The Issue Whether Petitioner, Department of Financial Services, Division of Workers’ Compensation (“Division”), properly issued a Stop-Work Order and 4th Amended Penalty Assessment against Respondent, Best Affordable Contractors, LLC (“Respondent”), for failing to obtain workers' compensation insurance that meets the requirements of chapter 440, Florida Statutes.
Findings Of Fact On July 31, 2020, the parties filed a Joint Pre-hearing Stipulation, by which the parties stipulated to the facts set forth in the following paragraphs 2 through 17. Stipulated Findings The Division is the state agency responsible for enforcing the statutory requirement that employers secure the payment of workers’ compensation for the benefit of their employees and corporate officers. Respondent was engaged in business operations in Florida during the entire period of January 4, 2017, through January 3, 2019. On January 3, 2019, the Division’s investigator, Deryck Gallegos, commenced a workers’ compensation compliance investigation at Respondent’s work site at 1203 Dancy St., Jacksonville, Florida 32205. On January 3, 2019, Respondent had a paid subcontractor, Terry Wayne Lyons, Sr., performing roofing work at 1203 Dancy St., Jacksonville, Florida 32205. On January 3, 2019, Respondent’s subcontractor, Terry Wayne Lyons, Sr., had five paid employees performing roofing work at 1203 Dancy St., Jacksonville, Florida 32205: Terry Wayne Lyons, Sr.; Jahru Li-Ly Campbell; Kevin Lee Hagan; Terry Wayne Lyons, Jr.; and Jonathan Wayne McCall. On January 3, 2019, Respondent’s subcontractor, Terry Wayne Lyons, Sr., had no workers’ compensation exemptions and no workers’ compensation insurance coverage. On January 3, 2019, Respondent had no workers’ compensation exemptions and no workers’ compensation insurance coverage. On January 3, 2019, the Division issued a Stop-Work Order for Specific Worksite Only and Order of Penalty Assessment to Respondent. The Division served the Stop-Work Order for Specific Worksite Only and Order of Penalty Assessment on Respondent by personal service on January 4, 2019. The Division served a Request for Production of Business Records for Penalty Assessment Calculation on Respondent on January 4, 2019. On February 1, 2019, the Division issued an Amended Order of Penalty Assessment to Respondent. The Division served the Amended Order of Penalty Assessment on Respondent on February 7, 2019. The Amended Order of Penalty Assessment imposed a penalty of $353,349.72. On June 3, 2020, the Division issued a 2nd Amended Order of Penalty Assessment to Respondent. The Division served the 2nd Amended Order of Penalty Assessment on Respondent on June 11, 2020. The 2nd Amended Order of Penalty Assessment imposed a penalty of $68,705.29. On July 30, 2020, the Division served a 3rd Amended Order of Penalty Assessment to Respondent. The 3rd Amended Order of Penalty Assessment imposed a penalty of $46,805.02. Throughout the penalty period, Respondent was an “employer” in the state of Florida, as that term is defined in section 440.02(16). Respondent did not obtain exemptions from workers’ compensation insurance coverage requirements for the entries listed on the penalty worksheet of the 3rd Amended Order of Penalty Assessment as “Employer’s Payroll” during the penalty period. Respondent did not secure the payment of workers’ compensation insurance coverage, nor did others secure the payment of workers’ compensation insurance coverage, for the entries listed on the penalty worksheet of the 3rd Amended Order of Penalty Assessment as “Employer’s Payroll” during the periods of non-compliance listed on the penalty worksheet. The manual rates, class codes, and gross payroll identified on the penalty worksheet of the 3rd Amended Order of Penalty Assessment are correct to the extent a penalty is due. Evidentiary Findings Based on business records received from Respondent, the Division has recalculated the assessed penalty. The proposed penalty has been reduced to $27,553.78. Respondent has paid $1,000.00 for the release of the Stop Work Order, leaving a remaining penalty of $26,553.78. In determining the penalty, the Division reviewed Respondent’s business and financial records for a period of two years, from January 4, 2017, through January 3, 2019. Respondent was cooperative and forthcoming with the Division in providing its business and financial records. Penalties are calculated first by establishing the nature of the work being performed by employees. That is done by comparing the work to descriptions provided in the National Council of Compensation Insurance (NCCI) SCOPES® Manual. As relevant to this proceeding, the work being performed by persons who were employees of Respondent was as described in SCOPES® Manual class codes 5551 (Roofing - All Kinds & Drivers); 8227 (Construction or Erection Permanent Yard); 5213 (Concrete Construction NOC); and 8810 (Clerical Office Employees NOC). Workers’ compensation insurance premium rates are established based on the risk of injury associated with a particular class code. The greater the risk of injury, the greater the premium rate to insure that risk. Work such as roofing entails a significant risk of injury, and the approved manual rate is thus very high. Office and clerical work entails a very low risk of injury, and the approved manual rate is correspondingly very low. When work is performed but it is not specifically identified, e.g., laborer, the highest rated classification code for the business being audited is assigned to the employee. In this case, the highest rated classification code applicable to Respondent is class code 5551, for roofing. The 4th Amended Order of Penalty Assessment reveals payroll for individuals engaged in work described in class codes as follows: Anthony Wright - class code 5551 Donnell Eugene Johnson - class code 5551 Edward Tipton - class code 8227 Eugene Monts - class code 5213 James Dunlap - class code 5551 James Walters - class code 5551 Jorel Golden - class code 5551 Kelvin Morrison - class code 5551 Matthew Robinson - class code 5551 Vincent Marino - class code 8810 Jahru Li-Ly Campbell - class code 5551 Kevin Lee Hagan - class code 5551 Jonathan Wayne McCall - class code 5551 Terry Lyons, Jr. - class code 5551 Terry Lyons, Sr. - class code 5551 Mr. Lyons, Sr., was retained by Respondent as a subcontractor. Mr. Lyons, Sr., previously held an exemption from workers’ compensation as an officer of his company, but it had expired on December 27, 2017. Mr. Lyons, Sr., was working at the 1203 Dancy Street worksite on January 3, 2019. The evidence was sufficient to establish that Mr. Lyons, Sr., was appropriately assigned as class code 5551. His exemption was accepted up to its date of expiration, so the period applicable to the penalty calculation for Mr. Lyons, Sr., was from December 28, 2017, to January 3, 2019. Mr. Lyons, Sr.’s employees who were working at the 1203 Dancy Street worksite on January 3, 2019, were Mr. Campbell, Mr. Hagan, Mr. McCall, and Mr. Lyons, Jr. The evidence was sufficient to establish that they were employees of Respondent’s uninsured subcontractor, and that they were appropriately assigned as class code 5551. Mr. Wright and Mr. Robinson were listed on Respondent’s Profit & Loss Detail Sheet as “subcontract labor -- roofing.” Respondent was not able to demonstrate that they were covered by workers’ compensation. The evidence was sufficient to establish that Mr. Wright and Mr. Robinson were appropriately included in the penalty calculation, and that they were appropriately assigned as class code 5551. Mr. Johnson, Mr. Dunlap, and Mr. Morrison were listed on Respondent’s Profit & Loss Detail Sheet as “subcontract labor -- laborer.” Respondent was not able to demonstrate that they were covered by workers’ compensation. The evidence was sufficient to establish that Mr. Johnson, Mr. Dunlap, and Mr. Morrison were appropriately included in the penalty calculation, and that they were appropriately assigned as the highest rated classification code applicable to Respondent, class code 5551. Mr. Tipton was listed on Respondent’s Profit & Loss Detail Sheet as “subcontract labor -- handyman, yard work/clean up, truck detail.” Mr. Monts was listed on Respondent’s Profit & Loss Detail Sheet as “subcontract labor -- laborer.” Ms. Murcia testified that Mr. Marino provided information that Mr. Monts did concrete work, rather than roofing. Respondent was not able to demonstrate that they were covered by workers’ compensation. Mr. Marino indicated that Mr. Tipton and Mr. Monts should have been identified as his personal expenses, performing work at his home. However, they were identified in Respondent’s records as subcontract labor, and the payments to them were reported on Respondent’s 2017 income tax return as business expenses. They each received multiple payments over an extended period. The evidence was sufficient to establish that Mr. Tipton and Mr. Monts were employees of Respondent. The evidence was sufficient to establish that Mr. Tipton was appropriately assigned as class code 8227, and that Mr. Monts was appropriately assigned as class code 5213. Nonetheless, payments to the two were reduced by 20 percent to account for expenditures for materials, with the remaining 80 percent constituting payroll. Fla. Admin. Code R. 69L-6.035(1)(i). Mr. Marino was not an on-site employee of Respondent, but rather performed administration and clerical functions for Respondent. Mr. Marino previously had workers’ compensation, but it had been cancelled on February 28, 2015. The evidence was sufficient to establish that Mr. Marino was appropriately assigned as class code 8810. Mr. Marino obtained an exemption from workers’ compensation as an officer of Respondent on January 4, 2019. The evidence established that James Walters performed repairs to Respondent’s truck. The evidence was not clear and convincing that Mr. Walters was an employee of Respondent. Jorel Golden was identified solely as the payee on a single check image. He did not appear on Respondent’s Profit & Loss Detail Sheet, and there was no evidence as to why Mr. Golden was being paid. The evidence was not clear and convincing that Mr. Golden was an employee of Respondent. The salaries of the employees were calculated based on Respondent’s business records. The total gross payroll amounted to $170,139.07. Except for the amount of payments to Mr. Walters and Mr. Golden, that figure is supported by clear and convincing evidence. The penalty for Respondent’s failure to maintain workers’ compensation insurance for its employees is calculated as 2.0 times the amount Respondent would have paid in premiums for the preceding two-year period. The NCCI periodically issues a schedule of workers’ compensation rates per $100 in salary, which varies based on the SCOPES® Manual classification of the business. The NCCI submits the rates to the Florida Office of Insurance Regulation, which approves the rates to be applied to the calculation of premiums in Florida. The workers’ compensation insurance premium was calculated by multiplying one percent of the gross payroll ($17,013.91) by the approved manual rate for each quarter (which varied depending on the quarterly rate), which resulted in a calculated premium of $18,369.19. Clear and convincing evidence supports a finding that the Division applied the correct rates in calculating the premium. The penalty was determined by multiplying the calculated premium by 2.0, resulting in a final penalty of $36,738.38. In recognition of Respondent’s cooperation in the investigation and the timely submission of its business records, the Division applied a 25 percent reduction in the penalty ($9,184.60), resulting in a total penalty of $27,553.78. The evidence established that the Division gave every benefit of the doubt to Respondent to reduce the penalty, and its effect on Respondent, to the extent allowed within the confines of the law and the records provided.
Recommendation Based on the Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law set forth herein, it is RECOMMENDED that the Department of Financial Services, Division of Workers’ Compensation enter a final order assessing a penalty of $27,553.78, against Respondent, Best Affordable Contractors, LLC, for its failure to secure and maintain required workers’ compensation insurance for its employees and subcontracted labor, subject to recalculation as provided herein, and subject to Respondent’s previous payment of $1,000.00. DONE AND ENTERED this 15th day of September, 2020, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S E. GARY EARLY Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 15th day of September, 2020. COPIES FURNISHED: Vincent Marino Best Affordable Contractors, LLC 1348 Clements Woods Lane Jacksonville, Florida 32211 (eServed) Leon Melnicoff, Esquire Department of Financial Services 200 East Gaines Street Tallahassee, Florida 32399-4229 (eServed) Julie Jones, CP, FRP, Agency Clerk Division of Legal Services Department of Financial Services 200 East Gaines Street Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0390 (eServed)
The Issue The issues in this enforcement proceeding are whether Respondent failed to comply with Sections 440.10, 440.05, and , Florida Statutes (2003),1 and, if so, whether Petitioner correctly assessed the penalty for said failure.
Findings Of Fact Based upon observation of the demeanor and candor of each witness while testifying; documentary materials received in evidence; evidentiary rulings made pursuant to Section 120.57, Florida Statutes (2004); and stipulations of the parties, the following relevant and material facts, arrived at impartially based solely upon testimony and information presented at the final hearing, are objectively determined: At all times material, Petitioner, Department of Financial Services, Division of Workers' Compensation (Department), is the state agency responsible for enforcement of the statutory requirements that employers secure the payment of workers' compensation coverage requirements for the benefit of their employees in compliance with the dictates of Chapter 440, Florida Statutes. Employers who failed to comply with Chapter 440, Florida Statutes, are subject to enforcement provisions, including penalty assessment, of Chapter 440, Florida Statutes. At all times material, Respondent, St. James Automotive, Inc. (St. James), is a corporation domiciled in the State of Florida and engaged in automobile repair, with known business locations in Pine Island and St. James City, Florida. Both locations are owned by Richard Conrad (Mr. Conrad). On or about August 5, 2004, a Department investigator conducted an "on-site visit" at the St. James location on Pine Island Road, Pine Island, Florida. The purpose of the on-site visit was to determine whether or not St. James was in compliance with Chapter 440, Florida Statutes, regarding workers' compensation coverage for the workers found on-site. The investigator observed four individuals working on-site in automotive repair functions. One employee, when asked whether "the workers had workers' compensation coverage in place," referred the investigator to the "owner," who, at that time, was at the second business location at 2867 Oleander Street, St. James City, Florida. The investigator verified the owner's presence at the St. James City location by telephone and met him there. Upon his arrival at the St. James City location, the investigator initiated a workers' compensation coverage check on two databases. He first checked the Coverage and Compliance Automated System (CCAS) to ascertain whether St. James had in place workers' compensation coverage. The CCAS system contained current status and proof of workers' compensation coverage, if any, and record of any exemptions from workers' compensation coverage requirements filed by St. James' corporate officers. The CCAS check revealed no workers' compensation coverage filed by any corporate officers of St. James. The second system, the National Council on Compensation Insurance (NCCI), contained data on workers' compensation coverage in effect for workers (employees) in the State of Florida. NCCI similarly revealed no workers' compensation coverage in effect for St. James' Florida employees. The investigator discussed the situation and findings from both the CCAS and NCCI with Mr. Conrad who acknowledged and admitted: (1) St. James had no workers' compensation coverage in place; (2) St. James had made inquiry and arranged for an unnamed attorney to file exemptions from workers' compensation coverage on behalf of several St. James employees, but the attorney never filed exemptions; and (3) Mr. Conrad subsequently attempted to file the exemptions himself but was unsuccessful-- "because names of exemption applicants [employees] did not match the corporate information on file for St. James, Inc., at the Division of Corporations." When offered the opportunity by the Department's investigator to produce any proof of workers' compensation coverage or exemption from coverage, Mr. Conrad was unable to do so. At the conclusion of the August 5, 2004, on-site visit, and based upon a review of the CCAS and NCCI status reports and Mr. Conrad's inability to produce proof of workers' compensation coverage or exemptions, the investigator determined that St. James was not in compliance with requirements of Chapter 440, Florida Statutes. The investigator then issued a Stop Work Order on St. James' two business locations. The Stop Work Order contained an initial assessed penalty of $1,000, subject to increase to an amount equal to 1.5 times the amount of the premium the employer would have paid during the period for which coverage was not secured or whichever is greater. Mr. Conrad acknowledged his failure to conform to the requirements of Chapter 440, Florida Statutes, stating5: I guess you could say--I first of all, I am guilty, plain and simple. In other words, I did not conform. Subsequent to issuing the August 5, 2004, Stop Work Order, the Department made a written records' request to Mr. Conrad that he should provide payroll records listing all employees by name, social security number, and gross wages paid to each listed employee.6 Mr. Conrad provided the requested employee payroll records, listing himself and his wife, Cheryl L. Conrad, not as owners, stockholders or managers, but as employees. Pursuant to Section 440.107, Florida Statutes, the Department is required to link the amount of its enforcement penalty to the amount of payroll (total) paid to each employee. The persons listed on St. James' payroll records received remuneration for the performance of their work on behalf of St. James and are "employees" as defined in Subsection 440.02(15), Florida Statutes. Review of the payroll records by the Department's investigator revealed the listed employees for services performed on its behalf. The employee payroll records provided by St. James were used by the Department's investigator to reassess applicable penalty and subsequent issuance of the Amended Order of Penalty Assessment in the amount of $97,260.75.7 St. James' payroll records did not list the type of work (class code or type) each employee performed during the period in question. Accordingly, the Department's investigator properly based the penalty assessment on the highest-rated class code or type of work in which St. James was engaged, automotive repair. The highest-rated class code has the most expensive insurance premium rate associated with it, indicating the most complex activity or type of work associated with St. James' business of automotive repair. The Department's methodology and reliance on the NCCI Basic Manual for purpose of penalty calculation is standardized and customarily applied in circumstances and situations as presented herein.8 Mr. Conrad, in his petition for a Chapter 120, Florida Statutes, hearing alleged the 8380 (highest premium rate) class code applied to only three of his employees: himself, Brain Green, and William Yagmin. On the basis of this alleged penalty assessment error by the Department, Mr. Conrad seeks a reduction of the Amended Order of Penalty Assessment amount of $97,260.75. Mr. Conrad presented no evidence to substantiate his allegation that the Department's investigator assigned incorrect class codes to employees based upon the employee information Mr. Conrad provided in response to the Department's record request. To the contrary, had he enrolled in workers' compensation coverage or had he applied for exemption from coverage, Mr. Conrad would have known that his premium payment rates for coverage would have been based upon the employees' class codes he would have assigned each employee in his workers' compensation coverage application. In an attempt to defend his failure to comply with the workers' compensation coverage requirement of Chapter 440, Florida Statutes, Mr. Conrad asserted that the Department's investigator took his verbal verification that certain employees were clerical, but neglected to recognize his statement that he was also clerical, having been absent from the job-site for over three years. Mr. Conrad's excuses and avoidance testimony was not internally consistent with his earlier stated position of not conforming to the statutory requirements of Chapter 440, Florida Statutes. The above testimony was not supported by other credible evidence of record. This is critical to the credibility determination since Mr. Conrad seeks to avoid paying a significant penalty. For those reasons, his testimony lacks credibility. Mr. Conrad also attempted to shift blame testifying that--"My attorney did not file exemption forms with the Department," and my "personal attempts to file St. James' exemption form failed--[B]ecause the mailing instructions contained in the Department's form were not clear." In his final defensive effort of avoidance, Mr. Conrad testified that he offered to his employees, and they agreed to accept, unspecified "increases" in their respective salaries in lieu of St. James' providing workers' compensation coverage for them. This defense suffered from a lack of corroboration from those employees who allegedly agreed (and those who did not agree) and lack of documented evidence of such agreement. The intended inference that all his employees' reported salaries included some unspecified "salary increase" is not supported by employee identification or salary specificity and is thus unacceptable to support a finding of fact. St. James failed to produce credible evidence that the Department's Stop Work Order, the Penalty Assessment, and/or the Amended Penalty Assessment were improper. St. James failed to produce any credible evidence that the Department's use of the NCCI Basic Manual, as the basis for penalty assessment calculation based upon employee information provided by St. James, was improper and/or not based upon actual employee salary information provided by St. James. Prior to this proceeding, the Department and Mr. Conrad entered into a penalty payment agreement as authorized by Subsection 440.107(7)(a), Florida Statutes.9 The penalty payment agreement required fixed monthly payments be made by Mr. Conrad and afforded Mr. Conrad the ability to continue operation of his automotive repair business that was, by order, stopped on August 5, 2004.
Recommendation Based upon the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is hereby RECOMMENDED that the Department of Financial Services, Division of Workers' Compensation, enter a final order that affirms the Stop Work Order and the Amended Order of Penalty Assessment in the amount of $97,260.75, minus any and all periodic payments of the penalty remitted by St. James, pursuant to agreed upon conditional release from the Stop Work Order dated August 5, 2004. DONE AND ENTERED this 4th day of March, 2005, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S FRED L. BUCKINE Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 4th day of March, 2005.
Findings Of Fact 12. The factual allegations contained in the Stop-Work Order and Order of Penalty Assessment issued on November 17, 2011, the Amended Order of Penalty Assessment issued on December 5, 2011, and the 2"! Amended Order of Penalty Assessment issued on February 20, 2012, attached as exhibits and fully incorporated herein by reference, are hereby adopted as the Department’s Findings of Fact in this case.
Conclusions THIS PROCEEDING came on for final agency action and Jeff Atwater, Chief Financial Officer of the State of Florida, or his designee, having considered the. record in this case, including the request for administrative hearing received from J & S CONCRETE, INC., the Stop-Work Order and Order of Penalty Assessment, the Amended Order of Penalty Assessment, and the 2™ Amended Order of Penalty Assessment, and being otherwise fully advised in the premises, hereby finds that: 1. On November 17, 2011, the Department of Financial Services, Division of Workers’ Compensation (hereinafter “Department”) issued a Stop-Work Order and Order of Penalty Assessment in Division of Workers’ Compensation Case No. 11-313-D7 to J & S CONCRETE, INC. The Stop-Work Order and Order of Penalty Assessment included a Notice of Rights wherein J & S CONCRETE, INC. was advised that any request for an administrative proceeding to challenge or contest the Stop-Work Order and Order of Penalty Assessment must be filed within twenty-one (21) days of receipt of the Stop-Work Order and Order of Penalty Assessment in accordance with Sections 120.569 and 120.57, Florida Statutes, and must conform to Rule 28-106.2015, Florida Administrative Code. 2. On November 17, 2011, the Stop-Work Order and Order of Penalty Assessment was served by personal service on J & S CONCRETE, INC. A copy of the Stop-Work Order and Order of Penalty Assessment is attached hereto as “Exhibit A” and incorporated herein by reference. 3. On November 23, 2011, J & S CONCRETE, INC. timely filed a request for administrative hearing (hereinafter “Petition”) with the Department. A copy of the petition is attached hereto as “Exhibit B” and incorporated herein by reference. 4. On December 5, 2011, the Department issued an Amended Order of Penalty Assessment to J & S CONCRETE, INC. The Amended Order of Penalty Assessment assessed a total penalty of $45,720.65 against J & S CONCRETE, INC. The Amended Order of Penalty Assessment included a Notice of Rights wherein J & S CONCRETE, INC. was advised that any request for an administrative proceeding to challenge or contest the Amended Order of Penalty Assessment must be filed within twenty-one (21) days of receipt of the Amended Order of _ Penalty Assessment in accordance with Sections 120.569 and 120.57, Florida Statutes, and must conform to Rule 28-106.2015, Florida Administrative Code. 5. On December 7, 2011, the Department served by personal service the Amended Order of Penalty Assessment to J & S CONCRETE, INC. A copy of the Amended Order of Penalty Assessment is attached hereto as “Exhibit C” and incorporated herein by reference. 6. On January 20, 2012, the Department referred the matter to the Division of Administrative Hearings for assignment to an Administrative Law Judge. 7. On February 20, 2012, the Department issued a 2"! Amended Order of Penalty Assessment to J & S CONCRETE, INC. The 2™ Amended Order of Penalty assessed a total penalty of $6,416.73 against J & S CONCRETE, INC. The 2"? Amended Order of Penalty Assessment included a Notice of Rights wherein J & S CONCRETE, INC. was advised that any request for an administrative proceeding to challenge or contest the 2"? Amended Order of Penalty Assessment must be filed within twenty-one (21) days of receipt of the 2" Amended Order of Penalty Assessment in accordance with Sections 120.569 and 120.57, Florida Statutes, and must conform to Rule 28-106.2015, Florida Administrative Code. 8. On May 24, 2012, J & S CONCRETE, INC. entered into a Settlement Agreement. Under the Settlement Agreement, J & S CONCRETE, INC. must pay a total penalty of $6,413.73, or enter into a Periodic Payment Agreement within thirty (30) days of the execution of the Settlement Agreement. The Agreement also provides that the petition be dismissed with prejudice upon the execution of the Settlement Agreement. A copy of the Settlement Agreement is attached hereto as “Exhibit D” and incorporated herein by reference. 9. On May 24, 2012, Administrative Law Judge Lynne A. Quimby-Pennock issued an Order Closing File and Relinquishing Jurisdiction as a result of the executed Settlement Agreement. A copy. of the Order is attached hereto as “Exhibit E” and incorporated herein by reference. 10. On May 29, 2012, the 2"! Amended Order of Penalty was served via certified mail on Michael J. Rich, Esq., counsel for J & S CONCRETE, INC. A copy of the 2" Amended Order of Penalty is attached hereto as “Exhibit F” and incorporated herein by reference. 11. As of the date of this Final Order, J & S CONCRETE, INC. has failed to comply with the conditions of the Settlement Agreement. The Department has received no payment from J & S CONCRETE, INC. in this matter, nor has J & S CONCRETE, INC. entered into a Periodic Payment Agreement at this time.
Findings Of Fact Petitioner, Department of Labor and Employment Security, Division of Unemployment Compensation (Division), administers the State Unemployment Compensation Program, which includes the payment of benefits to unemployed individuals and the collection of taxes or reimbursement payments from employers to finance these benefits. By law petitioner is authorized to seek reimbursement from political subdivisions for a pro-rata portion of benefits paid to their employees. If a subdivision fails to timely reimburse the State, the Division may certify the delinquent amount to the Department of Banking and Finance, and request the Comptroller to transfer funds otherwise due that entity to the Unemployment Compensation Trust Fund (Trust Fund). If a subdivision contends an employee is not entitled to unemployment benefits, it may contest a claim for benefits with a claim examiner employed by the Division. That decision may be reviewed by an appeals referee, and if either side is still aggrieved, a final administrative appeal may be heard by the full Unemployment Compensation Commission. Those decisions are then reviewed only by the First District Court of Appeal. Respondent, Board of County Commissioners of Flagler County (Board), is a political subdivision of the state, and is required by law to reimburse the Trust Fund for its pro-rate share of benefits paid to former employees. On July 10, 1984, petitioner issued to respondent a notice of intent to certify delinquency wherein it claimed that between October 1, 1979 and December 31, 1983 respondent incurred a liability to the State totaling $6,409.71. This amount included $5,704.92 in benefits paid to former employees and $703.79 for 6 percent interest on overdue payments. That precipitated the instant controversy. The amount due was later reduced to $5,204.79 by the issuance of an amended notice of intent to certify delinquency on January 11, 1985. At hearing respondent conceded it owed all claimed monies except those due for two individuals: Emma Worthington and Margaret Prather. This resolved more than 60 percent of the Division's claim leaving only around $600 in dispute. Emma Worthington was a former employee of the Clerk of the Circuit Court of Flagler County (Clerk) and was never employed by the Board of County Commissioners of Flagler County. Nonetheless, for some reason, the Clerk reported Worthington's wages to the Division under the Employer Identification Number assigned to respondent. Because of this, the Division assumed respondent was Worthington's employer. When Worthington was terminated by the Clerk's office, she requested unemployment benefits. The Clerk filed an appeal with a claims examiner contesting the payment of such benefits. The examiner ruled that such benefits were due, and this decision was affirmed by both an appeals referee and the full commission. As required by law, on an undisclosed date the Division forwarded a reimbursement notice to respondent advising that certain monies were due because of unemployment compensation payments made to Worthington. The Board did not respond to this notice but simply referred it to the Clerk's office. There is no evidence that the Division was ever formally notified by the Board that the employee was actually a Clerk employee, that the bill was forwarded to another party, or that the wrong Employer Identification number had been used. The bill was never paid. Margaret Prather was an employee of the Flagler County Supervisor of Elections (Supervisor) when she was terminated from employment. Before that, she was a Board employee. While employed by the Supervisor of Elections, Prather's wages were erroneously reported to the Division under the Employer Identification number of respondent. Because of this, the Division assumed Prather was a Board employee. After she was terminated by the Supervisor, Prather received unemployment benefits. Whether the Supervisor contested these benefits is not known. In any event, the Division sent the Board a Reimbursement Invoice on an undisclosed date requesting reimbursement for benefits paid to Prather. The Board did not respond to the Invoice but simply forwarded it to the Supervisor. Again, there is no evidence that the Board advised the Division of the erroneous use of its Employer Identification number, that the bill had been forwarded to another party, or that Prather was not an employee. To date, the bill has not been paid.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing findings of fact and conclusions of law, it is RECOMMENDED that respondent reimburse petitioner for benefits paid to employees Worthington and Prather as set forth in the amended notice of intent to certify delinquency within thirty days from date of final order. DONE and ORDERED this 23rd day of April, 1985, in Tallahassee, Florida. DONALD R. ALEXANDER Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The Oakland Building 2009 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32301 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 23rd day of April, 1985.
The Issue Whether Respondent may levy upon property belonging to Petitioner (specially, funds in Petitioner's account, number 300126719, at Admiralty Bank), as proposed in Respondent's March 30, 2000, Notice of Intent to Levy?
Findings Of Fact Based upon the evidence adduced at hearing, and the record as a whole, the following findings of fact are made: Petitioner operates a Chevron station at 4109 Northlake Boulevard in Palm Beach Gardens, Florida, at which it engages in the business of selling motor fuels at posted retail prices. Petitioner maintains a business account at Admiralty Bank. The number of its account is . Petitioner's Local Option Motor Fuel License number is 60-023068. Petitioner was delinquent in remitting to the Department "local option gas tax" payments for the period from July 1, 1995, through June 30, 1996. The Department provided Petitioner notice of Petitioner's failure to make these payments. The Department filed with the Clerk of the Circuit Court in Palm Beach County a Tax Warrant "for collection of delinquent local option gas tax[es]," in the amount of $106,904.62, plus penalties (in the amount of $59,556.47), interest (in the amount of $12,026.25), and the amount of the "filing fee" ($12.00), for a "grand total" of $178,499.34. Rafael Fanjul is the president and sole owner of Petitioner. On May 2, 1997, Mr. Fanjul, on behalf of Petitioner, entered into a Stipulation Agreement with the Department, which provided as follows: THE FLORIDA DEPARTMENT OF REVENUE AND ELF SERVICES, D/B/A PALM BEACH CHEVRON S/S THE TAXPAYER, TAX IDENTIFICATION NO. 60- 123068, HEREBY AGREE THAT THE $178,024.29 TAX LIABILITY IS DUE THE STATE OF FLORIDA. IT IS FURTHER AGREED THE SUM OF TAX, PENALTY, AND INTEREST REFERENCED ON THE WARRANT OR WARRANTS DATED 02/20/97 IS SUBJECT TO THE FOLLOWING STIPULATIONS: The taxpayer will retire the tax, penalty, and interest shown on the Tax Warrant or Warrants whose dates or dates are shown above. The taxpayer waives any and all rights to institute any further judicial or administrative proceedings under S.72.011, F.S., with respect to this liability and; The taxpayer further agrees to meet each payment term which is detailed on the Amortization Schedule and Payment Coupons provided by the Department of Revenue. IN THE EVENT THE TAXPAYER FAILS TO MEET THE PAYMENT TERMS DETAILED ON THE ENCLOSED AMORTIZATION SCHEDULE AND PAYMENT COUPONS OR FAILS TO TIMELY REMIT ALL TAXES WHICH BECOME DUE AND PAYABLE SUBSEQUENT TO THE DATE OF THIS AGREEMENT, ANY UNPAID BALANCE OF TAX, PENALTY, AND/OR INTEREST SCHEDULED PURSUANT TO THIS AGREEMENT SHALL BECOME IMMEDIATELY DUE AND PAYABLE. Mr. Fanjul had the authority to bind Petitioner to the terms set forth in the Stipulation Agreement. There has been no showing that, in so doing, he acted involuntarily or under coercion or duress. Petitioner made some, but not all of the payments, set forth on the Amortization Schedule incorporated by reference in the Stipulation Agreement. 4/ On May 1, 1998, Petitioner entered into a second Stipulation Agreement with the Department, which provided as follows: THE FLORIDA DEPARTMENT OF REVENUE AND ELF SERVICES, D/B/A PALM BEACH CHEVRON S/S 4806, THE TAXPAYER, TAX IDENTIFICATION NO. 60- 123068, HEREBY AGREE THAT THE $142,701.38 TAX LIABILITY IS DUE THE STATE OF FLORIDA. IT IS FURTHER AGREED THE SUM OF TAX, PENALTY, AND INTEREST REFERENCED ON THE WARRANT OR WARRANTS DATED 02/20/97 IS SUBJECT TO THE FOLLOWING STIPULATIONS: The taxpayer will retire the tax, penalty, and interest shown on the Tax Warrant or Warrants whose dates or dates are shown above. The taxpayer waives any and all rights to institute any further judicial or administrative proceedings under S.72.011, F.S., with respect to this liability and; The taxpayer further agrees to meet each payment term which is detailed on the Amortization Schedule and Payment Coupons provided by the Department of Revenue. IN THE EVENT THE TAXPAYER FAILS TO MEET THE PAYMENT TERMS DETAILED ON THE ENCLOSED AMORTIZATION SCHEDULE AND PAYMENT COUPONS OR FAILS TO TIMELY REMIT ALL TAXES WHICH BECOME DUE AND PAYABLE SUBSEQUENT TO THE DATE OF THIS AGREEMENT, ANY UNPAID BALANCE OF TAX, PENALTY, AND/OR INTEREST SCHEDULED PURSUANT TO THIS AGREEMENT SHALL BECOME IMMEDIATELY DUE AND PAYABLE. Mr. Fanjul had the authority to bind Petitioner to the terms set forth in the second Stipulation Agreement. There has been no showing that, in so doing, he acted involuntarily or under coercion or duress. Petitioner made some, but not all of the payments, set forth on the Amortization Schedule incorporated by reference in the second Stipulation Agreement. 5/ On August 12, 1999, Petitioner entered into a third Stipulation Agreement with the Department, which provided as follows: THE FLORIDA DEPARTMENT OF REVENUE AND ELF SERVICES, D/B/A PALM BEACH CHEVRON S/S 4806, THE TAXPAYER, TAX IDENTIFICATION NO. 60- 123068, HEREBY AGREE THAT THE $88,375.04 TAX LIABILITY IS DUE THE STATE OF FLORIDA. IT IS FURTHER AGREED THE SUM OF TAX, PENALTY, AND INTEREST REFERENCED ON THE WARRANT OR WARRANTS DATED 02/20/97 IS SUBJECT TO THE FOLLOWING STIPULATIONS: The taxpayer will retire the tax, penalty, and interest shown on the Tax Warrant or Warrants whose dates or dates are shown above. The taxpayer waives any and all rights to institute any further judicial or administrative proceedings under S.72.011, F.S., with respect to this liability and; The taxpayer further agrees to meet each payment term which is detailed on the Amortization Schedule and Payment Coupons provided by the Department of Revenue. IN THE EVENT THE TAXPAYER FAILS TO MEET THE PAYMENT TERMS DETAILED ON THE ENCLOSED AMORTIZATION SCHEDULE AND PAYMENT COUPONS OR FAILS TO TIMELY REMIT ALL TAXES WHICH BECOME DUE AND PAYABLE SUBSEQUENT TO THE DATE OF THIS AGREEMENT, ANY UNPAID BALANCE OF TAX, PENALTY, AND/OR INTEREST SCHEDULED PURSUANT TO THIS AGREEMENT SHALL BECOME IMMEDIATELY DUE AND PAYABLE. Mr. Fanjul had the authority to bind Petitioner to the terms set forth in the third Stipulation Agreement. There has been no showing that, in so doing, he acted involuntarily or under coercion or duress. The Amortization Schedule incorporated by reference in the third Stipulation Agreement required Petitioner to make 47 weekly payments of $1,000.00 each from August 12, 1999, to June 29, 2000, and to make a final payment of $28,994.57 on July 6, 2000. As of January 12, 2000, Petitioner was five payments behind. Accordingly, on that date, the Department sent a Notice of Delinquent Tax to Admiralty Bank, which read as follows: RE: ELF SERVICES INC. DBA: PALM BEACH GARDENS CHEVRON STA 48206 FEI: 65-0055086 ACCT: ST#: To Whom It May Concern: You are being notified, under the authority contained is Subsection 212.10(3), Florida Statutes, that the referenced dealer is delinquent in the payment of gas tax liabilities in the amount of $75,581.47 to the State of Florida. You may not transfer or dispose of any credits, debts, or other personal property owed to the dealer, that are to become under your control during the effective period of this notice. Any assets in your possession exceeding the dollar amount shown above may be released in the ordinary course of business. This notice shall remain in effect until the Department consents to a transfer or disposition or until sixty (60) days elapse after receipt of this notice, whichever period expires the earliest. Please furnish a list of all credits, debts, or other property owed to the dealer in your possession and the value of these assets to the Department. Chapter 212.10(3), F.S. requires this list within five (5) days. If you fail to comply with this notice, you may become liable to the State of Florida to the extent of the value of the property or amount of debts or credits disposed of or transferred. Thank you for your cooperation. If you have any questions, please contact the undersigned at the telephone number below. On or about January 18, 2000, in response to the foregoing notice, Admiralty Bank advised the Department in writing that "the balance being held" in Petitioner's account at the bank was $2,223.53. On February 10, 2000, the Department sent Admiralty Bank a Notice of Freeze, which read as follows: RE: Elf Services Inc. DBA Palm Beach Gardens Chevron FEI: 65-0055086 ACCT: ST#: Dear Custodian: You are hereby notified that pursuant to Section 213.67, Florida Statutes, the person identified above has a delinquent liability for tax, penalty, and interest of $75,581.47, which is due the State of Florida. Therefore, as of the date you receive this Notice you may not transfer, dispose, or return any credits, debts, or other personal property owned/controlled by, or owed to, this taxpayer which are in your possession or control. This Notice remains in effect until the Department of Revenue consents to a transfer, disposition, or return, or until 60 consecutive calendar days elapse from the date of receipt of this Notice of Freeze, whichever occurs first. Further, Section 213.67(2), F.S., and Rule 12-21, Florida Administrative Code, require you to advise the Department of Revenue, within 5 days of your receipt of this Notice, of any credits, debts, or other personal property owned by, or owed to, this taxpayer which are in your possession or control. You must furnish this information to the office and address listed below. Your failure to comply with this Notice of Freeze may make you liable for the amount of tax owed, up to the amount of the value of the credits, debts or personal property transferred. Thank you for your cooperation. If you have any questions please contact the undersigned at the telephone number listed below. On March 22, 2000, the Department sent to Petitioner a Notice of Intent to Levy upon Petitioner's "Bank Account # , in the amount of $2,320.07, . . . in the possession or control of Admiralty Bank" "for nonpayment of taxes, penalty and interest in the sum of $75,581.47." After receiving information from Admiralty Bank that Petitioner actually had $7,293.36 in its account at the bank, the Department, on March 30, 2000, sent Petitioner a second Notice of Intent to Levy, which was identical in all respects to the March 22, 2000, Notice of Intent to Levy except that it reflected that Petitioner's account at Admiralty Bank contained $7,293.36, instead of $2,320.07. Petitioner's account at Admiralty Bank does not contain any monies paid by a third party to Petitioner as salary or wages. The amount of the Petitioner's current outstanding delinquent "tax liability" is $75,581.47.
Recommendation Based upon the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is hereby RECOMMENDED that the Department enter a final order upholding its March 30, 2000, Notice of Intent to Levy and proceed with the garnishment of the funds in Petitioner's account at Admiralty Bank. DONE AND ENTERED this 25th day of October, 2000, in Tallahassee, Florida. STUART M. LERNER Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 25th day of October, 2000.
The Issue The issues in this case are whether Petitioner was overpaid certain wages by the Respondent, and, if so, whether repayment is warranted.
Findings Of Fact Petitioner was an employee of the Department until December 13, 2005. She was employed as a corrections officer and, as such, was eligible for criminal justice incentive pay. Criminal justice incentive pay is paid separately and apart from regular salary payments through a separate payment system used by the Department. A person whose employment with the Department is terminated would not be terminated automatically from the incentive pay payment system. Upon her termination from employment with the Department, Petitioner continued to receive incentive pay by direct deposit to her bank account. This occurred on five occasions following her termination. The total amount of the overpayments to Petitioner after taxes was $111.13. The Department asked Petitioner to return the money that had been overpaid, but Petitioner did not comply with the request. In her request for a formal hearing, Petitioner alleged some error in the amount of overpayments being claimed, but no evidence was presented to support that allegation at the final hearing. The Department presented evidence as to each of the incentive pay payments to Petitioner following her termination from employment. Respondent averred that all taxes withheld from the incentive payments would be credited to Petitioner upon return of the overpayment amount.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that a final order be entered by the Department of Corrections requiring repayment of the incentive payments made to Petitioner in the sum of $111.13. DONE AND ENTERED this 9th day of October, 2006, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S R. BRUCE MCKIBBEN Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 9th day of October, 2006. COPIES FURNISHED: Jennifer Sullivan 38618 Kapok Avenue Zephyrhills, Florida 33542 Matthew M. Deleo, Esquire Department of Corrections 2601 Blair Stone Road Tallahassee, Florida 32399 James R. McDonough, Secretary Department of Corrections 2601 Blair Stone Road Tallahassee, Florida 32399-2500 Rosa Carson, General Counsel Department of Corrections 2601 Blair Stone Road Tallahassee, Florida 32399-6563
The Issue The issue is whether Petitioner violated Chapter 440, Florida Statutes, by not having workers’ compensation insurance coverage, and if so, what penalty should be imposed.
Findings Of Fact Petitioner operates a gas station and convenience store in Winter Garden. Mohammad Sultan is Petitioner’s owner and president. On November 2, 2006, Margaret Cavazos conducted an unannounced inspection of Petitioner’s store. Ms. Cavazos is a workers’ compensation compliance investigator employed by the Department. Petitioner had nine employees, including Mr. Sultan and his wife, on the date of Ms. Cavazos' inspection. Petitioner had more than four employees at all times over the three-year period preceding Ms. Cavazos' inspection. Petitioner did not have workers’ compensation insurance coverage at the time of Ms. Cavazos’ inspection, or at any point during the three years preceding the inspection. On November 2, 2006, the Department served a Stop-Work Order and Order of Penalty Assessment on Petitioner, and Ms. Cavazos requested payroll documents and other business records from Petitioner. On November 6, 2006, the Department served an Amended Order of Penalty Assessment,1 which imposed a penalty of $70,599.78 on Petitioner. The penalty was calculated by Ms. Cavazos, using the payroll information provided by Petitioner and the insurance premium rates published by the National Council on Compensation Insurance. The parties stipulated at the final hearing that the gross payroll attributed to Mr. Sultan for the period of January 1, 2006, through November 2, 2006, should have been $88,000, rather than the $104,000 reflected in the penalty worksheet prepared by Ms. Cavazos. The net effect of this $16,000 correction in the gross payroll attributed to Mr. Sultan is a reduction in the penalty to $68,922.18.2 On November 3, 2006, Mr. Sultan filed a notice election for exemption from the Workers’ Compensation Law. His wife did not file a similar election because she is not an officer of Petitioner. The election took effect on November 3, 2006. On November 6, 2006, Petitioner obtained workers’ compensation insurance coverage through American Home Insurance Company, and Petitioner also entered into a Payment Agreement Schedule for Periodic Payment of Penalty in which it agreed to pay the penalty imposed by the Department over a five-year period. On that same date, the Department issued an Order of Conditional Release from Stop-Work Order. Petitioner made the $7,954.30 “down payment” required by the Payment Agreement Schedule, and it has made all of the required monthly payments to date. The payments required by the Payment Agreement Schedule are $1,044.09 per month, which equates to approximately $12,500 per year. Petitioner was in compliance with the Workers’ Compensation Law at the time of the final hearing. Petitioner reported income of $54,358 on gross receipts in excess of $3.1 million in its 2005 tax return. Petitioner reported income of $41,728 in 2004, and a loss of $8,851 in 2003. Petitioner had total assets in excess of $750,000 (including $540,435 in cash) at the end of 2005, and even though Petitioner had a large line of credit with Amsouth Bank, its assets exceeded its liabilities by $99,041 at the end of 2005. Mr. Sultan has received significant compensation from Petitioner over the past four years, including 2003 when Petitioner reported a loss rather than a profit. He received a salary in excess of $104,000 in 2006, and he was paid $145,333 in 2005, $63,750 in 2004, and $66,833 in 2003. Mr. Sultan’s wife is also on Petitioner’s payroll. She was paid $23,333.40 in 2006, $25,000 in 2005, and $12,316.69 in 2004. Mr. Sultan characterized 2005 as an “exceptional year,” and he testified that his business has fallen off recently due to an increase in competition in the area. Todd Baldwin, Petitioner’s accountant, similarly testified that 2006 was not as good of a year as 2005, but no corroborating evidence on this issue (such as Petitioner’s 2006 tax return) was presented at the final hearing. Mr. Sultan testified that payment of the penalty imposed by the Department adversely affects his ability to run his business. The weight given to that testimony was significantly undercut by the tax returns and payroll documents that were received into evidence, which show Petitioner’s positive financial performance and the significant level of compensation paid to Mr. Sultan and his wife over the past several years. The effect of the workers’ compensation exemption elected by Mr. Sultan is that his salary will no longer be included in the calculation of the workers’ compensation insurance premiums paid by Petitioner. If his salary had not been included in Ms. Cavazos’ calculations, the penalty imposed on Petitioner would have been $40,671.36. Ms. Cavazos properly included Mr. Sultan’s salary in her penalty calculations because he was being paid by Petitioner and he did not file an election for exemption from the Workers' Compensation Law until after her inspection.
Recommendation Based upon the foregoing findings of fact and conclusions of law, it is RECOMMENDED that the Department issue a final order imposing a penalty of $68,922.18 on Petitioner to be paid in accordance with a modified payment schedule reflecting the reduced penalty and the payments made through the date of the final order. DONE AND ENTERED this 22nd day of August, 2007, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S T. KENT WETHERELL, II Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 22nd day of August, 2007.
The Issue The issue is whether Petitioner is entitled to receive survivor benefits from a joint and survivor annuity, under Option 3 of the Florida Retirement System (FRS) defined benefit plan, following the death of her spouse, Anne M. Birch, who, as an FRS member, elected Option 1 in 2012 when Florida law would not allow Ms. Birch to elect Option 3 or 4 and designate the joint annuitant as Petitioner, whom she lawfully married after electing Option 1.
Findings Of Fact Ms. Birch, who was born on September 12, 1950, and Petitioner, who was born on August 26, 1956, fell in love and began to live together in 1992. They jointly owned all significant property, including their primary residence, with a right of survivorship and were jointly liable for household expenses and debt, including the mortgage note on their primary residence. On January 31, 2001, Ms. Birch executed a will that left any remaining property to Petitioner and named her as the personal representative of the estate.1/ Ms. Birch designated Petitioner as her primary beneficiary for employee benefits that authorized such designations. On October 11, 2002, Ms. Birch and Petitioner signed an Amended Declaration of Domestic Partnership, pursuant to the Broward County Domestic Partnership Act of 1999, to register themselves as domestic partners under Broward County Ordinance 1999-18. Fully vested and having accrued substantial benefits from having worked for Broward County in an FRS-covered position for nearly 30 years, on October 23, 2012, Ms. Birch entered DROP, effective October 1, 2012. At that time, Ms. Birch elected Option 1 for the payment of her benefits, checking the "no" box in response to the question of whether she was married. As described in the Conclusions of Law, Option 1 is the maximum benefit and is payable for the life of the retiree. Ms. Birch's monthly Option 1 benefit was $3039.25. The monthly Option 3 benefit, which, as described below, is payable until the latter death of the FRS member or her surviving spouse,2/ would have been nearly $1000 less than the monthly Option 1 benefit.3/ Respondent implemented Ms. Birch's election by paying Ms. Birch's Option 1 benefits into her DROP account. In August 2013, Ms. Birch became ill with cancer. She eventually had to quit working and terminated DROP, at which point Respondent paid Ms. Birch her Option 1 benefits directly. On June 16, 2014, Ms. Birch and Petitioner were lawfully married in Massachusetts. Almost two years later, on May 24, 2016, Ms. Birch died, at which time all payments under Option 1 ended. When Ms. Birch and Petitioner registered as domestic partners in Broward County, no state allowed or recognized same- sex marriage, often pursuant to a "Defense of Marriage Act" (DOMA). Continuously since 1997, Florida law banned the allowance and recognition of same-sex marriage, even if performed in a jurisdiction where such a marriage were legal, and restricted "marriage" to a legal union between a man and a woman and "spouse" to a member of such a union. § 741.212(1) and (3); Ch. 97-268, § 1, at 4957, Laws of Fla. (Florida DOMA).4/ Massachusetts was the first state to allow and recognize same-sex marriage, effective in 2004. Goodridge v. Dep't of Pub. Health, 798 N.E. 2d 941 (Mass. 2003) (decision stayed 180 days to allow legislature to enact law consistent with the court's ruling). Three or four years after Goodridge, Ms. Birch and Petitioner visited Massachusetts, but did not exercise their right to enter into a lawful marriage at that time. A series of court decisions invalidated the federal and state DOMAs, including the Florida DOMA. On June 26, 2013, the U.S. Supreme Court in United States v. Windsor, 133 S. Ct. 2675 (2013), held that the federal DOMA, as applied to federal tax law, was unconstitutional. By order entered August 21, 2014, in Brenner v. Scott, 999 F. Supp. 2d 1278 (N.D. Fla. 2014) (Brenner I), Respondent was enjoined from enforcing or applying the Florida DOMA, although the court stayed its injunction. The U.S. Supreme Court lifted the stay,5/ as reported by the district court in Brenner v. Scott¸ 2016 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 91969 (N.D. Fla. 2016) (Brenner II), in which, on March 30, 2016, the court issued a summary judgment on its injunction in Brenner I. Between Brenner I and Brenner II, on June 26, 2015, the U.S. Supreme Court held that state DOMAs were unconstitutional in Obergefell v. Hodges, 135 S. Ct. 2584 (2015). Petitioner testified that she and Ms. Birch would have been lawfully married by October 2012, when Ms. Birch retired, but for the Florida DOMA. This testimony is credited. Long prior to 2012, Ms. Birch and Petitioner organized their financial affairs as though they were lawfully married, sharing assets and liabilities equally. Petitioner testified credibly that she and Ms. Birch always "played by the rules": thus, Ms. Birch and Petitioner would have been deterred from getting married prior to Ms. Birch's retirement, such as when they were visiting Massachusetts in 2007, due to the legal futility of attempting to obtain recognition in Florida of a marriage lawfully performed elsewhere. Less persuasive is Petitioner's testimony that, in October 2012, Ms. Birch would have elected Option 3, if this option had been available to her, and it is impossible to find on this record that she would have done so. There is no evidence that Ms. Birch and Petitioner rearranged their financial affairs to achieve, to the extent possible, an Option 3 election. Household income was $1000 per month greater under Option 1 than Option 3, so life insurance on Ms. Birch or an annuity for Petitioner could have mitigated Ms. Birch's inability to choose Option 3 when she retired. Prior to retiring, Ms. Birch did not attempt to elect Option 3 in writing or orally. Even after retiring, as noted below, Ms. Birch displayed ambivalence about whether she wanted to change her election. As a named defendant in Brenner I, on April 14, 2015, Respondent responded to the injunction against its enforcement or application of the Florida DOMA by issuing Information Release #2015-184 (Release). Sent to FRS members who retired prior to January 2, 2015, and elected Option 1 or 2, the Release states: . . . FRS retirees and . . . DROP participants who were in legally-recognized same-sex marriages at the time they retired or began DROP participation and chose Option 1 or Option 2 will have an opportunity to change benefit payment options in light of . . . Brennan. These retirees will be able to change their retirement payment option from their current selection to Option 3 or Option 4 to provide a continuing monthly benefit to their spouse. The retirees impacted by this change have an effective retirement date or DROP begin date on or before January 1, 2015. The Release provides that an eligible retiree interested in a second election must contact Respondent in writing, identify the retiree's spouse, and certify that the retiree and spouse were married in a state or country that allowed same-sex marriage when the FRS member retired. The Release states that Respondent will respond with an estimate of the new benefit payment under the option that the retiree intends to select and provide the retiree with the paperwork necessary to make the second election. Available on Respondent's website,6/ the Release provides the opportunity of a second election of Option 3 or 4 to any FRS member7/ who retired prior to January 2, 2015; chose Option 1 or 2 when she retired; and was in a same-sex marriage when she retired. The Release places no limit on how far in the past the retirement took place.8/ The thrust of Petitioner's case is directed toward backdating her lawful marriage to Ms. Birch to a point prior to Ms. Birch's retirement. As noted above, the timing of the lawful marriage is a problem under the Release, which requires a lawful marriage at the time of retirement, but another problem under the Release is the fact that the Release provides to the FRS retiree, not her surviving spouse, the opportunity for a second election, nor, as discussed immediately below, is this a technical requirement that can be overcome by Petitioner's serving as a representative of Ms. Birch--the second election is extended only to living FRS retirees. The virtue of the Release for Petitioner is that it confers the opportunity of a second election without any proof that, at the time of the first election, the FRS member would have elected Option 3 or 4. If Petitioner does not rely on the Release, she must also prove that Ms. Birch would have elected Option 3 or 4, which, as noted above, she has failed to prove. By limiting the second election to the FRS retiree, the Release limits the potential of adverse selection in allowing a second election, possibly years after the first election.9/ There are three possibilities at the time of the second election: both spouses are alive, only the FRS retiree is alive, and only the surviving spouse is alive. The Release's restriction of the right to make the second election to the FRS retiree means that the second and third possibilities do not result in second elections: respectively the FRS retiree would not reduce her payment to provide an annuity to a spouse who is already deceased10/ and a surviving spouse has no right to make an election under the Release. The couple may gain a minor financial advantage by the opportunity to revisit the payment option several years after the retirement of the FRS member, so that they may be better informed of the health of each of them. But the surviving spouse would gain a significant financial advantage by the opportunity to revisit the payment option after the death of the FRS member. Shortly after Respondent issued the Release, Ms. Birch filed with Respondent a Spousal Acknowledgement Form that she had signed on May 8, 2015. This form indicates that Ms. Birch is married, but nothing else. At about the same time, though, Ms. Birch contacted Respondent by telephone to discuss the Release and any choices that she may now have under the Release. By letter dated May 26, 2015, Respondent calculated monthly benefit amounts under Options 1 through 4, but the letter warns: "Your benefit option will not be changed unless you complete and return the required forms noted in this letter" and indicate a choice of repaying in a single payment or installments the excess benefits of Option 1 over the smaller benefits paid under Option 3 or 4. The May 26 letter requires further action on Ms. Birch's part and predicates any right to a second election upon a lawful marriage at the time of retirement. The record provides no basis for finding that any of Respondent's representatives misstated the lawful-marriage condition. To the contrary, in at least one conversation with Ms. Birch, Respondent's representative insisted on verification of a lawful marriage as of October 2012. Additionally, Ms. Birch was not requesting a right to make a second election; at most, she was gathering information to prepare to decide whether to ask to change her election. By June 26, 2015, pursuant to a note documenting a telephone conversation between Ms. Birch and a representative of Respondent, Ms. Birch decided to keep Option 1 rather than make a second election of Option 3.11/ In May 2016, Ms. Birch finally made a clear attempt to change her election to Option 3. By letter dated May 12, 2016, Ms. Birch stated that she was lawfully married to Petitioner on June 12, 2012, and asked for "the change in beneficiary for my pension, due to the one time option given" in the Release. Even at this late date, Ms. Birch was not yet ready to elect Option 3 because the letter concludes: "I would like to see the breakdown of monetary options to make an informed decision." However, on May 20, 2016, during a telephone call with a representative of Respondent, Ms. Birch provided the date of birth of Petitioner and asked Respondent to expedite her request because she did not have long to live. On the same date, Ms. Birch signed an Option Selection form electing Option 3. By letter dated July 18, 2016, Respondent acknowledged the death of Ms. Birch and informed Petitioner that all pension benefits ended at that time. By letter dated September 22, 2016, Petitioner asked for reconsideration and supplied copies of various documents, the relevant provisions of which have been referenced above. By letter dated October 20, 2016, Respondent denied the request for reconsideration.
Recommendation It is RECOMMENDED that Respondent enter a final order denying Petitioner's request for benefits under Option 3 from Ms. Birch's FRS account and dismissing Petitioner's Request for Administrative Hearing. DONE AND ENTERED this 16th day of January, 2018, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S ROBERT E. MEALE Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 16th day of January, 2018.
The Issue The issue is whether Respondent is liable for a penalty of $265,604.81 based on payroll records for the period from October 28, 2008, through October 27, 2008, pursuant to Subsection 440.107(7), Florida Statutes (2008).1
Findings Of Fact Petitioner is the state agency responsible for enforcing the statutory requirement that employers secure the payment of workers’ compensation insurance for the benefit of their employees in accordance with Section 440.107. Respondent is a Florida corporation engaged in the construction business. On October 27, 2008, a compensation compliance investigator and other investigators for Petitioner conducted a targeted investigation of Respondent’s business based on reports from a confidential informant that Respondent was not in compliance with Chapter 440 and the Insurance Code. The compliance investigator met two relatives of the sole shareholder of the company, who identified themselves as employees. The compliance investigator also identified construction work being conducted by two workers, who, it is undisputed, were not in compliance with Chapter 440. The disputed issues of fact are comprised of two issues. The first issue is whether payments to relatives of the sole shareholder are compensation or loans. The second issue is whether cash payments to the sole shareholder are compensation or business expenses. None of the loans to family members were repaid to the employer at the time of the hearing. Loans that have not been repaid to the employer are defined as payroll by Florida Administrative Code Rule 69L-6.035, and Respondent owes that portion of the penalty assessment allocable to the first issue. Respondent provided ample evidence to demonstrate that the disputed transactions were loans rather than compensation for employment. One relative is disabled and unable to work at the level for which he is allegedly compensated. He will repay the loans out of the sale proceeds of his home upon his death. Other family members have less tragic but similarly sad stories. However, deviation from Florida Administrative Code Rule 69L- 6.035 would merely invite remand pursuant to Section 120.69. The remaining issue is whether cash payments by Respondent to its sole shareholder are properly characterized as compensation or business expenses. Florida Administrative Code Rule 69L-6.035(1)(f) defines payroll to include expense reimbursements to the extent the business records do not confirm the expense was incurred as a valid business expense. For the reasons stated hereinafter, it is less than clear and convincing that the disputed cash payments are payroll within the meaning of Florida Administrative Code Rule 69L-6.035(1)(f). The sole shareholder explained under oath at the hearing that the cash payments at issue were for business expenses, including the payment of construction materials. He does not give workers charge cards to buy construction materials. He gives them cash. They do not always bring him receipts. The witness submitted detailed tabulations of approximately $77,002.46 in such expenses during the audit period, and the trier of fact found the testimony and supporting documentation to be credible and persuasive. The sole shareholder also testified that he incurred cash office expenses during the audit period of approximately $22,500.00 and submitted documentation to support that testimony. He also purchased three trucks for the business and made cash down payments on each truck with documentation to support the cash payments. The trier of fact finds that testimony and supporting documentation to be credible and persuasive. Based on the evidence through the date of the hearing, it is less than clear and convincing that the disputed cash payments to the sole shareholder were not incurred as valid business expenses within the meaning of Florida Administrative Code Rule 69L-6.035(f). The testimony of the sole shareholder and the supporting documentary evidence also shows that the disputed amounts were not cash payments to the sole shareholder in his capacity as an employee within the meaning of Florida Administrative Code Rule 69L-6.035(1)(b).
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that Petitioner enter a final order imposing a fine consistent with the amount attributable to unpaid loans. DONE AND ENTERED this 24th day of November, 2009, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S DANIEL MANRY Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 24th day of November, 2009.
