The Issue Whether Petitioners should remain eligible for entitlement to a new quota alcoholic beverage license in St. Lucie County, Florida under the facts and circumstances of this case.
Findings Of Fact Upon consideration of the oral and documentary evidence adduced at the hearing, the following relevant findings of fact are made: On December 4, 1989 the Petitioners filed an application for inclusion in the drawing for a new quota alcoholic beverage license for St. Lucie County, Florida in accordance with Section 561.19(2), Florida Statutes. The application to participate in the drawing was properly and timely filed on DBR Form 747L, entitled, "Preliminary Application for New Quota Alcoholic Beverage License". Paragraph 4 of the General Instructions of DBR Form 747L, advised the applicants as follows: This is Part One of a two (2) part applica- tion. The Division will only accept final application (Part Two) and award licenses to those persons listed on the application, provided such persons are qualified under the beverage laws and are successful in the drawing. On March 29, 1990, the Respondent held a drawing in Tallahassee, Florida for 163 new quota liquor licenses. Petitioners were selected as a preliminary applicant for a new quota license in St. Lucie County. On April 6, 1990, the Petitioners were mailed a certified letter entitled "Notice of Selection" advising the Petitioners of their selection as preliminary applicants for a new quota liquor license in St. Lucie County. Petitioners received this letter on April 9, 1990. This letter clearly advises the Petitioners: that an application for either a "grant" or an "issuance" of a license must be filed; of the difference between "grant" and "issuance"; that a complete application for a "grant" or "issuance" must be filed within 45 days of the date of the letter which is calculated to be May 21 ,1990; that failure to timely file such applica- tion shall be deemed a waiver of the Peti- tioners' right to file for a new quota license and; of the immediacy of contacting the District 10 office in Ft. Pierce, Florida to obtain instructions and, if necessary, answer questions. On or about April 17, 1990 John Clark, Petitioners' employee went to the District 10 office in Fort Pierce and discussed with Irene Wahlenmeyer the suitability of a location of a former lounge. There was no evidence that Clark discussed the May 21, 1990 deadline for applying for the new quota liquor license with Wahlenmeyer at this time. On April 18, 1990 Petitioner, Owen Young contacted the District 10 office by phone and talked to Wahlenmeyer concerning the procedural aspects of applying for a new quota liquor license including the procedural aspects of applying for a "grant" of a license as opposed to applying for the "issuance" of a license. There is insufficient evidence to show that Wahlenmeyer suggested or implied that the Petitioners should apply for the "issuance" of a license as opposed to applying for a "grant" of a license. During the telephone conversation with Wahlenmeyer on April 28, 1990, Petitioner, Owen Young discussed with Wahlenmeyer the suitability of a location of a former lounge known as "Fanny's" and, the potential lease of this property. This was the same location discussed by Clark on April 17, 1990. There is no evidence that either of the Petitioners had any further contact with any of Respondent's employees subsequent to April 18, 1990 and prior to May 21, 1990, the final deadline to submit an application for a new quota liquor license. Although Petitioners' employee Clark visited the District 10 office sometime between May 10, 1990 and June 5, 1990, there is insufficient evidence to show that this visit was prior to May 21, 1990. Subsequent to April 18, 1990 Owen Young began work on the application process by publishing a fictitious name, applying for an occupational license and obtaining a distance waiver from the zoning board as to the Fanny's location. Additionally, Petitioners entered into a lease for the Fanny's location, expended considerable sums of money on remodeling and obligated themselves to a monthly expenditure of approximately $2,500.00 per month. There is no evidence that either of the Petitioners or Clark, on behalf of Petitioners, contacted the District 10 office or any of Respondent's other offices or any of Respondent's employees subsequent to April 6, 1990, the date of the notice of selection letter and prior to June 5, 1990, the date of the Notice of Intent to Disapprove letter inquiring as to the significance of the deadline date of May 21, 1990 or requesting an extension or waiver of the deadline date. Furthermore, there is no evidence that Wahlenmeyer or any of Respondent's other employees advised, suggested or implied that the May 21, 1990 deadline date could be or would be extended or waived. On June 5, 1990 a letter entitled, Notice of Intent to Disapprove was mailed to the Petitioners advising them that: (a) their application for a new quota liquor license had not been filed within the prescribed time period of 45 days from April 6, 1990 the date the Notice of Selection had been mailed; (b) it was Respondent's intent to deny the Petitioners' entitlement to apply for a new quota liquor license in St. Lucie County; (c) they were given until June 18, 1990 to respond as to why this entitlement should not be disapproved and; (d) this time period to respond should not be considered as an extension of the time originally granted to file the application. On June 8, 1990 Petitioners filed an Application for the Grant of a New Quota Liquor License with the District 10 office in Fort Pierce. This application was forwarded to Respondent's central office on an "Application Transmittal Form" which indicated a recommendation of approval by the District 10 office Investigator, Irene Wahlenmeyer on June 8, 1990 and her supervisor, Bob Young on January 11, 1990. Bob Young later withdrew his recommendation of approval. There is insufficient evidence to show why Young withdrew his initial recommendation of approval. On June 25, 1990, a letter entitled, "Notice of Disapproval" was sent to Petitioners from Respondent advising the Petitioners that their entitlement to apply for a new quota liquor license had been disapproved. The reasons stated for the disapproval was the failure of the Petitioners to timely file a complete application within the 45 days required by Section 561.19, Florida Statutes. On or about July 5, 1990 the Petitioner, Owen Young contacted Schoenfeld via telephone and followed up with a letter on July 6, 1990 concerning the "Notice of Intent to Disapprove" and the "grant" of a license application filed on June 8, 1990. Schoenfeld responded with an investigation of the matter with the assistance of Captain D. L. Gray of the West Palm Beach district office. Gray's investigation concluded with a memorandum dated July 16, 1990 wherein Gray advised Schoenfeld that while the Fort Pierce office should not have accepted the application for grant of license from Petitioners or recommended approval, the notice of disapproval of June 25, 1990 was justified. Respondent did not consider the application for grant of license filed on June 8, 1990 as being a completed application and as of December 6, 1990 the Petitioners have not filed any other application for a new quota alcoholic beverage license. Respondent has extended the deadline date or re-initiated the application process where it was shown that the Respondent had incorrectly advised an applicant or had lost an application resulting in the applicant's untimely filing of an application. The purpose of the "Notice of Intent To Disapprove" is to allow the applicant the opportunity to point out to the Respondent its error. There is insufficient evidence to show that Petitioners' failure to timely file their application was due to any incorrect advise given them by the Respondent notwithstanding Petitioners' contention that they were advised to apply for an issuance of a license as opposed to a grant of a license. In any event, the Petitioners neither requested nor were they advised by the Respondent that the deadline date could or would be waived or extended.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing, it is recommended that the Respondent enter a Final Order finding that the Petitioners have waived their entitlement to apply for a new quota liquor license. RECOMMENDED this 15th day of January, 1991, in Tallahassee, Florida. WILLIAM R. CAVE Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 15th day of January, 1991. APPENDIX TO RECOMMENDED ORDER, CASE NO. 90-4470 The following constitutes my specific rulings pursuant to Sections 120.59(2), Florida Statutes, on the Proposed Findings of Fact submitted by the parties in this case. Specific Rulings on Proposed Findings of Fact Submitted by Petitioner 1. - 2. Adopted in Finding of Fact 1 as modified. Not material or relevant. Adopted in Finding of Fact 3 except the date was March 29, 1990 instead of April 6, 1990. - 6. Adopted in Finding of Fact 4. - 7. Adopted in Finding of Fact 5 but clarified. 8. - 9. Adopted in Finding of Fact 6 but clarified. 10. - 11. Adopted in Finding of Fact 7 but clarified. Not material or relevant. Adopted in Finding of Fact 9. - 19. Restatement of testimony and not of Finding of Fact but see Finding of Fact 14. 20. - 21. Not material or relevant. Third sentence adopted in Finding of Fact 10 otherwise not material or relevant. Adopted in Finding of Fact 10. Not material or relevant. Adopted in Finding of Fact 12. Adopted in Finding of Fact 12 as clarified otherwise not material or relevant. Specific Rulings on Proposed Findings of Facts Submitted by Respondent 1. 7. - 6. Adopted in Findings of Fact 1, 3, 4, 6, 9, and 10, respectively. Not material or relevant. 8. - 10. Adopted in Findings of Facts 11, 12, and 13, respectively. COPIES FURNISHED: Leonard Ivey, Director Division of Alcoholic Beverages and Tobacco Department of Business Regulation 725 South Bronough Street Tallahassee, FL 32399-1000 Joseph Sole, General Counsel Department of Business Regulation 725 South Bronough Street Tallahassee, FL 32399-1000 Eric S. Haug, Esquire Department of Business Regulation 725 South Bronough Street Tallahassee, FL 32399-1007 James P. McCollum, Esquire 129 South Commerce Avenue Sebring, FL 33870
Findings Of Fact The Respondent, Cornelia T Brown, doing business as the Oasis Restaurant Bar and Lounge, is the holder of beverage license No. 45-356, Series 2-COP. This license allows the consumption of alcoholic beverages on the premises, located on Douglas Road, Groveland, Florida. The Petitioner, State of Florida, Division of Alcoholic Beverages and Tobacco, is an agency of the State of Florida which has its responsibility the licensure and regulation of beverage license holders in the State of Florida. On June 12, 1980, pursuant to a search warrant, Lake County Sheriff and Groveland Police officials accompanied by Petitioner's Beverage Officer, conducted a search of the licensed premises. Respondent was present throughout the investigation. Among the items seized as suspected controlled substances were seven plastic baggies and eight small manila envelopes containing a total of 52.1 grams of cannabis. Currency in the amount of $2,273,67 was also seized. The cannabis and currency were contained in a purse belonging to Respondent. The purse was discovered in the kitchen of the licensed premises, an area not open to bar/restaurant patrons or other members of the public.
Recommendation From the foregoing findings of fact and conclusions of law, it is RECOMMENDED that Respondent be found guilty of violations as alleged in Counts 1, 2 and 4. It is further RECOMMENDED that County 3, which duplicates County 2, and Count 5, be DISMISSED. It is further RECOMMENDED that Respondent's License No. 45-356 be REVOKED. DONE AND ENTERED this 30th day of September 1981 in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. R. T. CARPENTER Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The Oakland Building 2009 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 30th day of September 1981. COPIES FURNISHED: Cornelia T. Brown Route 1, Box 350-7 Groveland, Florida 32736 James N. Watson, Jr., Esquire Department of Business Regulation 725 South Bronough Street Tallahassee, Florida 32301
Findings Of Fact The Parties. Petitioner, the Department of Business Regulation and Professional Regulation, Division of Alcoholic Beverages and Tobacco (hereinafter referred to as the "Division"), is an agency of the State of Florida charged with responsibility for enforcing Chapter 561, Florida Statutes. The Respondent is Walter Falcon, d/b/a Falcons JVJ General Store (hereinafter referred to as "Falcons"). At all times relevant to this proceeding Mr. Falcon held Florida alcoholic beverage license number 64-00453, series 2-COP (hereinafter referred to as the "License"). The License authorized Mr. Falcon to sell and possess alcoholic beverages on premises of Falcon's located at 1088 Highway 20, Interlachen, Putnam County, Florida. The Putnam County Sheriffs Office Investigation of Falcon's. In October of 1993, the Putnam County Sheriffs Office initiated an investigation of alleged sales of alcoholic beverages to persons under the age of 21 years at Falcons. On October 14, 19, 20 and 28, 1993 Pollyanna Alessi entered Falcons in furtherance of the Putnam County Sheriffs Office investigation. Ms. Alessi's date of birth is March 13, 1973. At all times relevant to this proceeding, Ms. Alessi was 20 years old. Ms. Alessi's appearance in October of 1993 was not such that an ordinary prudent person would believe her to be of legal age. On October 14, 1993: Ms. Alessi entered Falcon's and purchased a six-pack of Miller Genuine Draft beer. Petitioner's exhibit 2. Mr. Falcon sold the beer to Ms. Alessi. Mr. Falcon did not ask Ms. Alessi for any identification or other proof of age. Mr. Falcon also did not ask Ms. Alessi her age. On October 19, 1993: Ms. Alessi entered Falcon's and purchased a six-pack of Miller Genuine Draft beer. Petitioner's exhibit 3. Mr. Falcon sold the beer to Ms. Alessi. Mr. Falcon did not ask Ms. Alessi for any identification or other proof of age. Mr. Falcon also did not ask Ms. Alessi her age. On October 20, 1993: Ms. Alessi entered Falcon's and purchased one bottle of Miller Genuine Draft beer. Petitioner's exhibit 4. Mr. Falcon sold the beer to Ms. Alessi. Mr. Falcon did not ask Ms. Alessi for any identification or other proof of age. Mr. Falcon also did not ask Ms. Alessi her age. On October 28, 1993: Ms. Alessi entered Falcon's and purchased a six-pack of Coors beer. Petitioner's exhibit 5. Mr. Falcon sold the beer to Ms. Alessi. Mr. Falcon did not ask Ms. Alessi for any identification or other proof of age. Mr. Falcon also did not ask Ms. Alessi her age. The products purchased by Ms. Alessi were clearly labelled as beer, an alcoholic beverage, and were identified as alcoholic beverages. The Division's Investigation of Falcon's. On October 29, 1993, Chris LaBelle, while in the employ of the Division, participated in the investigation of alleged sales of alcoholic beverages to persons under the age of 21 years at Falcons. Ms. LaBelle's date of birth is April 29, 1974. At all times relevant to this proceeding, Ms. LaBelle was 19 years old. Ms. LaBelle's appearance on October 29, 1993 was not such that an ordinary prudent person would believe her to be of legal age. On October 29, 1993: Ms. LaBelle entered Falcon's and purchased a six-pack of Michelob Light beer. Petitioner's exhibit 7. Mr. Falcon sold the beer to Ms. LaBelle. Mr. Falcon did not ask Ms. LaBelle for any identification or other proof of age. Mr. Falcon also did not ask Ms. LaBelle her age. The products purchased by Ms. LaBelle were clearly labelled as beer, an alcoholic beverage, and were identified as alcoholic beverages.
Recommendation Based upon the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that the Department of Business and Professional Regulation, Division of Alcoholic Beverages and Tobacco, enter a Final Order finding that Walter Falcon, d/b/a Falcon's JVJ General Store, is guilty of the violations of Section 562.11(1)(a), Florida Statutes, alleged in the Administrative Action of December 17, 1993. It is further RECOMMENDED that Walter Falcon, d/b/a Falcon's JVJ General Store, alcoholic beverage license number 64-0453, series 2-COP be revoked. DONE AND ENTERED this 9th day of November, 1994, in Tallahassee, Florida. LARRY J. SARTIN Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 9th day of November, 1994. APPENDIX The Division has submitted proposed findings of fact. It has been noted below which proposed findings of fact have been generally accepted and the paragraph number(s) in the Recommended Order where they have been accepted, if any. Those proposed findings of fact which have been rejected and the reason for their rejection have also been noted. Mr. Falcon did not file a proposed recommended order. The Division's Proposed Findings of Fact 1 Accepted in 3. 2 See 4. 3 Accepted in 5-7. 4 Accepted in 7. 5 Accepted in 8. 6 Accepted in 9. 7 Accepted in 10. 8 Accepted in 12-14. 9 Accepted in 14. 10 Accepted in 11 and 15. COPIES FURNISHED: Miguel Oxamendi Assistant General Counsel Department of Business and Professional Regulation 725 South Bronough Street Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1007 Jack McRay DBPR Acting General Counsel Northwood Centre 1940 North Monroe Street Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0792 John J. Harris Acting Director Division of Alcoholic Beverages and Tobacco Northwood Centre 1940 North Monroe Street Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0792
Findings Of Fact Respondent, Seminole Park and Fairgrounds, Inc., holds alcoholic beverage license number 69-255, Series 12, RT, which licensed premises is located at Seminole Greyhound Park, a greyhound racing facility in Casselberry, Florida. The officers of this corporation who are accused of filing false personal questionnaires with Petitioner are Paul Dervaes, Jack Demetree, William Demetree and Ernest Drosdick. Paul Dervaes and William Demetree also filed a certificate of incumbency and stock ownership which is also alleged to have been false. The principal issue concerns the involvement of John Fountain in the affairs of Seminole Park and Fairgrounds, Inc. Fountain is a convicted felon who was adjudicated guilty of bookmaking in the Jacksonville Federal District Court in October, 1972. The principal parties to this matter, Paul Dervaes, Jack and William Demetree and Ernest Drosdick knew from the outset that John Fountain was a convicted felon ineligible for licensing in this state under either the pari- mutuel or beverage laws. John Fountain conceived the idea of acquiring Seminole Park and Fairgrounds, Inc., a money-losing harness racing facility, and obtaining necessary legislation to convert the facility to greyhound racing. Fountain first brought this idea to his long-term friends and business associates, Jack and William Demetree, in the mid to late 1970's. Fountain also initiated the involvement of another longtime friend, Paul Dervaes, as President of Seminole Park and Fairgrounds, Inc. When the enterprise was short of cash in late 1978 and early 1979, Fountain made successive loans of $152,000 and $169,499.82 to the corporation through Paul Dervaes for use in converting and operating Seminole Park. When the necessary legislation was passed to convert to a greyhound facility, John Fountain, for several months, worked long hours without any salary as head of the physical conversion project for the Demetrees. Fountain originated the Super 8 betting feature at Seminole Park, one of the cornerstones of the track's promotion and publicity endeavors. Fountain also, after the conversion was complete and the facility was opened for business, authorized complimentary meals and drinks at the licensed premises at Seminole Park and authorized petty cash disbursements for a wedding present for a newspaper reporter and the distribution of gasoline without charge from Seminole Greyhound Park's fuel tanks. On March 31, 1980, Paul Dervaes, who at the time held 53 percent of the outstanding stock of Seminole Greyhound Park, sent a memo to William Demetree and sought to extricate himself from a managerial position at the track on the basis that the Demetrees appeared not to be satisfied with his managerial abilities. In this memo, Dervaes identified himself as a minority stockholder of the enterprise, despite his then ownership of a majority of 53 percent of the shares of stock. Respondent has sought to explain such incongruity by candidly admitting that Dervaes was fronting for John Fountain as to 43 shares or 43 percent of the stock in Seminole Park. As this time, Ernest Drosdick, who had for years handled all legal affairs for Seminole Park as well as for William Demetree, advised Dervaes and Jack and William Demetree that the loans to Seminole from John Fountain through Paul Dervaes had to be repaid so that the involvement of Fountain could be terminated. Drosdick's advice was predicated on Fountain's felony conviction and he noted that Fountain's continued involvement in such manner would be violative of the pari-mutuel and beverage licensing laws. The corporation thereupon obtained $321,499.82 in early April of 1980, such sum being the total of the principal but not interest due on the $152,000 and $169.499.82 loans made from John Fountain to Seminole Park through Paul Dervaes. Drosdick's advice was not consistently applied, however, with regard to recalling the loans from John Fountain. The $321,499.82 was paid by check to Paul Dervaes on April 1, 1980, which Dervaes deposited in his bank account. William Demetree then asked Dervaes if $160,000 of the funds just paid him could be borrowed back from Fountain despite Drosdick's advice against such loans. The re-loan was agreeable with Fountain and on April 9, 1980, Dervaes wrote a check in the amount of $160,000 back to Seminole Park and Fairgrounds, and on April 21, repaid the remaining $161,499.82 to Fountain. The $160,000 loan was reflected in an April 9, 1980, note signed by William Demetree as Chairman of Seminole Park and Fairgrounds, Inc. It was also acknowledged by William Demetree that he knew the money was coming from John Fountain. It is this loan, which was repaid as to principal only in November of 1980, that was not reflected on the personal questionnaires of each of the principal parties. At the time the April 9, 1980, $160,000 loan was made by Fountain to Seminole Park through Dervaes, all of the principal parties, Paul Dervaes, Jack and William Demetree and Ernest Drosdick, knew that John Fountain was a convicted felon and knew that his involvement through loans would be impermissible under pari-mutuel and beverage licensing statutes. It was established that the $160,000 loan was not listed on the personal questionnaires filled out in July of 1980, by each of the aforementioned individuals despite the clearly expressed directive of such questionnaire forms, which states: List the total amount and sources of money you personally are investing in the proposed operation. Also, list any persons, corporations, partnerships, banks, and mortgage companies who have or will invest or lend money in the proposed operation. Immediately prior to the applicant's signature line on the personal questionnaire form is the following statement: I swear or affirm under penalty of perjury as provided for in Florida Statute 837.06 that the foregoing information is true to the best of my knowledge, and that no other person, persons, firm or corporation, except as indicated herein, has an interest in the alcoholic beverage license for which these statements are made. Immediately under the signature line is a boxed-in passage entitled "WARNING" with the word "warning" capitalized and underlined and the following: Read carefully, this instrument is a sworn document. False answers could result in criminal prosecution, subject to fine and/or imprisonment. The principal parties seek to excuse their failure to include the Fountain loan on their personal questionnaires by claiming that Drosdick, who is now deceased, was unaware of the $160,000 loan, that he filled out the questionnaires for them and that they merely signed them under oath and attested to their veracity without reading them. This testimony is not credible in view of the material, self-serving omission made on these questionnaires. Therefore, Respondent's agents, who are experienced businessmen, must be held responsible for their sworn statements. The principals have also sought to excuse their conduct on the basis that any matters which transpired between John Fountain and Paul Dervaes in connection with the loan were personal matters between Dervaes and Fountain and thus immaterial to the corporation. However, this theory avoids recognizing that personal questionnaires were submitted by four individuals and not by the corporate entity. It was established that each of the four individuals had knowledge of the $160,000 loan in question and thus were required to list such loan on their personal questionnaires. It was Fountain who conceived the idea of conversion, who supplied the capital necessary to effectuate the conversion, who without salary headed the physical conversion of the facility and who after the opening of the track authorized the expenditure of funds and the giving of certain gratuities at the track. Fountain was clearly and intimately involved with the overall success of the track. Indeed, the original loans in the amount of $152,000 and $169,499.82 from Fountain called for the payment of 10 percent interest and the $160,000 loan called for the payment of 15 percent interest, none of which has ever been paid. Such interest, as of September 30, 1982, had accrued in the amount of $15;173. Dervaes acknowledged that such interest was but a "paper transaction" in that the principal parties and Fountain all knew and agreed that Fountain would not be paid until such time as the track paid Dervaes the interest. Consequently, Fountain has held with the full knowledge of all the principal parties, an impermissible pecuniary interest in the licensed facility which continues to the present time. The Certificate of Incumbency and Declaration of Stock Ownership submitted as part of the beverage license application process was likewise incorrect. It reflected Jack and William Demetree as 50 percent each owners of Seminole Park and Fairgrounds, Inc. when, in fact, the separate corporate entity Seminole Greyhound Park, was the sole stockholder of this corporation. Such document was signed by William Demetree and certified as being true and correct by Paul Dervaes under oath. William Demetree and Paul Dervaes attempt to place the blame on Drosdick for improperly preparing the document. However, they signed this document and cannot avoid responsibility for their sworn statements.
Recommendation From the foregoing, it is RECOMMENDED: That Petitioner enter a Final Order revoking Respondent's alcoholic beverage license no. 69-255. DONE and ENTERED this 23rd day of November, 1982, in Tallahassee, Florida. R. T. CARPENTER, Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The Oakland Building 2009 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32301 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 23rd day of November, 1982. COPIES FURNISHED: Harold F. X. Purnell, Esquire Department of Business Regulation 725 South Bronough Street Tallahassee, Florida 32301 Steven A. Werber, Esquire 2000 Independent Square Jacksonville, Florida 32202 Charles A. Nuzum, Director Division of Alcoholic Beverages and Tobacco 725 South Bronough Street Tallahassee, Florida 32301 Gary R. Rutledge, Secretary Department of Business Regulation 725 South Bronough Street Tallahassee, Florida 32301
The Issue Whether the age requirement for entry into the double random drawing for general liquor licenses is an invalid rule.
Findings Of Fact The Division of Alcoholic Beverages and Tobacco (Division) is vested with general regulatory authority over the alcoholic beverage industry within the state and the creation of double random selection drawings for beverage licenses. § 561.11, Fla. Stat (2005). The Division issues both general and special alcoholic beverage licenses. See Chapter 561-565, Fla. Stat. and §§ 561.11, 561.17, and 561.19, Fla. Stat. (2005). General licenses, also known as quota licenses permit the sale or consumption of various types of beer, wine or distilled spirits on the licensed premises. General licenses are 1-COP licenses, 2-COP licenses and 4-COP licenses Ultimately licenses are issued after an application for licensure has been filed and investigated by the Division. §§ 561.17 and 561.18, Fla. Stat. (2005). Section 561.17, Florida Statutes, only requires an “applicant” to be a person or legal entity. The section does not place an age limitation on the applicant. The Beverage Law bars the issuance of an alcoholic beverage license to a person less than 21 years old. § 561.15(1), Fla. Stat. (2005). The statute also prohibits the issuance of a license to people who have committed certain crimes, violated the beverage law or have had their beverage license revoked or suspended. Similarly law enforcement officers cannot be issued a liquor license. Section 561.15(1), Florida Statutes (2005), applies only to the issuance of a beverage license. The statutes do not specifically bar a person under 21 years of age from entering the double random drawing process or applying for a beverage license. General beverage licenses are issued under a quota system based on the population of the county and are limited in number. § 561.20(1), Fla. Stat. (2005). To issue a quota license, the Division conducts a double random drawing pursuant to Section 561.19(2), Florida Statutes (2005). The drawing determines the order in which individuals may apply for issuance of available licenses in each county. Section 561.19 does not use the term ”entrant,” but only uses the term “applicant.” Florida Administrative Code Rule 61A-5.0105 establishes a list of procedures that shall be followed when entry forms are accepted for the issuance of new state liquor licenses. This rule outlines time deadlines, what forms shall be utilized for making an application for an alcoholic beverage license, how notification of winners will be conducted, how alternates are selected, and defines certain terms. Subsection (2) of Rule 61A-5.0105 provides for the use of DBPR Form 4000-033L, titled “Quota License Entry Form,” and the instructions that accompany it. This form and the accompanying instructions state that an applicant must be 21 years of age in order to gain entry into the quota license drawing. This form is not the form used to apply for a quota license. This form is simply an entry form to the quota license drawing. Under the system established by the Division, when additional quota licenses become available by reason of an increase in the population of a county or by reason of existing licenses being revoked and re-included in the available license pool, the Division annually publishes a notice in the Florida Law Weekly of the number of licenses available and establishes the 90-day application period for entry into the double random drawing. Entry into the double random drawing does not mean that the entrant has applied for or may receive a quota license. The entry form only permits the applicant to participate in the drawing to determine the order of the entrants that will later receive the opportunity to apply for a quota license. If a person or entity files a properly completed entry form and pays a nonrefundable $100.00 entry fee, the entrant is included in the quota drawing if the entry application does not disclose on its face any matter rendering the entrant ineligible. § 561.19(2)(d), Fla. Stat. (2005). After the 90-day application period ends, the Division publishes notice in the Florida Administrative Weekly of the date scheduled for the quota drawing. There is no set time after the application period that the Division holds the quota drawing. The interim period is used to process the various entry applications. Drawings held during the last three years have been delayed from 7 to 10 months after the close of the application period. In this case, the drawing has not been held. After the drawing, the Division notifies the person selected first of their entitlement to apply for a quota license. Under Section 561.19(2)(c), Florida Statutes (2005), the selected person has 45 days from the date of the Division’s mailing of the notice of selection to file an application for a quota license. At this point, the Division investigates the person’s eligibility to possess a quota license and either grants or denies the application. Depending on the action taken, the Division proceeds down the list, notifying each entrant of his or her right to apply for a quota license. For example, a felony conviction does not necessarily render an applicant ineligible to hold an alcoholic beverage license. Thus the simple disclosure of such would not render the application ineligible on its face. There are circumstances in which an individual with a felony conviction may hold an alcoholic beverage license. Such a person may enter the quota drawing. Likewise, a previously revoked alcoholic beverage license would also not necessarily render the application ineligible on its face. The determination would be based on the type of license revoked, and the date of the revocation. On August 12, 2005, the Division published notice in Volume 31, Number 32 of the Florida Administrative Weekly that quota licenses were available in several Counties. The entry period was established from August 15, 2005 through November 12, 2005. Entry could only be made using DBPR Form ABT 4000-033L. The instructions to this form prohibit a person who is under 21 years old at the close of the application period from entering the quota drawing. The Petitioner, Brent A. Moody, is a resident of Tallahassee, Florida. He was born on December 11, 1984. On November 1, 2005, the Petitioner properly completed and filed entry applications with the Division for the year 2006 quota license drawings for Bay, Duval, Franklin, Indian River, Lee, Lake, Manatee, Polk, Walton, Volusia, Sarasota, St. Johns, Palm Beach, Orange, Martin, Leon, Broward, Dave, Collier, Hillsborough, Hernando, and Brevard. At the end of the application period for the 2006 quota license drawing, the Petitioner was 29 days shy of his 21st birthday. He is now over 21 years old. The applications filed by the Petitioner were rejected for the year 2006 quota license drawing because he would not be 21 years old by the close of the entry period. There is no dispute that the Petitioner would have been 21 years old by the time any opportunity to apply for a 2006 quota license might have been extended to him. The Division relies upon an in pari materia reading of Sections 561.15, 561.17 and 561.19, Florida Statutes (2005), for the authority to require an individual to be 21 years of age in order to submit an application for entry into the quota license drawing.
The Issue The issues in these cases are whether Respondent, Club Manhattan Bar and Grill, LLC, d/b/a Club Manhattan Bar and Grill (Respondent), committed the acts alleged in the administrative complaints dated September 13, 2010, and December 1, 2010, and, if so, what disciplinary action, if any, should be taken against Respondent.
Findings Of Fact The Department is the state agency charged with the responsibility of regulating persons holding alcoholic beverage licenses. § 561.02, Fla. Stat. Respondent is licensed under the Florida beverage law by the Department. Respondent holds a 4COP/SRX special restaurant license issued by the Department with Alcoholic Beverage License No. 68-04347. Ms. Stokes is the licensee of record for Respondent. Consequently, Respondent is subject to the Department's regulatory jurisdiction. Respondent's series 4COP/SRX is a special restaurant license that permits it to sell beer, wine, and liquor for consumption on the licensed premises. Additionally, the licensee must satisfy seating and record-keeping requirements and must comply with 51 percent of its gross sales being food and non- alcoholic beverages. See § 561.20(2)(a)4., Fla. Stat. Respondent's restaurant is located in Sarasota County, Florida, and, pursuant to the 4COP/SRX license, must have seating and capability to serve 150 customers at any one time. On August 5, 2010, Special Agent Flynn conducted an inspection of Respondent's business premises. He conducted the inspection based on complaints made to the Department that Respondent was operating as an after-hours bar, rather than a restaurant. At this initial inspection, which occurred at 2:30 p.m. on August 5, 2010, Special Agent Flynn found the restaurant did not have any customers or menus. Further, he noticed that the premises had seating for only 92 people and a large dance floor. Further, he observed that the walls had signs advertising drink specials and late-night parties. Special Agent Flynn met Ms. Stokes, Respondent's manager and holder of the license, and informed her that the beverage license required that Respondent be able to serve 150 customers at one time. Also, Special Agent Flynn requested the required business records concerning the purchase of alcoholic beverage invoices from the distributors for a 60-day proceeding period. Ms. Stokes did not have the requested records on the premises. On August 19, 2010, Special Agent Flynn sent Ms. Stokes a written request, requesting alcoholic purchase invoices for a 60-day period before August 19, 2010. The request allowed Ms. Stokes 14 days to compile the records and to provide the records to the Department. The record here showed by clear and convincing evidence that Respondent did not produce records for the audit period. On September 8, 2010, at approximately 3:00 p.m., Special Agent Flynn returned to Respondent's premises. Again, he found that Respondent did not have the required seating number and ability to serve 150 customers at one time. Special Agent Flynn offered credible testimony that, during the September 8, 2010, inspection, he found Respondent had only 106 available seats. Further, consistent with his inspection on August 5, 2010, Special Agent Flynn observed facts showing that Respondent was a late-night bar, as opposed to a restaurant. The evidence showed that on September 8, 2010, Special Agent Flynn observed that Respondent did not have any customers, menus, and very little food in its small kitchen. Special Agent Flynn, however, did observe that Respondent continued to have its large dance floor, disc jockey booth, advertised drink specials, and posters advertising late-night parties. Clearly, Respondent was being operated as a bar, rather than a restaurant as required by its license. At the September 8, 2010, inspection, Special Agent Flynn again requested Respondent's business records that he had previously requested for the 60-day time period before August 19, 2010. Ms. Stokes provided a few invoices for purchases of food and non-alcoholic beverages. These invoices were dated after the August 19, 2010, date that Special Agent Flynn had requested and did not cover the requested 60 days prior to the August 19, 2010, request. These records included food and beverage purchases by Respondent from retailers, but did not contain any records concerning the points of sale at the restaurant. Ms. Nadeau, an auditor for the Department, offered credible testimony concerning the Department's request for business records from Respondent for the audit period of April 1, 2010, through July 31, 2010. On August 27, 2010, Ms. Nadeau set up an audit request for the period of April 1, 2010, through July 31, 2010, based on information provided by Special Agent Flynn. The Department provided Ms. Stokes with an audit engagement letter that requested business records. Ms. Nadeau testified that on September 10, 2010, she was contacted by Ms. Stokes. Ms. Stokes informed Ms. Nadeau that Ms. Stokes had become the owner of the restaurant in June 2010 and that she did not have the required records. Ms. Nadeau informed Ms. Stokes to provide all the records requested in the audit engagement letter that Ms. Stokes had and to try to obtain the prior records from the previous managing member of Respondent. On September 22, 2010, Ms. Stokes mailed to the Department records she claimed met the audit period. The records consisted of guest checks for July and August 2010, which only showed food purchases and no alcoholic beverage purchases. Further, Ms. Nadeau found that the records were not reliable, because the records contained numerous personal items not related to the restaurant, such as baby wipes, cotton swabs, and boxer shorts. Consequently, the record clearly and convincingly shows that Respondent failed to provide the required business records for the audit period of April 1, 2010, through July 31, 2010. Next, based on Respondent's failure to provide any reliable records, the Department was unable to conduct an audit of the business. Records provided by Respondent indicated that the only sales that occurred on the premises were for food. However, the testimony showed that Respondent's business included the sale of alcohol and marketed the sale of alcoholic beverages for late-night parties. Mr. Torres, the senior auditor for the Department, credibly testified that he conducted an independent review of Ms. Nadeau's initial audit findings. Mr. Torres, who has been employed with the Department for 27 years, reviewed the records provided by Respondent. He credibly testified that Respondent's guest checks were very questionable because they showed all food sales, but no alcohol, which was not consistent with Special Agent Flynn's observations. The evidence further showed that Ms. Stokes became the managing member of Respondent in June 2010. Ms. Stokes provided the Department with a change of corporate officers and named herself as registered agent, rather than apply for a new license. This distinction would later become important because, as explained by Ms. Nadeau, in the Department's eyes, there is a continuation of ownership. Under a continuation of ownership, Ms. Stokes was required to have business records for the time period before she became the managing member of Respondent. Ms. Stokes credibly testified that she did not have any records before June 20, 2010; thus, Respondent was unable to provide records for the audit period. Ms. Stokes candidly admitted that her restaurant had been struggling financially, which is why she had worked to catering special events to draw foot traffic.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that the Department of Business and Professional Regulation, Division of Alcoholic Beverages and Tobacco, enter a final order revoking Respondent's alcoholic beverage license and finding that Respondent violated: 1. Section 561.20(2)(a)4., within section 561.29(1)(a), on September 8, 2010, by failing to provide the required service area, seating, and equipment to serve 150 persons full-course meals at tables at one time as required by its license; 2. Rule 61A-3.0141(3)(a)1., within section 561.29(1)(a), the audit period of April 1, 2010, through July 31, 2010, by not providing the requested business records; and 3. Rule 61A-3.0141(3)(a)1., within section 561.29(1)(a), on September 8, 2010, by not providing the requested business records. It is further RECOMMENDED that the final order find that the Department did not prove by clear and convincing evidence that Respondent violated section 561.20(2)(a)4., within section 561.29(1)(a). DONE AND ENTERED this 23rd day of September, 2011, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S THOMAS P. CRAPPS Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 23rd day of September, 2011.
The Issue Whether Petitioners' applications for the delinquent renewal of their special restaurant licenses pursuant to Section 561.27(2), Florida Statutes, should be denied for the reasons set forth in the Notices of Intent to Deny.
Findings Of Fact Based on the evidence adduced at hearing, and the record as a whole, the following findings of fact are made: There are various types of DABT-issued licenses authorizing the retail sale of alcoholic beverages. Among them are quota licenses, SRX licenses, and SR licenses. All three of these licenses allow the licensee to sell liquor, as well as beer and wine. Quota licenses, as their name suggests, are limited in number. The number of quota licenses available in each county is based upon that county's population. SRX and SR licenses are "special" licenses authorizing the retail sale of beer, wine, and liquor by restaurants. There are no restrictions on the number of these "special" licenses that may be in effect (countywide or statewide) at any one time. SRX licenses are "special restaurant" licenses that were originally issued in or after 1958.3 SR licenses are "special restaurant" licenses that were originally issued prior to 1958. For restaurants originally licensed after April 18, 1972, at least 51 percent of the licensed restaurant's total gross revenues must be from the retail sale of food and non- alcoholic beverages.4 Restaurants for which an SR license has been obtained, on the other hand, do not have to derive any set percentage or amount of their total gross revenues from the retail sale of food and non-alcoholic beverages. DABT-issued alcoholic beverage licenses are subject to annual renewal.5 License holders who have not timely renewed their licenses, but wish to remain licensed, may file an Application for Delinquent Renewal (on DABT Form 6015). Until recently, it was DABT's longstanding policy and practice to routinely grant applications for the delinquent renewal of SR and other alcoholic beverage licenses, regardless of the reason for the delinquency. DABT still routinely grants applications to delinquently renew alcoholic beverage licenses other than SR licenses, but it now has a "new policy" in place with respect to applications for the delinquent renewal of SR licenses. The "new policy" is to deny all such applications based upon these SR licenses' not having been in "continuous operation," action that, according to DABT, is dictated by operation of Section 561.20(5), Florida Statutes, a statutory provision DABT now claims it had previously misinterpreted when it was routinely granting these applications. Relying on Section 561.20(5), Florida Statutes, to blanketly deny all applications for the delinquent renewal of SR licenses was the idea of Eileen Klinger, the head of DABT's Bureau of Licensing. She directed her licensing staff to implement the "new policy" after being told by agency attorneys that this "was the appropriate thing [from a legal perspective] to do." Abkey and Amy Cat have SR licenses that were originally issued in 1956 "per general law and not pursuant to any special or local act." Maneros has an SR license that was originally issued in 1952 "per general law and not pursuant to any special or local act." As applicants applying to delinquently renew their SR licenses, Petitioners are substantially affected by DABT's "new policy" that SR licenses cannot be delinquently renewed because they have not been in "continuous operation," as that term is used in Section 561.20(5), Florida Statutes. Their applications for the delinquent renewal of their licenses would have been approved had the status quo been maintained and this "new policy" not been implemented. Abkey filed its application (on DABT Form 6015) for the delinquent renewal of its SR license (which had been due for renewal on March 31, 2005) on February 21, 2007. On the application form, Abkey gave the following "explanation for not having renewed during the renewal period": "Building was sold. Lost our lease." On April 2, 2007, DABT issued a Notice of Intent to Deny Abkey's application. DABT's notice gave the following reason for its intended action: The request for delinquent renewal of this license is denied. Florida Statute 561.20(5) exempted restaurant licenses issued prior to January 1, 1958 from operating under the provisions in 561.20(4) as long as the place of business was in continuous operation. This business failed to renew its license on or before March 31, 2005, therefore it did not comply with the requirements and is no longer valid. Maneros filed its application (on DABT Form 6015) for the delinquent renewal of its SR license (which had been due for renewal on March 31, 2005) on June 4, 2007. On the application form, Maneros gave no "explanation for not having renewed during the renewal period"; however, the application was accompanied by a letter from a Maneros representative, which read, in pertinent part, as follows: I am today submitting a delinquent renewal application for the above-referenced alcoholic beverage license. The building has been demolished, and there is a vacant lot at the site at this time. Redevelopment is scheduled for this area, and I expect new construction to begin shortly. The license was first issued to this location 55 years ago. I have inquired with the City of Hallandale Beach, Florida, and there remains a question as to whether zoning approval for this type of alcoholic beverage license would be permitted under current uses once reconstruction is complete. The licensee of record wishes to reinstate and possibly use or transfer the license. . . . On June 8, 2007, DABT issued a Notice of Intent to Deny Maneros' application. DABT's notice gave the following reason for its intended action: The request for delinquent renewal of this license is denied. Florida Statute 561.20(5) exempted restaurant licenses issued prior to January 1, 1958 from operating under the provisions in 561.20(4) as long as the place of business was in continuous operation. This business failed to renew its license on or before March 31, 2005, therefore it did not comply with the requirements and is no longer valid. SR licenses will not be allowed to be moved from the location where the license was originally issued. Amy Cat filed its application (on DABT Form 6015) for the delinquent renewal of its SR license (which had been due for renewal on March 31, 1999) on December 6, 2006. On the application form, Amy Cat gave the following "explanation for not having renewed during the renewal period": "Building was closed." On June 8, 2007, DABT issued a Notice of Intent to Deny Amy Cat's application. DABT's notice gave the following reason for its intended action: The request for delinquent renewal of this license is denied. Florida Statute 561.20(5) exempted restaurant licenses issued prior to January 1, 1958 from operating under the provisions in 561.20(4) as long as the place of business was in continuous operation. This business failed to renew its license on or before March 31, 1999, therefore it did not comply with the requirements and is no longer valid. SR licenses will not be allowed to be moved from the location where the license was originally issued.
Recommendation Based upon the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is hereby RECOMMENDED that the Department issue a Final Order granting Petitioners' applications for the delinquent renewal of their SR licenses. DONE AND ENTERED this 30th day of April, 2008, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S STUART M. LERNER Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 30th day of April, 2008.
The Issue Whether the Petitioners are entitled to a transfer of the quota license they attempted to apply for in their initial application. Whether the Petitioners are entitled to an alcoholic beverage license for a restaurant based upon their second application. Whether the Petitioners are entitled to an alcoholic beverage license based upon their third application in spite of the county's refusal to approve the zoning of the proposed location until a pending declaratory judgment before the circuit court is resolved. Whether the Respondent is estopped to deny any of the applications because of the representations made by a field agent for the agency that to his knowledge, there were no problems at the proposed location.
Findings Of Fact The joint stipulation of facts entered into by the parties on December 21, 1988, are adopted as the findings of fact in this proceeding. A copy of the stipulation is attached and made part of this Recommended Order.
The Issue Whether Respondent violated Sections 562.11(1)(a), and 561.29(1)(a) (sale of an alcoholic beverage to an underage person) and/or 561.29(1)(a) and 561.17(3) (failure to notify Petitioner licensing agency of the transfer of ten percent or more of any financial interest, change of executive officers or directors or a divestiture or resignation of such interest or position), Florida Statutes, as charged in the Administrative Complaint dated May 4, 2008, and if so, what discipline should be imposed.
Findings Of Fact At all times material, Respondent was licensed under the Florida Beverage Law, by Petitioner Department of Business and Professional Regulation, Division of Alcoholic Beverages and Tobacco. Respondent is subject to Petitioner’s regulatory jurisdiction, having been issued License Number 72-00497, Series 2-APS, to sell beer and wine in sealed containers for consumption off of the licensed premises only. There is no evidence that Respondent business had ever been previously cited for violation of its license or that Petitioner was investigating the premises on the basis of a complaint or allegation at the time this case arose. Charging Paragraph One 4/ Petitioner’s Special Agent and a Lieutenant, who at all times material was working as Petitioner's Special Agent, addressed “a directed enforcement issue,” the belief that because energy drinks containing alcohol had newly come on the market, there would be sales of them to underage persons. On April 25, 2008, the agents conducted undercover operations at what their paperwork shows to be a minimum of 13 alcoholic beverage retail stores in Perry, Florida, and one store in Steinhatchee, Florida, between 4:35 p.m. and 8:22 p.m. The agents testified that their operation on that date also involved even more stores in several counties. The agents’ paperwork shows they arrived at Respondent’s store at 5:11 p.m. on April 25, 2008, and that they followed standard Agency procedures. On April 25, 2008, the Agency employed M.C. as “Investigative Aide AL0015.” M.C. had worked for the Agency as an undercover operative for almost five years and previously had worked with the aforementioned two agents. On that date, M.C., a female, was 19 years old. On April 25, 2008, the agents gave M.C. a $5.00 bill with which to make “the buy.” She took no other money into Respondent’s store with her. Petitioner’s two agents testified that at 5:11 p.m., while sitting in their car parked in front of Respondent’s store, they witnessed M.C. purchase a “Sparks” from Respondent Meah. Between them, the officers’ testimony included details such as seeing that one other person was in the store when M.C. entered the store; seeing M.C. remove a Sparks can from the cooler; seeing that no conversation took place between M.C. and Respondent Meah; and seeing that no identification was requested by Mr. Meah. M.C. did not relate that anyone else was in the store at the time of her purchase. The agents provided no information as to how they saw so much detail through their car's windshield and the window of the store. Clearly, they could not have heard any conversation at that distance and under those conditions. There also is no evidence of backlighting from inside the store by which the agents could even see Huranur Rashid Meah and M.C. in silhouette so as to observe them talking or not talking. For these reasons, the only competent evidence of what occurred between M.C. and Mr. Meah is the testimony of M.C. and Mr. Meah. M.C. testified that at approximately 5:12 p.m. on April 25, 2008, M.C. presented a can of “Sparks” alcoholic beverage and a package of Orbits gum to Respondent Meah at the cash register; that he did not require identification/proof of age from her; that he did not ask her how old she was; and that he rang up her purchase, giving her $1.92 in change, the can of “Sparks,” and the gum. Huranur Rashid Meah testified that he sold only one can of Sparks at approximately 5:27 p.m. on April 25, 2008, to his long-time customer, Stephanie Lee Wood, née Johnson. At hearing, Ms. Wood presented herself as an adult, without stating her age for the record. She testified that for a significant period of time, she was in Respondent's store every day about the same time and at that time "mostly" bought a Sparks Malt Beverage from Respondent Meah. Ms. Wood is Caucasian, and M.C. is a light-skinned Negro, but they have very similar builds or silhouettes, and could be mistaken for being of a similar age. Upon observation of M.C. at hearing, the undersigned was unable to discern her age, and without testimony would not have guessed she was merely 21 years old on the date of hearing. Her photograph in evidence, taken on April 25, 2008, does not look like an under-age person, or even very much as M.C. looked when she testified at age 21. When M.C. returned from Respondent’s store to the car containing the two agents on April 25, 2009, the agents verified that she had only $1.92 on her; that she had with her a can of “Sparks” and a package of Orbits gum; and that $1.92 was an appropriate remainder for the purchase of a “Sparks” 16 oz. can and a package of Orbits gum, plus tax. Then all three of Petitioner’s operatives filled-out their on-scene paperwork. Before leaving the scene on April 25, 2008, the agents issued to Respondent Meah an Arrest/Notice to Appear/Probable Cause Affidavit. Respondent Meah signed on the bottom of this item, acknowledging receipt thereof. After repeating similar procedures multiple times throughout the remainder of the evening, Petitioner’s agents checked the can of “Sparks” they had bagged at the scene into their headquarters' secure evidence lock-up, and prepared additional paperwork at headquarters. Sparks Malt Beverage apparently contains seven percent alcohol. From differences in the paperwork filled out at the scene, the paperwork from the evidence lock-up, and the oral testimony at hearing, one could guess that the 16-oz. can allegedly purchased by the underage operative from Respondent Meah contained “Sparks Plus Lemonade,” “Sparks Malt Beverage,” or “Sparks” as an energy drink. Ultimately, the State Attorney for Taylor County, in and for the Third Judicial Circuit, issued a “nolle prosequi,” for the associated criminal case, brought against Respondent Meah,5/ and destroyed the “Sparks” can involved. No physical evidence of the can allegedly purchased by M.C. was available to be admitted in evidence during this administrative case’s disputed-fact hearing. Respondent Meah submitted in evidence an automatically printed cash register tape from his store’s single cash register. He claimed this item showed the transaction he had with Ms. Wood on April 25, 2008. The register tape shows that only one sale for the combined amount of $1.69 (the cost of a can of Sparks Malt Beverage), and for $1.19, (the cost of a package of Orbits gum), was rung up together on that date. It further shows that after tax, $1.92 was given in change to the customer. Respondent's cash register tape also shows a sales time of 5:27 p.m. on April 25, 2008. This is the only similar transaction on that date on the whole cash register receipt. Several other transactions on the tape show beer sales at $1.69 each, but no other transactions match the exact amount(s) testified-to by Meah, Wood, and Petitioner's three operatives. Based on the evidence as a whole, there is no persuasive reason to rely on the time posted on this cash register receipt as being reliable; but likewise, there is no clear evidence that the time on the receipt is not reliable. The receipt could be read to show Sparks and Orbits were sold to M.C. or that Ms. Wood purchased the Sparks and something else at that time. It could also be interpreted in a variety of other ways, but clearly, it shows only one sale matching all witnesses' testimony occurred on that date. Charging Paragraph Two On August 8, 2006, Respondent had completed and submitted to Petitioner his application for a beverage license. Section six, on page seven of that application, shows “Abdul Latif Meah” (Respondent Hurunar Rashid Meah’s father) as a 50 percent owner of the corporate Respondent (licensed premises), and further shows Respondent “Harunur Rashid Meah” as a 50 percent owner. It also shows the father as corporate president and Respondent Meah as corporate vice-president. At no time has anyone notified Petitioner that any change in the stock or ownership interest in the licensed facilities has taken place, or that the corporate officers have changed. However, as of November 26, 2007, Respondent Harunur Rashid Meah filed with the Secretary of State, Division of Corporations, papers for “reinstatement” of the Respondent Corporation, and these papers show Harunur Rashid Meah, as the sole owner/president, treasurer/director of Respondent corporation. Respondent Meah's explanation of the foregoing is that: He “missed a payment.” He never dissolved the original corporation, but he needed to get the corporation reinstated or reactivated, which he did as of November 26, 2007, listing only himself on the papers required by the Division of Corporations. Respondent Meah also testified that he had signed all the papers for obtaining the alcoholic beverage license from Petitioner without understanding or reading them, and without appreciating the oath thereon that he signed, promising to tell the truth on those papers, and further promising to comply with the Florida Beverage Law. Among other requirements, the Florida Beverage Law requires notice to Petitioner of the transfer of ten percent or more of any financial interest, change of executive officers or directors, or divestiture or resignation of such interest or position. (See Conclusions of Law.) Petitioner Agency asserts that the contradiction between the August 8, 2006, disclosure of interested parties on Section Six of the Beverage Law license application and the interested parties listed on the November 26, 2007, Division of Corporations documents violates Section 561.17(3), Florida Statutes, because Mr. Meah did not notify the Petitioner Agency as he was required to do, and that the present situation is especially serious because Petitioner had previously warned Respondent of the violation. Special Agent Lastinger’s testimony is credible that he discovered the November 26, 2007, incorporation papers when he was preparing to draft the criminal and administrative charges after the April 25, 2008, undercover operation. However, his testimony that finding those papers after April 25, 2008, reminded him that he had warned Respondent Meah two years before April 25, 2008 (that is, sometime between April and December 2006) that Respondent could be prosecuted for ownership problems, is not credible or persuasive testimony, since the change of ownership, if any, can only be traced to November 2007.6/
Recommendation Upon the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law it is RECOMMENDED That the Department of Business and Professional Regulation, Division of Alcoholic Beverages and Tobacco, enter a Final Order that (1) Dismisses Charging Paragraph One, sale of alcoholic beverage to an underage person; (2) Finds Respondent guilty of Charging Paragraph Two, failure to notify Petitioner of the transfer of ten percent or more of any financial interest, or change of executive officers or directors, and fines him $500.00, therefor; and (3) Requires Respondent to notify Petitioner of the current ownership interests and names of executive officers within 30 days of the final order. DONE AND ENTERED this 14th day of September, 2009, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S ELLA JANE P. DAVIS Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 14th day of September, 2009.
The Issue Whether or not on or about October 31, 1978, the Respondent, Cesar Augustus Rodriguez, a licensed vendor or distributor, or his authorized agent, did sell alcoholic beverages with an improper license, to-wit: Selling under authority of a license when the license fee required for renewal had not been properly paid, contrary to Section 562.12, Florida Statutes.
Findings Of Fact On September 30, 1978, the Respondent, Cesar Augustus Rodriguez, issued or caused to be issued a check in the amount of $1,750.00 made in behalf of the Petitioner, State of Florida, Department of Business Regulation, Division of Alcoholic Beverages and Tobacco. The purpose of this check was to pay for the annual renewal of Respondent's beverage license, Number 39-994, 4-COP, under which the Respondent was trading as Tom's Place. The requirement for payment of the renewal of the license is established by Section 561.27, Florida Statutes. The check for payment was drawn on the Barnett Bank of Tampa. When presented by the Petitioner for payment, the check was returned on the basis that there were insufficient funds for the check to be honored. The check number in question was check No. 407, drawn on account No. 01704386. (The facts as stated above were arrived at pursuant to a stipulation entered into by the parties and placed on the record during the process of a formal hearing conducted pursuant to Section 120.57, Florida Statutes.) Representatives of the Petitioner tried on a number of occasions to get the Respondent to pay the required license fee by an instrument that was negotiable. Those representatives were unsuccessful in their attempts, and on October 30, 1978, Captain R. Caplano, District VI Supervisor, Division of Alcoholic Beverages and Tobacco dispatched officers to retrieve the aforementioned beverage license from the premises known as Tom's Place. The license was brought back to the District headquarters. Around 4:55 p.m. on October 30, 1978, the Respondent came to the District office of the Petitioner with the intention of redeeming the license to Tom's Place and two other licensed premises owned and operated by him, namely, Port Tampa Bar and Rene's Lounge. Rodriguez offered to pay the licensing fee in cash; however, there was insufficient cash to pay the entire fee required and the necessary penalty established under Section 561.27, Florida Statutes. Moreover, the language of of Rule 7A-2.15, Florida Administrative Code, establishes that the Petitioner shall accept only a cashier's check, money order or certified check in payment for the license fee once an insufficient funds check has been tendered for that payment initially. During the course of the meeting between the Respondent and Captain Caplano on the afternoon of October 30, 1978, held in the District office, Mr. Rodriguez indicated his concern that he not be able to operate during the interim period necessary to obtain the proper form of payment for the license fee and penalty. After that discussion, the license to Tom's Place and the other licenses discussed were returned to the Respondent with the understanding that the Respondent was to bring in the proper license fees and penalty payments on the following morning, October 31, 1978; immediately after the banking institutions had opened, to allow the Respondent to obtain the necessary cashier's checks. The Respondent was under the impression that between the hours that his licenses had been returned to him and the time on the morning of October 31, 1978, to make the proper payment, he was at liberty to operate the licensed premises to the extent of selling alcoholic beverages. Captain Caplano, through his testimony in the course of the hearing, established that the act of returning the license on the evening of October 30, 1978, was tantamount to allowing the Respondent to operate, conditioned upon the immediate payment of the license fees on the following morning of October 31, 1978. The licensed premises, Tom's Place, was opened the next morning at 7:05 a.m. It opened after the license had been seized on the prior afternoon of October 30, 1978, at 4:31 p.m. and after advising the employee on duty for the Respondent that no more alcoholic beverages could be sold following the seizure. This arrangement was superseded by the arrangement between the Respondent and Captain Caplano, which was made in the late afternoon of October 30, 1978. Turning back to a consideration of the situation on October 31, 1978, at the time Tom's Place was opened, a different employee was on duty than that person who was there on the afternoon of October 30, 1978. This new employee was one Corine Lewis. At about the time the premises opened, she called the stepson of the Respondent to ascertain whether or not alcoholic beverages could be sold. The response of the stepson, who was acting under the authority of the Respondent, was to the effect that the "boss" was on the way with the license, creating the belief in the mind of Ms. Lewis that she could sell alcoholic beverages. At around 8:30 a.m., the same Ms. Lewis called the Petitioner's office and spoke to Beverage Officer John Allen, the same officer who had removed the license from the premises on the afternoon of October 30, 1978. Officer Allen instructed Ms. Lewis not to sell any alcoholic beverages without the license being available. Following the conversation between Ms. Lewis and Officer Allen, the Respondent came to the District headquarters around 10:00 a.m. on October 31, 1978, with the necessary funds to pay for the renewal of the licenses pertaining to Port Tampa Bar and Rene's Lounge. He did not have the necessary funds to pay for the renewal of the license for Tom's Place. He indicated to officials at the District office of the Petitioner, that it would be necessary for him to obtain a cashier's check from a separate bank for the payment of the license for Tom's Place, meaning by that a separate bank than the one from which the cashier's checks were issued for the purpose of paying the licenses for Port Tampa Bar and Rene's Lounge. Rodriguez indicated that he would leave the license for Tom's Place until he could obtain the money for the license fee. He did in fact leave that license with the Division of Alcoholic Beverages and Tobacco and the fee was paid sometime in the early afternoon of October 31, 1978. At around the time the conversation was occurring between the Respondent and Captain Caplano, the representative of the Petitioner, Officer Allen had returned to Tom's Place. When he entered the licensed premises, he discovered a number of patrons in the premises and opened beer bottles in evidence. Officer Allen inquired of Ms. Lewis about the license and Ms. Lewis informed him that she did not have the license. Officer Allen then left the licensed premises and called Captain Caplano to ascertain the whereabouts of the license. He also advised Captain Caplano that alcoholic beverages had been sold in the licensed premises on the morning of October 31, 1978. Captain Caplano indicated that he had the license and that the license fee had not been paid and that Officer Allen should write a citation for selling alcohol without a license if in fact that had occurred at a time when the premises was not operating under an authorized beverage license. Officer Allen followed those instructions, and cited the licensee for a violation of Section 562.12, Florida Statutes, which pertains to selling alcoholic beverages with an improper license. While Officer Allen was still at the licensed premises the morning of October 31, 1978, the stepson of the Respondent arrived at that location to close the bar, and did close it. Under the circumstances, the Respondent was of the persuasion that he could operate the bar until such time as the license fee had been properly paid after the bank had been opened on the morning of October 31, 1978. He did not feel that he had the opportunity to visit two banks to get the necessary cashier's checks, prior to reporting to the District office of the Petitioner to pay the license fees and penalties. Captain Caplano was of the belief that the licensee could operate on the evening of October 30, 1978, but did not envision the right of the licensee to operate on the morning of October 31, 1978, if the licensee did not immediately tender payment for the license fees on the morning of October 31, 1978. In the mind of Captain Caplano, the idea of selling any form of alcoholic beverages on the morning of October 31, 1978, without first paying the license fee for Tom's Place constituted the sale of alcoholic beverages under an improper license. It is unclear exactly when the alcoholic beverage was sold on the morning of October 31, 1978, in Tom's Place. Ms. Lewis' testimony is to the effect that one beer was sold sometime between 7:05 a.m. and 8:30 a.m., with 8:30 a.m. being the time at which Officer Allen advised Ms. Lewis that no alcoholic beverages should be sold on that morning without the license being on the premises and this testimony is unrefuted by the Petitioner. In view of the totality of the facts, it has not been demonstrated by the Petitioner that the Respondent was acting in derivation of the inherent authority to sell alcoholic beverages extended to him when the licenses were returned to him on the afternoon of October 30, 1978, through the person of Captain Caplano. Therefore, there has been no showing of a violation of Section 562.12, Florida Statutes.
Recommendation It is recommended that the case before the State of Florida, Department of Business Regulation, Division of Alcoholic Beverages and Tobacco, Number 33276- A, be dismissed. DONE AND ENTERED this 6th day of March, 1978, in Tallahassee, Florida. CHARLES C. ADAMS, Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings Room 101, Collins Building Tallahassee, Florida 32301 (904) 488-9675 COPIES FURNISHED: Mary Jo M. Gallay, Esquire Staff Attorney Department of Business Regulation 725 South Bronough Street Tallahassee, Florida 32304 Cesar Augustus Rodriguez t/a Tom's Place 2605 West Kennedy Boulevard Tampa, Florida 33609
