Elawyers Elawyers
Ohio| Change
Find Similar Cases by Filters
You can browse Case Laws by Courts, or by your need.
Find 49 similar cases
CAROL D. WHEELER vs DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH AND REHABILITATIVE SERVICES, 91-002364 (1991)
Division of Administrative Hearings, Florida Filed:Miami, Florida Apr. 19, 1991 Number: 91-002364 Latest Update: Dec. 16, 1991

The Issue Whether Petitioner abandoned her position of employment with Respondent and resigned from the career service.

Findings Of Fact At all times pertinent to this proceeding, Petitioner was employed the Department of Health and Rehabilitative Services (DHRS) at South Florida State Hospital (SFSH) as a Human Services Worker I, a career service position. Petitioner was absent without authorized leave or explanation on February 6, 7, 8, 9, 10, and 13, 1991. Petitioner was not at work on February 11 and 12, 1991, but those were scheduled days off. On February 13, 1991, David A. Sofferin, Hospital Administrator at SFSH, notified Petitioner by letter that DHRS had no choice but "... to consider you to have abandoned your Human Services Worker I position and resigned from the State of Florida Career Service at South Florida State Hospital. ..." This letter also advised Petitioner of her right to challenge this action. Petitioner wrote DHRS a letter which was received by DHRS on February 25, 1991. In this letter Petitioner admitted that she had violated the personnel rules and asked for a second chance. Petitioner's letter stated that she had been abducted by a boyfriend on February 11, 1990 (sic), 1/ and taken to Bradenton. The letter did not attempt to explain her absences on February 6, 7, 8, 9, and 10. 1991. Petitioner was provided a copy of DHRS' Employee Handbook on April 20, 1990. Petitioner had been previously advised of Respondent's attendance policies and she had been previously reprimanded for failing to adhere to those policies. The following is found on page 13 of the Employee Handbook under the paragraph entitled "Absences": If you expect to be absent from work for any reason, you must request leave from your supervisor as much in advance as possible, so that suitable disposition of your work may be made to avoid undue hardship on fellow employees and clients. As soon as you know you will be late or absent from work you must notify your supervisor. Absences without approved leave is cause for disciplinary action. If you are absent for three consecutive workdays without authorization, you may be considered to have abandoned your position and thus resigned. (Emphasis added.) CONCLUSIONS OF LAW The Division of Administrative Hearings has jurisdiction over this matter. Section 120.57(1), Florida Statutes. Rule 22A-7.010(2)(a), Florida Administrative Code, provides, in pertinent part, as follows: An employee who is without authorized leave of absence for 3 consecutive workdays shall be deemed to have abandoned the position and to have resigned from the career service . ... . The foregoing rule creates a rebuttable presumption. DHRS has established that Petitioner was absent without authorized leave so that she is rebuttably presumed to have abandoned her position of employment and to have resigned from the career service. Petitioner has failed to rebut that presumption.

Recommendation Based upon the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that a Final Order be entered which finds that Petitioner, Carol Wheeler, has abandoned her position of employment with the Department of Health and Rehabilitative Services and which further finds that she has resigned from the career service. DONE AND ORDERED in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida, this 13th day of November, 1991. CLAUDE B. ARRINGTON Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 13th day of November, 1991.

Florida Laws (1) 120.57
# 2
WINIFRED CHAMBERS vs. BOARD OF MEDICINE, 89-001712 (1989)
Division of Administrative Hearings, Florida Number: 89-001712 Latest Update: Jul. 02, 1990

Findings Of Fact Petitioner, Dr. Winifred Chambers received a master's degree in religion and art in 1957, a second master's degree in 1968 in philosophy with a specialization in ethics and social philosophy and a Ph.D. (with honors) in 1975 in the philosophy of science, all from the University of Chicago. While working on her dissertation, she studied at the Chicago Institute of Psychoanalysis. After working around hospitals and conducting classes and workshops on medical ethics for medical personnel, Petitioner decided to attend medical school. Because her educational training did not include extensive background in certain scientific areas, Petitioner was concerned with her ability to score well on the MCATS, which are the entrance examinations required by all medical schools in the United States. In addition, Petitioner's age (she was in her mid 40's at the time) was considered a negative factor by many medical schools in the United States. As a result, she inquired about attending certain foreign medical schools. She was limited in the schools that she could consider because she did not speak Spanish. Medical Education In 1979, Petitioner applied to the American University of the Caribbean (AUC). AUC taught its medical courses in English and Petitioner was only required to make up a few undergraduate science courses (including physics) in order to enroll in the medical school. Petitioner enrolled in classes at AUC in May of 1980. She actually started classes a few days after the semester began. She completed the first two semesters from May to December 1980 and then went home during the Christmas break. During the break, Petitioner learned that she had received an F in her course in neurosciences. Petitioner met with the professor from that course to discuss the failing grade she received and also met with the President of AUC. As a result of these meetings, it was her understanding that the grade was changed to a passing grade. In January of 1981, Petitioner visited CETEC (another Caribbean medical school located in the Dominican Republic,) and met with officials of the school to discuss transferring from AUC to CETEC. Petitioner applied to CETEC during her visit and, prior to leaving, was informed of her acceptance into medical school at CETEC. Petitioner returned to AUC and completed her third semester at the school. In May of 1981, she officially enrolled at CETEC by initiating clinical rotations at Sharp Hospital in San Diego, California. Even though Petitioner had only completed three semesters at AUC, she was granted status as a fifth semester medical student. She contends that she was granted this status based upon CETEC'S evaluation of her transcript and the number of hours she took at AUC. Prior to her enrollment at CETEC, Petitioner provided CETEC with a transcript indicating she had passed neurosciences at AUC and CETEC gave her credit for the course. From May 4, 1981 to June 6, 1982, Petitioner participated in clinical rotations at Sharp Memorial Hospital in San Diego, California as part of her medical education at CETEC. During this time period, Petitioner also participated in a clinical rotation at Children's Hospital in San Diego, California (from 12/28/81 to 2/20/82). Beginning in 1983, the media and some state licensing agencies began challenging the validity and/or authenticity of the credentials and training of some CETEC medical graduates. CETEC medical school was ultimately closed in 1984. The Dominican Republic government formed an agency to verify and certify the transcripts of CETEC graduates. This agency was called the "Counsel For Superior Education" also referred to by the acronym of CONES. CONES verified and certified the legitimacy of higher education credentials from all Dominican schools submitted to other countries. As part of her pending Florida Application, Petitioner has submitted a certification from CONES dated October 15, 1987 attesting to Petitioner's graduation from medical school at CETEC on June 12, 1982. Petitioner has also submitted a second certification from CONES dated July 8, 1988 confirming her graduation on June 12, 1982. Included as part of the documents submitted by Petitioner from CONES is a Certification of Clinical Rotations dated July 14, 1987 (the "CONES Report") and an academic transcript dated July 14, 1987 (the "CONES Transcript.") The "Education Commission For Foreign Medical Graduates" ("ECFMG") provides a certification of the education of applicants from foreign medical schools who seek licensure in the various United States and offers an examination required by some state licensing boards for licensure of applicants graduating from foreign medical schools. Petitioner passed the ECFMG examination and was certified by the ECFMG in 1982. However, after the CETEC scandal began in 1983, the ECFMG started an investigation of graduates of CETEC (including Petitioner) for the purpose of reverifying their medical training. The ECFMG required clearance from CONES of Petitioner's CETEC education before reverifying her ECFMG certificate. The ECFMG reinstated Petitioner's ECFMG certification on June 26, 1987. The earliest certification from CONES that has been submitted by Petitioner is dated July 14, 1987, approximately two and a half weeks after the ECMFG certification. It is not clear what the ECFMG relied upon in reissuing a certification to Petitioner. While Petitioner contends that CONES had originally certified her CETEC transcript shortly after her graduation in June of 1982, no competent evidence was presented to establish when or if an earlier CONES certification was issued. In any event, Petitioner currently holds a valid ECFMG certificate. In certifying Petitioner's medical degree from CETEC, CONES gave Petitioner credit for courses taken and work done at non-medical schools (i.e., the University of Chicago) prior to entering medical school. These credits are discussed in more detail in Findings of Fact 17. Although the ECFMG has apparently accepted CONES' certification of Petitioner's medical education at CETEC, there are several inconsistencies on the face of the CONES Report. The CONES Report states that during the period from May 4, 1981 to June 6, 1982, Petitioner completed fifty six (56) weeks of clinical rotations. However, in reaching this total the CONES Report provides one week of credit for a rotation (from 5/24/82 to 5/28/82) in obstetrics and gynecology which overlapped with another rotation (from 5/10/82 to 6/5/82) in obstetrics and gynecology. It it also provides double credit for a single two week clinical rotation (from 5/4/81 to 5/16/81) in obstetrics and gynecology. In addition, there are two periods of time (from 2/21/82 to 3/14/82 and from 4/25/82 to 5/9/82, which total approximately five (5) weeks), during which no clinical rotations were taken. Since the period between May 4, 1981 and June 6, 1982 consisted of approximately fifty seven (57) weeks, it does not appear that Petitioner actually completed fifty six (56) weeks of rotations as listed. Deleting the double credit received for the 5/4/81 to 5/16/81 clinical rotation, the CONES Report only appears to certify completion of fifty four (54 weeks) of clinical rotations. Moreover, those fifty four (54) weeks of rotations include one week of credit for five (5) days in obstetrics and gynecology (from 5/24/82 to 5/28/82) which directly overlapped a separately listed clinical rotation in obstetrics and gynecology, and one (1) week of credit for six (6) days in obstetrics and gynecology from 6/1/82 to 6/6/82. Thus, on the face of the CONES Report it appears that Petitioner actually completed only fifty three (53) weeks of rotations at most. This conclusion is bolstered by the fact that, according to the CONES Report, there were approximately five (5) weeks of the fifty-seven (57) week period during which no clinical rotations were taken. Petitioner contends that the CONES Report fails to take into account a five (5) week clerkship in family medicine which she completed at Sharp Hospital and which was accepted by the ECFMG when Petitioner applied for licensure in California. This clerkship is reflected in the CETEC Transcript even though it is not reflected in the CONES Report. It is not clear why this rotation was not included in the CONES Report However, the evidence did establish that Petitioner completed the rotation. One of the five weeks of this family medicine rotation overlaps with an OB/GYN rotation (from 5/4/82 -5/8/82). The time frame of the family medicine rotation roughly coincides with the period of time during which no rotations are reflected in the CONES Report. Thus, this rotation would only add four more weeks to the clerkship total listed on the CONES Report. Even if this four week rotation is added to the fifty three (53) weeks certified in the CONES Report, the Report would still only indicate that Petitioner completed a total of fifty seven (57) weeks of clinical rotations. According to the boiler-plate language on the CONES Report, sixty (60) to seventy-two (72) total weeks of clinical rotations had to be completed by CETEC students who took their clinical rotations outside of the Dominican Republic. Thus, the CONES Report does not reflect completion of the required weeks of clinical rotations even though CONES has issued a certification that purports to certify successful completion of the degree requirements. This discrepancy has not been adequately explained. The CONES Report does not reflect any clinical rotations by Petitioner in psychiatry. However, the CETEC Transcript does indicate that Petitioner was granted eight hours credit for her graduate studies at the University of Chicago from 1971-1973. Petitioner contends she is entitled to at least four hours of clerkship in psychiatry for those studies. However, it appears from the CONES Transcript that the credit she received was applied towards classes in Human Conduct which were a part of the curriculum during the first two years of medical school. There is no evidence to indicate that CETEC or CONES granted or should have granted Petitioner credit for clinical rotations in psychiatry based upon her graduate studies at the University of Chicago. During a three week period (between her second and third semesters at AUC) from December 20, 1980 to January 10, 1981, Petitioner participated in an OB/GYN clinical rotation at Sharp Memorial Hospital in San Diego, California (hereinafter this rotation will be referred to as the "Unsanctioned Rotation.") This rotation is usually not done until after a student completes the third semester of medical school. Petitioner's participation in this Unsanctioned Rotation was not authorized by any medical school and was not a part of any medical school program. Petitioner contends that she satisfied the required sixty (60) clerkship weeks if the Unsanctioned Rotation at Sharp Hospital from December 20, 1980 to January 10, 1981 is added to the undisputed clinical rotations and the family medicine rotation discussed in Findings of Fact 15. However, the Unsanctioned Clerkship was not accepted by CONES and Petitioner has not provided sufficient evidence to establish that it should be counted towards her required clinical rotations. Although CETEC had previously granted Petitioner credit for the neurosciences course at AUC, CONES was not able to verify that Petitioner passed the course and CONES required Petitioner to retake the course in order to obtain the 1987 certification from CONES. Petitioner attended Northwestern University during the spring quarter of 1987 and completed a four credit hour course (based on a quarter system) in neurosciences. This neurosciences course was apparently given five hours ex post facto credit by CONES to fulfill the neurosciences requirement for Petitioner's 1982 CETEC medical diploma. From December, 1987 to March, 1988, Petitioner attended Xochicalco Medical School in Ensenada, Mexico in order to take additional coursework in partial fulfillment of a requirement by the California licensing board in a stipulated agreement for additional medical training before licensure. (Petitioner's stipulation with the State of California is discussed in more detail in Findings of Fact 47-50.) The courses taken at Xochicalco were approved by the California licensing agency and included clinical pathology, pharmacology (two courses) and physiology (two courses). Petitioner successfully passed all of the courses. However, no evidence was presented as to the accreditation status of this school. Petitioner completed a five week rotation in emergency medicine at Cruze Roja Hospital in Mexico in 1988 while she was completing the remedial science classes required by the California Licensing Board. Post-Graduate Training Petitioner completed one year of post graduate training from July 1, 1982 to June 30, 1983 in the family medicine residency program at Holston Valley Community Hospital through East Tennessee State University's Quillen-Dishner College of Medicine. Petitioner has presented a certificate verifying succcessful completion of her first post graduate year of training in this program. Petitioner performed her residency at two hospitals which are part of the East Tennessee State University Quillen-Dishner College of Medicine: Kingsport Family Practice Center and Holston Valley Community Hospital. She saw patients at the Kingsport Family Practice Center for 7 months, one afternoon each week under the supervision of various physicians. The rest of Petitioner's residency was performed at the Holston Valley Community Hospital. Dr. Lee S. Hyde was the program director of the Kingsport Family Medicine Center. Petitioner's contact with Dr. Hyde was limited, but she did have several consultations with him about patients. In an evaluation submitted to the Florida Board of Medicine in connection with Petitioner's application for licensure, Dr. Hyde evaluated Petitioner's diagnostic ability and relationships with patients as poor. He also stated that Petitioner came to the program with a "poor fund of knowledge, clinical habits, and basic medical education". Although he felt Petitioner made progress during the residency program, he did not think it was sufficient. However, his overall evaluation was to recommend with reservations. Dr. Hyde's evaluation of Petitioner to the Board was received by the Board on July 18, 1983. Dr. Hyde noted on the back of the evaluation form that Petitioner was not ready to begin a second year of unsupervised practice. Petitioner was not and would not have been offered a contract for a second year in the residency program. Dr. Hyde also commented that Petitioner demonstrated poor judgment by once going "AWOL" from the program. While Petitioner did take a three (3) day leave over a weekend while assigned to a particular rotation with another physician contrary to the rules of the program, she did so with the permission of her supervisor at the time. Prior to the negative evaluation submitted by Dr. Hyde in July of 1983, Dr. Hyde had previously written a letter dated March 24, 1983 to the Florida Board of Medicine recommending Dr. Chambers for licensure stating that she was in good standing with the program and of reasonable professional competence and excellent moral character. Leslie P. Reynolds, Jr., M.D., was a professor of Family Medicine, assistant Dean, and Director of Medical Education at the Holston Valley Hospital during Petitioner's year of residency. In a June 29, 1983 evaluation form submitted to the Florida Board, Dr. Reynolds, gave an evaluation of Petitioner's performance during the family medicine residency and recommended her as an outstanding applicant. Dr. Reynolds subsequently submitted an affidavit to the Florida Board of Medicine dated October 21, 1987 attesting that Petitioner earned the respect of both her instructors and fellow residents and that the hospital's records suggest that she performed well on all her services and that she was very helpful to other residents. Several other physicians who served as clinical supervisors during Petitioner's residency at Holston Valley have submitted letters of recommendation and virtually all other evaluations of her work were positive. Aside from the letter from Dr. Hyde, (Dr. Hyde did not testify and his letter is hearsay,) no other evidence was presented to demonstrate that Petitioner is incapable of practicing medicine with reasonable skill and safety. The weight of the evidence established that Petitioner is capable of practicing with reasonable skill and safety. Numerous letters from the physicians who have worked with Petitioner over the last several years corroborate to her ability to practice medicine with reasonable skill and safety. Petitioner was employed as a house physician at Jackson Memorial Hospital in Miami from July 11, 1983 to October 31, 1983. Her position was under the supervision of the Department of Family Medicine in the Ambulatory Care Unit of the Emergency Room Department and the Family Medicine Clinical Faculty from the University of Miami. However, the position was not an advanced residency program and the nature of the supervision and training that Petitioner received has not been fully explained. Furthermore, the evidence did not establish the exact nature of her duties and functions. From October 1984 to March 1985, Petitioner participated in a series of clinical rotations at the Wesley Medical Center which is affiliated with the University of Kansas. The exact nature of Petitioner's position is not clear. The position at the Wesley Medical Center was a non-paying position during which Petitioner completed an eight week rotation in Internal Medicine, twelve weeks in General Surgery and four weeks in psychiatry functioning in each rotation at the level of a first-year resident. Petitioner was not officially enrolled as a resident in this program. However, she did receive evaluations from the attending physicians and her evaluations by the supervising physicians in that program were acceptable. In 1988, Petitioner completed an eight month internship at Universal Medical Center in Plantation, Florida Universal Medical Center is an osteopathic teaching institution. This internship was undertaken to satisfy a requirement of the California licensing authority for eight months of "remedial" clinical work. See, Findings of Fact 50. Petitioner was evaluated as performing in a competent and professional manner in this program. At the Universal Medical Center, Petitioner completed thirty three (33) weeks of clinical rotations. The program extended from March 21, 1988 through November 3, 1988. Her duties and responsibilities were similar to other interns in the program. In sum, Petitioner has successfully completed several additional science courses and completed at least thirty eight (38) additional weeks of clinical training beyond her medical school rotations and first post-graduate year residency. Those weeks of training include thirty three (33) weeks at Universal Medical Center which is an approved osteopathic medical training program that was accepted by the California Licensing Agency for purposes of Petitioner's remedial clinical work. Licensure Applications Petitioner passed the FLEX exam in June, 1982 with a score of 78. She also passed the ECFMG exam in January, of 1982 with a score of 76. In addition, she passed an oral examination administered by the California State Licensing Board in 1988. After graduating from CETEC in June 1982, Petitioner initiated efforts to obtain licensure in several states. In her initial attempts at licensure, Petitioner submitted several misleading applications which have backfired into a morass of complications and confusion. In 1982, Petitioner knowingly submitted a fraudulent application to the State of Oregon. Petitioner filed the application with the Oregon licensing authority in order to take the Federal Licensing Examination known as the FLEX. Oregon was one of the few states which allowed applicants to take the FLEX examination prior to graduation and also granted applicants some choice in the location of the exam. Petitioner took the FLEX in the Virgin Islands in June of 1982. This was the nearest location to the Dominican Republic where she was attending graduation ceremonies at CETEC around the same time. On the application to take the FLEX exam filed with Oregon, Petitioner falsely stated that she attended AUC from May, 1979 to April, 1981. She actually attended AUC from May, 1980 through April, 1981. In the early part of 1983, Petitioner submitted applications for licensure to South Carolina, California, Georgia, New Mexico, and Florida. South Carolina determined that Petitioner was not eligible for licensure in that state because she had not completed the required post-graduate training. Her application for licensure in that state was returned without action. In her applications to Georgia, California and Florida in 1983, Petitioner misrepresented her attendance at CETEC as having commenced in May, 1979 rather than reporting attendance at AUC starting in May, 1980 and ending in May, 1981 when she transferred to CETEC. Petitioner admits that she falsely stated that she began her medical education in May, 1979 on the Oregon FLEX application, as well as the California, Georgia and 1983 Florida applications. In an attempt to justify these false statements, Petitioner points out that the Dean from CETEC had issued a letter to these licensing agencies stating that Petitioner had completed eight (8) semesters at CETEC from 1979 to 1982. Petitioner claims she completed the misleading applications because she wanted her statements to be consistent with the CETEC Dean's certification of attendance. It would appear that an additional motivation for falsifying the applications was to avoid having to explain that she had received medical education credit for some of her non-medical course work at the University of Chicago approximately ten years earlier. It is unclear why the Dean's certification letters were not accurate. While no evidence was presented to directly link Petitioner to the issuance of these incorrect Dean's letters, the shady circumstances surrounding her involvement with Pedro de Mesones around this same time period (discussed in Findings of Fact 87-95 below) leads to an inference that Petitioner was at least indirectly responsible for these misleading letters. In her February 1983 application to New Mexico, Petitioner accurately stated the dates and locations of her medical school education. No adequate explanation was given as to why the correct dates were listed on this 1983 application but not the other applications filed around the same time in Georgia, Florida and California. Petitioner listed the correct dates of attendance at AUC and CETEC on her 1984 Florida application and the 1988 filing which are discussed in more detail in Findings of Fact 69-72 below. Georgia and New Mexico granted Petitioner licensure based upon the 1983 applications. California initially denied her licensure. However, as described in Findings of Fact 47-51 below, Petitioner challenged that decision. Florida permitted Petitioner to withdraw her 1983 Application rather than go to hearing on the Board's intent to deny licensure. See Findings of Fact 67-68. Petitioner's application for licensure in California was filed in the Spring of 1983. Petitioner received a letter in April of 1983 returning her application without action. Petitioner requested reconsideration of her application which, eventually, resulted in a proposed order of denial dated June 9, 1986. Petitioner requested a hearing on that proposed denial. The proposed denial was resolved without hearing by a stipulation between Petitioner and the California licensing agency in an order dated November 5, 1987 (the "California Stipulation"). The stipulated findings of fact in the November 5, 1987 California Stipulation recognize that the application filed by Petitioner in March, 1983 remained pending without action until the 1987 California Stipulation was entered. The California Stipulation notes that the proposed denial of her application in 1986 was based on the grounds that: (a) Petitioner had not listed on her application her attendance at AUC; (b) she had falsely stated under oath that she began her medical education at CETEC beginning in May, 1979; and (c) her medical education did not conform to California requirements. The California Stipulation provides that it supersedes the reasons set forth in the 1986 proposed denial so long as Dr. Chambers abides by the terms of the Stipulation. The California Stipulation makes no findings of fact or conclusions of law regarding wrongdoing on the part of the Petitioner. The California Stipulation provides that Petitioner would be issued a license to practice medicine in California upon completion of remedial medical education specified in the Stipulation, completion of an additional academic year of clinical training before September, 1990, satisfactory proof of certification by CONES, and passage of an oral examination. The California Stipulation also provides that Petitioner shall take forty (40) hours of continuing medical education within the first two (2) years of licensure in addition to the continuing education classes statutorily required for licensure in California. Petitioner was issued her license to practice medicine in California on November 11, 1988 demonstrating that she satisfied the requirements of the November 1987 California Stipulation. In her application to the State of Georgia in June of 1983, the Petitioner specifically represented that she attended CETEC from May of 1979 to April 1980, attended AUC from April, 1980 to May, 1981 and CETEC again from April 1981 through June, 1982. The Dean of CETEC certified to the Georgia licensing agency that Petitioner enrolled in the school of medicine in May, 1979 and attended eight semesters of 4.2 months each. As discussed in Findings of Fact 43, the basis for this certification by the Dean is unclear. Petitioner obtained a license to practice medicine in Georgia based on her 1983 application and did in fact practice medicine in that state from January, 1984 to August, 1984. On August 17, 1984 the Georgia State Board of Medical Examiners issued a Notice of Hearing to Petitioner setting forth charges against her including failure to meet the standards for licensure and/or intentionally making false statements in obtaining a license to practice medicine. The charges also included an allegation that Petitioner "was denied a license by the Board of Medical Quality Assurance of the State of California based on evidence of making false statements on a sworn application and submitting false and/or inaccurate certificates of education to obtain a license to practice in that state." In fact, in 1984 the California licensing authority had not formally denied Petitioner's application for licensure. The proposed denial of Petitioner's California application was pending, but not acted upon. Indeed, a formal denial of her California application was never finalized. Instead, the issues were resolved by the California Stipulation in November, 1987. On September 22, 1984, Petitioner executed a "Voluntary Surrender" which was approved by the Georgia State Board of Medical Examiners and served as the final order of that agency with respect to the Notice of Hearing discussed in Findings of Fact 54. By voluntarily surrendering her license to practice medicine in Georgia, Petitioner waived her right to a hearing on the charges contained in the Notice of Hearing. The first paragraph of the "Voluntary Surrender" states: "I hereby acknowledge that this surrender shall have the same effect as revocation of my license, and I knowingly forfeit and relinquish all right, title and privilege of practicing medicine in the State of Georgia, unless and until such time as my license may be reinstated, in the sole discretion of the Board." Notwithstanding this language, Petitioner contends the "Voluntary Surrender" should be distinguished from a revocation because she did not admit to any wrongdoing and because she was allowed to seek reinstatement upon application and demonstration of the ability to safely practice medicine. The Voluntary Surrender of the Georgia license contains no specific findings of fact or conclusions of law that establish any wrongdoing on the part of the Petitioner. The "Voluntary Surrender" states that Petitioner did not admit to any wrongdoing and it allows Petitioner to seek reinstatement. The Executive Director of the Composite State Board of Medical Examiners of Georgia certified to the Florida Board of Medicine on August 2, 1988, that Petitioner's Georgia license had been issued in 8/83, surrendered in 9/84 and that license had not been "suspended or revoked." Thus, while disciplinary action was clearly initiated against Respondent in Georgia, her license was not revoked. Petitioner was licensed to practice medicine in the State of New Mexico in November, 1983. On January 10, 1985, the New Mexico Board of Medical Examiners served on Petitioner a Notice of Contemplated Action notifying her of charges including having made misrepresentations in applying for and procuring a license to practice medicine in New Mexico and having her license in Georgia revoked. The New Mexico case was referred to a hearing officer who considered argument and briefs by the parties regarding the nature and effect of Petitioner's surrender of her Georgia license. By an order of the New Mexico State Board of Medical Examiners, Petitioner's New Mexico medical license was revoked in January, 1986. The New Mexico order of revocation treated Petitioner's voluntary surrender of her Georgia medical license as the functional equivalent of a revocation for purposes of the New Mexico licensing statute. In reaching this determination, the New Mexico Board relied upon the wording of the Voluntary Surrender and the Georgia Statutes which both indicate that a voluntary surrender shall have the same effect as revocation. No other specific grounds were cited by the New Mexico Board in its Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, Decision and Order. As indicated above, Petitioner's initial application to the Florida Board of Medicine (the "Board") for licensure was filed March, 1983. When the Board proposed denial, Petitioner requested a formal hearing. Prior to hearing, the Board obtained leave from the hearing officer to amend the basis for denial to include grounds relating to information presented to the Board by U.S. Postal Service investigators regarding Petitioner's truthfulness on her application form and the validity of certain documents she utilized in her attempt to obtain a Florida medical license. The Board was granted leave to amend as requested by order dated February 20, 1984. Shortly thereafter, Petitioner filed with the hearing officer a motion to withdraw her application because of the new information presented from the "federal investigation." The Board granted the request to withdraw the 1983 Application in an order rendered May 29, 1984. The Board's proposed denial of Petitioner's 1983 Application was on the basis that the Board had reason to believe that Petitioner, "as a graduate of CETEC, was not capable of safely engaging in the practice of medicine as a result of a report of the California Board of Medical Quality Assurance which indicated gross irregularities in the degree granting process of CETEC University and which raised serious doubts about the adequacy of medical education certified by CETEC." Petitioner filed with the Board a second application for licensure in Florida in December of 1984 (hereinafter referred to as the 1984 Application.) In response to a request for additional information from the Board regarding this second application, Petitioner executed a waiver of the requirement that the Board act upon the application within 90 days. As a result, the 1984 Application was left pending. The 1984 Application was for licensure by endorsement based upon Petitioner's license in New Mexico. As discussed in Findings of Fact 62-66, action was initiated against that New Mexico license in January, 1985 ultimately leading to the revocation of the license in January, 1986. After her New Mexico license was revoked, Petitioner did not hold a valid license to practice medicine in any other state until California issued her a license in November, 1988. On August 1, 1988, Petitioner filed another application with the Board as an update to the 1984 Application. (This August 1988 application is referred to as the "1988 Filing.") In her 1988 Filing, Petitioner included a recertification from ECFMG. At the time she filed her 1984 Florida application, Petitioner's original ECFMG certification had been placed on hold because of the CETEC scandal. Petitioner was required to provide a revalidation of her medical education by ECFMG in order to obtain consideration of her application in Florida. This revalidation was not provided until the 1988 Filing. On September 12, 1988, Petitioner filed a supplement to the 1988 Filing. On November 2, 1988 the Board requested additional information relating to the application. On December 12, 1988 Petitioner filed a response to this request. The Board issued an Order of Intent to Deny on March 3, 1989 stating as grounds for denial in Paragraph 2: You have had licenses in Georgia, New Mexico and California acted against by the licensing bodies of those states. See, Subsections 458.331(1)(b) and 458.311(1)(d), Florida Statutes (1988). The only year of training you received was in 1982-1983 at Holston Valley Community Hospital and the Kingsport Family Practice Center through the auspices of East Tennessee State University Quillen-Dishner College of Medicine. You were recommended less than favorably by both hospitals and you were not permitted to return for a second year of residency training by the College of Medicine. Your poor performance in your only year of medical training evidences your inability to practice medicine with reasonable skill and safety. See, Sections 458.301 and 458.331(4), Florida Statutes (1988). There are material discrepancies between answers and information provided in your 3 different applications and supporting documents submitted to the Board; and you have provided fraudulent information and misrepresented or concealed information regarding your medical education. See Subsections 458.311(1)(c) and 458.331(1)(a) and (hh), Florida Statutes (1988). Inconsistencies in the Application There are several discrepancies between Petitioner's 1983 Florida Application, her 1984 Application, and her 1988 Filing. On the 1984 Application, Petitioner reported her participation in the Unsanctioned Rotation at Sharp Memorial Hospital from December 20, 1980 to January 10, 1981 as part of her clinical clerkships. The Unsanctioned Rotation is not listed on the 1988 Filing. Petitioner contends that it was not until after submission of the 1984 Application that she found out that CONES refused to recognize the clerkships taken in 1980 because Petitioner was not enrolled as a student at CETEC at the time. Therefore, Petitioner deleted those unapproved clerkship weeks from the 1988 Filing. However, while specific reference to the clerkship was deleted in 1988, Petitioner admitted at the hearing that she counted the Unsanctioned Rotation as part of sixty (60) weeks of clerkships claimed in the 1988 Filing. The 1988 Filing states Petitioner completed sixty (60) weeks of clinical clerkships as part of her medical education at CETEC. However, as discussed in Findings of Fact 13 through 18, Petitioner's submitted a CONES verification of clinical rotations that only details fifty six (56) weeks (including duplicate and overlapping credit) of clinical clerkships. In the 1988 Filing, Petitioner did report the actions taken against her medical licenses in Georgia and New Mexico and mentioned her problems obtaining licensure in California. On the 1984 Application, Petitioner responded to the question "Have you ever been notified to appear before any licensing agency for a hearing on a complaint of any nature, including, but not limited to, a charge or violation of the medical practice act, unprofessional or unethical conduct?" by stating "after my voluntary surrender, notice of hearing in Georgia, [sic] charging denial and Flafalse documents re licensure (both false)." Both the Notice of Hearing and the Voluntary Surrender in Georgia were issued prior to the completion of Petitioner's 1984 Florida Application. Thus, while Petitioner did disclose the voluntary surrender, she only provided a brief and somewhat misleading explaination. The 1984 Application does not mention Petitioner's application in South Carolina (which was returned without action) nor does it discuss Petitioner's licensure difficulties in California other than to say she had been denied a license because of "informal deficiencies." The 1984 Application also omits Petitioner's licensure problems in New Mexico which is understandable since the Notice of Contemplated Action in that case was not filed until January, 1985. The application form requires the applicant to list all universities or colleges where the applicant "took classes/received training." Petitioner listed her training at the University of Kansas, Wesley Medical Center under the medical education section of her 1984 Application. In the 1984 application, she refers to it as a "externship". That position is also listed in the medical education section of the 1988 Filing with an explanation indicating that she was not actually a resident. As discussed in Findings of Fact 30, her position at the Wesley Medical Center is not easily described due to the unusual circumstances that led to her participating in the program. She was repeating clerkships in certain areas in accordance with the stipulation reached with the California licensing agency. Although Petitioner was not officially enrolled in classes or a residency program in that position, she considers it as part of her medical education and training and, therefore, listed it as such. In her 1984 Application, Petitioner listed time spent at Jackson Memorial Hospital (University of Miami) and Wesley Medical Center (Unversity of Kansas) on a sheet entitled graduate and post-graduate education. On her 1988 Filing, she listed both positions as post-graduate training. Both of these positions were actually house staff positions rather than part of the training programs of the affiliated medical schools. In the 1984 Application, Petitioner listed her dates of training at the Wesley Medical Center as October, 1984 to April 1985 (which was her projected completion date.) The 1984 Application was filled out and filed with the Board in December 1984, four months prior to the projected completion date of the Wesley position. In the 1988 Filing, Petitioner listed her actual completion date of March, 1985, which was approximately two weeks earlier than the projected completion date referred to in the 1984 Application. From January 1984 to August 1984, Petitioner worked for Spectrum Emergency Care in emergency rooms and free-standing clinics in Georgia. Petitioner listed different dates of service with Spectrum on the 1984 Application and the 1988 Filing. Petitioner contends the differences are due in part because the 1988 Filing included employment at Spectrum in New Mexico in December 1984 and January 1985 after submission of the 1984 Application. However, the 1988 Filing states that Petitioner was continuously employed by Spectrum from January 1984 - January 1985. In fact, she was not employed during the months of August, September, October and November, 1984. Moreover, her employment with Spectrum in New Mexico in December, 1984 and January, 1985 overlaps with her "externship" at the Wesley Medical Center/University of Kansas which took place from October, 1984 through March, 1985. Apparently, this overlap was possible because her work for Spectrum in December, 1984 consisted of one weekend and a holiday and in January, 1985 consisted of one weekend. In sum, the 1988 Filing significantly overstates her actual experience with Spectrum. The 1988 Filing contains several inconsistent statements regarding Petitioner's employment as a ship's physician. Under the practice/employment section of that Filing, she states she was a ship's physician for SeaEscape from April, 1985 to September, 1985 and a ship's physician for Commodore Cruise Lines from February, 1986 to September, 1986. Later in the application, under postgraduate medical training and work experience, she states she was a Chief Medical Officer for cruise ships from April, 1985, through September, 1986. However, according to the previously cited information, for at least a four month period during that time frame, she was not employed. In another portion of her application, Petitioner lists under clinical medicine that she worked on the two ships from April, 1985 through September, 1987. Even assuming that there is a typographical error and Petitioner meant September, 1986 as indicated in the other listings, by deleting any reference to the four months that she was not employed, an impression is created that Petitioner has more clinical experience than was actually true. There is a conflict between the AUC transcript that Petitioner submitted with the 1988 Filing and earlier versions of the transcript that appear in her records. The course titles are consistent in the transcripts, but the numbers of some of the courses are different. Only the last digit of the course numbers are different. Whether a course is listed in the 100 series, 200 series and 300 series is consistent in all of the transcripts. The series numbers reflect first semester, second semester and third semester courses respectively. The AUC transcript submitted with the 1988 Filing was the most recent one obtained by Petitioner from AUC. That transcript was prepared in June, 1986 and reflects a failing grade in the neurosciences course. However, as discussed in Finding of Fact 4, that grade was changed to a passing grade as reflected in a 1981 transcript from AUC which was submitted to CETEC when Petitioner transferred to that school. No adequate explanation has been given to explain why the 1986 AUC transcript is not consistent with the earlier one. Postal Investigation The confusing circumstances surrounding Petitioner's medical education are further complicated by her involvement with Pedro de Mesones. The circumstances surrounding her involvement with Pedro de Mesones have not been fully explained. While Pedro de Mesones' exact status or position is unclear, Petitioner believed him to be a representative of CETEC. He has subsequently been convicted of mail fraud in connection with selling medical diplomas and has been sentenced to a federal prison term. Between July, 1981 and January, 1982, while Petitioner was conducting her clinical rotations in San Diego, she attempted to get information and documentation from CETEC, but she had trouble getting responses to her repeated telephone calls, letters and telegrams. Petitioner sought the help of Pedro de Mesones in getting cooperation and/or responses from CETEC regarding transcripts and other documents necessary for the loan applications and residency applications which she had to file prior to her anticipated medical school graduation date of June, 1982. Another reason Petitioner hired Pedro de Mesones was to get confirmation that CETEC would give her credit towards her medical degree for her prior work on her Ph.D. at the University of Chicago. These credits were necessary for Petitioner to graduate in June of 1982 as she anticiapted. Petitioner was advised by others familiar with the school that Pedro de Mesones could help her in her dealings with CETEC. She first contacted Pedro de Mesones by telephone in February, 1982. She agreed to pay him a total of more than $8,000 for his services. Petitioner explains her payments to Pedro de Mesones as a $3000 fee, plus the next two (2) semester's tuition payments totaling an additional $5000.00 plus a $100.00 graduation fee. Pedro de Mesones advised Petitioner that she had to pay CETEC's tuition totalling $5,000 for two (2) additional semesters even though she did not have to take any classes at CETEC because she was given credit for her work at the University of Chicago. At one point during her dealings with Pedro de Mesones, Petitioner signed a false transcript from a Mexican medical school at Pedro de Mesones' request. This transcript reflected work which Petitioner never completed. No adequate explanation was given as to why these false transcripts were ever prepared. While Petitioner contends that she asked Pedro de Mesones not to use the false Mexican transcript for any purpose, it appears that these transcripts were prepared in the event that Petitioner could not secure two semesters credit from CETEC for her Ph.D. work at the University of Chicago. Ultimately, CETEC decided to give her credit for some of the Ph.D. course work she completed at the University of Chicago. As a result, Petitioner was able to graduate in June of 1982 from CETEC without having to use the false Mexican transcripts. It does not appear that the fraudulent Mexican transcript were ever used by Petitioner in any of her applications. Petitioner provided Pedro de Mesones with two false transcripts regarding her AUC medical education. It is clear that she intended for him to use those transcripts, if necessary, to get a dean's certification from CETEC. One of the false AUC transcripts she prepared made its way into the records of CETEC. It is not clear how CETEC obtained that transcript. Because Petitioner was given credit for her graduate work at the University of Chicago, she did not need the extra credits reflected on the false AUC transcripts. Petitioner subsequently wrote the Dean of CETEC requesting removal of the false AUC transcript after she saw it in her CETEC records during a visit to CETEC to obtain a letter from the Dean showing her to be in good standing. Petitioner asked Pedro de Mesones to provide her with letters signed by the CETEC Dean showing her to be in good standing and on track for graduation in June, 1982. She intended to use these letters in applying for licensure for residency programs. Petitioner felt that she was on track to graduate and indicated to Pedro de Mesones that because of time pressures, she felt it would be acceptable for him to forge the signature of the Dean on the letters required by the various state licensing agencies. However, there is no indication that he did so. While none of the false transcripts prepared by Petitioner were directly submitted by her in any of the applications for licensure filed with any state licensing authorities, it is clear the Dean's certification letters included in Petitioner's 1983 Applications in some of the states were false. See Findings of Fact 39-44. No direct connection has been drawn between the false Dean's certification letters submitted with Petitioner's applications in Georgia and California and Pedro de Mesones. However, the circumstances surrounding Petitioner's dealings with Pedro de Mesones raise a question as to how the certifications were obtained. More importantly, it is clear that Petitioner was aware that the representations contained in the Dean's certifications and the dates of attendance at medical school listed on her 1983 Applications were false. Nevertheless, she still submitted the applications. Petitioner's dealings with Pedro de Mesones ended on June 14, 1982, two days after her graduation ceremonies at CETEC. Practice Experience Petitioner has at various times practiced medicine in Georgia and New Mexico prior to surrendering or losing her license in those states. She has also worked on cruise ships as a ship's doctor for several months. She is currently licensed and practicing in California. She has been licensed in that state since November, 1988. She has practiced emergency medicine at various hospitals and has been practicing as a primary care physician for Castle Air Force Base in California since December 1988. There is no indication that she has been deficient in carrying our her professional duties in any of these positions.

Recommendation Based upon the foregoing findings of fact and conclusions of law, it is RECOMMENDED that the Board of Medical Examiners enter a Final Order granting Petitioner's application for licensure as a physician in the State of Florida subject to a probationary period of two years upon such terms and conditions as the Board deems appropriate. DONE AND ORDERED in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida, this 2nd day of July, 1990. J. STEPHEN MENTON Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 2nd day of July, 1990. APPENDIX Both parties have submitted Proposed Recommended Orders. To the extent that the proposed findings of fact can be isolated, they are addressed below. The Petitioner's Proposed Findings of Fact Proposed Finding Paragraph Number in the Findings of Fact of Fact Number in the Recommended Order Where Accepted or Reason for Rejection. 1. Adopted in substance in Findings of Fact 37, 46-50 and 67. 2. Aubored in substance in Findings of Fact 67 and 68. 3. Adopted in substance in Findings of Fact 69. 4. Adopted in substance in Findings of Fact 70. 5. Adopted in substance in Findings of Fact 71. 6. Adopted in substance in Findings of Fact 72. Adopted in substance in the preliminary statement. Adopted in substance in Findings of Fact 73. Adopted in substance in Findings of Fact 73. Adopted in substance in Findings of Fact 1. Subordinate to Findings of Fact 2-4 and 6. Adopted in substance in Findings of Fact 5. Subordinate to Findings of Fact 6. Suborindate to Findings of Fact 6 and 8. Adopted in substance in Findings of Fact 20. Adopted in substance in Findings of Fact 96. Adopted in substance in Findings of Fact 9. Subordinate to Findings of Fact 9. Adopted in substance in Findings of Fact 10. Adopted in substance in Findings of Fact 11 and 33. Subordinate to Findings of Fact 87. Subordinate to Findings of Fact 87 and 88. Subordinate to Findings of Fact 88. Subordinate to Findings of Fact 89. Subordinate to Findings of Fact 90-94. The first sentence is rejected as constituting argument. The second sentence is subordinate to Findings of Fact 94. Adopted in substance in Findings of Fact 95. Subordinate to Findings of Fact 35. Subordinate to Findings of Fact 35. Subordinate to Findings of Fact 35. Adopted in substance in Findings of Fact 36. Subordinate to Findings of Fact 36 and 39- 42. Adopted in substance in Findings of Fact 45. The first sentence is adopted in Findings of Fact 87. The remainder is rejected as irrelevant. Rejected as irrelevant. Rejected as irrelevant. Adopted in substance in Findings of Fact 73. Subordinate to Findings of Fact 47-66. Adopted in substance in Findings of Fact 47. Adopted in substance in Findings of Fact 48. Adopted in substance in Findings of Fact 50. Adopted in substance in Findings of Fact 51. Adopted in substance in Findings of Fact 49. Subordinate to Findings of Fact 54. Adopted in substance in Findings of Fact 55. Subordinate to Findings of Fact 57, 59-60. Subordinate to Findings of Fact 58. Suborindate to Findings of Fact 61. Adopted in substance in Findings of Fact 59. Subordinate to Findings of Fact 62-66. Subordinate to Findings of Fact 66. Subordinate to Findings of Fact 66. Adopted in substance in Findings of Fact 73. Adopted in substance in Findings of Fact 73. Subordinate to Findings of Fact 20-30. Adopted in substance in Findings of Fact 73. Adopted in substance in Findings of Fact 22 and 27. Adopted in substance in Findings of Fact 23. Subordinate to Findings of Fact 24. Adopted in substance in Findings of Fact 23. Subordinate to Findings of Fact 25-26. Adopted in substance in Findings of Fact 27. Subordinate to Findings of Fact 24 and 25. Adopted in substance in Findings of Fact 73. Subordinate to Findings of Fact 27. Adopted in substance in Findings of Fact 73. Subordinate to Findings of Fact 74. See proposed findings 26-30 above. Subordinate to Findings of Fact 79-80. Subordinate to Findings of Fact 81. Subordinate to Findings of Fact 82-83. Subordinate to Findings of Fact 38. Subordinate to Findings of Fact 78. Subordinate to Findings of Fact 83. Subordinate to Findings of Fact 77. Rejected as irrelevant. Rejected as irrelevant. Rejected as irrelevant. Rejected as irrelevant. Subordinate to Findings of Fact 78. Subordinate to Findings of Fact 84. Addressed in Findings of Fact 12-18. Rejected as irrelevant. Subordinate to Findings of Fact 12-19. The Respondent's Proposed Findings of Fact Proposed Finding Paragraph Number in the Findings of Fact of Fact Number in the Recommended Order Where Accepted or Reason for Rejection. Adopted in substance in Findings of Fact 1. Subordinate to Findings of Fact 2. Subordinate to Findings of Fact 3. Subordinate to Findings of Fact 4. Adopted in substance in Findings of Fact 5. Adopted in substance in Findings of Fact 6. Adopted in substance in Findings of Fact 7. Subordinate to Findings of Fact 9 and 13. Subordinate to Findings of Fact 13 and 14. Subordinate to Findings of Fact 16. Subordinate to Findings of Fact 18. Subordinate to indings of Fact 35. Adopted in substance in Findings of Fact 37. Adopted in substance in Findings of Fact 48. Adopted in substance in Findings of Fact 39. Adopted in substance in Findings of Fact 44. Subordinate to Fndings of Fact 46-52 and 67- 68. Adopted in substance in Findings of Fact 69. Subordinate to Findings of Fact 78. Subordinate to Findings of 78. Subordinate to Findings of Fact 76. Adopted in substance in Findings of Fact 70. Subordinate to Findings of Fact 76, 77 and 78. Adopted in substance in Findings of Fact 71. Adopted in substance in Findings of 72. 26. Adopted in substance in the preliminary statement. 27. Adopted in substance in Findings of Fact 73. 28. Adopted in substance in Findings of Fact 73. 29. Adopted in substance in Findings of Fact 54. 30. Adopted in substance in Findings of Fact 56. 31. Adopted in substance in Findings of Fact 78. 32. Adopted in substance in Findings of Fact 63. 33. Adopted in substance in Findings of Fact 65. Subordinate to Findings of Fact 47-51. Adopted in substance in Findings of Fact 22. Subordinate to Findings of Fact 24-26. Adopted in substance in Findings of Fact 27. Adopted in substance in Findings of Fact 25. Subordinate to Findings of Fact 31 and 79- 81. Subordinate to Findings of Fact 29. Adopted in substance in Findings of Fact 12 and 17. Adopted in substance in Findings of Fact 19. Subordinate to Findings of Fact 87-95. Adopted in substance in Findings of Fact 20. Adopted in substance in Findings of Fact 97. Subordinate to Findings of Fact 87-95. Rejected as not supported by competent substantial evidence. Adopted in substance in Findings of Fact 40. Rejected as not supported by competent substantial evidence. Subordinate to Findings of Fact 47-68. Rejected as constituting argument. Rejected as constituting argument. Copies furnished: Paul Watson Lambert, Esquire Attorney at Law 1355 Mahan Drive P. O. Box 31 Tallahassee, Florida 32308 Allen R. Grossman, Esquire Assistant Attorney General Suite 1602 - The Capitol Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1050 Dorothy Faircloth Executive Director Department of Professional Regulation 1940 North Monroe Street Suite 60 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0792 Kenneth E. Easley General Counsel Department of Professional Regulation 1940 North Monroe Street Suite 60 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0792

Florida Laws (5) 120.57458.301458.311458.313458.331
# 4
DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH, BOARD OF NURSING vs ZAUHER KARIM, C.N.A., 14-001972PL (2014)
Division of Administrative Hearings, Florida Filed:St. Petersburg, Florida Apr. 29, 2014 Number: 14-001972PL Latest Update: Mar. 18, 2015

The Issue The issue in this case is whether the allegations set forth in the Administrative Complaint filed by Petitioner, Department of Health, Board of Nursing, against Respondent, Zauher Karim, C.N.A., are correct, and, if so, what penalty should be imposed.

Findings Of Fact Petitioner is the state agency charged with regulating the practice of nursing assistance, pursuant to chapters 20, 456, and 464, Florida Statutes. At all times material to the Administrative Complaint, Respondent was a certified nursing assistant (C.N.A.) in the State of Florida, having been issued Certificate No. CNA 191405. The certificate was issued on June 27, 2009. At all times material to the Administrative Complaint, Respondent did not hold any other medical licenses or certificates issued by the Florida Department of Health. On October 17, 2010, Respondent submitted a Health Care Clinic Establishment (HCCE) application to the Department of Health for Chantilly Health Research (Chantilly Health) located at 12800 Indian Rocks Road, Indian Rocks, Florida 33774. Chantilly Health was also known as Chantilly Health and Wellness. At all times material to the Administrative Complaint, the address of record listed on Respondent’s C.N.A. certificate was the same location as Chantilly Health. Respondent’s current address of record is 12199 Indian Rocks Road, Largo, Florida 33774. In his application for HCCE license, Respondent listed Dr. Dunja Boljesic as the Designated Qualifying Practitioner. Respondent signed the application as the clinic manager. Dr. Boljesic had retired and was no longer physically present at Chantilly Health at the time of the investigation giving rise to the Administrative Complaint. It is unknown whether Dr. Boljesic currently maintains any ownership or financial interest in Chantilly Health. On November 30, 2010, the Florida Department of Health, Division of Medical Quality Assurance, issued the HCCE license to Chantilly Health, License No. 604026. Chantilly Health was also licensed with the City of Largo as a “Clinic of Doctors,” a health food store, and a dietary supplement store. Respondent had three different filings with the Florida Secretary of State, Division of Corporations (Sunbiz): one for a research company, one for “vitamin,” and one for a health and nutrition clinic. On January 27, 2012, Department investigator Michael Smith approached Respondent at Chantilly Health and told him he had been diagnosed with multiple myeloma. In response to Mr. Smith’s questions regarding his feigned illness, Mr. Smith testified that Mr. Karim informed him that he could draw blood from him and utilize an independent laboratory to obtain additional information about a specific type of cancer. The laboratory testing would neither be done by Respondent nor Chantilly Health, and would cost $195. Mr. Karim denies having offered to draw blood from Mr. Smith, but testified he could draw a small sample to send to an independent laboratory for testing. Respondent had a glucose and hemoglobin meter at Chantilly Health which he used to draw small samples of blood to determine iron and glucose levels. He did not perform these tests on Mr. Smith, primarily since Mr. Smith refused to have any actual tests performed upon him by Respondent. Had he drawn blood from Mr. Smith, Respondent would not have received any direct or indirect financial benefit or remuneration from the third-party laboratory. Respondent advised Mr. Smith that multiple myeloma, a form of cancer, is related to an inflammation in the gastro- intestinal tract as well as suffering from “toxicity.” He offered to help Mr. Smith strengthen his immune system, which would have included a liver detoxification. Respondent offered to have a blood test performed, after which he would devise a holistic plan of detoxification for Mr. Smith. Mr. Smith chose not to have any of these services performed or ordered by Respondent since he was acting as an investigator and not an actual potential customer of Chantilly Health. Mr. Smith asked Respondent if he was a doctor. Respondent stated he was a doctor “in nutrition medicine and no pharmaceuticals.” He handed Mr. Smith two business cards. The cards contained the following language: Card one: Chantilly Natural Health Research, Functional Blood Nutrition & Lipid-profile, Cardio Risk APW IN-Ratio, centres of enzyme research, Functional Medicine and Orthomolecular Medicine research, Board Certified Fellow of American Association of Integrative Medicine, Board Certified Am Anti-Aging & Regenerative Med, Board Certified American Alternative Medicine, Reg/Lic: Washington, D.C., West Virginia, DC . . .; WV . . . dr. karim, www.chantillyhealth.com Card two: Chantilly Natural Health Research, Functional Blood Nutrition & Lipid-profile, Cardio Risk APW IN-Ratio, z.karim, centres of enzyme research, Functional Medicine & Orthomolecular Medicine Research, Board Certified & Fellow of American Association of Integrative Medicine, Board Certified, Am Anti-Aging & Regenerative Med, Board certified American Alternative Medicine, Reg/Lic: Washington, D.C., West Virginia, Florida . . . www.chantillyhealth.com www.chantillyhealth.us The cards also displayed a logo that read “American Association of Integrative Medicine, The Medical Society for the 21st Century,” and contained a logo of a staff with two snakes entwined, commonly known as a “caduceus.” Respondent testified he applied for all the board certifications listed on his business cards and that he provided these credentialing associations with documentation of his credentials and transcripts. None of these board certifications are related to a Florida license held by Respondent. In January 2013, Mr. Smith returned to Chantilly Health and observed a certificate on the wall with Respondent’s name and the initials “M.D.” following his name. The initials “M.D.” commonly refer to “medical doctor.” Respondent is not licensed as a medical doctor in Florida. Respondent is not licensed as a naturopathic physician in Florida. Respondent admitted to Mr. Smith that he refers to himself as a doctor on his business cards and on the internet. He says he uses the term “doctor” to mean a doctor of oriental medicine. Respondent is not licensed as an acupuncturist in Florida. Respondent admitted giving information about Vitamin E supplements to Mr. Smith. Respondent admitted having a glucose meter and a hemoglobin meter at Chantilly Health. Respondent admitted performing blood glucose level screenings at Chantilly Health. Respondent testified that he performed hemoglobin tests at Chantilly Health to look at hematocrit iron levels and cholesterol levels. Respondent testified that he advised individuals on whom he performed blood glucose level screenings to “cut down” on their sugar intake. Respondent admitted telling individuals on whom he performed hemoglobin tests to increase their liver intake by once a week. Respondent admitted he should not use the term “doctor” in Florida. Respondent testified that he had never been licensed as a medical doctor in any state. Petitioner submitted into evidence in lieu of live testimony, the deposition transcript of Victor Mendez, C.N.A., who is accepted as an expert in nursing assistance based upon his credentials and experience. He testified as to the standard of care and scope of practice for C.N.A.s. A C.N.A. is restricted to working under the direct supervision of a licensed practical nurse or registered nurse. The job of a C.N.A. is to observe and assist patients. A C.N.A. is not permitted to prescribe any type of supplement or medication when performing his or her duties. A C.N.A. is not permitted to recommend vitamins or supplements even if they are available without a prescription, and may not recommend changes in dietary intake. According to Mr. Mendez, C.N.A.s are not permitted to run diagnostic tests, diagnose patients, evaluate diagnoses, or recommend treatments. Mr. Mendez observed that Chantilly Health was set up much like a medical office with a seating or waiting area, the credentials displayed, Respondent’s attire (personalized surgical scrubs), and the products displayed. Mr. Mendez noted that the type of surgical scrubs worn by Respondent were more akin to those worn by physicians in a health care setting than those worn by non-medical health care staff. Mr. Mendez opined that Respondent telling Mr. Smith he was suffering from “leaky gut” was a diagnosis of an individual’s condition which is clearly outside the scope of practice of a C.N.A. Likewise, Respondent’s offer both to conduct blood tests and create a treatment plan was outside the scope of a C.N.A.’s license. Petitioner also presented the expert testimony of Philip N. Styne, M.D., through a transcript of his deposition taken in lieu of live testimony at the final hearing. Dr. Styne was presented as an expert in the fields of internal medicine and gastroenterology. Dr. Styne has been licensed as a medical doctor in Florida since 1979, and is board certified in internal medicine and gastroenterology. He is also the medical director of Digestive Health Clinical Informatics and Liver Services for Florida Hospital. Based upon Dr. Styne’s credentials and experience, the undersigned accepts him as an expert for purpose of offering opinion testimony in this matter. Dr. Styne provided a description of what characterizes multiple myeloma, the disease feigned by Mr. Smith during his investigation of Respondent. Dr. Styne testified that multiple myeloma is treated by chemotherapy, an allogeneic or autologous blood or bone marrow transplant, or a combination of these. Detoxifying the liver is not an accepted form of medical treatment in his opinion. If a patient presented himself to Dr. Styne suffering from multiple myeloma, he would seek a referral to a board-certified oncologist, an internist who specializes in the treatment of cancer. He would make the referral since multiple myeloma is not particular to his specialty, and because it is usually a lethal disease. On December 30, 2013, Respondent submitted a copy of John Daidone’s registered nursing license to Petitioner along with his request for a hearing before the Board of Nursing. Respondent wrote on the copy of the license that Mr. Daidone had supervised him since February 2003. Respondent has only held a C.N.A. license since June 26, 2009. Mr. Daidone testified on behalf of Petitioner at the hearing. He has been licensed as a registered nurse in Florida since around 1990. After presenting a detailed description of his work experience, Mr. Daidone testified he had never supervised Respondent. Mr. Daidone was originally referred to Respondent when he needed a blood test performed. Respondent pricked Mr. Daidone’s finger to draw blood which he examined under a microscope. Respondent advised Mr. Daidone that he was suffering from mycoplasma pneumonia and gave him some supplements to treat his condition. Mycoplasma pneumonia is an infection of the lungs caused by bacteria of a similar name. Respondent gave Mr. Daidone a signed document stating he had the disease and signing it “Z. Karim, N.D.” The abbreviation N.D. stands for naturopathic doctor. Respondent also attached a Chantilly Health business card to the document listing him as an M.D. Mr. Daidone last spoke with Respondent about two months prior to the final hearing, at which time Respondent asked him to say he had supervised Respondent. When testifying, Respondent claimed that Mr. Daidone had signed Respondent’s name on the document with the initials “M.D.” after it. Respondent stated he may have signed a blank piece of paper that Mr. Daidone completed at a later time. Respondent further testified that Mr. Daidone must have picked up a business card from Chantilly Health and photocopied it to the document he created at a later time. Respondent admitted he kept his business cards in the lobby of Chantilly Health in an area accessible to the public. Mr. Daidone could not recall whether he or Respondent typed the letter, or whether it was his handwriting or that of another person appearing on the letter. Mr. Daidone candidly admitted he has problems with his recall and memory. In January 2013, Respondent was issued a Uniform Unlicensed Activity Citation by the Florida Department of Health for practicing medicine in violation of chapters 456 and 458, Florida Statutes. Respondent entered into a Settlement Agreement in that matter in which he neither admitted nor denied the facts alleged in the citation, and paid $4,754.11 (representing a fine of $1,000.00 and costs of $3,754.11) to resolve the citation. Respondent also agreed not to violate any provision of chapter 456 or any Florida statute or rule related to the practice of any health care profession.

Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that the Board of Nursing enter a final order: Adopting the Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law; Finding that Respondent violated section 464.204(1)(b), Florida Statutes, by intentionally violating section 456.072(1)(o) and (m), Florida Statutes, as alleged in the Administrative Complaint; and Revoking Respondent’s certificate to practice as a certified nursing assistant. DONE AND ENTERED this 5th day of December, 2014, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S ROBERT S. COHEN Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 5th day of December, 2014. COPIES FURNISHED: Thomas W. Caufman, Esquire David M. Greene, Esquire Quintairos, Prieto, Wood and Boyer, P.A. 4905 West Laurel Street, Suite 200 Tampa, Florida 33607 (eServed) Yolonda Y. Green, Esquire Ana M. Gargollo-McDonald, Esquire Lauren A. Leikam, Esquire Prosecution Services Unit Department of Health 4052 Bald Cypress Way, Bin C-65 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3265 (eServed) Joe Baker, Jr., Executive Director Board of Nursing Department of Health 4052 Bald Cypress Way, Bin C-02 Tallahassee, Florida 32399 (eServed) Jennifer A. Tschetter, General Counsel Department of Health 4052 Bald Cypress Way, Bin A-02 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1701 (eServed) Lavigna A. Kirkpatrick, BS, RN, Chair Board of Nursing Department of Health 4052 Bald Cypress Way, Bin C-02 Tallahassee, Florida 32399

Florida Laws (8) 120.569120.57120.68400.23456.072464.003464.201464.204
# 5
DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH, BOARD OF NURSING vs PEARLA M. MIXON, C. N. A., 03-001458PL (2003)
Division of Administrative Hearings, Florida Filed:Tampa, Florida Apr. 23, 2003 Number: 03-001458PL Latest Update: Nov. 26, 2003

The Issue Whether Respondent violated Sections 456.072(1)(k) and 464.204(1)(b), Florida Statutes (2001), and, if so, what penalty should be imposed.

Findings Of Fact Effective July 1, 1997, Petitioner is the state agency charged with regulating the responsibility for regulation and discipline of the nursing practice within the State of Florida. Respondent is a certified nursing assistant (CNA) holding Florida nursing certificate number CX 0993266675590. In December 2001, Respondent was employed as a CNA at Beverly Health Care, now known as Seacrest Health Care of Largo. Patient F.K. was a dementia patient in her advanced years and was not coherent or responsive. She was a total care patient, which required staff to perform all activities of daily living for her, such as mouth care, showers, feeding, dressing, bathing, and getting her into and out of bed. Patient F.K. did not speak, but did have a tendency to hum loudly and continuously. On December 20, 2001, Respondent was in Patient F.K.'s room following Patient F.K.'s return from lunch. Respondent called another CNA, Sheleta Cunningham-Talley, into Patient F.K.'s room, and Respondent engaged her in conversation. At that time, Patient F.K. was humming, as she often did. Respondent said to Talley, "watch how I shut this bitch up" and then proceeded to strike Patient F.K. on the face and throat. Patient F.K.'s face and neck turned red, and she became visibly upset after being struck. Beverly Health Care has a policy that residents have a right not to be physically abused. CNAs are under a legal or statutory duty not to hit or abuse patients. Striking a patient in the face and throat is a violation of that duty to not physically abuse a patient. Agnes Kelly is a registered nurse who was employed at Beverly Health Care during Respondent's employment there. Kelly has practiced as a registered nurse since 1994. She was a weekend supervisor at Beverly Health Care and supervised approximately 25 nursing employees which included a number of CNAs. Kelly has supervised nursing staff and CNAs for approximately nine years, and, as such, is familiar with the duties and responsibilities of CNAs. It is her opinion that Respondent violated her duty not to physically abuse a patient. Based on the foregoing, the evidence is clear and convincing that Respondent violated Sections 456.072(1)(k) and 464.204(1)(b), Florida Statutes (2001), by intentionally violating the statutory and legal obligation of CNAs to not physically abuse or hit a patient.

Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that Petitioner issue a final order finding Respondent guilty of violating Sections 456.072(1)(k) and 464.204(1)(b), Florida Statutes (2001), and revoking Respondent's certification and requiring Respondent to pay the costs of investigation and prosecution of this matter. DONE AND ENTERED this 22nd day of July, 2003, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S DANIEL M. KILBRIDE Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 22nd day of July, 2003. COPIES FURNISHED: Kim M. Kluck, Esquire Department of Health 4052 Bald Cypress Way, Bin C-65 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3265 Pearla M. Mixon 4365 Tuna Drive, Southeast St. Petersburg, Florida 33705 Dan Coble, R.N., Ph.D., C.N.A.A. C., B.C. Executive Director Board of Nursing Department of Health 4052 Bald Cypress Way, Bin C02 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3252 R. S. Power, Agency Clerk Department of Health 4052 Bald Cypress Way, Bin A02 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1701 William W. Large, General Counsel Department of Health 4052 Bald Cypress Way, Bin A02 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1701

Florida Laws (3) 120.57456.072464.204
# 8
BOARD OF MEDICAL EXAMINERS vs. PATRICIA MAJOR, 86-000469 (1986)
Division of Administrative Hearings, Florida Number: 86-000469 Latest Update: Mar. 05, 1987

Findings Of Fact Respondent, Patricia Major, M.D., graduated from Harvard undergraduate school with honors; graduated with honors from New York University School of Medicine; served her internship at Yale New Haven Hospital, as well as completing a residency program and fellowship program in pulmonary diseases at Yale in 1974. She was certified in 1974 by the American Board of Internal Medicine. She was a teaching fellow at Yale during her pulmonary fellowship and had a faculty appointment thereafter at that same school. She was Assistant Director and Educational Coordinator at the Family Practices Residency Program for the University of Connecticut and from 1974 through 1976 had teaching appointments there. In 1976, she left New England and returned to Florida to practice internal medicine in Key West where she had grown up. During the period from 1976 to 1980, when she practiced medicine in Key West, she also worked with Emory University and the University of Miami as a clinician teaching medical students who were placed in Key West on rotating clerkships. She served as an emergency room physician at Florida Keys Memorial Hospital and was an admitting physician on the staff. In 1978 she was selected as one of five physicians to become the first civilians to go through the Navy's Diving Medical Officers Training Program and served as a civilian diving medical officer for the Navy in Key West. In 1980, the Board of Medical Examiners of the State of Florida brought charges against Respondent that resulted in a stipulation being entered into between Respondent and the Board that she would voluntarily cease practicing in Florida and relinquish her Florida license. The stipulation was signed in December, 1981, and her license was relinquished by Order of the Board in February, 1982. The charges that resulted in the initial suspension of Respondent's license and in the stipulation between the Respondent and the Board dealt with charges based on impairment due to drugs and alcohol. Respondent moved to Massachusetts where she practiced medicine under a temporary license and voluntarily participated in the Impaired Professionals Program for two years. From 1982 to 1984 she had twice-weekly urine screens under her contract between the assigned Massachusetts monitoring physician and herself. In no instance was there evidence of impairment or a positive urine screen during her Massachusetts stay. In 1984, Respondent returned to Florida and applied to the Board of Medical Examiners for permission to return to practice. On March 14, 1984, the Board of Medical Examiners entered an order reinstating Respondent's medical license for the State of Florida, placing her on probation for a period of three years and setting up a monitoring agreement under which Dr. John Buckner of the Island Clinic would serve as supervising physician for Respondent. From March, 1984, until April, 1986, Respondent worked at the Island Clinic with Dr. Buckner, seeing 15 to 25 patients a day. During that period of time, she only missed one working day, in September, 1985, when she was moving from one house to another and during the period of time immediately before and during her October, 1985 stay at South Miami Hospital. Respondent, and all of the witnesses who had personal knowledge of her contact with patients, denied that she ever treated or dealt with patients while under the influence of drugs or alcohol from 1984 until the current time. Iris Carleen Cervantes, who served as secretary to Dr. Buckner and is currently on the staff of Dr. Davidson, Respondent's current monitoring physician, has had the opportunity over two and one-half years to observe Respondent on a regular basis in her dealings with patients. She has been with Respondent socially as well. She has never seen Respondent drink alcoholic beverages. She uses Respondent as her personal physician and for all other members of her family. She is aware of the Respondent's regular visits to her psychiatrist, Dr. Jerrold Weinstock, and takes those into account in doing the scheduling for Dr. Major. She is similarly aware of Respondent's regular attendance at Alcoholics Anonymous meetings, has never heard Respondent disparage A.A.; and in fact, has a brother whom Respondent helped get into A.A. At no time has Cervantes ever seen any indication, even when Respondent has returned to the office late at night, of any use of drugs or alcohol. Linda Susan Park, a counselor at the Delphus Drug and Alcohol Treatment Center at Florida Keys Memorial Hospital for the last three and one-half years, knows Respondent both personally and professionally. She has never seen Respondent under the influence of any mood-altering chemicals. Although they go out socially together, she has never seen Respondent order an alcoholic beverage. When they are together, they talk program, i.e., A.A. steps. Parks has regularly seen Respondent at A.A. meetings, and they attend a number of the same groups including a Wednesday night women's group called The New Beginnings Group. Parks is aware of the interest Respondent has shown in drug and alcohol-impaired nurses at Keys Memorial and of her attendance at the impaired nurses Caducues meetings. Respondent has worked with the Delphus Program at Florida Keys Memorial Hospital referring a number of patients to the program. Park has seen the Respondent under extremely stressful situations, particularly in the past year; and has seen her act only appropriately. With the Board's approval, Respondent has also worked with indigent patients at the Health Care Center at Florida Keys Memorial Hospital since August, 1986. The Director of that program, Thomas C. Puroff, testified regarding her employment there. Respondent was originally hired on a temporary basis to cover for the primary care physician for three weeks. The Director's assessment of her initial period of employment at the Health Care Center is as follows: The staff was very, very pleased with her performance, and I was very pleased with her performance. The staff felt that they were learning a lot from her, that she was an exemplary doctor who explained why she was doing things with patients and it became a learning process for our nurse practitioners and nurses. Her interaction with the receptionist, administrative assistant was very high level, very positive, and the patients loved her. And both--well, later on when we did hire her on a one day per week basis to fill in when the regular doctor could not be there, a lot of patients would call and specifically request an appointment when she was going to be there. (Transcript, P. 199) The Health Care Center ultimately hired the Respondent for one to two days a week when the other physician was not there. She works the longest day of the stretch, which is a ten-hour day. The Director describes the job as a high stress one in which he has seen no difficulty in handling stress on Respondent's part. He has never seen any indication of impairment of faculties or inability to handle her job in any fashion on Respondent's part. When he hired Respondent, Puroff had full knowledge that she had problems with the Board of Medical Examiners, had been assigned a monitoring physician, had been brought in restraints to the emergency room at Florida Keys Memorial Hospital and had been committed under the Baker Act in September of 1985, that she was an alcoholic who attended A.A., and that she regularly visited a psychiatrist. None of these matters were kept secret from him. Karl Michael Davidson, M.D., who became Respondent's monitoring physician after Dr. Buckner abruptly left town in April, 1986, has similarly seen no sign of any kind of impairment during the time he has worked with her. He has never seen her indulge in any drugs or alcohol. He knows that she regularly sees her psychiatrist. He has received no complaints from anyone in the medical community, the patient community, or the general community of Key West with regard to Respondent since he has served in a monitoring capacity for her. Even Sally Parr who testified on behalf of the Petitioner denied that Respondent ever used alcohol when she was in a situation in any way connected with patients. Regarding the change of monitoring physicians in April, 1986, the testimony of Respondent and her witnesses was consistent and uncontradicted, with Petitioner presenting no facts other than those stipulated. The individual having the most knowledge regarding the circumstances under which Dr. Buckner left Key West, was his secretary, Iris Cervantes. She, like the other witnesses, was aware that he had gone to look at a number of schools and other medical positions. He would say he was going to leave, but he always came back. On April 6, 1986, Buckner's wife told Respondent the Island Clinic was being closed and Buckner was leaving. On April 7, the locks on the doors to the Island Clinic were changed. Cervantes was one of two people to have a new key; Respondent and the other doctors practicing with Dr. Buckner were not given keys. This left Respondent in a position where she could not write some pharmaceutical prescriptions, all appointments had to be cancelled, and there was no way to treat ongoing patients who were ill at the time. When the locksmiths changed the locks, Respondent contacted Buckner to ask if he knew what he was doing and if he were going to be gone permanently. He indicated that he had started working in California, but he did not know whether it would be permanent. He said that he had spoken with Dr. Davidson and asked him to act as a temporary supervising physician in addition to himself. Respondent spoke with Dr. Davidson who said that she was welcome to see patients at his office and that he would monitor until Buckner decided what he was doing. They spoke about immediately notifying the Board of the change in her office location. It was her impression that Dr. Davidson had actually notified the Board with a handwritten memo the first day she was there and that was how the investigator from the Department knew how to find her when the investigator came to see Respondent at Davidson's office on April 18, 1986. On that date Davidson also discussed with the investigator Buckner's abrupt departure which might be permanent. Respondent ultimately wrote the Board herself. That correspondence dated April 22, 1986, was received by the Department of Professional Regulation on April 28, 1986, the same day on which the Department received from Davidson his notification letter dated April 17, 1986. Four to six weeks after that letter, Dr. Davidson and Respondent were advised that the Board had received the information and would consider Dr. Davidson as her supervisor. On August 2, 1986 Davidson and Respondent appeared before the Board of Medical Examiners and received formal approval. The remaining allegations involve two separate incidents occurring during the week of September 16, 1985. At that time, and since January of that year, Respondent was living in the home of Sally Parr, an Assistant State Attorney for Monroe County. It was Parr's testimony that several months after Respondent moved in, Respondent began to drink wine on a regular basis sometimes to the point of intoxication. Parr is the sole person to testify to having seen Respondent drink alcoholic beverages. Other witnesses testified to Parr's own problems with alcohol. The emotional relationship between Parr and Respondent from March, 1985, until September, 1985, was "stormy" and "tremendously emotional." The two of them attended therapy with Dr. Jerrold Weinstock. On September 16-17, 1985, all of this emotionalism culminated in Parr calling the emergency number 911. During the evening of Monday, September 16, Parr's sister arrived in town. There were highly controverted scenes which both Parr and Respondent described. The two participants were clearly emotionally charged, angry, and upset. It was Parr's testimony that Respondent walked into the back bedroom and with a syringe in her hand with a pale yellow fluid in it, lifted her shirt and injected that material into her chest under her left breast Saying she was going to kill herself. According to Parr, Respondent said the fluid was 100 percent xylccaine and she would die in one minute. Parr then called 911, Respondent told her she was a fool to believe that, and Respondent left the house and drove away. Parr also confusedly describes a later scene that night with Respondent and another syringe and more light yellow fluid. Officer Cynthia Tingley responded to that call from Parr. The report was treated as one for an "attempted suicide". At no time did Ms. Parr tell the officer that Respondent was not in danger or that Respondent had told Parr that she was "a fool" to believe that this was a way to kill oneself. In the opinion of the investigating officer, Parr had an odor of alcoholic beverage on her breath. The officer had no personal knowledge that Respondent had administered the legend drug to herself. She did note an empty bottle of xylocaine in the room but no syringe was found. Later the officer was called to where another officer had stopped Respondent and had given her a citation for careless driving. Respondent was cooperative and did not seem to be having health problems, although she did appear to be under a lot of stress and appeared anxious. Neither officer made any attempt to detain Respondent after the stopping. Under Parr's version of this event, it ended with Respondent refusing to go to sleep in the back bedroom and only agreeing to go to sleep if she could sleep in Parr's room. That occurred and ended the evening. Respondent continued to live at the house, and on Thursday Parr and her sister left for a short vacation. Parr testified that she called from out-of-town to tell Respondent that she was not coming back to the house unless Respondent had moved out. Respondent agrees that Parr called and told her that but adds that Parr had promised to go on vacation with Respondent and told Respondent to arrange that vacation while Parr and her sister were gone. Respondent specifically denies that she made a suicide attempt or attempted to give the impression she was trying to commit suicide on September 16-17, 1985, or any other time. She denies that the events described by Parr occurred but agrees that it was a very confusing, emotional night. She denies that there was any further incident when she returned that night and only recalls them both being pretty tired and having gone to bed. Dr. Jerrold Weinstock, Respondent's treating psychiatrist and the individual to whom Parr and Respondent had gone for counselling, testified that the only description of the xylocaine/suicide incident he received came from Parr, not from Respondent. No information that Weinstock gained from his psychotherapy of Respondent indicated that Respondent's version of the event (or non-event) was incorrect. It is specifically found based upon the credibility of the witnesses that Respondent did not inject herself or attempt to inject herself with anything and specifically not with xylocaine. The second incident of that week occurred on Friday evening, September 20-21, 1985. This was the evening when Parr called Respondent and told her to move out of the house. Respondent describes that scene as follows. She [Parr] called. We had arranged that she would call at that time. I had seen my last patient about 5:30 or 5:45 and I was waiting at home for her call . . . She started screaming at me to get out of her home, that she did not want me there when she got back. I was stunned because I was making arrangements for vacation. I said, "What about the vacation?" She said, "I lied to get out." And I said, "Well, what will you do." "Call the police," she said. "I know people on the police force and I won't hesitate to use them." And then she hung up on me. (Transcript, P. 248) Respondent had taken steps during the day to arrange a trip to New York and Connecticut because Parr had never been to New York. An acquaintance came by while Respondent was still sitting stunned and asked her if she wanted to go to the Black Angus and have a drink. Respondent went with this individual to the Black Angus and had three very strong drinks there. She realized that she was feeling intoxicated after the third drink. She asked the woman, who was driving, to drop her off at Sally's house, but the woman wanted to go downtown to a few more bars. Respondent pleaded to be dropped off, and her companion became belligerent. Ultimately, the acquaintance assaulted Respondent tearing her shirt off, punching her in the face, hitting her about the head, grabbing her purse and pulling it away from her. During the scuffle, Respondent even lost her sandals. Petitioner has not controverted this account. Cervantes and Buckner both confirmed the bruises and scratches from the fight. Cervantes also described an incident a few days later whereby the same woman came into the Clinic, gave Cervantes some earrings she said she had taken out of Respondent's purse, and slashed the tires on Respondent's car on her way out. Respondent was left intoxicated, running, frightened, with no top on and three miles from Parr's house. She did not have her keys which had been in her purse and could not get into the clinic but felt she could get into Parr's house if she could get there. She felt intoxicated and becoming more so, uncertain whether it was the alcohol or being beaten that was affecting her. She was disoriented and embarrassed to be running down the street wearing only a pair of shorts. She crawled under a garage on the side of the road to sleep to clear her head to find a solution to her predicament. She was awakened by police officers but said nothing in response to questioning. Respondent was taken by the police to Florida Keys Memorial Hospital. When the police officers tried to transport Respondent, she became physically violent, kicking at the officers and attempting to kick out the windows of the patrol car. When she arrived at the hospital, she was physically restrained with arm and leg restraints. A drug analysis performed on Respondent at the hospital showed her blood alcohol level to be 0.235 percent. Respondent was next transported to Marc House in Marathon, Florida. She was involuntarily committed under the Baker Act for that one night. The next morning, Dr. Jesse Sewell, Director of Marc House, spoke with Respondent, determined there was absolutely no reason for Respondent to be there, and called Buckner to pick up Respondent and transport her back to Key West. Dr. Buckner did and took Respondent to Parr's house so she could move out her belongings. Respondent and Buckner discussed the episode at great length and she got in touch with Dr. Weinstock. Buckner and Respondent called her probation officer with the Department of Professional Regulation, a Diane Robie, who advised them to contact Dr. Roger Goetz, head of the Florida Impaired Physicians Program. Buckner called Goetz and described the incident that resulted in Respondent being committed overnight. He told Goetz that Respondent had moved out of the place where she had been living which seemed to have precipitated the disturbance; that she was in daily contact with her psychiatrist; that she had started attending A.A. meetings daily as recommended to someone who has had an episode of drinking; and that she would bring her support systems together. Goetz suggested going for evaluation at South Miami Hospital with Dr. Lynn Hankes. When Respondent was evaluated by Hankes, he recommended entry into South Miami's treatment program. Respondent went back to Key West and conferred with Buckner, Weinstock, and Goetz. Although Weinstock believed the inpatient program at South Miami would be therapeutically counterproductive, Respondent followed the recommendations of Goetz and Hankes and entered the treatment program on October 6, 1985. Buckner (whose deposition was taken prior to his departure from Key West in April, 1986) considers Respondent the best internal medicine doctor in Monroe County. Since he had noticed nothing wrong with Respondent through Friday afternoon, September 20, 1985, he was surprised by the telephone call from Dr. Sewell at Marc House on Saturday morning. When Buckner spoke with Weinstock that day, Weinstock explained that Respondent completely removes her emotional problems from her professional self. After the Friday/Saturday Marc House incident, Respondent finished her weekend move from Parr's house on Monday and came back to work on Tuesday. From Tuesday until she entered South Miami's treatment program, her performance as a practicing physician remained exemplary, analytical and calm. Respondent entered the program committed to making the program work and seeking insights into the nature of her disastrous interpersonal relationships as well as the episode that led to her admission to Marc House. Dr. Lynn Hankes testified that Respondent is a chronic alcoholic who will always be an impaired physician. He described in detail the South Miami Treatment Program beginning with the first phase of detox and assessment. He admitted that Respondent did not require detoxification and that she suffered no abstinence syndrome or withdrawal syndrome. She became immediately oriented to the program and began interacting with her counselor. However, Dr. Hankes believes that Respondent only intellectually admitted to the problem and that she was preoccupied with only interacting with the other medical professionals on the unit. He described at some length Respondent's "negative limit testing" and her preoccupation with the medical professionals on the unit. He regarded her as "sabotaging her own treatment". For example, Respondent did not initially tell program personnel that she sometimes had a glass of wine at dinner over the last several months or that she shared a marijuana cigarette on her way from Key West to admit herself into South Miami Hospital although she did disclose that information during her stay in the program. It is his opinion that there is a clear medical indication for extended treatment in a secondary facility for many reasons. Basically, in his opinion, it was a bottom line of an intellectual admission of the disease with only minimal acceptance. He administratively discharged Respondent from the program on October 31, 1985 just prior to her completing the program because she refused to accept his recommendation for extended care for an indefinite period of time. Dr. Hankes did not see Respondent after October 31, 1985 in any capacity. All of his testimony was based on information which he had prior to October 31, 1985. Dr. Hankes admitted that the only limit testing, rule breaking that Respondent had engaged in was that she spoke to other medical professionals, she spoke to male patients in their room while she stood at the door, and she walked a friend to the lobby of the hospital but did not leave the premises. He also observed isolation tendencies on her part. His dire predictions of doom have not proven accurate. In the subsequent year and a quarter Respondent has stayed sober and practiced medicine successfully with no further incident. It was Buckner's impression that the major reason Respondent was being required to go into the hospital for the inpatient treatment was because other impaired physicians in the Key West area had had to go through the program, and they were unhappy that she had somehow missed it. Buckner encouraged Respondent to enter the treatment program, even against the advice of her psychiatrist, so that the Board would be on her side after she "completed the drill." Buckner spoke with her counselor and therapist regularly during the time she was at South Miami Hospital and got indications that everything was progressing well and that she would be back to Key West to practice at the scheduled time. Buckner went to South Miami Hospital three weeks after Respondent's admission to meet with Dr. Hankes on a Saturday. Hankes did not show up for the appointment, but Buckner later reached him by phone. Hankes told Buckner that Respondent was progressing fine, although she still had some problems. Hankes said Respondent would be back in Key West practicing the next week and could have outpatient treatment with Dr. Weinstock. Buckner returned to Key West and told his staff to schedule Respondent for patients the next week when she would return. On Monday Respondent telephoned to tell him that Hankes had changed his mind, that they were not going to release her, and that she was going to have to sign herself out. No explanation has been offered as to why Hankes changed his mind between Saturday and Monday so radically from outpatient treatment with Respondent's treating psychiatrist to indefinite inpatient hospitalization. Buckner and Weinstock agreed the best treatment for Respondent was to get her back practicing medicine. Buckner contacted Cecilia Bradley, the attorney representing the Department and the Board, asking for direction. Bradley advised Buckner that he would have to personally decide whether Respondent was a threat to the community. He saw no such threat. Respondent returned to the Island Clinic and resumed her practice. Buckner saw her there on a daily basis, and her performance was, in his opinion, the same as before, "absolutely flawless." When Respondent did not accept Hankes' recommendation of indefinite long-term treatment in Mississippi, she became, in Dr. Goetz's opinion, in noncompliance with the Florida statute on impaired physicians. Dr. Goetz subsequently reported her to the Department of Professional Regulation for her failure to continue satisfactorily in the program. Goetz admitted that his role as Director of the program was one of an administrative officer, and he has offered no opinion as to whether Respondent is in fact impaired. Goetz has received no information that Respondent's impairment, if any, has in any way affected her practice or patient contact. All the information that Goetz relies on is information prior to Respondent's discharge from South Miami Hospital on October 31, 1985. It was Buckner's understanding, and that of Respondent, that she had not violated the Order of the Board in having an instance where she "slipped" with regard to drinking. Dr. Goetz agreed with that assessment a "slip" can be a part of a rehabilitation program. Linda Parks, Diane Robie, and Dr. Weinstock agree with that assessment. Respondent could not have financially afforded the Mississippi program. Despite the testimony of Hankes and Goetz that Respondent could have gone there for free, Goetz did not tell her that, Hankes did not know what the financial arrangement was, and the Director of that program whom Respondent personally contacted regarding the program did not mention such a possibility. Jerrold Weinstock has been Respondent's treating psychiatrist since 1984. His opinion is that there is no basis for the allegation that Respondent be considered an impaired physician incapable of rendering safe, quality, and competent services to her patients. In fact, Weinstock refers members of his own family to her. That opinion is shared by two independent psychiatrists, Stanley I. Holzberg, M.D., and Milton Burglass, M.D. Dr. Holzberg examined Respondent initially on behalf of the Florida Impaired Physicians Program in 1983; reexamined her at the request of the Department in February, 1984; and saw her for a third time at her own request in November, 1985, following Respondent's discharge from South Miami Hospital. On all of the occasions when he examined Respondent, Holzberg opined that she could practice medicine with skill and safety with the conditions that she have treatment and monitoring. Holzberg considers the treatment she is receiving from Weinstock, including the prescription of an antidepressant, as appropriate long-term treatment. He agrees with Weinstock and Buckner that long-term inpatient hospitalization would not be helpful to Respondent. Holzberg further agrees with Weinstock that Respondent's major illness is chronic depression, the affective disorder. Dr. Milton Burglass evaluated Respondent on March 25 and April 2, 1986, and reached the same conclusion. Burglass administered a full series of psychological tests to Respondent, including the Minnesota Multi-Phasic' Personality Inventory; the Beck Depression Inventory; the Cattell Use for Tension and Anxiety Survey Schedule; the Rotter Incomplete Sentences Blank; the Cattell Assertive Behavior Survey Schedule; the Cattell Thought Stopping Survey Schedule; and the Standardized Medical and Personal History Form. He spent, in addition, a total of five hours interviewing Respondent, and he went over all the records from other psychiatric and related medical evaluations that she had had from 1980 forward. Burglass found nothing to suggest that Respondent is incapable of practicing medicine with skill and safety. Burglass believes that people can, in fact, function normally and be able to perform professionally in their chosen profession after recovering from a chemical dependency, be it drug or alcohol. Burglass specifically opined that Respondent is not impaired.

Recommendation Based upon the foregoing Findings of Facts and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that a final order be entered: Dismissing with prejudice the complaint filed against Respondent in DOAH Case NO. 86-0469; Finding Respondent guilty of the allegation contained in the Administrative Complaint filed in Case No. 86-2065 but taking no disciplinary action against her, and Allowing Respondent to continue to practice medicine under reasonable monitoring conditions until the period of her probation has been completed on March 15, 1987. DONE AND ORDERED this 5th day of March, 1987, in Tallahassee, Florida. LINDA M. RIGOT Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 2009 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32301 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 5th day of March, 1987. APPENDIX TO RECOMMENDED ORDER DOAH Case Nos. 86- 0469 and 86-2065 Rulings are made as to each of Petitioner's proposed findings of fact as follows: 1-2. Adopted. 3. Rejected as irrelevant. 4-5. Adopted. 6-7. Rejected as not supported by the weight of the credible evidence. Rejected as being contrary to the weight of the credible evidence. Adopted. Rejected as not supported by the weight of the credible evidence. Adopted. Rejected as being a statement taken totally out of context. Adopted. Rejected as being contrary to the weight of the credible evidence. 15-17. Adopted. Rejected as not supported by the weight of the credible evidence. Adopted. Rejected as not supported by the weight of the credible evidence. First two sentences adopted; third sentence rejected as being contrary to the weight of the credible evidence. 22-23. Adopted. Rejected as being secondary. Adopted. First sentence rejected as being contrary to the weight of the credible evidence. Second sentence adopted. Rejected as being contrary to the weight of the credible evidence. 28-29. Adopted. 30-32. Rejected as not supported by any evidence. Rejected as being secondary. Rejected as being contrary. Rejected as being irrelevant. Rejected as being secondary. Adopted. Rejected as not supported by any evidence. Rejected as being irrelevant. 40-45. Adopted. Rejected as being irrelevant. Adopted. Rulings are made as to each of Respondent's proposed findings of fact as follows: 1-27. Adopted. 28. Rejected as being redundant. 29-32. Adopted. 33. Rejected as being redundant. 34-39. Adopted. 40-41. Rejected as being unnecessary. 42-43. Adopted. COPIES FURNISHED: Leslie Brookmeyer, Esquire Department of Professional Regulation 130 North Monroe Street Tallahassee, Florida 32301 Elizabeth Du Fresne, Esquire 2950 S.W. 27th Avenue, Suite 10 Coconut Grove, Florida 33133 Nathan Eden, Esquire 417 Eaton Street Key West, Florida 33040 Van Poole, Secretary Department of Professional Regulation 130 North Monroe Street Tallahassee, Florida 32301 Dorothy Faircloth Executive Director Board of Medical Examiners 130 N. Monroe Street Tallahassee, Florida 32301

Florida Laws (3) 120.57458.33151.011
# 9
DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH, BOARD OF NURSING vs BOBSILYN GREAVES, 01-004818PL (2001)
Division of Administrative Hearings, Florida Filed:Miami, Florida Dec. 13, 2001 Number: 01-004818PL Latest Update: Dec. 25, 2024
# 10

Can't find what you're looking for?

Post a free question on our public forum.
Ask a Question
Search for lawyers by practice areas.
Find a Lawyer