issue, which was first seen in April 2007, was whether a vested member forfeited her payment or payments if she retired prior to the 16th through 20th years of service. If a member forfeits her payment or payments, an actuary could 31 § 6.01. consider projected forfeitures in calculating the full actuarial cost of the additional accrual rate purchase; this would lower the cost to a member, whose enhanced benefit would be partly paid by such forfeitures. This issue may have been more theoretical, unless the Plan had had sufficient experience with such forfeitures to allow an actuarial assumption as to the amount that would be forfeited over a specific interval. In any event, Plan provisions clearly would have supported the Board's determination that such forfeitures were not permitted by the Plan.32 The second issue, with which the Board wrestled from at least September 200833 through February 2009,34 is whether a member who pays the full actuarial cost by installments must pay interest on the installments. This issue raises questions about the communications between the Board and its actuaries,35 who, if asked, should have promptly advised the Board that their actuarial calculations already captured the time value of money, so as to dispense with the necessity of charging interest.36 32 See footnote 21. 33 Minutes of Board meeting on Sept. 8, 2008. 34 Minutes of Board meeting on Feb. 23, 2009. 35 A couple of years later, relations between the Board and its actuaries were decidedly suboptimal when the actuary informed the Board that his firm would require an additional $100 per calculation of the full actuarial cost of additional accrual rate, the Board told the actuary that his firm needed to live up to its contract, a motion to approve the fee increase died for lack of a second, and the actuary told the Board that the firm would resign, if the Board failed to approve the fee increase. Minutes of Board meeting on Oct. 10, 2011. 36 This assumes that Respondent or the trust did not effectively lend the purchase price to the member--perhaps, to simplify the actuarial calculations--and, if not, that the actuaries made some attempt at pricing the full actuarial cost based on how long the trust held each installment payment. Because the full actuarial costs reflects the amount necessary to produce the defined benefit, the member who pays over ten years already will pay more than the member who pays in a lump sum at the time of purchase; the former's final year's installment payments will support investment return for nine fewer years than any payments in the year of purchase. Charging interest on deferred payments would have imposed duplicative exactions upon the member. Nevertheless, the available minutes do not document how the Board resolved this issue. Given one year's probation for new hires, the above-described changes to Section 8.08 would have applied to police officers starting in 2007 and firefighters starting in 2008. Although Respondent did not enact the first ordinance with these changes until 2008, the operative language had been incorporated into the CBA, which adequately captures the new provisions governing additional accrual rate purchases, so as to permit immediate implementation. The CBA provides: For employees hired after 01/01/2007, modify the Additional Accrual Service (AAS) Buyback percent the employee pays from 8.4% to the actual actuarial cost of the benefit and allow the member to pay for this in 10 years instead of 5 years. Effective 11/01/2006, continue the current prior service credit buyback provision … .[37] The record contains no minutes for Board meetings prior to 2007, but, in minutes of a meeting in early January 2007, the Board recognized that it could not provide a member with the purchase price of additional accrual rate until an actuary calculated the full actuarial cost.38 This was a good start. The next month's Board meeting, though, provided evidence of poor communications with the actuaries on the crucial issue of Plan provisions. In February 2007, an actuary performing an audit of the trust fund complained that the Plan was unclear in its treatment of the "buyback [of] service," and he could not reconcile his determination of the present value of benefits with the same determination by another actuary, who had a different interpretation of this buyback provision. Due to confused use of nomenclature, as described above, it is unclear whether this complaint pertained to additional accrual rate, additional years of service, or both 37 Coyle Ex. 11, Bates Stamp, p. 296. 38 Minutes of Board meeting on Jan. 8, 2007. optional benefits, but, given the recent change as to the accrual rate, it likely pertained to the optional benefit at issue in this case. The response of the Board's counsel was not to refer the actuary to language in the ordinance or a collective bargaining agreement, but to a recommended clarification of the "service buyback" within the Summary Plan Description,39 which, as the name implies, is intended to be merely a synopsis of provisions in the operative Plan, not a source of Plan provisions.40 In a Board meeting in April 2007, a Board trustee asked whether a vested member who terminated service was entitled to a refund of the member's contributions as part of a "five year buyback," which likely referred to the additional accrual rate purchase, as a member may purchase five years of that optional benefit, but only four years of additional years of service. Construing the question to pertain to the purchase of additional accrual rate, Board counsel referred to a Draft Summary Plan Description from October 2006 that provided clearly that such contributions were forfeited if a member elected to receive a retirement benefit prior to the completion of the 16th through 20th years of service, but member contributions were not forfeited if the member elected to receive a refund of all contributions instead of a pension benefit.41 Rather than accept this substantive guidance or argue for a different policy, another Board trustee 39 Minutes of Board meeting on Feb. 26, 2007. 40 Nor may a collective bargaining agreement have been the sole alternative source of important Plan provisions. On one occasion, the minutes state that an important provision regarding DROP was addressed only in "a contract"--presumably, a collective bargaining agreement--not in any "ordinance," and Mr. Antonio suggested that Respondent and the union enter into a "letter of understanding" on the matter. Minutes of Board meeting of Oct. 15, 2007. 41 Neither the Draft Summary Plan Description nor any written opinion of Board counsel is part of the record. It seems odd that a vested member would not receive a refund of her payments, but an unvested member would. See footnote 22. The last sentence of section 1.01, which defines the "accumulated contributions" that are to be returned to a member, states: "Accumulated contributions shall also include buy-back amounts paid under sections 8.07 and 8.08." responded that Respondent had never adopted this Draft Summary Plan Description. The discussion ended, and the forfeiture issue remained unresolved for an extended period of time, even though Board counsel had provided the Board with an unequivocal opinion that a vested member forfeited her payments, and the implementation of this opinion would not have impacted--i.e., increased--Respondent's contribution, as addressed in Section 3.16. The Board's nondecision on forfeitures deprived the actuaries of important information needed to price the full actuarial cost of additional accrual rate purchased. Poor communications with the actuaries may have resulted from direct communications that they received, not from Board representatives, but from representatives of Respondent. At times during the hearing, Petitioners' witnesses described how well the Plan was administered when Respondent's employee, Marc Antonio, was available to prepare cost worksheets for the optional benefits and help new hires complete their applications. In 2007, Mr. Antonio was an assistant City manager; by August 24, 2009, he was in the Finance Department. But Mr. Antonio was still regularly attending Board meetings during the period that the full actuarial cost was in effect, and neither he nor the Board was able to provide this information to interested members. The record does not reveal whether Mr. Antonio contributed to confusion among the actuaries. However, another employee of Respondent did. According to Board minutes in 2018, Mr. Cowley recalled speaking ten years earlier to a former human resources director who had become active in Plan business. Mr. Cowley mentioned to the director the need of the Board to be able to present full actuarial costs to members seeking to purchase additional accrual rate, but any deadlines for producing this information "kept getting pushed back." A Board trustee familiar with the director added that he had "always deferred sharing the specifics of the buyback procedures and had trouble conveying the information to the actuary."42 Nevertheless, in early 2007, the actuaries began to develop a method to calculate the full actuarial cost of the purchase of additional accrual rate. Minutes of a Board meeting on August 27, 2007, reveal that, at the previous month's meeting, the Board had been presented with a draft ordinance, perhaps of the Plan or at least Section 8.08, as well as "buy-back tables" that appear to pertain to the purchase of additional accrual rate for a member who retired at age 52. An actuary referred to these tables as applicable to members purchasing "additional service," but these comments pertain to the purchase of additional accrual rate. Mr. Antonio replied that the "dynamic created by eligibility makes the cost very difficult to … estimate,"43 perhaps accurately commenting on the impact of the member's age at retirement on the full actuarial cost of the optional benefit. The actuary asked that each member seeking to purchase additional accrual rate be required to submit an application. At the time a Board trustee, Mr. Cowley asked for the chart as a guide for all members, even though the chart would overstate the cost for older members at retirement. Mr. Antonio seemed to discourage the broader use of a chart designed for a 52-year-old retiree, but incorrectly explained that, while he thought the chart would be accurate, the benefit and cost could be difficult to explain to members--obviously true if someone tried to explain the cost to a 65-year-old retiree based on a chart prepared for a 52-year-old retiree. The actuary said that she would expand the chart to include older members at retirement, and the Board agreed that members older than the oldest age used in the revised chart would apply for an individual calculation of the full actuarial cost. Mr. Antonio concluded the discussion by saying that he 42 Minutes of Board meeting on Nov. 26, 2018. 43 Minutes of Board meeting on Aug. 27, 2007. wanted "the chart" to be a fixed cost to members with Respondent bearing the financial burden of what he termed, "minor variations in experience." It seems as though Mr. Antonio was referring to the relatively minor cost of preparing a chart, rather than to a directive that the full actuarial cost disregard the age of the retiree--as before, at the expense of Respondent. The actuaries expended considerable time preparing the age-based "Buy Back Tables,"44 and the work proved to be much more difficult than they had initially expected. During a Board meeting in October 2007, the actuary, by letter, asked the Board to approve an increase in actuarial fees for this service from the quoted $2500 to $3000 to $19,424 for 89 hours of work already completed. The letter explained that "the unusual nature of the Plan's buyback provision" had necessitated "much more extensive testing than is required for other plans." Even though this optional benefit should have been rolled out for police officers months earlier, the Board deferred action on the request.45 These are all of the minutes of Board meetings in 2007 that are in the record. For all of 2007, the development of the full actuarial cost of additional accrual rate purchase indisputably remained a work in progress. Regardless, Respondent contends, in derogation of the Board's minutes, that an interested member could, in late 2007, obtain the full actuarial cost of additional accrual rate. In support of this fanciful contention, Respondent produced four exhibits. Respondent Exhibits 1 through 3 purport to be worksheets showing the calculation of the full actuarial cost of additional accrual rate purchased 44 If Mr. Antonio's "fixed cost" reply ended the investigation into charging the full actuarial cost for the purchase of additional service years, this reference to "Buy Back Tables" is to the purchase of additional accrual rate. Otherwise, the tables might pertain to the purchase of additional accrual rate and additional years of service. 45 Minutes of Board meeting on Oct. 15, 2007. by three police officers: John Cameron,46 Marco McAdam,47 and Victor Lynch,48 respectively. In each case, the worksheet indicates that the member had completed probation less than 90 days earlier. The Cameron and McAdam worksheets depict four years' additional service and one year's additional accrual rate, and the Lynch worksheet depicts five years' additional accrual rate. There is no evidence about the authorship of these worksheets or, for the Cameron and McAdam worksheets, that the members were able to purchase the service and rate credit at the prices quoted. Respondent Exhibits 1 and 2 are thus entitled to no weight. By contrast, the Lynch worksheet is supported by Respondent Exhibit 4, which is documentation of actual payroll deductions. Both documents are consistent, showing a total cost of $55,840.50, 260 payroll deductions of $214.77 each, and a start date of October 15, 2007. However, Respondent Exhibits 3 and 4 do not support Respondent's claim that, in the fall of 2007, members were able to obtain the full actuarial cost of additional accrual rate purchases, and, if they failed to do so, it was due to a lack of interest in this optional benefit. Given the timing of the Lynch worksheet and the request of the actuary for Board approval of fees over six times higher than the actuary had quoted for working up the full actuarial cost, the Lynch worksheet likely was a prototype that the actuary prepared in trying to develop a method for calculating full actuarial costs. Noticeably missing from the record is any indication that the calculations for the prototype Lynch worksheet proved reliable or the workup could be used for other members. Judging from the absence of Board-approved purchases the 46 Resp. Ex. 1. 47 Resp. Ex. 2. 48 Resp. Ex. 3. following year, either the Lynch calculations were unreliable or at least premature. Minutes of a Board meeting years later, in November 2018, address the Lynch worksheet. In this meeting, Mr. Dodea told Petitioner Roccisano that Mr. Dodea had found one early calculation of full actuarial cost--a calculation done by actuary, Chad Little, in 2008 for Victor Lynch, which the Board had approved. It seems that Mr. Dodea was off by one year in his description of Respondent Exhibit 3. Aptly, Petitioner Roccisano replied that all that this proved is that Mr. Lynch had found a "different channel" by which to obtain a calculation of the full actuarial cost of his purchase of additional accrual rate.49 The minutes of the Board meeting in January 2008 revealed progress in the preparation of an age chart for determining the full actuarial cost of additional accrual rate for a span of ages at retirement. The Board agreed that any member over the ages shown on the chart should receive an individual calculation.50 The next Board meeting for which minutes are available took place in August 2008, and they confirm that, besides Mr. Lynch, no one had obtained the full actuarial cost of additional accrual rate, so as to be able to make an informed purchase decision. An actuary stated that he would charge $600 for each such "buyback" calculation. Told that members had been waiting "for over a year" for an estimate of the full actuarial cost of a purchase of additional accrual rate, the Board agreed to send the information for these members to the actuary for calculations of their purchase prices. The motion 49 These minutes suggest that, contrary to Mr. Dodea's testimony (Tr., pp. 598, 601), he did not discover the Lynch worksheet on the day prior to the last day of the hearing, but, at best, he "rediscovered" it at that time. Given the treatment of the Lynch worksheet, Respondent's failure to disclose the existence of this exhibit in a more timely fashion is immaterial. 50 Minutes of Board meeting on Jan. 14, 2008. that passed specifically approved sending the information for members who "are past their one year anniversary since 9/30/06 through 9/30/08."51 In September 2008, a Board trustee raised the issue of interest on installment payments for "buyback purchases" and stated that the installment payments must not impact the trust assets. "Buyback purchases" may refer to the purchase of additional accrual rate, additional years of service, or both. Interest on the purchase of additional years of service makes sense, because 8.4% per year purchased does not seem to reflect the time value of money. Again, the full actuarial cost of additional accrual rate purchased should reflect the time value of money, although nothing in the record clearly confirms that actuaries calculated a considerably higher full actuarial cost for installment payments than for a lump sum.52 This issue should have been resolved at this time--ideally based on the approach of the actuary calculating the full actuarial cost, but practically with a decision either to charge interest or not to charge interest. Instead, as detailed below, this issue lingered, unresolved, until February 2009. The same Board trustee raised the forfeiture issue by suggesting that members be allowed to obtain a refund of their payments toward additional accrual rate, presumably if they were unable to qualify for the rate due to insufficient years of service. The minutes state: "The City does not agree, 51 Minutes of Board meeting on Aug. 11, 2008. 52 Nine years later, in 2017, an actuarial letter prepared for Petitioner Manny Gonzalez alludes to this issue. Coyle Ex. 1, Bates Stamp, p. 5. The letter quotes nearly $80,000 as the cost of five years' additional accrual rate for retirement benefits commencing 11 years later. Given that the full actuarial cost likely approximated Mr. Gonzalez's annual salary, the letter unrealistically "recommend[s] … payment … be made as a lump sum within six months of the request." This seems like wishful thinking by the actuary, but was it to spare the actuary the task of recalculating the full actuarial cost if paid over ten years, running a simple installment payment plan with interest, running a simple installment payment plan without interest (and ignoring the time value of money), or avoiding the interest issue with Respondent? until they can resolve a separate issue related to interest on buyback payments over time." This quote marks the end of a documented, evidently brief discussion about interest and forfeitures--over one-and-one-half years after the Board initially referred the matter to its actuaries. The Board does not explicitly defer to Respondent's objection to refunds and claim that it must resolve the interest issue, but, characteristically, the Board took no action. At this point, both of these issues were overripe for resolution,53 and the Board's failure to proceed appears at least partly attributable to Respondent's refusal to agree--even though, two years earlier, Respondent had completed its relevant work when it incorporated the change, in implementable form, in the CBA. The next Board meeting for which minutes are available took place in January 2009. The actuary discussed the calculations of the full actuarial cost of additional accrual rate purchases--work that was still "in the process." Someone asked whether a vested member would receive a refund of the purchase price if the member's services terminated, presumably prior to the 16th year of service. The Board attorney said that the member would receive a refund, but Mr. Antonio disagreed, adding that Respondent was negotiating this issue with the unions. A Board trustee raised the issue of interest, and Mr. Antonio replied that Respondent was negotiating this with the union. No one on the Board displayed the initiative to resolve the issues at this time. A Board trustee mentioned that two persons were "currently buying back time" and were not paying interest. Once again, a lack of clarity with nomenclature precludes a finding that Mr. Lynch had been joined by 53 It seems that these issues should have arisen and been resolved under the prior Plan provisions authorizing the purchase of either optional benefit at 8.4% of compensation per year purchased, even though the maximum repayment period for both options was only five years. It is unclear if the provision as to the 16th through 20th years of service previously applied to the purchase of additional accrual rate, but, if not, the forfeiture issue would have arisen at least when an unvested member terminated service. another lucky member; again, a member "buys back time" when purchasing additional years of service and buys rate when purchasing additional accrual rate. Rather than resolve the issue, the Board agreed on an impractical temporary fix: to provide members with two purchase prices--one with interest and one without interest. At the end of the minutes, a Board trustee noted that new employees did not know the cost of additional accrual rate, and the "Board must first retain an actuary"54--precisely what the Board had done two years earlier. At the Board meeting on the following month, the same Board trustee complained about the "buyback" calculations that had recently been completed for 14 members. Because Respondent had failed to indicate whether these installment payments would be charged interest, the calculations were done in the alternative, and the difference between each pair of calculations was "huge," thus demonstrating the impracticality of this "solution." However, this discussion concluded with an observation that "[s]ome members have already started buying back time."55 At a meeting in August 2009, the Board deferred the approval of "buyback statements" that had been prepared by an actuary.56 At the Board meeting the following month, the Board discussed a request of a member currently "buying back time." Without terminating employment, the member wanted to stop the purchase and obtain a refund of all payments previously made. The member added that he was under the old purchase price of 8.4%, suggesting that he was purchasing additional accrual rate, not years of service. The Board deferred action, but relieved the member from the responsibility of making further payments.57 54 Minutes of Board meeting on Jan. 5, 2008. 55 Minutes of Board meeting on Feb. 23, 2009. 56 Minutes of Board meeting on Aug. 24, 2009. 57 Minutes of Board meeting on Sept. 29, 2009. The next Board meeting for which minutes are available took place in January 2010. Board counsel informed the Board that the actuary had increased the cost of a calculation of additional accrual rate purchase to $350, but all other calculations would remain $100 per calculation.58 It seems, finally, that the Board had sorted out the remaining problems that had prevented the presentation of the full actuarial cost to a member purchasing additional accrual rate. By mid 2010, another issue had arisen, though. In July 2010, the Board considered the timeliness of a request to purchase an optional benefit relative to the expiration of probation. As noted above, a request for either optional benefit must be filed within 90 days of the completion of probation. An employee of the Board or Respondent advised the Board that members had been told to wait to purchase additional years of service until Respondent entered into a new collective bargaining agreement with the unions and, now that the parties had concluded a new agreement,59 the members wanted to proceed with their purchases of additional years of service. The Board agreed that it would allow these purchases to take place, but would need a list of these members.60 In August 2010, the Board was informed that a vested member had complained to the Florida Division of Retirement that, upon termination of employment, he had not received a refund of his payments for additional accrual rate. The Board declined to change its earlier decision, which evidently was not to refund the payments. In response to the business taken up at the July 2010 meeting, Mr. Dodea distributed a list of members who 58 Minutes of Board meeting on Jan. 11, 2010. 59 It is possible that a new collective bargaining agreement had resolved the issues of forfeitability of payments for additional accrual rate by a vested member and whether the installment payments bore interest. But the record contains no collective bargaining agreements subsequent to the CBA. 60 Minutes of Board meeting on July 12, 2010. wanted to purchase additional years of service, even though they were past 90 days from the end of their probation. Board counsel advised the Board that this process was being undertaken because, when the probation had ended for these members, a "final contract" was not in place.61 In any event, in October 2010, Board counsel presented lists of members who wanted to purchase additional accrual rate or additional years of service, but who were past 90 days from the end of their probation. The minutes reflect that Respondent had questioned by what authority the Board could "impasse [bypass?] the Ordinance," which probably means disregard the 90-day limitation periods, and Board counsel replied that Respondent would not have to amend the ordinance to authorize this extension of these two 90-day deadlines. Apparently mollified, Respondent insisted that the Board communicate a firm deadline to members by which they would have to elect one or both options. In other related business, the actuarial firm reported that it had completed its "first buyback calculation." But the actuary asked if the calculation was based on the member's base pay or pay with benefits. Suggestive of a program that was rolling out, finally, the Board told the actuary to use base pay--and not to charge interest on the installment payments.62 In April 2015, Board counsel stated that letters that the Board had sent to eligible members "a couple of years ago," advising them of the 61 Minutes of Board meeting on Aug. 23, 2010. Regardless of the status of any effort to document a collective bargaining agreement, the law unsurprisingly requires that, at all times, the provisions of a pension plan of the type at issue be documented, not open-ended. Section 175.261(2)(a)1. requires an annual filing with the Division of Retirement of "each and every instrument constituting or evidencing the plan." Chapter 175 applies to firefighters, and this requirement applies to "local law" plans, not "chapter" plans, which merely incorporate the relevant provisions of chapter 175. See § 175.032(4), (14) (definitions of "chapter plan" and "local law plan"). Similar provisions govern police pensions. See § 185.221(2)(a)1. 62 Minutes of Board meeting on Oct. 11, 2010. reopening of the window to purchase optional credit, had limited the reopening to the purchase of additional years of service. As noted above, four and one-half years earlier, the Board had approved such letters to members interested in purchasing either option. It seems that Board staff or the pension services representative had taken two years to mail or email these letters and had mistakenly dropped the option for the purchase of additional accrual rate. Board counsel asked if the Board wished to reopen the window for members interested in purchasing either option, and the Board agreed to do so.63 In May 2015, the Board clarified that, when the purchase window was reopened, the purchase price for additional years of service would be based on the member's current income, not the member's income in 2010.64 In its August 2015 meeting, Board staff informed the Board that buyback applications for the purchase of additional accrual rate and additional years of service had been emailed to all members with a deadline of September 18, 2015. Board staff advised that it would forward timely filed applications to the actuary for the calculation of the purchase price and then forward the price to the member, who would decide whether to complete the purchase.65 Minutes of the next month's Board meeting indicate that this process was continuing.66 In its August 2018 meeting, the Board was addressed by Petitioner Roccisano, who complained that the purchase price that he had been given for additional accrual time was based on current conditions, not the conditions when he first had the right to purchase additional accrual rate. By now a former Board trustee, Mr. Cowley confirmed that "the City" never 63 Minutes of Board meeting on Apr. 6, 2015. 64 Minutes of Board meeting on May 18, 2015. 65 Minutes of Board meeting on Aug. 24, 2015. 66 Minutes of Board meeting on Sept. 30, 2015. decided on the cost method, which "prohibited" a member from completing a timely purchase of additional accrual rate.67 Its own minutes reveal a Board that, sluggish, reactive, and aimless, failed to discharge its responsibility to implement the revision in the Plan requiring that members pay the full actuarial cost of additional accrual rate purchased. There were suggestions during the hearing that perhaps problems with certain actuaries or certain plan services representatives impeded this effort, but these advisors, like Board counsel, served the Board, and, if they failed to discharge their duties, it was the Board's job to replace them promptly with professionals who would timely do their jobs. From the minutes, the more prominent problem involving a third party was Respondent--specifically, the Board's reliance on Respondent's approval for administrative decisions that are assigned to the Board, not the Plan's sponsor. Respondent discharged its responsibilities with the documentation in the CBA of the changes to the purchase of additional accrual rate, as later enacted in Section 8.08, but the Board failed to discharge its responsibilities in the timely implementation of these changes--for years, not weeks or months. For these reasons, the Board prohibited members from purchasing additional accrual rate at all material times. On the other hand, no Petitioner ever submitted to the Board a request to purchase additional accrual rate in writing or at a Board meeting. 67 Minutes of Board meeting on Aug. 13, 2018. These comments get to the crux of the dispute from the perspective of Petitioners. They do not merely seek another reopening of the window to purchase additional accrual rate; now that this purchase is priced at full actuarial cost, Respondent may not even oppose such a remedy. Petitioners want to purchase additional accrual rate at the full actuarial cost, but as it would have been calculated when each petitioner first became eligible to purchase additional accrual rate--say, 12 or 13 years ago, not now. This administrative proceeding cannot reach such an issue. The Board did not contract with DOAH to address this issue and such a remedy likely represents damages, which are reserved for the judicial branch, not the mere application of basic principles of actuarial science, where investment returns, like time, wait for none of us, even the ever-youthful Petitioner Roccisano. The facts pertaining to each Petitioner are very similar. While still on probation, each Petitioner learned from more senior police officers or firefighters about the optional benefit for the purchase of additional accrual rate. If a police officer, the Petitioner contacted Mr. Cowley; if a firefighter, the Petitioner contacted Jim Bunce. Mr. Cowley was a Board trustee at all material times until at least early 2010. Mr. Bunce became a Board trustee by September 29, 2009, and remains on the Board; from 2007 until 2020, Mr. Bunce was the district president of the firefighters' union. Prior to the expiration of 90 days following the end of probation, each Petitioner contacted Mr. Cowley or Mr. Bunce, depending on whether Petitioner was a police officer or firefighter, and asked about purchasing additional accrual rate. In each case, Mr. Cowley or Mr. Bunce told the Petitioner that the optional benefit was not available due to problems in calculating the cost of the benefit and the absence of a procedure for applying for the benefit; each Petitioner was advised--or directed--to be patient. Sometimes, a Petitioner contacted an employee of Respondent, but was told the same thing. Petitioners completed their probations from March 12, 2008, in the case of Petitioner Pan, through June 8, 2010, in the case of Petitioner Bruce. At least 12 other members, who completed their probations from 2008 to 2012, are identically situated to Petitioners.
Recommendation It is RECOMMENDED that the Board enter a final order determining that Petitioners have failed to prove that they timely submitted a request to 68 See footnote 2. purchase additional accrual rate in writing to the Board or orally at a Board meeting. DONE AND ENTERED this 11th day of February, 2021, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. COPIES FURNISHED: S ROBERT E. MEALE Administrative Law Judge 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 11th day of February, 2021. Michael Allen Braverman, Esquire Michael Braverman, P.A. 2650 West State Road 84, Suite 104 Fort Lauderdale, Florida 33312 Brendan Michael Coyle, Esquire Law Office of Brendan M. Coyle, P.A. 407 Lincoln Road, Suite 8-E Miami Beach, Florida 33139 Teri Guttman Valdes, Esquire Teri Guttman Valdes LLC 1501 Venera Avenue, Suite 300 Miami, Florida 33146 Brett J. Schneider, Esquire Weiss Serota Helfman Cole & Bierman, P.L. 1200 North Federal Highway, Suite 312 Boca Raton, Florida 33432 Garth Bonner (Address of Record) Luis Acosta (Address of Record) Janira Camero (Address of Record) Miguel Cordova (Address of Record) John Faul (Address of Record) Philip Rothman (Address of Record) Yvette de la Torre (Address of Record) Wissem Mejdoub (Address of Record) Gabriel Castillo (Address of Record) Gary di Lella (Address of Record) Robert David Klausner, Esquire Klausner & Kaufman, P.A. 7080 Northwest 4th Street Plantation, Florida 33317 Michelle Rodriguez, Plan Administrator City of Hallandale Beach Police Officers’ and Firefighters’ Pension Plan Foster and Foster Plan Administration Division 2503 Del Prado Boulevard South, Suite 502 Cape Coral, Florida 33904 Pietro G. Roccisano (Address of Record) Anthony Gonzalez (Address of Record) Stephen Sanfilippo (Address of Record) Eric Bruce (Address of Record) David DeCosta (Address of Record)
The Issue The issues in this case are as follows: Whether a refund request submitted by Petitioner, FICURMA, Inc. (Petitioner or FICURMA), to Respondent, Department of Financial Services, Division of Workers' Compensation (Respondent or Department), on January 21, 2010, requesting a refund of assessments paid during 2005 and 2006, is barred pursuant to section 215.26(2), Florida Statutes (2009),1/ because the refund request was not submitted within three years after the assessment payments were made. Whether the doctrine of equitable estoppel can be raised to allow a refund that would otherwise be time-barred by section 215.26(2), and, if so, whether the facts show the sort of rare circumstances that would justify application of that doctrine against a state agency.
Findings Of Fact The Department is the agency that has been statutorily designated as the administrator of the SDTF (§ 440.49, Fla. Stat.) and as the administrator of the WCATF (§ 440.51). The Department's administration of these two funds includes making the requisite assessments to the entities required to pay the assessments and ensuring payment by the assessable entities for deposit into the state Treasury. §§ 440.49, 440.51. As the state agency with the responsibility for the collection of these assessments, the Department is charged with the authority to accept applications for refunds pursuant to section 215.26, for overpayments of assessments, for payment of assessments when none are due, or for payments of assessments made in error. The Department is responsible for making determinations on applications for refunds of SDTF and WCATF assessments. "FICURMA" stands for Florida Independent Colleges and Universities Risk Management Association. FICURMA, Inc., is an independent educational institution self-insurance fund that was established in December 2003, pursuant to the authority of section 624.4623, Florida Statutes (2003). FICURMA was approved as a Florida workers' compensation self-insurer meeting the requirements of section 624.4623, effective December 10, 2003. FICURMA's members self-insure their workers' compensation claims under chapter 440. On November 16, 2004, Evelyn Vlasak, the assessments coordinator for the SDTF and WCATF assessments, wrote to Ben Donatelli, FICURMA's executive director, to advise that the assessments unit of the Department's Division of Workers' Compensation (Division) received notice that FICURMA had been approved to write workers' compensation insurance in Florida, effective December 10, 2003. Therefore, Ms. Vlasak informed FICURMA that it was required to register with the Division; it was required to pay assessments to the WCATF and SDTF, calculated on the basis of premiums paid to FICURMA by its members; and it was required to submit quarterly premium reports to the Division. Ms. Vlasak enclosed quarterly report forms for FICURMA to catch up on its premium reports for the last quarter of 2003 and the first three quarters of 2004. Ms. Vlasak also enclosed Bulletin DFS-03-002, dated June 26, 2003, which attached two Orders Setting Assessment Rates, one for the WCATF for calendar year 2004, and the other for the SDTF for fiscal year 2003-2004. The two orders, issued by E. Tanner Holloman, then-director of the Division, included a Notice of Rights. This notice advised of the right to administrative review of the agency action pursuant to sections 120.569 and 120.57, Florida Statutes, by filing a petition for hearing within 21 days of receipt of the orders. In bold, the Notice of Rights concluded with the following warning: "FAILURE TO FILE A PETITION WITHIN THE TWENTY-ONE (21) DAYS CONSTITUTES A WAIVER OF YOUR RIGHT TO ADMINISTRATIVE REVIEW OF THIS ACTION." Mr. Donatelli testified that Ms. Vlasak's letter came as a surprise, because he and the others involved in lobbying for the passage of section 624.4623 and setting up FICURMA, pursuant to the new law, believed that FICURMA was not subject to SDTF and WCATF assessments. Mr. Donatelli said that he called Ms. Vlasak to ask why FICURMA had to pay when according to their interpretation of the statute authorizing FICURMA to be created, FICURMA was not subject to the assessment requirements. Mr. Donatelli said that in response to his question, Ms. Vlasak stated that it was her interpretation of the statute that FICURMA was required to pay assessments. She stated that she would have that confirmed by "Legal," but that FICURMA should be prepared to start paying in order to avoid penalties for late payment. Mr. Donatelli testified that "obviously with her response, then we started to think hard about reading [section 624.4623] again, and we did, and didn't see any reason that we needed to pay this." But he also testified that when Ms. Vlasak said she would confirm her interpretation with the legal department, he began calculating what the assessments might cost, because they had not been collecting funds to cover the assessments from its members, since they did not know they had to pay the assessments. The next communication received by FICURMA from Ms. Vlasak came by way of a December 20, 2004, memorandum to all carriers and self-insurance funds, providing information to assist with computation of premiums to be reported for the fourth quarter 2004 SDTF and WCATF assessments. At around the same time, FICURMA received Bulletin DFS 04-044B. This bulletin attached copies of the two Orders Setting Assessment Rates signed by Tom Gallagher, then-Chief Financial Officer. One order was for the WCATF for calendar year 2005 and the other order was for the SDTF for fiscal year 2004-2005. As with the previous bulletin attaching two orders for the prior year, this mailing included a Notice of Rights, which provided a clear point of entry to contest the action by filing a petition for administrative hearing within 21 days of receipt. Mr. Donatelli acknowledged that the two Holloman orders and the two Gallagher orders all ordered FICURMA to pay the SDTF and WCATF assessments. Mr. Donatelli testified that after reviewing the second set of orders received, FICURMA did not believe it had any alternative but to pay the assessments. However, because there was a reference to some "legal stuff," he "asked the legals" to take a second look, because this was not an insignificant payment. In fact, the calculation of assessments to catch up for the prior quarters of missed payments was more than $104,000. When asked why, if he believed FICURMA was not assessable, Mr. Donatelli did not direct "the legals" to file a petition for an administrative hearing on FICURMA's behalf to contest the assessment rate orders, Mr. Donatelli's response was: "Basically, it was our respect of the opinion of the Office Of Insurance Regulations [sic: Division of Workers' Compensation] that said that we had to pay that. I mean--we were basically trying to--being good citizens." Accordingly, FICURMA chose to not challenge the assessments, or otherwise object to paying the assessments. Instead, FICURMA transmitted payment on December 26, 2004, for SDTF and WCATF assessments calculated to be due for the fourth quarter of 2003 and the first three quarters of 2004, totaling $104,282.11. Neither this payment, nor subsequent FICURMA assessment payments were made "under protest." Mr. Donatelli's question to Ms. Vlasak sometime in late 2004--whether FICURMA was assessable under either section 440.49 (for the SDTF) or section 440.51 (for the WCATF)--was never put in writing. However, FICURMA's general counsel wrote to Ms. Vlasak on January 7, 2005, to raise a different assessment question: "whether [FICURMA] is assessed and therefore required to pay into the [SDTF] as it was established within the past year and as such none of the group's claims would be eligible for reimbursement from the Fund." This question, limited to the SDTF assessments, was not based on the status of FICURMA as an entity authorized by section 624.4623 but, rather, was based on the fact that the SDTF had been closed for certain new claims before FICURMA was established. After no response was received, FICURMA's general counsel wrote a second time on February 14, 2005, attaching another copy of the January 7, 2005, letter. Neither of these letters asked about Mr. Donatelli's prior telephonic inquiry regarding whether FICURMA was assessable at all because of its status as an entity formed under section 624.4623. Ms. Vlasak responded in writing after the second written inquiry by FICURMA's general counsel that addressed the propriety of the SDTF assessments. Ms. Vlasak stated the Department's position that assessments were to continue to all assessable entities, even though the SDTF was being prospectively abolished. Ms. Vlasak concluded, therefore, that FICURMA "is not exempt" from the SDTF assessments. Ms. Vlasak's letter dated February 16, 200[5],4/ responded only to the written inquiry in the January 7, 2005, letter and February 14, 2005, reminder letter and, thus, addressed only the limited question about SDTF assessments. Thereafter, until 2009, FICURMA had no further telephonic or written communications with the Division about FICURMA's assessability. Instead, FICURMA fell into the pattern of making quarterly premium reports and assessment payments, pursuant to notice by the Department. In total, FICURMA's payments received by the Department in 2005 and 2006 add up to $288,607.32 in SDTF assessments and $63,164.70 in WCATF assessments. The breakdown of assessment payments credited by quarter is as follows: 2003, Q 4 (received 1-11-05) SDTF: $7,652.36 WCATF: $2,962.75 2004, Q 1 (received 1-11-05) SDTF: $22,957.34 WCATF: $ 7,618.49 2004, Q 2 (received 1-11-05) SDTF: $23,685.39 WCATF: $ 7,860.20 2004, Q 3 (received 1-11-05) SDTF: $23,685.39 WCATF: $ 7,860.19 2004, Q 4 (received 2-10-05) SDTF: $25,543.10 WCATF: $ 8,476.00 2005, Q 1 (received 5-2-05) SDTF: $29,258.54 WCATF: $ 4,854.45 2005, Q 2 (received 7-29-05) SDTF: $29,258.54 WCATF: $ 4,854.45 2005, Q 3 (received 11-1-05) SDTF: $29,350.54 WCATF: $ 4,854.85 2005, Q 4 (received 2-2-06) SDTF: $27,193.93 WCATF: $ 4,527.53 2006, Q 1 (received 5-1-06) SDTF: $23,340.73 WCATF: $ 3,098.33 2006, Q 2 (received 7-26-06) SDTF: $23,340.73 WCATF: $ 3,098.33 2006, Q 3 (received 10-27-06) SDTF: $23,340.73 WCATF: $ 3,098.33 In 2007, 2008, and part of 2009, FICURMA continued these quarterly payments pursuant to notice by the Department, paying quarterly assessments to the SDTF totaling $363,441.86 and to the WCATF totaling $31,132.88. In the 2009 legislative session, the adoption of a new law authorizing another type of self-insurance fund contained language that caused Ms. Vlasak to question whether certain other self-insurance funds authorized under different statutes were assessable under sections 440.49 and 440.51. The 2009 law, codified in section 624.4626, Florida Statutes (2009), specifically provided that a "self-insurance fund that meets the requirements of this section is subject to the assessments set forth in ss. 440.49(9), 440.51(1), and 624.4621(7), but is not subject to any other provision of s. 624.4621 and is not required to file any report with the department under s. 440.38(2)(b) which is uniquely required of group self-insurer funds qualified under s. 624.4621." (Emphasis added). In contrast, section 624.4623, the statute under which FICURMA was formed, contained the following language: "An independent education institution self-insurance fund that meets the requirements of this section is not subject to s. 624.4621 and is not required to file any report with the department under s. 440.38(2)(b) which is uniquely required of group self-insurer funds qualified under s. 624.4621." (Emphasis added). Ms. Vlasak asked the Division's legal office to analyze the legal question and give advice. Meanwhile, Ms. Vlasak and her supervisor, Mr. Lloyd, agreed that the standard quarterly assessment notices would not be sent to FICURMA, so that the Department could consider the question of its assessability after receiving advice from its legal office. By not sending the notices, the clock would not start on the deadlines for FICURMA to pay the assessments without imposition of a statutory penalty for late payment. FICURMA, however, had been well-conditioned to expect those quarterly notices and became concerned when the expected notices did not arrive. Mr. Donatelli and his assistant, Joanne Hansen, called Ms. Vlasak several times to ask why nothing had been received yet. They ultimately spoke with Ms. Vlasak, who advised that the Department was reviewing whether FICURMA was assessable, and it did not have to worry about not receiving the notices because payments would not be due until after the notices were received. On October 1, 2009, the Department's legal staff issued a Memorandum of Opinion regarding independent education institution self-insurance funds (like FICURMA), authorized by section 624.4623. This opinion analyzed section 624.4623, as well as the statutory terms used to identify which entities are subject to assessments in section 440.49 (for the SDTF) and section 440.51 (for the WCATF). Based on that analysis, the opinion concluded that self-insurance funds qualifying under section 624.4623 (like FICURMA), are not subject to SDTF or WCATF assessments. Although the analysis was prompted by a different self-insurance fund statute adopted in 2009, the conclusion reached as to section 624.4623 entities would apply to the entire time period since the adoption of section 624.4623 in 2003. The Department witnesses testified unequivocally that the legal opinion was advisory only, and it was up to the administration to make the policy decision to follow the advice given. However, it is difficult to discern any "policy" choice to be made, since the plain import of the opinion was that the statutes were not susceptible to any different interpretation other than that section 624.4623 entities were not subject to SDTF or WCATF assessments. Nonetheless, the legal opinion was reviewed, and, ultimately, the Department agreed with the advice. On November 14, 2009, Ms. Vlasak and Mr. Lloyd called Mr. Donatelli to advise that FICURMA was not required to pay SDTF or WCATF assessments anymore. In addition, they discussed how FICURMA could go about requesting refunds of assessments previously paid. However, they alerted FICURMA to the fact that section could present a problem with respect to requests for refunds of payments made more than three years ago. At the time of this conversation, all of the assessments paid in 2005 and 2006 had been made more than three years ago, while the payments made in 2007-2009 were within the three-year window. On January 12, 2010, Ms. Vlasak wrote to FICURMA, sending the forms for applying for refunds. In the letter, she reiterated the potential problem for refund requests of payments made more than three years ago. Accordingly, she recommended that FICURMA submit separate requests for payments made within the last three years versus those made more than three years ago, as the former would be able to go through more easily. FICURMA completed four separate refund application forms: one for SDTF payments made in 2005 and 2006; one for WCATF payments made in 2005 and 2006; one for SDTF payments made in 2007-2009; and one for WCATF payments made in 2007-2009. The refund forms state that the refund requests are submitted pursuant to section 215.26; FICURMA did not fill in the blank that is required to be filled in if the refund requests were being submitted under any other statute besides section 215.26. The applications were dated January 20, 2010, and were received by the Department on January 21, 2010. The Department approved the refund applications for payments made in 2007-2009 and caused warrants to be issued to FICURMA to refund $363,441.86 for SDTF assessments and $31,132.88 for WCATF assessments. By authorizing refunds of assessments paid in 2007, 2008, and 2009, the Department has acknowledged that FICURMA should never have been assessed under sections 440.49 and 440.51 and should never have been served annually with the Orders Setting Assessment Rates or quarterly with assessment notices. The Department acknowledged FICURMA's entitlement to refunds despite FICURMA's failure to challenge the assessments in 2007, 2008, and 2009 pursuant to the Notice of Rights provided annually. However, as warned, on May 12, 2010, the Department issued a Notice of Intent to Deny Applications for refund of the 2005 and 2006 payments to the SDTF and the WCATF. The sole reason for the denial was that section 215.26(2) required that refund applications be filed within three years after the right to the refund accrued "or else the right is barred." The Department noted--as stated on the refund application form--that the three-year period normally commences when the payments are made. No evidence was presented regarding what are considered "normal" circumstances or what sort of not-normal circumstances would have to be shown to establish that the three-year period in section 215.26(2) would commence at some other point in time, rather than when payments are made.
Recommendation Based upon the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is hereby RECOMMENDED that Respondent, Department of Financial Services, Division of Workers' Compensation, enter a final order denying the requests for refunds of SDTF and WCATF assessments paid by Petitioner, FICURMA, Inc., in 2005 and 2006, because Petitioner's requests are time-barred by section 215.26(2) and because Petitioner has not met its burden of proving that equitable estoppel should be applied against Respondent. DONE AND ENTERED this 8th day of July, 2011, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S ELIZABETH W. MCARTHUR Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 8th day of July, 2011.
The Issue The issue is whether Petitioner is entitled to be registered as a risk retention group that has the right to do business in Florida.
Findings Of Fact In February 1998, Petitioner was incorporated in the State of Hawaii. On April 6, 1998, the State of Hawaii licensed Petitioner as a risk retention captive insurance company, authorized to provide its members contractual liability insurance in the manner provided by Chapter 431, Article 19, Hawaii Revised Statutes. Petitioner submitted an "Application for Registration as a Risk Retention Group" dated February 3, 1999, to Respondent. Along with the application, Petitioner furnished Respondent a copy of the plan of operation that it had previously submitted to Hawaii, an Appointment of the Insurance Commissioner of the State of Florida to accept service of process, and a resolution by Petitioner's Board of Directors authorizing the appointment. Petitioner furnished Respondent other information, including, but not limited to, the "Statement of Actuarial Opinion of PrimeGuard" for the year ended December 31, 1998, its annual statement for the year ended December 31, 1998, and its quarterly statement as of March 31, 1999, in the form prescribed by the National Association of Insurance Commissioners. Petitioner had previously furnished Hawaii and the other states in which it was doing business with this information. Respondent requested additional information for each of Petitioner's directors and officers, including the following: biographical affidavits, releases of information forms, waiving any right of confidentiality; fingerprint cards; and background investigative reports. Respondent also requested Petitioner to furnish an economic feasibility study for Florida, an organizational chart, copies of relevant Hawaii law, documents relating to the relationship between Petitioner and First Assured Warranty Corporation (FAWC), financial statements for FAWC, information regarding an entity described as "Transportation American Group," and copies of agreement relating to Petitioner's initial funding. Petitioner did not furnish Respondent with the requested information. By letter dated February 21, 2000, Respondent advised Petitioner that its application was incomplete and therefore denied. On or about June 22, 2000, Respondent issued the Amended Letter of Disapproval referenced above in the Preliminary Statement. At the time of the hearing, Petitioner was registered as a non-domiciliary risk retention group in over 30 states. In 1997, Respondent approved the registration of two non-domiciliary risk retention groups, both of which were chartered in Vermont. The business plans of these risk retention groups provide that they will spread and assume the liabilities of their members' failure to perform under home warranties that their members issue, and will directly perform those obligations should the member not do so. These groups are: (a) United Home Insurance Company, owned by Beezer Homes, USA, Inc. and its wholly-owned subsidiaries; and (b) Columbia National Risk Retention Group, owned by the Ryland Group and its wholly-owned operating subsidiaries. As of December 31, 1999, Petitioner had only three members. Two members were "third party obligors" or automobile warranty companies that market, issue and administer automotive service warranties. The third member was a "dealer-obligor." As of March 1, 2000, Petitioner had seven members. Five members were auto dealers in Oklahoma, and two were warranty companies in Colorado. FAWC was one of the two warranty companies. Petitioner had no members in Hawaii, its state of incorporation and charter. In the "insurance policy" between Petitioner and the dealers, the phrase "the Company" refers to Petitioner. The term "insured" is defined as "[t]he person, corporation, partnership or other entity, who is a member of PrimeGuard and participates in PrimeGuard's Administrator's program. In addition, the Insured issued an accepted and validated ESA [extended service agreement] to the Purchaser and is named on the ESA as the Obligor." Petitioner's Articles of Incorporation limit its board of directors to three members. Petitioner has two types of stock, series A redeemable preferred (preferred) and common. Holders of both types of stock have voting rights. The holders of preferred stock as a class are entitled to elect at least 40 percent, or two of the three directors. FAWC owns all of Petitioner's preferred stock; therefore, FAWC has the right to elect the majority of the board. Petitioner issues its members one share of common stock at a cost of $1 per share. FAWC owns 100,000 shares of common stock; it has the right to one vote per share of common stock. The six other members have one share of common stock each for a total of six votes. The holders of the common stock are entitled to vote on the third director. Because FAWC has the majority of the common stock, it also controls the election of the third director. Only the class of shareholders that elects a director may fill a vacancy in the position of that director. Therefore, FAWC will always control the election of Petitioner's board, which may take any action regarding Petitioner's management with or without a formal meeting. FAWC owns 650,000 shares of preferred stock. With one vote per share of stock, FAWC has 750,000 votes, 650,000 votes from its preferred stock and 100,000 votes from its common stock. Petitioner can take no significant action (merger, payment of dividends, or entry into reinsurance agreements) without the consent of the preferred stockholders. Therefore, Petitioner cannot take any such action without the approval of FAWC. The Articles of Incorporation state that the preferred stock is redeemable. Petitioner asserts that its goal is redemption of that stock. However, as of the date of the hearing, no preferred stock has been redeemed. The common stock issued to the five auto dealers has no investment potential. Petitioner has no authority to demand that its members make up a deficiency. On its face, Petitioner's plan of operation provides that only persons or entities who are obligated to perform under motor vehicle service warranties, and who are members and equity owners of Petitioner, are to be insured by Petitioner; the plan reflects that Petitioner has as its owners only persons or companies who comprise the membership of Petitioner and who are provided insurance by Petitioner. Additionally, the plan provides that Petitioner will not, itself, sell or provide motor vehicle service warranties or extended service warranties to consumers or owners of automobiles, but will instead accept and spread, and issue insurance policies for the liability exposure of its members' failure or inability to perform their obligations under motor vehicle service warranties, which the members have provided to consumers. Petitioner has designated FAWC as the administrator of its extended service agreement (ESA) program. FAWC is required to establish a "Dealer/Administrator Agreement" which must be signed by FAWC and dealers, who enroll in the ESA program and "sell" the ESAs. Petitioner obtains its business through FAWC and these dealer members. Petitioner's actuaries determine the prices that it will charge for the ESAs. FAWC then provides the dealers with pricing information regarding each of Petitioner's ESA programs. Petitioner issues the ESAs, not the dealers. The dealers merely sell the ESAs to their customers, the general public. When auto dealers sell a warranty to car buyers, they enter certain information into FAWC's computer system, which automatically displays the "best coverage" for the particular vehicle, based on mileage, age, and other guidelines. The dealers enter their "markup percentage or fixed dollar amount markup," which is automatically added to the "dealer cost" to produce the suggested list price. In other words, dealers are paid a commission for each warranty sold. The dealers keep the commission and remit the "net dealer cost" to FAWC. The net dealer cost first goes to FAWC, then to Petitioner as its premium for the issuance of the warranty. The dealers pay no part of the premium. FAWC decides whether to accept or reject the applications for ESAs submitted by dealers. Dealers may not sell an ESA on a vehicle that does not meet Petitioner's underwriting guidelines. FAWC's computer system generates the ESA acceptance or rejection postcards for mailing directly to the ESA holders. This is exactly the way an insurance agent sells insurance for an authorized insurer. In this case, the dealer sells a warranty issued by Petitioner. FAWC's computer system provides instant access to each dealer's complete history "in regards to monthly production." In the insurance industry, a producer is an insurance salesman. Every ESA contains "convenience benefits," including towing coverage, substitute car rental coverage, tire/road hazard protection, lost key/lockout assistance, and trip interruption protection. A customer, dealer, or transient repair facility may file a claim for service directly to FAWC. FAWC processes the claim, reports it to Petitioner, and requests claim payment from Petitioner. Petitioner sends funds for claim payment to FAWC, which issues the check for the repair directly to the customer (reimbursement), dealer, or transient repair facility. Pursuant to the ESA application, FAWC has sole discretion to determine whether a particular repair or replacement of a part is covered by the ESA. FAWC must pre- authorize all services provided under an ESA, except for certain emergency repairs. FAWC requires a dealer to "highlight the parts and labor charges for which you expect payment." A dealer must obtain an authorization number from FAWC before the dealer can begin making repairs. The only time that the dealer is involved in the claims process is when dealer makes the actual repairs. The dealer has no obligation to make the repairs. Petitioner will either repair or replace, or pay for the repair or replacement of any warranted failures to a covered vehicle. When ESA owners wish to cancel their warranties, they send FAWC a written request. FAWC processes the cancellation and requests the unearned premium from Petitioner. Petitioner refunds the unearned premium for the warranty directly to the purchaser, not the dealer. FAWC audits each dealer's earned loss ratios. FAWC will take corrective action against a dealer if necessary. Corrective action may include, but is not limited to, imposing a surcharge on all ESAs a dealer writes or negotiating a discounted repair pricing structure. If a dealer has too many claims, the dealer may be required to give up its share of common stock. In that case, Petitioner will reimburse the dealer for the price of its stock. Petitioner has purchased "New and Used Automobile Warranty Aggregate Stop Reinsurance" from Swiss Re America. In Petitioner's application to become a captive insurance company in the State of Hawaii, Petitioner could not provide financial information about its owners/insureds because it could not begin operations until it was licensed in Hawaii and registered in the jurisdictions in which it intended to market and insure risks. Petitioner provided the State of Hawaii with additional information in a supplemental application. This information indicates that Petitioner's line of business would be automotive service contracts. Petitioner projected that it would insure approximately 3,500 vehicles in the first year. Petitioner set forth the following marketing strategies: First Assured will use its own marketing force to initially solicit automobile dealers within the states of Colorado, Arizona, New Mexico and Utah. By developing a service contact [sic] that offers a variety of comprehensive coverage options, many customer-friendly features, and a competitive price, First Assured believes that it can and will capture a respectable share of the marker. Most importantly, the level of service that First Assured will provide its dealers will be unmatched in the industry. There is no evidence that Hawaii ever made a determination that Petitioner was structured properly as a risk retention group. Moreover, Hawaii did not license Petitioner as an insurer. Instead, Hawaii licensed Petitioner as a captive insurance company to provide contractual liability insurance to its members under Article 19, Hawaii Revised Statutes. Neither Petitioner nor FAWC is licensed in Florida as a motor vehicle service agreement company.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED: That Respondent enter a final order denying Petitioner's application to register as a risk retention group. DONE AND ENTERED this 3rd day of October, 2000, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. SUZANNE F. HOOD Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 3rd day of October, 2000. COPIES FURNISHED: John Keller, Esquire Margaret-Ray Kemper, Esquire Ruden, McClosky, Smith, Schuster, & Russell, P.A. 215 South Monroe Street, Suite 815 Tallahassee, Florida 32301 Robert Prentiss, Esquire Department of Insurance Division of Legal Services 200 East Gaines Street Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0333 Daniel Y. Sumner, General Counsel Department of Insurance The Capitol, Lower Level 26 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0307 Honorable Bill Nelson Commissioner Department of Insurance The Capitol, Plaza Level 02 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0300
The Issue Whether Gary Savage committed the statutory violations alleged in the Amended Administrative Complaint and, if so, what penalty is authorized for such violations.
Findings Of Fact The Parties and Principle Allegations The Department is the state agency charged with the licensing of insurance agents in Florida, pursuant to authority granted in chapter 626, parts I and IX, Florida Statutes, and Florida Administrative Code Chapter 69B-231. Mr. Savage is a 75-year-old registered investment advisor and financial planner who also is licensed to sell life insurance in Florida. The Department’s Complaint seeks to revoke Mr. Savage’s license as an insurance agent. Counts I through III and V through VIII concern eight clients, whereby Mr. Savage earned commissions for selling them annuities and, based on agreements they signed, charged them annual one-percent financial planning service fees tied to the value of their portfolios, including the annuities. Each of these counts alleged the following statutory violations: Engaging in unfair insurance trade practices for knowingly collecting an excessive premium or charge. § 626.9541(1)(o)2., Fla. Stat.; Demonstrating a lack of fitness or trustworthiness to conduct insurance business. § 626.611(1)(g), Fla. Stat.; Demonstrating a lack of reasonably adequate knowledge and technical competence to engage in insurance transactions. § 626.611(1)(h), Fla. Stat.; Engaging in fraudulent or dishonest insurance practices. § 626.611(1)(i), Fla. Stat.; and Misappropriating, converting, or unlawfully withholding moneys belonging to others in conducting insurance transactions. § 626.611(1)(j), Fla. Stat. Count IX charged Mr. Savage with two violations concerning adverse administrative action taken by the Financial Industry Regulatory Authority (“FINRA”) against his securities license: Failing to timely report final administrative action taken by FINRA against his securities license. § 626.536, Fla. Stat.; and Being suspended and fined for violating FINRA’s rules. § 626.621(12), Fla. Stat. At the time of the hearing, Mr. Savage was not working in the financial services industry because FINRA suspended him for several months. During his suspension, Mr. Savage continued to meet with his insurance clients, though he currently has no appointments with life insurers to sell their products. Wearing Two Hats - An Investment Advisor and Insurance Agent Mr. Savage has worked in the investment industry for over 50 years, initially focusing on securities but evolving into financial advising and estate planning work. He has taken numerous courses and examinations relevant to securities law, financial planning, and tax law. Mr. Savage owns two investment advisor businesses: Wall Street Strategies, Inc. (“Wall Street”), is a stock brokerage firm that handles securities transactions; and Advanced Strategies, Inc. (“Advanced Strategies”), is a registered investment advisor firm, offering clients financial planning, tax management, and estate planning advice. In order to provide a wide variety of products to his financial planning clients, Mr. Savage also is licensed as a nonresident agent in Florida to sell life insurance, including annuities.2/ Annuities provide a guaranteed income stream over a term of years, but also come with substantial penalties if they are surrendered or cancelled before the term expires. Fixed index annuities, like those Mr. Savage sold to the clients at issue here, offer portfolios of funds tracking stock market indexes. Owners choose from around six portfolios and can then reallocate by choosing different portfolios each year. Mr. Savage considers himself an investment advisor who is licensed to sell insurance, which is what he tells new clients. Indeed, his businesses are securities and investment advisor firms, not insurance agencies. Mr. Savage’s client base is diverse. Many have portfolios with annuities and other investment products. Some have portfolios with no annuities. Others have portfolios with only annuities, like most of the clients at issue. In order to procure new clients, Mr. Savage held financial planning seminars where diverse speakers discussed financial and estate planning, and tax management. Mr. Savage discussed the types of insurance products he preferred, including fixed index annuities. Other speakers discussed real estate, oil, and investment trusts, which were beneficial from a tax perspective. Most of the clients at issue attended such a seminar and later met with Mr. Savage to discuss their financial plans. When Mr. Savage first met with the clients at issue, he asked them to bring tax returns, investment statements, wills and/or trusts, and other documents relevant for a financial planning discussion. They completed a new client form with information about their assets, investments, and objectives. He often met several times with new clients to develop a plan for them to reach their financial, estate, and tax management goals. To provide financial planning services, Mr. Savage—— like most investment advisors——charged an annual one-percent fee based on the total value of the portfolio. He has reduced or waived his fee if the clients’ situation warranted it or if they continued to purchase products for which he received commissions to compensate him for providing financial planning services. Before that are charged an annual fee, Mr. Savage’s clients signed a “Service Fee Agreement” (“Fee Agreement”), which was on “Advanced Strategies, Inc., Registered Investment Advisor” letterhead and provided as follows: Advanced Strategies charges a 1% (one percent) financial planning retention fee annually. This fee is based upon the total combined value of accounts including annuities, indexed life, mutual funds, income products and brokerage accounts that we manage or provide service for. This amount is tax deductible as a professional fee. The Fee Agreement offered to provide several financial planning services3/: Address, ownership, and beneficiary changes; Duplicate statements and tax returns; Required minimum distribution and withdrawal requests, and deposits; General account questions; One printed analysis per year; Annual review; Asset rebalancing when applicable; Informing client of new tax laws, changes in estate planning, and new exciting products and concepts. The Fee Agreement noted that the non-refundable fee was due on the service anniversary date and that non-payment would result in discontinuation of the planning services until paid in full. Mr. Savage confirmed that the Fee Agreement was voluntary. If clients wanted to purchase a product, but did not want him to manage their portfolio or provide the outlined services, they did not have to sign the agreement. In that event, Mr. Savage would procure the product and not provide financial planning services. All of the clients at issue here purchased annuities from Mr. Savage. He helped them complete the applications with the insurance companies and, if necessary, assisted them with transferring or closing out other investments used to pay the premiums. He ensured that the insurers received the paperwork and the premiums. Once the annuities were procured, he received commissions from the insurers. The Complaint did not allege that he acted unlawfully in recommending annuities to the clients or receiving commissions from the insurers. All of the clients at issue also signed the Fee Agreement and Mr. Savage provided them with services every year.4/ Some of the services were things an insurance agent technically could handle, such as answering client calls, making address and beneficiary changes, providing duplicate statements, assisting with the paperwork for required minimum distributions, withdrawals, and deposits, and asset reallocation. Other services were things that an agent could not provide, such as tax management/credits, duplicate tax forms, assistance with estates, trusts, and wills, and financial planning advice. But, even as to the services an agent technically could provide, Mr. Savage used his financial planning expertise to advise these clients as to a number of decisions relating to their annuities. For instance, although agents can assist with reallocation, required minimum distributions, and withdrawals, Mr. Savage’s securities and financial planning expertise allowed him to make recommendations that took into account an analysis of the stock market, the economy, and the clients’ financial circumstances and overall goals. An agent is not required to have that expertise, which is one reason he charged the clients an annual service fee. Many of these clients did not recall Mr. Savage providing most of the services listed in the Fee Agreement, but the weight of the credible evidence reflects otherwise. He analyzed asset reallocations for these clients every year and, when he believed reallocation was appropriate, he undisputedly made it happen. He provided annual account analyses consolidating the clients’ investment statements. He met with some of them every year to conduct an annual review and, for those he did not meet, he offered to do so in their annual invoice letter. Whenever the clients asked for assistance with questions, address, beneficiary, or ownership changes, withdrawals or required minimum distributions, or deposits, among others, he performed the task. And, as he confirmed and some of the clients acknowledged, the Fee Agreement made it clear that the services were available, even if they did not need all of them in a particular year or did not think to ask. Although some of the clients testified that Mr. Savage failed to tell them that his fee was optional, all of them had a chance to review the Fee Agreement before voluntarily signing it. The agreement noted that the fee was a “financial planning retention fee” based on the value of the accounts “that we manage or provide service for,” and that non-payment “will result in the discontinuation of my/our planning services.” These clients believed they hired Mr. Savage as an investment advisor and many understood that such advisors do charge fees for providing services. More importantly, no client testified that Mr. Savage said his annual fee was required to procure the annuities or was a charge for insurance. Nothing in the Fee Agreement gave that indication either. Mr. Savage credibly confirmed that he did not charge a fee for insurance; rather, the client paid the fees for financial planning services. And, if they decided they no longer wanted Mr. Savage’s services and stopped paying his fee, they took over management of their annuities without losing access to them or the money in them. The Department concedes that Mr. Savage may wear two hats, as both the agent selling an annuity and the financial advisor managing his client’s portfolio. It contends, however, that Mr. Savage violated the insurance code by selling annuities to these clients and thereafter charging them annual fees——tied to the value of the annuities——to provide services that he should have provided for free after earning commissions on the sale of those annuities. The Department’s investigator, Ms. Midgett, testified about annuities, commissions, and insurance agent services based on her experience in the industry as both a former agent and certified chartered life underwriter.5/ Ms. Midgett confirmed that the Department approves both the premiums and commissions applicable to annuities. Once the premium or deposit is paid, the commission is earned; if an additional deposit is made into the annuity, the agent would earn another commission. Ms. Midgett testified that it is improper for an agent to receive a commission and knowingly charge a client any fees with respect to that annuity under section 626.9541(1)(o). However, she admitted that a financial advisor may charge service fees on annuities if they did not receive a commission on the sale. And, if the annuity is ever rolled into a non- insurance product, that agent could charge service fees on that asset because they are no longer tied to the annuity. Ms. Midgett also testified about the services agents are expected to provide. Once an agent sells a product, he or she becomes the agent of record and does “things such as answer questions, beneficiary changes, address changes, yearly reviews, anything to keep that client and to help them in any way they can.” According to her, “it’s basic 101 insurance that an agent services their clients,” which is “extremely important if you want to build your book of business and to keep a client happy.” Importantly, however, Ms. Midgett conceded that no statute or rule specified what services agents were required to provide once they sold an annuity. “It’s just understood when you’re an insurance agent that you’re going to service your clients. It’s part of the sale of the product.” She believed agents learned this in the course study to obtain a license. Although Ms. Midgett testified that Mr. Savage should have provided most of the services listed in the Fee Agreement for free once he earned commissions on the sale of the annuities, she conceded that at least two of them——duplicate tax forms and informing the client of new tax laws——were not services agents would do. She also agreed that agents could not advise clients as to taking money from an annuity and investing in stocks, mutual funds, real estate trusts, or other investment-related options as “those are all investment advisor functions.” Ms. Midgett initially admitted having no knowledge of whether insurance agents were trained in asset reallocation, though she “would assume so” because “[i]f you have a license to sell the product, then obviously you have to have the knowledge of how to be able to service that product and make the allocations.” When she testified several months later in the Department’s rebuttal case, she stated that the manual used to obtain a license in Florida had a chapter on annuities that “touched on” reallocation. But, she admitted she was not an expert on reallocation or analyzing market conditions, and she had only previously worked with one agent who sold annuities, though he did advise his annuity clients on reallocation. In sum, the Department conceded that no statute or rule articulated the services an agent is required to provide upon receiving a commission. The appointment contracts between the agents and the insurance companies, two of which are in the record, apparently do not specify the services agents are expected to provide. At best, the evidence established what a good agent should do to build a book of business; the evidence did not establish what services an agent, like Mr. Savage, was legally required to provide for receiving a commission. Count I – Kathy Butler Ms. Butler met Mr. Savage while working at a yacht club. In February 2011, they met at his office and she filled out a new client form with financial information. In March 2011, Mr. Savage assisted Ms. Butler with the application for a fixed index annuity for $50,000. On that same day, she signed the Fee Agreement, which she understood to be paying for his services as an investment advisor to manage the annuity and ensure it was being invested correctly; she believed he received income from the insurance company. In January 2012, she purchased another fixed index annuity for $8,000. Mr. Savage procured both annuities. Between 2012 and 2015, Ms. Butler received annual invoices from Mr. Savage and paid about $3,265 in service fees. At this point, Ms. Butler deals directly with the insurance companies, though Mr. Savage is still listed as her agent. The weight of the credible evidence shows that Mr. Savage answered general account questions, made a beneficiary change, conducted annual reviews when requested, sent annual account statements, analyzed reallocation each year and, when he recommended reallocation in 2014 and 2015, he handled the paperwork. Ms. Butler knew she could avail herself of the services in the Fee Agreement, even though she chose not to request many of them. Count II – Beverly Wilcox Ms. Wilcox met Mr. Savage at a seminar in early 2009. In February 2009, they met at his office, she completed a new client form, and she signed the Fee Agreement. She believed he was a financial advisor and that she would owe him money, but she did not read the Fee Agreement before signing it. In March 2009, Mr. Savage assisted Ms. Wilcox with the application to purchase a fixed index annuity for $120,000. He procured the annuity, as requested. Between 2010 and 2016, Ms. Wilcox received yearly invoices from Mr. Savage and paid about $6,500 in fees, after which she decided to deal with the annuity company directly. The weight of the credible evidence shows that Mr. Savage answered questions when asked, offered to conduct annual reviews each year, sent annual account statements, analyzed reallocation each year and, when he recommended reallocation in 2010 and 2012, he handled the paperwork. Count III – Joseph Cerny Mr. Cerny met Mr. Savage while working at a yacht club and knew he was a financial advisor. Mr. Cerny purchased several fixed index annuities and other investments from Mr. Savage, who helped him complete the paperwork and procured the policies. Between 2003 and 2004, he bought two annuities for $100,000 each and two mutual funds for about $30,000 each. In 2008, he bought an annuity for $10,000. In 2010, he bought another annuity for $119,400. Mr. Savage did not charge fees for the first few years. Mr. Cerny believed he received compensation from the companies. However, in March 2010, Mr. Cerny signed the Fee Agreement. Between 2011 and 2012, he received two invoices, paying the first for $1,266.84 but refusing to pay the second. Mr. Cerny and Mr. Savage ended their relationship at that point. The weight of the credible evidence shows that Mr. Savage answered questions, provided annual statements, assisted with making withdrawals when requested, met with Mr. Cerny yearly, analyzed reallocation each year and, when he recommended reallocation in 2010 and 2011, he handled the paperwork. Count V – Marion Albano Ms. Albano met Mr. Savage at a retirement seminar in early 2007. In February 2007, they met at his office to go over her investments, including several annuities. Based on his recommendation, she surrendered her old annuities and purchased a fixed index annuity for about $1.6 million. He assisted her with the application and procured the annuity. In February 2007, Ms. Albano also signed the Fee Agreement. Mr. Savage told her there was a service charge to manage the annuity and she agreed because her brother pays the same rate on his managed brokerage account. She was never worried about losing the annuity if she failed to pay the fee. Ms. Albano received invoices from Mr. Savage every year from 2008 through 2015 and testified that she had paid between $110,000 and $120,000 in fees during that time. She had to pay some of the fees out of her distributions. The weight of the credible evidence shows that Mr. Savage answered account questions, corresponded with her daughter about his recommendations, provided her with an account analysis each year, met with her annually to review her account, and assisted her with required minimum distributions and withdrawals. He analyzed reallocation each year and, when he recommended reallocation in 2010 and 2011, he handled the paperwork. Count VI – Jane D’Angelo Ms. D’Angelo and her late husband, whose son-in-law was an insurance agent, met Mr. Savage at an estate planning seminar in early 2003; they believed he was an investment advisor. In March 2003, he came to their home and they completed a new client form, indicating they had several types of investments, including annuities. Between 2003 and 2016, the D’Angelos invested with Mr. Savage. In 2003, they purchased a tax credit investment for $10,000. In 2005, they purchased a similar investment for $19,000, which resulted in tax credits totaling $17,174. Between 2005 and 2011, they purchased eight fixed index annuities from Mr. Savage. He assisted them with the applications, informing them that the companies paid him directly. He procured the following annuities, some of which were purchased by transferring money from their existing annuities: In April 2005, they bought an annuity for $250,000; in May 2007, they bought an annuity for $32,789.78; in May 2008, they bought an annuity for $29,510; in March 2009, they bought three annuities for $337,554, $550,000, and $6,000; in May 2011, they bought two annuities, one for $40,715 and another for $150,889; and, in June 2011, they bought an annuity for $24,667. Prior to 2010, they paid no service fees. However, in April 2010, they signed the Fee Agreement. Although they were surprised and felt like they had to sign, Ms. D’Angelo agreed they were not coerced or told the annuities would lapse if they failed to do so. Indeed, she never lost access to the annuities even after she stopped paying Mr. Savage’s fees in 2015. Mr. Savage sent them annual invoices from 2010 through 2015, totaling $54,000 in fees. Mr. Savage agreed to waive the 2010 fee and, ultimately, they only paid about $14,511 total. In 2016, Ms. D’Angelo informed Mr. Savage that she no longer needed his services. She had been dealing directly with the insurance companies herself, though they have provided her with names of individuals if she wanted someone to advise her. The weight of the credible evidence shows that Mr. Savage provided numerous services to the D’Angelos on the investments he managed for them.6/ He had discussions with them, sent them annual statements, and assisted them with deposits and transfers between annuities, required minimum distributions and withdrawals, income riders, and beneficiary and ownership changes. He analyzed reallocation every year and handled the paperwork when he felt it was appropriate. He also offered to meet annually and held those meetings in years in which they were requested. Count VII – Ernest Blougouras Rev. Ernest Blougouras, a Greek Orthodox priest, attended several financial planning seminars with Mr. Savage. They met privately in February 2005, at which he completed a new client form listing his investments, which included fixed annuities, CDs, mutual funds, bonds, and stocks. Rev. Blougouras purchased fixed index annuities and other investments from Mr. Savage. He told Rev. Blougouras that he received commissions for selling the annuities. Mr. Savage assisted with the applications and procured the policies. Over the last 14 years, Rev. Blougouras purchased nine fixed index annuities. In March 2005, he bought an annuity for $347,003; in April 2005, he bought an annuity for $229,458; in August 2005, he bought an annuity for $102,227; in June 2006, he bought an annuity for $8,300; in May 2007, he bought an annuity for $41,143; in June 2009, he bought an annuity for $50,000; in July 2009, he bought an annuity for $14,308; and, though the record is unclear as to the date, he bought another annuity that was worth $40,572 in 2010. Since 2011, he bought an additional annuity and several non-insurance investments, such as real estate trusts and energy funds. Prior to 2010, Mr. Savage did not charge Rev. Blougouras service fees because he continued to purchase annuities. However, in 2010, Mr. Savage decided to start charging an annual service fee and sent Rev. Blougouras the Fee Agreement. Rev. Blougouras believed that Mr. Savage’s services would be cancelled if he failed to pay the fee and he would have to hire another advisor. He signed the Fee Agreement and continues to use Mr. Savage’s services. Mr. Savage has sent annual invoices to Rev. Blougouras every year since 2010. The record only contains the 2010 invoice for $9,883 and Rev. Blougouras could not recall how much he paid overall. However, he confirmed that he has paid every invoice he has received either himself or with distribution checks he received from the annuities. The weight of the credible evidence shows that Mr. Savage provided numerous services to Rev. Blougouras. He prepared paperwork and documents for required minimum distributions and withdrawals, held meetings to review and organize his tax paperwork, copied documents requested, and made address changes when requested. He analyzed asset reallocation every year and, when he recommended reallocation in 2010 and 2011, he completed the necessary paperwork. Count VIII – George Flate Mr. Flate and his wife met Mr. Savage at a financial planning seminar in 2010. In February 2010, they met Mr. Savage and completed their new client form listing their investments, including fixed annuities, CDs, mutual funds, and stocks. They also signed the Fee Agreement, which Mr. Flate believed was a standard service agreement. They thought they hired Mr. Savage as an investment advisor and never believed they would lose access to the annuities if they stopped paying his fees. Based on Mr. Savage’s recommendation, the Flates purchased two fixed index annuities: one annuity was issued in April 2010 for approximately $22,000, and the other annuity was issued in May 2010 for approximately $22,500. Mr. Savage assisted them with filling out the applications and handled the paperwork to ensure the annuities were issued. Between 2012 and 2015, Mr. Savage sent the Flates invoices for his annual service fees every year. In total, they paid approximately $1,506 in service fees. In 2015, the Flates terminated their relationship with Mr. Savage. They have worked with two financial advisors since then, neither of whom charged them service fees relating to the annuities. The weight of the credible evidence shows that Mr. Savage provided numerous services to the Flates. Each year, he met with them to go over their account, provided them with account analyses, analyzed reallocation and, the two to three times they agreed with his recommendations, he handled the paperwork. He handled withdrawals and address changes for them when requested, and he provided them with information as to changes in tax law and estate planning, though they did not believe that was necessary since they had tax and estate lawyers. The Flates understood that Mr. Savage was available to answer their questions and provide the services if they asked. Count IX – FINRA Disciplinary Proceeding On July 14, 2016, two former clients of Mr. Savage’s filed a Statement of Claim with FINRA alleging that he had recommended investments that were not suitable for them. Over Mr. Savage’s objections to proceeding with the hearing as scheduled, the arbitration panel awarded the clients over $725,000 in damages, fees, and costs. The clients filed a petition in Florida circuit court to approve the arbitration award. Mr. Savage responded in opposition and moved to vacate the arbitration award on grounds that it violated his due process rights. On November 9, 2017, the circuit court issued a final judgment awarding over $769,000. On December 4, 2017, Mr. Savage appealed the circuit court’s order to the Second District Court of Appeal. On June 12, 2018, while the appeal was pending, Mr. Savage signed a Letter of Acceptance, Waiver and Consent (“AWC”) with FINRA. The AWC stated that Mr. Savage accepted and consented, without admitting or denying, the following findings: Wall Street failed to apply for a material change in its business operations, i.e., to sell oil and gas interests, private placements, and non-traded real estate investment trusts, before engaging in more than 50 such transactions, many of which were consummated by Mr. Savage; Mr. Savage failed to timely update his FINRA Form U4 within 30 days of the Statement of Claim being filed against him in July 2016; Mr. Savage failed to timely respond to FINRA’s requests for information relating to an upcoming examination of Wall Street; and Wall Street failed to maintain the minimum net capital requirements of $5,000 while engaging in securities transactions. Mr. Savage agreed to three sanctions: (1) a five- month suspension from associating with any FINRA registered firm; (2) a three-month suspension from association with any FINRA registered firm in a principal capacity, to be served following the five-month suspension; and (3) a $30,000 fine. The AWC confirmed that Mr. Savage waived his procedural rights relating to these alleged violations and made clear that it would become part of his permanent disciplinary record that could be considered in future actions brought by FINRA or other regulators. He was precluded from taking positions inconsistent with the AWC in proceedings in which FINRA was a party, but was not precluded from taking inconsistent positions in litigation if FINRA was not a party. The five-month suspension began on June 13, 2018, and ended on November 17, 2018. The three-month suspension began on November 18, 2018, and ended on February 17, 2019. In the interim, on August 16, 2018, FINRA notified Mr. Savage by letter that it was suspending his securities license indefinitely for his “failure to comply with an arbitration award or settlement agreement or to satisfactorily respond to a FINRA request to provide information concerning the status of compliance.” This letter is not in the record and, as such, it is unclear whether Mr. Savage had an avenue to challenge that suspension directly. Mr. Savage had challenged the underlying arbitration award, which remained pending on appeal in the Second District Court of Appeal. On November 7, 2018, the Second District affirmed the circuit court’s arbitration order. On November 20, 2018, Mr. Savage put the Department on notice of the FINRA disciplinary actions, including the AWC from June 2018 and the decision of the Second District affirming the arbitration award.
Conclusions For Petitioner: David J. Busch, Esquire Department of Financial Services Room 612, Larson Building 200 East Gaines Street Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0333 For Respondent: Michael Buchholtz, Esquire The Law Office of Michael Buchholtz Post Office Box 13015 St. Petersburg, Florida 33777
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that the Department of Financial Services issue a final order suspending Mr. Savage’s license as an insurance agent for twelve months. DONE AND ENTERED this 30th day of September, 2019, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S ANDREW D. MANKO Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 30th day of September, 2019.
The Issue The issue in this case is whether Petitioner's application for self-insurance for workers' compensation should be approved.
Findings Of Fact Based upon the observation of the witnesses' testimony and the documentary evidence received into evidence, the following relevant and material facts that follow are determined. The Florida Self-Insurers Guaranty Association, Inc. (Association), is established by Section 440.385, Florida Statutes (2003), and is an organization that provides a guarantee for workers' compensation benefits for companies that are self-insured. The Association pays injured workers their benefits, if the self-insurer becomes insolvent. An insolvency fund is established and managed by the Association, which funds the workers' compensation benefits for insolvent members. The insolvency fund is funded by assessments from members of the Association. Pursuant to Florida Administrative Code Rule 69L-5.102 (formerly Florida Administrative Code Rule 4L-5.102), in order for an employer to qualify for self-insurance under the relevant provisions of law, the applicant must meet the following requirements: (1) have and maintain a minimum net worth of $1,000,000; (2) have at least three years of financial statements or summaries; (3) if the name of the business has changed in the last three years, provide a copy of the Amended Articles of Incorporation; and (4) have the financial strength to ensure the payment of current and estimated future compensation claims when due, as determined through review of their financial statement or summary by the Department. Of the general requirements noted in paragraph 3, above, the only issue in this proceeding regards N.C.M.'s financial strength. An applicant for self-insurance is required to submit in its application audited financial statements for its three most recent years. All financial statements, audits, and other financial information must be prepared in accordance with Generally Accepted Accounting Principles. The Association is required to review each application and the financial documents which are submitted as part of that application to determine if the applicant has the financial strength to ensure the timely payment of all current and future workers' compensation claims. After the Association reviews the application, it makes a recommendation to the Department as to whether the application for self-insurance should be approved or denied. The Department is required by law to accept the Association's recommendations unless it finds that the recommendations are clearly and convincingly erroneous. N.C.M. submitted its application for self-insurance on or about May 6, 2003, and included in its application audited financial statements for its three most recent fiscal years. The statement contained an unqualified opinion from N.C.M.'s accountant. N.C.M. provided information in its application regarding the number of employees, the worker classifications of these employees, and a payroll classification rating that has been established by the National Council on Compensation Insurance. The application made it clear that the Department could use this information to calculate a manual annual rate premium for each worker classification to determine an overall workers' compensation premium based on statewide manual rates. The Association calculated a standard premium of $507,088.75 for N.C.M., after giving credit for its experience modification of .71. N.C.M. confirmed in its application that it was a corporation duly organized and existing in the State of Florida. N.C.M. also supplied information on its corporate officers and copies of its Articles of Incorporation confirming its corporate existence. In its application and at the hearing, N.C.M. agreed that, if accepted for membership, it will maintain security deposits and excess insurance as required by the Department's administrative rules. Upon receipt of N.C.M.'s application, the Association thoroughly reviewed the application and financial statements for the three most recent years. The Association examined the balance sheets to analyze the Company's assets, liabilities, working capital, and equity structure. Additionally, the Association examined N.C.M.'s income statements to analyze the Company's revenues, profits and/or losses, and expenses. The Company's cash flows were examined. The Association calculated various financial ratios for N.C.M. in order to examine, among other things, the company's asset structure, liquidity, total debt to equity structure, and net income or loss as it relates to the company's equity. The analysis and review performed by the Association, as described in paragraph 12, is the same type of analysis the Association performs on every applicant for self-insurance. Because applicants for self-insurance come from various types of industries, it is not useful to establish specific threshold values for various financial ratios in determining financial strength. However, the Association reviews and analyzes the financial statements of each applicant to determine the financial condition of that applicant. The Association's review of N.C.M.'s audited financial statements revealed that the Company had a net loss of $60,937 in the year ending December 31, 2002. The Company also had a loss from operations in its most recent year in the amount of $74,897, or negative .62 of its revenues. This was a significant factor to the Association because it revealed N.C.M.'s lack of profitability for its most recent year. Petitioner's tax return of 2002 showed a profit for the Company. However, the tax returns are not meant to reflect the economic profit of a business and are not prepared in accordance with Generally Accepted Accounting Principles. Rather, the audited financial statements provide more accurate information about the Company’s financial health. N.C.M.'s 2002 net worth was $1,218,895, which exceeded the $1,000,000 minimum net worth requirement established in the applicable rule cited in paragraph 3 above. However, the Association was concerned about N.C.M.'s net worth when taken as a percentage of its workers' compensation premiums, calculated by using the payroll classification information in N.C.M.'s application. The analysis of N.C.M.'s net worth as a percentage of workers' compensation premiums is important because workers' compensation claims can accrue each year and be paid out over a long period of time by the self-insurer. A company with equity that is relatively low in comparison to its workers' compensation exposure might, over time, owe its injured workers as much as, or more than, the equity in the company. This would increase the risk for the injured worker. Upon completing its financial analysis, the Association recommended that N.C.M.'s application for self- insurance be denied. Brian Gee, the executive director of the Association, conveyed the recommendation of denial to the Department in two letters, one dated May 12, 2003, and the other one dated June 19, 2003. The letters were virtually identical, except that the June 19, 2003, letter referred to the specific statute at issue and statutory language that N.C.M. did not have the financial strength necessary to ensure timely payment of all current and future claims. Attached to both the May 12, 2003, and June 19, 2003, letters was a copy of the Association's summary of N.C.M.'s audited financial statements for the years ended December 31, 2002, 2001, and 2000. Based on the review of the financial data, the Association made the following four findings, which it listed in both letters: The Company received unqualified audit opinions on its December 31, 2002, 2001, and 2000 financial statements from Rust & Christopher, P.A. Liquidity - The current ratio has decreased from 1.34 at December 31, 2000 to 1.13 at December 31, 2002. Capital Structure - The total liabilities to book equity ratio has increased since December 31, 2000 from 1.39 to 1.99 at December 31, 2002. Results of Operations - The Company's gross profit margin has negative 0.62 for the year ended December 31, 2002. The Company reported a net loss of $60,937 for the year ended December 31, 2002. Although the above-referenced letters listed findings relative to the Company's liquidity and capital structure, Mr. Gee did not believe that those findings were of "major significance." The Association's letters and accompanying financial data were submitted to the Department for a final decision to be made by the Department. The Department received and reviewed the Association's letters of recommendation and the accompanying documentation. Based on its review of the letter, the Department noted that the Association appeared to have concerns about the Company's liquidity, liabilities, and profitability. However, there was nothing in the letters which indicated that the Association did not consider the findings related to the Company's liquidity and liabilities (capital structure) to be of major significance. The Department sent N.C.M.'s application, which included the financial statements, to an outside CPA firm for review. The outside CPA performed a financial analysis, calculated various financial ratios on N.C.M., and provided a report to the Department. The outside CPA correctly noted in her report that N.C.M.'s gross profit margin for the year ended December 31, 2002, was 15.4 percent. In Finding No. 4 of its letters of recommendation to the Department, the Association had mistakenly mislabeled the Company's net profit margin as the gross profit margin. As a result of that mislabeling in the letters, the finding incorrectly stated that N.C.M.'s gross profit margin was a negative 0.62 percent for the year ending December 31, 2002. In fact, it was the Company's net profit margin for the year ending December 31, 2001, that was negative 0.62 percent. Notwithstanding the incorrect mislabeling of this item in the letters, the financial summary attached to the letters accurately reflected the Company's gross profits and revenue. The financial statement of N.C.M. also reflected that for the year ending 2002, the Company had a gross profit of $1,877,076, and for that same period had a loss from operations of $74,897, or negative .62 percent. The outside CPA also compared various financial information on N.C.M. to an industry average and concluded that "some of the Company's ratios are below the industry ratios." In making these comparisons, the outside CPA researched two companies she believed were in a business similar to N.C.M. The research on these companies provided an industry average for various financial information on companies in the same industry as the two reference companies. In this case, the two reference companies were primarily producers or sellers of concrete products, as opposed to construction companies like N.C.M. Accordingly, the industry ratios contained in the outside CPA's report may be different than the construction industry and not an appropriate basis with which to compare N.C.M. The report of the outside CPA stated that N.C.M. pays approximately $1,000,000 a year in workers' compensation insurance. That figure is higher than the premiums calculated by the Association using statewide manual rates. Instead of using those rates, the outside CPA based her figure on a newspaper article, which stated that Mr. DelDuca, president of N.C.M., pays $1,000,000 for workers' compensation insurance. In her report, the outside CPA cited N.C.M.'s lack of profitability for the year ending 2002 and correctly noted that for that year, the Company reported a net loss of $60,937. The outside CPA notified the Department that she concurred with the Association's recommendation to deny N.C.M.'s application to become self-insured because the Company had not demonstrated it has the financial strength to ensure timely payment of workers' compensation claims. The Department reviewed the outside CPA's report and noted the concerns about the company's debt equity and lack of profitability. Based on the outside CPA's report, the Department correctly determined that the report contained no information that the Association's recommendation was clearly and convincingly erroneous. As a result of its determination that the Association's recommendation to deny N.C.M.'s application for self-insurance was not clearly or convincingly erroneous, the Department denied the application.
Recommendation Based upon the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that the Department issue a final order denying N.C.M. of Collier County, Inc.'s application for self-insurance. DONE AND ENTERED this 26th day of February, 2004, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S CAROLYN S. HOLIFIELD Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 26th day of February, 2004. COPIES FURNISHED: John M. Alford, Esquire 542 East Park Avenue Tallahassee, Florida 32301 Cynthia A. Shaw, Esquire Department of Financial Services 200 East Gaines Street Tallahassee, Florida 32399-4229 Mark B. Cohn, Esquire McCarthy, Lebit, Crystal & Liffman Co., L.P.A. 1800 Midland Building 101 West Prospect Avenue Cleveland, Ohio 44115-1088 Honorable Tom Gallagher Chief Financial Officer Department of Financial Services The Capitol, Plaza Level 11 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0300 Mark Casteel, General Counsel Department of Financial Services The Capitol, Plaza Level 11 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0300
