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BOARD OF PHARMACY vs. DORA VILLANUEVA, 83-003916 (1983)
Division of Administrative Hearings, Florida Number: 83-003916 Latest Update: Nov. 07, 1984

Findings Of Fact Respondent Dora Villanueva, is a licensed pharmacist, having been issued license number PS 0014957, and whose last known address is 3017 Southwest 107the Avenue, Miami, Florida 33165. At all times material hereto, Respondent Villanueva was the prescription department manager and part-owner of Century Pharmacy, 3017 Southwest 107th Avenue, Miami, Florida 33165. Respondent Century is permitted to operate a community pharmacy under the laws of the State of Florida, having been issued permit number PH 0006839 and operating at 3017 Southwest 107th Avenue, Miami, Florida 33165. On or about August 5, 1983, a Department of Professional Regulation investigator purchased 20 Librax and 20 Donnatal from Century Pharmacy, without first presenting a prescription. The aforementioned Librax and Donnatal were dispensed by Jose Ceferino Calvera, not a licensed pharmacist in the State of Florida. Librax and Donnatal are medicinal drugs as defined in Subsection 465.003(7), Florida Statutes (1983)(F.S.), and require a prescription to be dispensed. Respondent Dora Villanueva was not present in the pharmacy when the Librax and Donnatal were dispensed on August 5, 1983, and the prescription department of the pharmacy had a sign stating that the prescription department was closed. On or about August 17, 1983, a Department of Professional Regulation investigator purchased ten Dalmane, 20 Librax and 20 Donnatal, from Respondent Villanueva at the Respondent Century Pharmacy, Inc. without first furnishing a prescription. Dalmane, Librax and Donnatal are medicinal drugs as defined in Section 465.003(7), F.S. and require a prescription to be dispensed. On or about August 22, 1983, a Department of Professional Regulation investigator purchased ten Tranxene 7.5 mg and ten Dalmane, 30 mg, from Respondent Villanueva at the Respondent Century Pharmacy, Inc., without a prescription. Tranxene and Dalame are medicinal drugs as defined in Section 465.003(7), F.S., and require a prescription to be dispensed. On or about September 8, 1983, an audit was conducted of the controlled substances at Respondent Century Pharmacy, Inc., for the time period of January 1, 1983 through September 8, 1983. Said audit revealed the following shortages in the drugs which were audited: DRUG SHORTAGE Dalmane 30 mg 1,590 Dalmane 15 mg 799 Ativan 1 mg 151 Ativan 2 mg 4,163 Talwin Injectable 22 Dalmane, Ativan and Talwin are controlled substances as defined in Chapter 893, F.S. and are medicinal drugs as defined in Subsection 465.003(7), F.S. Respondent Villanueva denied making the August 17, 1983 sale. However, she did remember Petitioner's investigator from the August 22, 1983, transaction. Since Petititoner's investigator kept a contemporaneous record of her purchases, Respondent's denial is rejected as not credible. Both Respondent Villanueva and Petitioners investigator are immigrants from Cuba. Respondents claim the investigator was allowed to make the August 22, 1983 purchase without a prescription because she stated she had recently arrived from Cuba and had no doctor or money to pay one. Even if this were an accurate account of the transaction (which Petitioner denies) it would not provide grounds for dispensing controlled drugs without a prescription.

Recommendation Based on the foregoing, it is RECOMMENDED: That Petitioner issue a final order suspending the license of Respondent Dora Villanueva and the permit of Century Pharmacy, Inc. for a period of 90 days. DONE and ENTERED this 31st day of July, 1984 in Tallahassee, Florida. R. T. CARPENTER, Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The Oakland Building 2009 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32301 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 31st day of July, 1984. COPIES FURNISHED: Bruce D. Lamb, Esquire Department of Professional Regulation 130 North Monroe Street Tallahassee, Florida 32301 Blas E. Padrino, Esquire 2355 Salzedo Street, Suite 309 Coral Gables, Florida 33134 Wanda Willis, Executive Director Board of Pharmacy 130 North Monroe Street Tallahassee, Florida 32301 Fred M. Roche, Secretary Department of Professional Regulation 130 North Monroe Street Tallahassee, Florida 32301 =================================================================

Florida Laws (6) 465.003465.015465.016465.018465.023893.07
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LIFE WORTH LIVING FOUNDATION, INC. vs DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH, 10-000042 (2010)
Division of Administrative Hearings, Florida Filed:Orlando, Florida Jan. 06, 2010 Number: 10-000042 Latest Update: Oct. 07, 2010

The Issue Whether Petitioner should be granted a Retail Pharmacy Drug Wholesale Distribution Permit, pursuant to Subsection 499.01(2)(f), Florida Statutes (2009).1

Findings Of Fact Background Petitioner holds Florida Community Pharmacy License No. PH23699 (the “pharmacy license”), pursuant to Chapter 499, Florida Statutes. The establishment is located at 1507 Park Center Drive, Suite 1L, Orlando, Florida 32835 (“establishment”), where Petitioner’s records are stored. On or about July 29, 2009, Petitioner submitted the first portions an application to Respondent for a Retail Pharmacy Wholesaler Distributor Permit, pursuant to Subsection 499.01(2)(f), Florida Statutes (“application”). On September 16, 2009, Respondent's drug agents conducted an onsite inspection of the establishment (“inspection”) for purposes of assisting in Respondent’s determination of whether to issue the permit to Petitioner. On or about November 13, 2009, Respondent notified Petitioner that Respondent intended to deny the application (“notice”), and Petitioner filed a petition for administrative review, raising disputes of material fact (“petition”). Prescription Drug Inventory and Petition as a “Retail Pharmacy” To qualify as a retail pharmacy, Petitioner must have adequate inventory on hand that would be required by the general public for a variety of medical conditions. On the date of inspection, there was inadequate inventory on hand. There were only 18 commercially-available prescription drugs. Many of the drugs were injectables, which would only fill the needs of a very specific and limited patient population. At the time of inspection, Petitioner’s on-hand inventory of prescription drugs lacked any opiate painkillers and any drugs indicated for treatment or maintenance of (i) high blood cholesterol levels, (ii) systemic bacterial infections (oral antibiotics), (iii) osteoporosis, (iv) cough (syrups), (v) viral infections, (vi) depression, and (vii) asthma. These are some of the most commonly-required drugs in the pharmacological arsenal. Petitioner’s specialization in the area of compounded prescription drugs is evidenced by Petitioner’s prescription drug inventory and the nature of the prescriptions Petitioner filled in the months leading up to inspection. Most of Petitioner’s on-hand prescription drug inventory was composed of compounded prescription drugs or ingredients to be used in compounding prescription drugs. Less than eight percent of Petitioner's prescription drugs, or about 18 items, consisted of commercially-available prescription drugs in finished dosage forms. In the two-month period before September 29, 2009, Petitioner did not dispense a single dose of commercially- available, finished-form prescription drugs. All were specially-prepared or “compounded” products tailored to the specific needs of individual patients. Petitioner, as a result of an inability to meet the most basic and commonplace prescription drug needs of the general public, lacked adequate inventory required by the general public. Petitioner served a specific and limited patient population: i.e., those patients requiring specially-compounded prescription drugs and those rare patients whose needs could not be met by commercially-available products. Petitioner's explanation as to the reason for having only 18 commercially-available prescription drugs available at the time of inspection is not persuasive; Petitioner, therefore, was not a retail pharmacy. Life Specialty Pharmacy Medical Equipment and Supplies, Inc.: Petitioner’s Unauthorized Source for Prescription Drugs Life Specialty Pharmacy Medical Equipment and Supplies, Inc. (“Life Specialty”), a separate entity from Petitioner, is under common control with Petitioner. It has the same owners, principals, and pharmacy department manager. Life Specialty holds Community and Special Parenteral/Enteral Pharmacy License No. PH22346 for an establishment located at 1507 Park Center Drive, Suite 1L, Orlando, Florida 32835. It is not authorized under Florida law to purchase, receive, own, or distribute prescription drugs. Petitioner’s prescription drug inventory at the time of inspection included certain quantities of Sarapin, a prescription drug. Life Specialty acquired and received Sarapin from a Kmart pharmacy that is no longer in business. At the time Life Specialty acquired and received the Sarapin from Kmart pharmacy, that drug was readily available from Life Specialty’s prescription drug wholesale suppliers. Life Specialty later transferred the Sarapin to Petitioner. Life Specialty lacks any permit or authorization under Part I of the Florida Drug and Cosmetic Act, Chapter 499, Florida Statutes (Act), to engage in the wholesale distribution of prescription drugs. Petitioner, nevertheless, received prescription drugs from Life Specialty, and many of these drugs were in Petitioner’s prescription drug inventory at the time of inspection, including prescription drugs compounded by Life Specialty. Those drugs included: Sarapin Ketamine Hydrochorlide USP Progesterone Micro USP Chloral Hydrate (CIV), Crystal USP 100% 125gm Testosterone Propionate Micro USP Ketamine Hydrochloride USP 100% Powder 25mg Amphotericin B USP 100% Powder 1gm Cyclobenzaprine HCl USP Recordkeeping and Pedigree Papers During the course of the inspection, Respondent requested the opportunity to review pedigree papers and other source-related records for the prescription drugs Petitioner received from Life Specialty. Specifically, Petitioner could not produce any pedigree papers for prescription drugs received from Life Specialty. Petitioner received from Life Specialty, without a valid pedigree paper, the following: Sarapin Ketamine Hydrochorlide USP Progesterone Micro USP Testosterone Propionate Micro USP Cyclobenzaprine HCl USP Recordkeeping Petitioner did not acquire all of its pedigree papers contemporaneously with the underlying transactions. Petitioner acquired many of the pedigree papers for the prescription drugs in its inventory after the Respondent's inspection. Petitioner's explanation for these failures was not credible.

Recommendation Based on the Findings of Facts and the Conclusion of Law cited above, it is RECOMMENDED that the Department of Health enter a final order, denying Petitioner's application for a permit to act as a retail pharmacy drug wholesale distributor. DONE AND ENTERED this 1st day of September, 2010, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S DANIEL M. KILBRIDE Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 1st day of September, 2010.

USC (1) 21 U.S.C 360 Florida Laws (13) 120.569120.57499.002499.003499.005499.0051499.006499.01499.012499.0121499.01212499.03499.067 Florida Administrative Code (2) 64F-12.00164F-12.012
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DEBORAH MCRAE vs KASH N' KARRY, D/B/A SWEETBAY SUPERMARKET, 09-006222 (2009)
Division of Administrative Hearings, Florida Filed:Fort Myers, Florida Nov. 13, 2009 Number: 09-006222 Latest Update: Jan. 14, 2011

The Issue Whether Petitioner was subjected to age, marital status, and disability or perceived disability discrimination while employed by Respondent, in violation of Subsection 760.10(1)(a), Florida Statutes (2009).1 Whether Petitioner was subjected to retaliation while employed by Respondent, in violation of Subsection 760.10(7), Florida Statutes.

Findings Of Fact Petitioner, Deborah McRae, is a registered pharmacist, licensed in Florida and Georgia since January 25, 1978. Petitioner has been employed by Respondent, Kash N' Karry, d/b/a Sweetbay Supermarket (Sweetbay or Respondent), from January 2005 to the present. Petitioner is currently on an extended leave of absence, but remains employed by Respondent. Respondent is an employer under the Florida Civil Rights Act (FCRA) of 1992. Petitioner’s Employment at the Daniels Parkway Store From January 2005 until December 2008, Petitioner worked as an assistant pharmacy manager inside Sweetbay store located on Daniels Parkway in Fort Myers, Florida. Her job duties included filling and dispensing prescriptions, counseling customers, screening for drug interactions or patient allergies, communicating with physicians to clarify prescriptions, and contacting insurance companies when necessary. Although the Daniels Parkway pharmacy was relatively slow, Respondent never promised Petitioner that she would not be required to work at a high-volume store. In fact, during the time she was employed at the Daniels Parkway store, she covered shifts at higher-volume stores, including the North Fort Myers store, whose pharmacy had at least double the weekly volume of the Daniels Parkway store. Although upper management had not been informed of problems with Petitioner’s job performance at the Daniels Parkway store, the pharmacy manager and store management received some complaints from customers about Petitioner being rude and providing poor customer service. Store management handled these complaints informally by speaking directly to Petitioner about them. Petitioner’s pharmacy manager at the Daniels Parkway store was Patrick Fung (Fung). In addition to a few customer complaints to Fung, Petitioner would leave a lot of tasks for Fung to complete the following day and would create difficulties with respect to the pharmacy schedule. In February 2009, Respondent permanently closed the Daniels Parkway store. Earlier, in mid-January 2009, the company announced to the associates that the Daniels Parkway store would be closing. In December 2008, Petitioner took a medical leave of absence for back surgery. Although she mentioned that she was having back surgery, Petitioner did not inform anyone in Respondent's management that she had a permanent disability concerning her back or that she had any other disability. Respondent's management did not know Petitioner had, nor did it regard Petitioner as having, a permanent disability. Petitioner never asked for an accommodation for her back pain or any mental health disability. Indeed, Petitioner never submitted any documents to Respondent, stating that she had a disability or any type of mental health condition. Petitioner never told Respondent that she had a mental health condition. No one in Respondent's management knew or thought that Petitioner had a mental condition and never saw any documentation to that effect. Petitioner was still on a medical leave of absence in early February 2009, when the Daniels Parkway store closed. Employment and Promotion to Pharmacy Manager Position at Lehigh Acres In mid-January 2009, when the company announced the Daniels Parkway store closing, there were only two open pharmacy positions in the region: the assistant pharmacy manager position at the store in Lehigh Acres near Fort Myers, Florida, and the assistant pharmacy manager position in the store in Estero, Florida. The regional pharmacy business supervisor during the relevant time period was Diane Fagan (Fagan). Fagan made an effort to place Petitioner and Fung into the two open pharmacy positions. Fagan felt both Fung and Petitioner were good pharmacists and wished to retain them with Respondent. Because Fung was a pharmacy manager and actively on the payroll, he was given the option of accepting either of the two open assistant pharmacy manager positions or, alternatively, to accept a severance package. Fung voluntarily selected the Estero position, to become effective after the Daniels Parkway store closed. In doing so, Fung voluntarily accepted a demotion with a concomitant reduction in pay. It is undisputed that Fung was qualified for the Estero position, he was Petitioner’s supervisor at the time, and, therefore, it was reasonable that he be offered the position first. By allowing Fung to decide between the two positions, Fagan did not consider Petitioner’s or Fung’s age, marital status, or disability status. Petitioner failed to provide any evidence as to Fung’s age, marital status or disability status, and whether they differed from Petitioner’s. There is no evidence on this issue that demonstrated that any decisions made by Respondent regarding Petitioner’s employment were made because of age, her marital status, disability or the perception that she had a disability. After Fung selected the Estero position, Petitioner was offered the remaining assistant pharmacy manager position at the Lehigh Acres store, to become effective after the Daniels Parkway store closed, and when she returned from medical leave. At the time, Petitioner did not yet have a projected release date to return to work. Alternatively, she was offered a severance package. In late February 2009, the pharmacy manager at the Lehigh Acres store abruptly resigned her position. On March 5, 2009, the two positions were offered to Petitioner. The following day, Petitioner voluntarily accepted the position of pharmacy manager. This was a promotion for Petitioner, which came with an increase in salary and additional benefits. During these discussions, Petitioner was offered the option of either a 30-hour or 36-hour work week (the 36-hour week came with the pro rata increase in pay). Petitioner voluntarily selected the 30-hour work week. Petitioner expressed that a 30-hour work week would be a positive for her. Petitioner never informed Respondent that she could not go to the Lehigh Acres store or that working at the Lehigh Acres store, in any way, would or did affect her back condition or any other alleged disability she may have had. Petitioner never informed Respondent that she had a permanent disability of any kind. Petitioner claims that she told Fagan that “she does not do well under stress.” Assuming that to be true, that statement does not qualify as informing Respondent that she had a mental health disability, and Petitioner never asked for a reasonable accommodation for any mental condition or disability. She never filed a request in writing for reasonable accommodation. The discussions about the job transfer and promotion were communicated to Petitioner while she was out on leave for the back surgery. Petitioner never indicated that the phone calls made to her by Fagan were inappropriate or unwelcomed. To the extent Petitioner contends the Lehigh Acres store was stressful due to high volume, the evidence shows that the Lehigh Acres pharmacy, although busier than the Daniels Parkway store, was a low-volume pharmacy, in comparison to other pharmacies in the region. Petitioner started in her pharmacy manager position at the Lehigh Acres Pharmacy on March 15, 2009, after she had been released by her doctor to return to work without restrictions of any kind. The job duties of a pharmacy manager are substantially the same as the job duties of an assistant pharmacy manager, the position Petitioner held at the Daniels Parkway store. The primary additional duty was that Petitioner was charged with the duty of working out the schedule between her and the assistant pharmacist and has input as to the pharmacy technician’s work schedule. Petitioner’s assistant pharmacist at the Lehigh Acres store was Opal Gagliardo (Gagliardo). Petitioner presented no evidence as to Gagliardo’s age or disability status, but testimony showed that she was married. In addition, Eron Goffena worked as a pharmacy technician at the Lehigh Acres pharmacy on Mondays and Tuesdays. Shortly after Petitioner started at the Lehigh Acres store, Respondent started receiving customer complaints about her. These included complaints about disorganization, inaccurate and incomplete filling of prescriptions, failure to fill prescriptions in a timely manner, and talking on the phone while ignoring customers for extended periods of time. Some customers became so dissatisfied that they transferred their prescriptions to another store. The Lehigh Acres pharmacy was open six days per week and was closed on Sundays. Petitioner was scheduled to work three 10-hour shifts per week. When Petitioner started at the Lehigh Acres store, Gagliardo was scheduled to work two 10-hour shifts per week, and the other shift was covered by another rotating pharmacist. Soon thereafter, in March 2009, Gagliardo agreed to become full-time and, like Petitioner, worked three 10-hour shifts per week. Consistent with normal practice, Petitioner and Gagliardo worked together to agree to a mutually-acceptable schedule: two-day-on/two-day-off, with each having every other weekend off. However, Petitioner later decided she no longer wanted to work this schedule and sought to make changes to it. This gave rise to an ongoing disagreement between Petitioner and Gagliardo regarding the schedule, which was not resolved by the time Petitioner went out on her second leave of absence. In addition, Petitioner failed to complete many of her daily pharmacist duties. The testimony is credible that she failed to consistently fill the prescriptions that came in during her shift; instead, leaving them for the next shift’s pharmacist. Petitioner was disorganized and did not follow the proper workflow procedures. This resulted in customers’ prescriptions not being completed in a timely manner. Additionally, Petitioner did not answer the telephone often while she was working, failed to put up the stock that came in during her shift, left the pharmacy messy, and would not empty her garbage, leaving it overnight for the next pharmacist to do. Petitioner did not work well with her coworkers and, unlike other pharmacists, delegated problems and insurance issues to the pharmacy technicians, or left them for Gagliardo. On Saturday, March 21, 2009, Gagliardo wrote a note to Petitioner setting forth her concerns about her work and customer complaints, and how it was affecting Gagliardo’s working conditions. Gagliardo left the note next to the pharmacy computer for Petitioner to read during her next scheduled shift. When Fagan learned of customer complaints about Petitioner and issues regarding the timeliness of processing prescriptions, she asked her pharmacy specialist, Christine Stills (Stills), to visit the store to introduce the company’s pharmacy workflow program to Petitioner, in order to reduce the level of stress and improve customer service. On March 23, 2009, Stills, Anna Winters (Winters), and Petitioner met in Winters’ office to discuss the workflow procedures. In response, Petitioner indicated that she wanted additional technician hours to help with the workflow. Petitioner did not express or suggest that her desire for more technician hours was, in any way, due to, or a request for accommodation for any disability. Respondent has company-wide guidelines for determining the number of pharmacy technician hours that can be used in each store, based on the number of prescription filled by the store per week. The staffing at the Lehigh Acres pharmacy was consistent with these guidelines and was consistent with staffing before and after Petitioner worked there. Although Petitioner disagreed with the guidelines, Petitioner’s pharmacy technician hours actually exceeded the company guidelines. Pursuant to the guidelines, a pharmacy with Lehigh Acres’ volume was allotted six hours of technician help per week. During Petitioner’s tenure, the Lehigh Acres pharmacy was provided at least 13 hours of technician help. In addition, Petitioner had a trainee helping her on the cash register for at least two days. The Lehigh Acres pharmacy also was staffed similarly pursuant to the guidelines under the previous pharmacy manager, Anna Lowry. The customer volume (and number of technician hours) at the Lehigh Acres pharmacy has remained approximately the same since Petitioner went out on a second leave of absence. Following the March 23, 2009, meeting, Petitioner went back to the pharmacy and found the note Gagliardo had left by the computer. Petitioner returned to Stills and accused Gagliardo of “sabotaging” her. Petitioner also called Gagliardo at home that evening and was very belligerent, accusing Gagliardo of “sabotage” and stating that Gagliardo had “crucified her” and “nailed her to the cross.” On Friday, April 3, 2009, a meeting was held at the Lehigh Acres store between Petitioner, Fagan, Stills and Winters. This meeting was to be a fact-finding meeting to let Petitioner know her performance was not at the expected level, to discuss the customer complaints and concerns, and to get some feedback from Petitioner as to why this was happening. During this meeting, Petitioner was counseled with respect to the customer complaints about her. In response, Petitioner blamed Gagliardo for at least one of the complaints and again accused Gagliardo of “sabotaging” her. The only example Petitioner could provide of purported “sabotage” was that a box of paper clips she had placed on the pharmacy counter had been moved, and she believed that Gagliardo hid them (although the paper clips later were found in a drawer marked “pharmacy supplies”). Fagan asked Petitioner for other examples of “sabotage,” to which Petitioner pulled out a bundle of notes, which, she suggested may reflect additional examples, but Petitioner would not turn them over or allow anyone to read them. Petitioner also responded that the pharmacy manager duties were overwhelming. When asked for specifics, she could not provide any examples of duties she had as a pharmacy manager that were over and above what she previously had as the assistant pharmacy manager. Instead, Petitioner again requested that she needed more pharmacy technician hours. The pharmacy staffing guidelines were again explained to her, and her request was denied. Near the conclusion of the meeting, Fagan asked Petitioner if she had any questions or comments in response to what had been presented, but Petitioner did not offer any questions or comments. At no time during the meeting did Petitioner say anything about age or disability discrimination, or retaliation. At no time during the meeting was Petitioner ever told that her employment was being terminated, that she was being suspended or demoted, or that she was being subjected to a reduction in salary or benefits, or any other adverse employment action. Petitioner’s counseling had no tangible impact on terms, conditions, or privileges of her employment. Petitioner was never suspended, her employment was not terminated, and her salary and benefits were not reduced. Following the meeting, Petitioner went to the store pharmacy, gathered her personal belongings and pharmacy license, packed them up, and left the store. She was not asked to do this, nor was it even suggested; rather, she took it upon herself to behave as if she would not be returning to the store. A Counseling Memo was prepared specifying the concerns and issues shared with Petitioner during the meeting. A Counseling Memo is a document on which company management highlights an issue related to job performance. It coaches an associate, as to, how that issue can be addressed and resolved. Neither the meeting nor the Counseling Memo were in any way based on Petitioner’s age, marital status, disability or any perceived disability. Because Petitioner had removed her possessions from the pharmacy, management was concerned she may not be returning for her next scheduled shift: Monday, April 6, 2009. Thus, Stills (who was responsible for insuring pharmacy coverage) called Petitioner and asked her if she was reporting to work on Monday. Winters also called Petitioner to see how she was doing. Although Petitioner was offended, these calls did not constitute adverse employment actions. Petitioner reported to work for her next shift on Monday, April 6, 2009, where she was presented the Counseling Memo. Petitioner was not being demoted, fired, suspended or otherwise suffering adverse employment action. In response, Petitioner wrote management, stating that she “did not realize the full responsibilities of pharmacy manager,” but did not make any reference to age or disability discrimination, or retaliation. Petitioner’s Second Leave of Absence The following day, April 7, 2009, was the last day Petitioner worked before going back out on a medical leave of absence. The reason for this second leave of absence was a recurrence of her back pain. Prior to taking this leave of absence, Petitioner had not told anyone that her back condition was bothering her while at the Lehigh Acres store. Since going out on this second leave of absence, Petitioner has not submitted any documentation to Respondent, which indicated that she is able to return to work in any capacity. Petitioner did testify that she expects to be released to return to work in the future. In June 2009, Petitioner did receive documentation from her physician indicating she was able to return to light-duty work, but Petitioner never submitted this documentation to Respondent and never requested Respondent to provide her any kind of light-duty work. Instead, she went to a different doctor, who stated that she was unable to return to work at that time, and submitted that documentation to Respondent. Petitioner remains employed by Respondent and is still on a leave of absence. She received short-term disability benefits of 100 percent of her salary for six months after going out on a leave of absence on April 7, 2009. Following the expiration of short-term disability benefits, and up to the present, Petitioner has received long-term disability benefits equivalent to one-third of her monthly salary. Since going out on a leave of absence, Petitioner has not sought any other employment except to submit an application for employment to Publix. She did not disclose to Publix that she had a disability. Alleged Discrimination/Retaliation Respondent has an anti-discrimination policy, which contains a complaint procedure under which employees are required to report any discrimination that they feel they are experiencing in the workplace. Petitioner was familiar with this policy and knew how to report perceived discrimination. Petitioner never reported any form of discrimination to Respondent. Therefore, no decisions made by Respondent regarding Petitioner’s employment were made in retaliation for reporting discrimination. The evidence does not show that any decisions made by Respondent's officials regarding Petitioner’s employment were made due to her age, marital status, disability, or any perceived disability. Petitioner speculates that Respondent's management may have viewed her personal pharmacy records and saw that she took anti-depressants and/or anti-anxiety medication and, from that, concluded that she suffered from a mental disability. Petitioner introduced no evidence supporting this theory. Petitioner admitted that she has no personal knowledge whether Respondent's management viewed her personal pharmacy records. Petitioner admits that the conditions she alleges were discriminatory (e.g., the allegedly stressful environment at the Lehigh Acres store) were not in any way related to her back condition. Rather, Petitioner theorizes that the allegedly stressful environment exacerbated her alleged mental condition. Petitioner failed to prove that she suffered age, marital status, or disability discrimination.

Recommendation Based upon the above Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that the Florida Commission on Human Relations enter a final order dismissing Petitioner's petition for age and disability discrimination and retaliation under the Florida Civil Rights Act. DONE AND ENTERED this 29th day of October, 2010, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S DANIEL M. KILBRIDE Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 29th day of October, 2010.

USC (2) 42 U.S.C 1210242 U.S.C 1211 CFR (1) 29 CFR 1630.2(m) Florida Laws (4) 120.569120.57760.10760.11
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BOARD OF PHARMACY vs AHMAD ALLY AND THE MEDICINE SHOPPE, 90-005809 (1990)
Division of Administrative Hearings, Florida Filed:Miami, Florida Sep. 14, 1990 Number: 90-005809 Latest Update: Dec. 23, 1991

The Issue Whether petitioner should take disciplinary action against respondent for the reasons alleged in the administrative complaint?

Findings Of Fact At all pertinent times, respondent has held a Florida pharmacist's license, No. PS0017402, and has been president of American Chemist Shops, Inc., which holds permit No. PH0009600 to operate The Medicine Shoppe, a community pharmacy, at 488 NE 125th Street in North Miami, Florida. A second generation pharmacist, Mr. Ally trained in his native (British) Guyana and at the Chelsea School of Pharmacy in London, before qualifying as a pharmacist in England. He also worked at Rand Memorial Hospital in Freeport, Bahama Islands, before his initial licensure in Florida in 1979. After three years as a staff pharmacist at one Florida hospital and five and a half years as director of pharmacy at another, he went to work for Mrs. Friedman, a pharmacist's widow, then bought the pharmacy from her. Ever since he started at The Medicine Shoppe, respondent has been director of the pharmacy department. Even when Howard Friedmann was alive, Bonita Liston, a woman in her twenties, was a regular customer of The Medicine Shoppe. From time to time a Dr. Murray prescribed pain killers or antibiotics for her. The shop kept a file or card on Ms. Liston as it did on other regular customers. Ms. Liston's record reflected the filling of several prescriptions, but none after June 10, 1988, the date respondent's assistant made a note in the file which reads, "North Miami Detectives came in Shoppe, Do not disperse any Rx's." Hearing Officer's Exhibit No. 1. Nevertheless, on November 28, 1988, Mr. Ally gave Ms. Liston a brown two-ounce bottle full of Tussionex, a Schedule III "medicinal drug" containing hydrocodone. Coughing, she had arrived without a prescription shortly before the pharmacy closed that day. Dr. Murray had prescribed six-ounce supplies of this medicine for her on two occasions in September of 1987, and, respondent testified, she told him she would secure another such prescription the next day, return for four more ounces, and make payment. With Ms. Liston at the pharmacy on November 28, 1988, was Jodie Schuster, at the time an undercover policewoman working for the North Miami Police Department. Concealed on her person was a microphone or "body bug" which allowed special agent Jeffrey Michael Portz of the Florida Department of Law Enforcement to monitor conversations in the pharmacy. On December 7, 1988, respondent's 35th wedding anniversary, Ms. Schuster returned to the pharmacy similarly wired, and Mr. Portz resumed monitoring. She asked for more cough medicine for Ms. Liston, and respondent gave her two ounces of Hycodan, a drug not unlike Tussionex. Respondent's testimony that he did not also give her Valium tablets has been credited. Again no money changed hands, nor was any consideration offered or discussed. Taken from the pharmacy in handcuffs, respondent was criminally prosecuted and, on May 22, 1987, sentenced. Among other things, the sentencing judge suspended respondent's pharmacist's license effective that date. Petitioner reinstated the license on January 31, 1991, and renewed it shortly before hearing. Before his arrest, respondent and his assistant filled 80 to 120 prescriptions a day. In keeping with legal requirements, physicians prescribing controlled substances report the number assigned them by the federal Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA), by writing it or causing it to be written on the prescription form. Every such number is preceded by two letters, "A" followed by the first letter of the doctor's last name. Among the prescriptions for controlled substances filled by respondent or under his supervision at The Medicine Shoppe were some 30 which another pharmacist testified he would not have filled without verification. Two do not have patients' addresses. One prescription filled, Petitioner's Exhibit No. 1A, lacks a legible doctor's name, and has no DEA number. Another gives DEA number AH 224 3119 for a Dr. A. Carlos Casademont. Petitioner's Exhibit No. 6B. These irregularities notwithstanding, petitioner did not offer competent evidence to prove that any of the prescriptions were forged or invalid. An expert testified that good practice would have required verification, but was unable to say that respondent had in fact failed to verify the prescriptions. Petitioner did not allege or prove the absence of a written record (apart from the cancelled prescriptions themselves) of controlled substances, or prove the contents of any such records.

Recommendation It is, accordingly recommended: That petitioner suspend respondent's pharmacist's license for two (2) years, with credit for any suspension on account of delivery of Tussionex to Bonita Liston already accomplished. That petitioner suspend respondent's pharmacy permit for one (1) year, with credit for any suspension on account of delivery of Tussionex to Bonita Liston already accomplished. RECOMMENDED this 27th day of August, 1991, in Tallahassee, Florida. ROBERT T. BENTON, II Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, FL 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 27th day of August, 1991. APPENDIX TO RECOMMENDED ORDER, CASE NO. 90-5809 With respect to petitioner's proposed finding of fact No. 1, the testimony was that the drug delivered to Ms. Schuster on December 7, 1988, resembled Tussionex but was not Tussionex. Petitioner's proposed finding of fact No. 2 is rejected as against the weight of the evidence. With respect to petitioner's proposed finding of fact No. 3, the evidence showed that certain prescriptions lacked the patient's address, the physician's DEA number or other detail, but petitioner's expert said it was acceptable practice to fill such prescriptions, if verified. Petitioner's proposed finding of fact No. 4 has been accepted at least as regards the Casademont prescription with DEA No. AH 224 3119. Petitioner's proposed finding of fact No. 5 is really a proposed conclusion of law. Respondent's proposed finding of fact No. 3, including subparts, has been adopted in substance, insofar as material, and to the extent reported in the findings of fact. Respondent's proposed findings of fact Nos. 4.1 through 4.4 are rejected as contrary to the weight of the evidence. Respondent's proposed findings of fact Nos. 4.5 through 4.9 and No. 5, including subparts, have been adopted, in substance, insofar as material. COPIES FURNISHED: John Taylor, Executive Director Board of Pharmacy Department of Professional Regulation 1940 N. Monroe Street Tallahassee, FL 32399-0792 Jack McRay, General Counsel Department of Professional Regulation 1940 N. Monroe Street Tallahassee, FL 32399-0792 Michael A. Mone, Esquire Department of Professional Regulation 1940 N. Monroe Street Tallahassee, FL 32399-0752 Neil F. Garfield, Esquire Garfield & Associates 3500 North State Road 7, Suite 333 Ft. Lauderdale, FL 33319

Florida Laws (5) 465.003465.0155465.016465.023893.04
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DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH, BOARD OF PHARMACY vs OLA`S PHARMACY, INC., 03-004782PL (2003)
Division of Administrative Hearings, Florida Filed:Miami, Florida Dec. 22, 2003 Number: 03-004782PL Latest Update: Dec. 25, 2024
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BOARD OF PHARMACY vs. SPRING LAKE PHARMACY AND NATALIE PATTON, 81-000555 (1981)
Division of Administrative Hearings, Florida Number: 81-000555 Latest Update: Nov. 22, 1991

Findings Of Fact The Respondent, Natalie Patton, is a licensed pharmacist and has been licensed since 1959. She is a graduate of Sanford University, Birmingham, Alabama, and was initially licensed in Alabama as a pharmacist. She has worked as a licensed pharmacist for twelve years in Highlands County in the vicinity of Sebring. She is licensed as a pharmacy consultant as well and has been employed at several hospitals and pharmacies in that geographical area. She opened her present pharmacy' business in November, 1978, in a rural area southwest of Sebring at the community of Spring Lake. Her's is the only pharmacy in seventeen miles and her business volume reflects the rural nature of her business location and clientele in that she fills an average of thirty-five to fifty prescriptions a day. On "Race Friday," the day prior to the Sports Car Race at Sebring, a man entered her pharmacy complaining of severe headache and allergy to fumes associated with the infield and pits at the racetrack. He asked for Darvon, explaining that this was the only medication successful in treating his headaches. He explained he was from another part of the State and had no way to contact his physician. She sold him a non-prescription drug. He came back the next day, the day in question, March 22, and explained that her suggestion that he go to the emergency room the day before was impractical because a newspaper ad he had seen described the emergency room as overloaded and turning patients away. He complained of a worsening headache. She testified that she felt sympathy for him and ultimately and reluctantly sold him, at her cost, four Darvon to be used that Saturday and four for that Sunday. The individual requesting the medication then revealed himself to be a Deputy Sheriff of Highlands County, who arrested her on the spot, charging her with dispensing the Darvon without a prescription in violation of the above authority. She ultimately was tried on the charges and convicted, but adjudication was withheld and she was placed on three years probation by the Circuit Judge. A second related criminal charge was ultimately dismissed. She has been under the direction of a probation officer since that time and must report all her activities and receive permission before traveling out of her county. She also has been required to pay fifty dollars a month to reimburse the public defender for his services on her behalf. She is still operating her business and her customers have professed loyalty to her and her business is still increasing in volume. She has never had any altercation with law enforcement authorities of any type in her past and has never been convicted of any felony or misdemeanor. With the agreement of counsel for the Petitioner, certain testimonial letters on her behalf from persons who were not in attendance at the hearing were admitted as composite exhibit 1. These letters attest to and establish the fact, in corroboration of her testimony, that she is a decent and useful citizen and that she was totally unaware that she was committing a felonious act. These letters corroborate her testimony and establish that she is a crucial asset to her rural community. She is depended upon by numerous citizens, many of whom are of advanced years and who require frequent medication and are unable to travel any great distance. She has obviously gone to great lengths to operate her business in a professional and compassionate manner even to the extent of delivering medications to senior citizens and others long after the closing hours of her pharmacy. These letters in support of her position also are replete with instances described where she adheres strictly to the dictates of the various physicians' prescriptions and refused on a number of occasions to prescribe medication without a prescription. There is no question that the evidence in this record establishes that the Respondent is clothed with the highest personal integrity and moral character and that the isolated incident when she dispensed medication in violation of the above authority is not characteristic of the regular and otherwise consistent manner in which she practices pharmacy and conducts her business. The Respondent's probation officer sent a letter which is incorporated in Respondent's Exhibit 1 attesting to her conscientious efforts to obey the law and her usefulness as a citizen. He expressed the belief that she was unaware that she was actually committing a crime when the subject violation occurred and that she was simply and compassionately attempting to help a customer in trouble. He is convinced that revoking her pharmacy license would serve no useful purpose and would indeed impose a hardship on the rural customers she serves. He firmly believes she would not consciously violate the law or purposefully commit an illegal act. The Respondent was authorized by the Circuit Judge in the Respondent's criminal proceeding to make the following statement on the record in this proceeding: In re Natalie Patton: In open Court, in disposing of this case, and putting Natalie Patton on probation without adjudication, I made note of the numerous letters I received from people in the community, urging the Court to be lenient. The Respondent then noted that there were a hundred and forty signatures on those testimonial letters. At the conclusion of the Respondent's case the Respondent requested that the penalty herein be limited to a letter of reprimand. The Petitioner introduced no evidence and otherwise took no position with regard to the question of an appropriate penalty.

Recommendation Having considered the foregoing findings of fact, conclusions of law, the candor and demeanor of the witness and the evidence in the record, it is RECOMMENDED: That Natalie N. Patton and Spring Lake Pharmacy remain licensed and that Natalie Patton be accorded a written reprimand by the Board regarding the subject violation and that she be placed on probation by the Board for a period of time coextensive with the probation imposed in the criminal proceeding related hereto during which time her conduct of the practice of pharmacy be subjected to periodic monitoring by the Board. DONE AND ENTERED this 2nd day of November, 1981, in Tallahassee, Florida. COPIES FURNISHED: William M. Furlow, Esquire Department of Professional Regulation 130 North Monroe Street Tallahassee, Florida 32301 Michael J. Trombley, Esquire 329 South Commerce Avenue Sebring, Florida 33870 P. MICHAEL RUFF, Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The Oakland Building 2009 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32301 904/488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 4th day of November, 1981.

Florida Laws (3) 120.57465.016893.04
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BOARD OF PHARMACY vs. CHARLES MCARTHUR, 84-001634 (1984)
Division of Administrative Hearings, Florida Number: 84-001634 Latest Update: Jun. 20, 1990

The Issue The issues are those promoted by an administrative complaint brought by the State of Florida, Department of Professional Regulation, against the Respondent, Charles McArthur. In particular, it is alleged that the Respondent practiced pharmacy in the state of Florida with an expired license, in violation of Subsection 465.015(2)(b), Florida Statutes (1981).

Findings Of Fact Respondent, Charles McArthur, is a pharmacist licensed by the State of Florida. His license number is 0012091. On June 20, 1983, Respondent attempted to renew his pharmacy license issued by the state of Florida on a bi-annual basis. He attempted this renewal by appearing in person before officials with the State of Florida, Board of Pharmacy, entitled to grant renewal. That renewal was denied based upon the fact that the Respondent was unable to provide verification of the requisite continuing education credits necessary for relicensure. As a consequence, on June 21, 1983 Respondent's active pharmacy license expired, leaving the Respondent with an inactive pharmacy license. For the period June 21, 1983 through July 20, 1983 Respondent practiced pharmacy with an inactive license. During that time frame, Thomas Hannah, an investigator with the State of Florida, Department of Professional Regulation, visited the Respondent in the pharmacy in which Respondent was practicing in Tallahassee, Florida. He observed the Respondent practice pharmacy and noted the presence of the expired active Florida pharmacy license. On that occasion, Hannah told the Respondent that he was operating without a current license. On the following day, July 20, 1953, Respondent paid the appropriate fees and made proof of the requisite continuing education credits and his active pharmacy license was re-issued. Subsequent to that date Respondent has held an active pharmacy license issued by the State of Florida. In view of the Respondent's practice of pharmacy with an inactive license from the period of June 21, 1983 through July 20, 1983, Respondent was charged with the present offense and requested, and was granted, a formal Subsection 120.57(1), Florida Statutes, hearing. In dealing with other recalcitrant licensees who have not renewed their licenses in the time allotted, the Board of Pharmacy, prior to February, 1980 sent a list to Board inspectors within one or two weeks following the due date of renewal and those inspectors contacted the licensees to ascertain whether the licensees had renewed their pharmacy licenses. If they found that the individual pharmacist did not renew his license that person was given an opportunity to fill out an application, to pay the fee, and to present his continuing education credits to the investigator. Persons who were not entitled to renew due to problems with the continuing education credits were told that they were delinquent, and practicing with a delinquent license was a violation of law. Those persons were given the opportunity to take leave of absence from their active pharmacy practice. Around February, 1980 due to the re- organization of the State of Florida, Department of Professional Regulation, insufficient work force was available to carry out this process of checking on the topic of the delinquent license renewals, and this sequence of inactivity continued until approximately December, 1981. During this period actions were not brought against pharmacists for failure to timely renew a license to practice pharmacy, within the meaning of Section 465.015(2)(b), Florida Statutes, provided they renewed licenses within one year of the appropriate renewal date. In December, 1981 the practice changed and the pharmacists would be prosecuted for failure to timely renew a license to practice pharmacy and continuing to practice with an expired license. This change in policy position which occurred in December, 1981 was not shown in the course of the hearing to be a matter noticed for the benefit of the practicing pharmacists in the State of Florida.

Florida Laws (4) 120.57465.008465.015465.016
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BOARD OF PHARMACY vs PATRICK O. OJO, 98-001093 (1998)
Division of Administrative Hearings, Florida Filed:Fort Lauderdale, Florida Mar. 06, 1998 Number: 98-001093 Latest Update: Jul. 06, 2004

The Issue At issue is whether Respondent committed the offenses set forth in the Administrative Complaint and, if so, what penalty should be imposed.

Findings Of Fact Respondent's license and employment Respondent, Patrick O. Ojo, is now, and was at all times material hereto, licensed as a pharmacist by the State of Florida, having been issued license number PS 0032023. At all times pertinent hereto, Respondent was under contract with Healthcare Consultants of Central Florida, Inc., d/b/a Healthcare Consultants Pharmacy Staffing (Healthcare Consultants) , a corporation engaged in "the business of placing licensed pharmacists on a temporary and permanent basis" with businesses in need of their services. Pursuant to the agreement, Healthcare Consultants would "from time to time during the term of . . . [the] agreement offer [the] pharmacist the right to perform pharmaceutical services at the location of various clients, " which the pharmacist had the option to accept or reject. If accepted, for temporary services provided under the agreement, Healthcare Consultants would pay the pharmacist $25.50 per hour, except for legal holidays when the rate would be $41.25 per hour. Pursuant to a referral from Healthcare Consultants, Respondent accepted a position, on a temporary basis, as pharmacy manager for A & N Discount Pharmacy on June 2, 1997. A & N Discount Pharmacy is a community pharmacy licensed by Petitioner pursuant to Section 465.018, Florida Statutes, and located at 900 Alton Road, Miami Beach, Florida. The pharmacy inspection On June 24, 1997, Harold Gluck, a senior pharmacist employed by the Agency for Health Care Administration (AHCA), entered A & N Discount Pharmacy to conduct a routine community pharmacy inspection. Pertinent to this case, that inspection noted three deficiencies or violations against the pharmacy business, to wit: (1) there was a 2:1 technician to pharmacist ratio, without prior approval of the Board of Pharmacy (a perceived violation of Rule 64B16-27.410, Florida Administrative Code); (2) the two technicians were not wearing identification badges ( a perceived violation of Rule 64B16-27.410, Florida Administrative Code); and (3) the prescription department was only open 24 hours per week, as opposed to 40 hours per week (a perceived violation of Rule 64B16-28.404, Florida Administrative Code). Mr. Gluck's visual observations are supported by compelling proof, and are credited.

Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that a final order be entered which dismisses Counts I and IV of the Administrative Complaint; finds Respondent guilty of violating Section 465.016(1)(n), Florida Statutes, by failing to comply with Rule 64B16-27.410, Florida Administrative Code, as alleged in Counts II and III of the Administrative Complaint; and, which imposes, as a penalty for such violations, the issuance of a letter of guidance. DONE AND ENTERED this 15th day of September, 1998, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. WILLIAM J. KENDRICK Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 15th day of September, 1998.

Florida Laws (7) 120.569120.57120.60465.003465.016465.018475.25 Florida Administrative Code (6) 64B16-27.10064B16-27.10464B16-27.41064B16-28.40464B16-30.00164B16-30.002
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DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH, BOARD OF PHARMACY vs PEARL STREET PHARMACY, 00-000687 (2000)
Division of Administrative Hearings, Florida Filed:Jacksonville, Florida Feb. 09, 2000 Number: 00-000687 Latest Update: Dec. 25, 2024
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