Findings Of Fact The Florida Department of Insurance (Department) is responsible for regulation of insurance transactions in the State of Florida. In 1996, the United States Supreme Court held in Barnett Bank of Marion County, N. A. v. Nelson, 517 U.S. 25 (1996) that nationally chartered banks located in towns with populations of 5000 or less were authorized to own insurance agencies. In response, the 1996 Florida legislature revised Section 626.988, Florida Statutes (the "anti-affiliation" statute) to conform to the Court's ruling in the Barnett case The 1996 legislature also enacted Section 626.5715, Florida Statutes, informally identified as the "parity statute." Section 626.5715, Florida Statutes, provides as follows: The department shall adopt rules to assure the parity of regulation in this state of insurance transactions as between an insurance agency owned by or an agent associated with a federally chartered financial institution, an insurance agency owned by or an agent associated with a state- chartered financial institution, and an insurance agency owned by or an agent associated with an entity that is not a financial institution. Such rules shall be limited to assuring that no insurance agency or agent is subject to more stringent or less stringent regulation than another insurance agency or agent on the basis of the regulatory status of the entity that owns the agency or is associated with the agent. For the purposes of this section, a person is "associated with" another entity if the person is employed by, retained by, under contract to, or owned or controlled by the entity directly or indirectly. This section does not apply with respect to a financial institution that is prohibited from owning an insurance agency or that is prohibited from being associated with an insurance agent under state or federal law. (Emphasis supplied.) The 1996 legislature also amended to Chapter 120, Florida Statutes (the Administrative Procedures Act) to restrict agency authority to promulgate rules, so as to prohibit the adoption of rules which, although perhaps rationally related to the purpose of an implementing statute, were not specifically authorized by the legislature. In the summer of 1996, the Department began circulating a draft of rules intended to address issues related to the sale of insurance in financial institutions. Beginning in January 1997, the Department began the formal process of adopting rules intended to address the "parity" of insurance regulation between insurance agencies affiliated with financial institutions and agencies which are unaffiliated. The Petitioners challenged parts or all of the proposed rules as invalid exercises of delegated legislative authority. As set forth in the Final Order entered June 29, 1998, in the consolidated rule challenges, Proposed Rules 4-224.002, 4-224.004, 4-224.007, 4-224.012, 4-224.013 and 4-224.014, Florida Administrative Code, were determined to be invalid exercises of delegated legislative authority. Although the challenged rules were determined to be invalid exercises of delegated legislative authority for various reasons, all were determined to be outside the Department's specific statutory authority as set forth by the legislature. There was no appeal of the Final Order. Prior to the hearing on the fee issue, all parties signed and filed a Prehearing Stipulation. According to the Prehearing Stipulation, "[t]he Department disputes entitlement to fees as a matter of law. It does not dispute the reasonableness of the fees, as capped by statute. It disputes the reasonableness of the costs sought by Florida Bankers Association. " The applicable statute provides that "a judgment or order shall be rendered against the agency for reasonable costs and reasonable attorney's fees, unless the agency demonstrates that its actions were substantially justified or special circumstances exist which would make the award unjust." The Department asserts that the agency's actions in adopting the challenged rules were substantially justified and that special circumstances exist which make the award unjust. The greater weight of the evidence fails to support the assertion. The evidence establishes that, from the initiation of the rule drafting process, the issue of whether the Department had the authority to adopt the proposed rules was of concern to the parties in this case. In response to an early draft of the rule circulated by the Department, the Florida Bankers Association (FBA) in June 1996 asserted that the proposed rules were outside the Department's authority under the parity statute. The FBA continued to maintain this position throughout the rule-drafting process and the subsequent rule challenge cases. The Department was apparently also concerned about whether the agency had authority to adopt the rules. In response to a question raised by Department legal staff, a December 31, 1996, letter to the Department from an attorney at the Joint Administrative Procedures Committee on the issue of authority indicates that the Department's general authority to adopt rules was restricted by the 1996 APA amendment to Section 120.536(1), Florida Statutes, and that additional specific authority would be required to support the promulgation of rules. At the fee hearing, the Department conceded that the parity statute alone did not grant the agency with the specific authority to prescribe or proscribe specific acts or actions of an insurance agent. The Department asserted that the authority for the proposed rules was set forth by the combination of Section 626.988, Florida Statutes, under which pre-existing rules had been adopted, with the Department's previous legal actions related to insurance sales by agents affiliated with financial institutions, and the presumed effect of the parity statute on the Department's otherwise-existing authority. The evidence fails to establish that the Department's reliance on historical authority to promulgate rules and the authority provided under the parity statute was reasonable given legislative restrictions on agency rulemaking set forth in the 1996 legislature's amendments to the Administrative Procedures Act. There was no credible evidence presented at the rule challenge hearing or during the fee hearing which suggested that an emergency, either existing or potential, which required the Department to take immediate action to protect insurance consumers. There was no credible evidence presented at the rule challenge hearing or during the fee hearing that insurance consumers were threatened by an availability of insurance products in settings other than in insurance agencies. There are no special circumstances that make an award of fees and costs unjust. The Department apparently asserts that because the FBA participated in the rulemaking process, special circumstances exist which make an award of fees unjust. Although the FBA participated in the workshop process, the FBA consistently asserted, as stated earlier, that the proposed rules were outside the Department's authority under the parity statute. By letter of June 5, 1996, the FBA specifically filed written objections to the proposed rules, asserting that they were inconsistent with the APA amendments and the authority granted by the parity statute. Further, the FBA noted in the June letter and again in a letter of September 27, 1996, that the purpose and authority of the parity statute was met by a single proposed rule which, in essence, stated that the provisions of the Florida Insurance Code were applicable equally to all agents and agencies, regardless of ownership or affiliation. At the fee hearing, the Department acknowledged that the FBA had raised specific objections regarding the agency's lack of statutory authority during the rule process. The FBA consistently asserted during the rulemaking process that the proposed rules were outside the Department's authority under the parity statute. The FBA pursued the assertion throughout the rulemaking process and successfully challenged the rules on the same basis. There was no evidence presented during the rule challenge or the fee case suggesting that the FBA retreated from the objection at any point in the rulemaking process. According to the Prehearing Stipulation signed and filed by the parties, the disputed issues of fact are whether the expert witness fee paid to Dr. Michael White was reasonable and whether other costs sought to be recoverable are reasonable. The only specific challenge presented by the Department to costs is directed towards Dr. White's fees. The evidence establishes that under the circumstances of this matter, Dr. White's fee is reasonable. At the fee case hearing, the FBA presented the deposition testimony of William B. Graham, an attorney practicing in Tallahassee, Florida, in support of Dr. White's fees. Mr. Graham's testimony is accepted and credited as to the amount of Dr. White's fee and to the time required to prepare for and participate in this proceeding. Based on Mr. Graham's testimony, Dr. White's fee of $320 per hour is reasonable for an expert of Dr. White's credentials. There is no credible evidence to the contrary. According to the three dated invoices submitted to the FBA by Dr. White, Dr. White expended a total of 106 hours and five minutes in rule challenge-related activities on behalf of the FBA. Based on Mr. Graham's testimony, the time recorded by Dr. White of 106 hours and five minutes for his services is reasonable under the circumstances of the rule challenge. There is no credible evidence to the contrary. The total amount of time billed by Dr. White results in a fee of $33,946.66. The three invoices submitted by Dr. White also bill the FBA for expenses totaling $2,643.72. There is no credible evidence that the Dr. White's expense billings are unreasonable. The total amount of fees and expenses charged by Dr. White to the FBA is $36,590.38. The FBA paid to Dr. White the total amount reflected on his invoices. By comparison with the fees charged by its own expert, the Department asserts that Dr. White's fees are unreasonable. The fact that the Department paid its expert less than the FBA paid to its own does not establish that payments to Dr. White were unreasonable. The amount of the attorney's fees to which the successful parties are entitled is not at issue in this proceeding. According to the Prehearing Stipulation, the Department "while contesting entitlement to any award of fees . . . does not dispute that the fees sought, as capped by the statute, is reasonable for the efforts of all counsel in this proceeding." The FBA, by affidavit, identified attorney's fees totaling $145,683.01, and seeks an award of $15,000, the statutory limit. By stipulation of the parties, the FBA is entitled to an award of attorney's fees in the amount of $15,000. The FBA identified total costs of $40,537.53, including the fees and expenses paid to Dr. White. There is no evidence that the costs of $3,947.15 set forth in the attorney billing records (and unrelated to costs related to Dr. White) are unreasonable. Based on the foregoing, the FBA is entitled to receive a total of $55,537.53. The Community Bankers Association identified attorney's fees totaling $10,290.00, and costs of $806.23. By stipulation of the parties, the Community Bankers Association is entitled to an award of attorney's fees in the amount of $10,290.00. There is no evidence that the Community Bankers Association costs of $806.23 are unreasonable. Based on the foregoing, the Community Bankers Association is entitled to receive a total of $11,096.23. The Department asserts that, due to "untimeliness" of the Petitions for Fees filed in these cases, an award of fees in this case is unjust. There is no issue of timeliness to be addressed in this matter. The Petitions for Fees were filed approximately 60-90 days after the time for appeal of the Final Order in the rule challenge cases had passed. The Final Order entered in the rule challenge proceeding specifically retained jurisdiction for an award of fees. There is no evidence that the Department was adversely affected by any delay in filing the Petitions for Fees.
Conclusions Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, the Department of Insurance shall pay total fees and costs as follows: The Florida Bankers Association shall receive a total of $55,537.53 The Community Bankers of Florida shall receive a total of $11,096.23. DONE AND ORDERED this 6th day of December, 2000, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. WILLIAM F. QUATTLEBAUM Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 6th day of December, 2000. COPIES FURNISHED: Virginia B. Townes, Esquire Akerman, Senterfitt & Eidson, P.A. Post Office Box 231 Orlando, Florida 32802-0231 Counsel for Florida Bankers Association Michael H. Davidson, Esquire Department of Insurance 612 Larson Building 200 East Gaines Street Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0333 Counsel for Department Martha J. Edenfield, Esquire Pennington, Moore, Wilkinson & Dunbar, P.A. Post Office Box 10095 Tallahassee, Florida 32302-2095 Counsel for Community Bankers of Florida Eli S. Jenkins 3330 Overlook Drive, Northeast St. Petersburg, Florida 33703 Authorized Representative of Specialty Agents, Inc. Daniel Y. Sumner, General Counsel Department of Insurance The Capitol, Lower Level 26 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0300 Honorable Bill Nelson State Treasurer and Insurance Commissioner Department of Insurance The Capitol, Plaza Level 11 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0300
Other Judicial Opinions A party who is adversely affected by this Final Order is entitled to judicial review pursuant to Section 120.68, Florida Statutes. Review proceedings are governed by the Florida rules of Appellate Procedure. Such proceedings are commenced by filing one copy of a notice of appeal with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings and a second copy, accompanied by filing fees prescribed by law, with the District Court of Appeal, First District, or with the District Court of Appeal in the Appellate District where the party resides. The notice of appeal must be filed within 30 days of rendition of the order to be reviewed.
Findings Of Fact Based upon the stipulation of the parties, the following facts are found: Respondent, (hereafter HRS) notified Petitioner (hereafter Starke) of a disallowance in Starke's Medicaid cost report by a letter which was received by Starke on October 4, 1983. The disallowance letter informed the Petitioner that pursuant to Rule 10-2.35, Florida Administrative Code, any request for a formal hearing must be "received by" HRS within 30 days or the hearing shall be deemed waived. Starke mailed its petition for formal hearing on November 3, 1983, a Thursday. The petition was received by HRS on November 7, 1983, a Monday. HRS denied Starke's petition for hearing on the grounds that the request for the hearing had not been received by HRS within 30 days of the date Starke received notice. The date by which the Petition had to be received was November 3, 1983. If HRS had allowed three (3) days for filing by mail, the petition would have been timely filed.
The Issue Fact Issues Did Petitioner, Flo-Ronke, Inc. (Flo-Ronke), fail to timely pay a fine imposed by Final Order of the Respondent, Agency for Health Care Administration (Agency)? Did the Agency reject attempts by Flo-Ronke to timely pay the fine in full by a single payment without conditions? Did Flo-Ronke attempt to pay the fine untimely in full by a single payment without conditions? If so, did the Agency reject the proffered payment? Did Flo-Ronke employ an individual in a position that required background screening who had a disqualifying criminal conviction? Law Issues Which party bears the burden of proof? What is the standard of proof? Do the facts support denying re-licensure of Flo-Ronke? Are untimely efforts to pay the fine in full with a single payment mitigating factors? If so, how should the factors be weighed?
Findings Of Fact Flo-Ronke is an Assisted Living Facility (ALF). An ALF is a building, part of a building, or a residential facility that provides “housing, meals, and one or more personal services for a period exceeding 24 hours to one or more adults who are not relatives of the owner or administrator.” § 429.02(5), Fla. Stat. (2015).1/ The Agency licenses and regulates ALFs. §§ 429.04 and 429.07, Fla. Stat. Flo-Ronke is subject to the Agency’s licensure requirements and is licensed by it. By Notice of Intent to Deny Renewal Application dated December 2, 2014, the Agency denied Flo-Ronke’s application to renew its license on the grounds that Flo-Ronke “failed to comply with the criminal background screening requirements by employing a caretaker who was not eligible to work in the facility.” On January 8, 2015, the Agency amended the Notice of Intent to Deny. On January 21, 2015, the Agency issued a Second Amended Notice of Intent to Intent to Deny for Renewal. This notice is the subject of this proceeding. The second amended notice asserts two bases for denial. One is the originally asserted background screening violation. The other is Flo-Ronke’s failure to pay an outstanding fine in AHCA Cases 2014002513 and 2014002514. Payment of the Fine In AHCA Cases 2014002513 and 2014002514, the Agency’s Administrative Complaint charged Flo-Ronke with four deficiencies involving insects, cleanliness, medication administration, and inadequate staffing. Originally, Flo-Ronke requested an evidentiary hearing before DOAH (DOAH Case No. 14-1939). Later, Flo-Ronke, through its owner Ms. Akintola, agreed there were no disputed issues of facts and stipulated to returning the matter to the Agency for an informal hearing. The Agency provided Flo-Ronke an opportunity for a hearing. No representative of Flo-Ronke appeared at the hearing. The Agency issued a Final Order on November 5, 2014, upholding the Administrative Complaint and imposing a $13,500 fine. The Agency’s Final Order included instructions on how to make the payment, advised that the payment was due within 30 days of the Final Order, and cautioned that interest would be imposed on overdue amounts. The Final Order included a Notice of Right to Judicial Review. On behalf of Flo-Ronke, Ms. Akintola appealed the Final Order pro se. The Florida Rules of Appellate Procedure do not provide for an automatic stay of a decision if it is appealed. Flo-Ronke did not seek a stay of the Final Order. Consequently, the obligation to pay the fine was effective as of the date of the Final Order. The First District Court of Appeal rendered an Order requiring Flo-Ronke to obtain counsel for the appeal because a corporation cannot be represented by an employee or officer. Flo-Ronke did not obtain counsel or respond to the court’s Order. On January 16, 2015, the court dismissed Flo-Ronke’s appeal. On April 9, 2015, Flo-Ronke, represented by the same counsel as in this proceeding, moved to re-open the appellate case. On April 17, 2015, the court denied the motion. It also denied Flo-Ronke’s subsequent motion seeking reconsideration, clarification, a written opinion, and a stay. From the date that the Agency entered the Final Order imposing the fine in DOAH Case No. 14-1939 (AHCA Cases 2014002513 and 2014002514) to the date of the final hearing, Flo-Ronke did not pay the fine. Starting around February 2015, attorney Scott Flint tried, on Flo-Ronke’s behalf, to arrange a payment plan for the fine. He discussed the proposal with Agency Attorney Edwin Selby. Mr. Flint linked the discussions to resolving a separate investigation of Flo-Ronke that the Agency was conducting. Mr. Flint never offered unconditional payment of the fine on behalf of Flo-Ronke. Mr. Flint testified that at some point during conversations about the two cases, Mr. Selby said the Agency would not accept full payment if it was offered. Mr. Selby testified that he did not make this statement. Mr. Selby’s testimony is more credible in this instance, as it is in other instances when Mr. Selby’s testimony differed from Mr. Flint’s. One reason Mr. Selby’s testimony is more credible is that on February 11, 2015, after the time Mr. Flint says Mr. Selby made the statement, Mr. Flint wrote Mr. Selby a letter proposing an installment plan for paying the fine. The letter did not mention the alleged statement that the Agency would not accept payment. The proposal and the failure to mention the alleged refusal are inconsistent with the assertion that Mr. Selby said payment would not be accepted. Also, Mr. Flint hedged his testimony about the alleged refusals, noting that lawyers say many things during negotiations. Mr. Selby’s testimony about conversations after the February 11 letter is also more credible. Mr. Selby never said that the Agency would not accept full payment if it were tendered. The clear and convincing evidence proves that from the date the Agency entered the Final Order to the date of the final hearing, Flo-Ronke never tendered full and complete payment of the fine to the Agency. Flo-Ronke, despite its assertions during pre-hearing motion practice, did not offer any evidence that could be reasonably be interpreted as proving that Flo-Ronke tendered full payment of the fine or that the Agency refused the payment. Even Mr. Flint’s testimony, if fully credited, is not evidence that Flo-Ronke tendered full payment or that the Agency refused full payment. Background Screening At all relevant times, Florida law required level two background screening of any person seeking employment with a provider whose responsibilities may require him to provide personal care or other services directly to clients or who will have access to the client living area. § 408.809(1)(e), Fla. Stat. (2014). Individuals who have disqualifying offenses may not hold positions where they provide services to clients or will have access to client living areas. Florida law also requires re-screening every five years after employment. § 408.809(2), Fla. Stat. (2014). Agency surveyor, Laura Manville, surveyed Flo-Ronke and its records on September 2, 2014. At that time, F.M. was employed there. Flo-Ronke employed F.M. since at least 2009. F.M.’s duties included caring for residents. In addition, even when performing non-caretaking duties, such as grounds-keeping and maintenance, F.M. had unsupervised access to the residents and their living area. F.M. was adjudicated guilty of a disqualifying sex offense on October 28, 1999. Flo-Ronke’s records did not document the required level 2 background screening of F.M. when reviewed on September 2, 2014. At that time, Ms. Manville told Ms. Akintola of the deficiency and that F.M. was not eligible to work at the ALF. This was not the first time the Agency advised Ms. Akintola of the deficiency. By letter dated October 2, 2009, the Agency advised that background screening of F.M. had revealed he had a disqualifying criminal offense. It advised Flo-Ronke that it must either terminate the employment of F.M. or obtain an exemption from disqualification. Flo-Ronke did neither. Ms. Manville conducted a follow-up survey on September 10, 2014. Despite the notice given on September 2, 2014, F.M. was still present at the facility performing grounds work and had access to client living areas. Ms. Akintola presented testimony and a single document attempting to prove that F.M. passed background screening in 2010. The document appears to show a determination of no background screening violation in 2010. Why it differs from other documents from 2009 and after 2010 is not explained. The circumstances surrounding the document are somewhat mysterious. It does not appear in the Agency files. On September 2, 2014, Ms. Akintola did not mention it. On that day, she said she thought F.M. did not need to satisfy screening requirements because he had worked for so long at Flo-Ronke. More importantly, the issue is whether F.M. was employed in 2014 in violation of the background screening requirements. The clear and convincing evidence, including evidence of the conviction in the background screening database, the continued employment of F.M. after September 2, 2014, and the letter of October 2, 2009, proves that in 2014 F.M. had a disqualifying offense and did not have an exemption from the disqualification.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that the Agency for Health Care Administration enter a final order denying the application of Flo-Ronke, Inc., for renewal of its ALF license. Jurisdiction over the Motion for Fees and Costs is retained for further appropriate proceedings once the prevailing party has been determined. DONE AND ENTERED this 30th day of October, 2015, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S JOHN D. C. NEWTON, II Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 30th day of October, 2015.
Findings Of Fact Based upon all of the evidence, the following findings of fact are determined: In February 1989, petitioner, Dennis John Hujar, was an examinee on the certified residential contractor examination The test is prepared under the direction of and administered by respondent, Department of Professional Regulation, Construction Industry Licensing Board (Department or Board). Petitioner later received written advice from the Department that he had made a grade of 68 on the examination. According to agency rules, a score of at least 69.1 is required for passing. Petitioner then filed an appeal of his grade contending that question 19 was ambiguous. That prompted this proceeding. The examination in question was prepared by the National Assessment Institute and contains three specific areas of testing, including business and financial management. The latter section includes questions on business law. Each item or question is drafted by a committee made up of representatives of the Department, Board and construction industry. After being drafted, the question is reviewed by the Department and Board for accuracy and content. However, the business law questions are not reviewed by attorneys prior to their use. Question 19 was a business law question having a value of two points on an examinee's overall score. The parties agree that if Hujar had received two additional points he would have passed the examination. Question 19 was designed to ascertain if the candidate could differentiate between a licensed and unlicensed contractor, the significance of that distinction, and the circumstances under which the recovery of profit and supervisory costs would be allowed. The question contained four possible answers, (a), (b), (c) and (d), one of which was a "good detractor" for the examinees. The correct solution was based on reference material contained in section 2.10 of the Florida Construction Law Manual, a copy of which has been received in evidence as hearing officer exhibit 2. As is pertinent here, that section provided as follows: Where a contractor or subcontractor has no license and enters into a contract, the contract is void for illegality. (citation omitted) The unlicensed contractor is not permitted to recover for lost profit. However, where work has already been done, the courts have allowed recovery on the basis of quantum meruit, but still deny recover of lost profit and cost of supervision. (citation omitted) In a case where the principal of a corporation was licensed as a general contractor for 17 years, but the corporation owned by the principal was not so licensed, a California court held that there was substantial compliance with licensing so as not to deny recovery of sums due. (citation omitted) Any person who is not licensed may not be considered as a lienor and may not have a mechanic's lien. (citation omitted) Because of security and confidentiality constraints, the challenged question cannot be repeated verbatim herein. It is suffice to say that the problem posed a hypothetical situation involving a state licensed general contractor who utilized an out-of-state (or unlicensed) subcontractor for site work on a Florida project. After the subcontractor completed site work of a specified value, the initial draw request was submitted to the owner for reimbursement of that cost and a reasonable profit. A second invoice for site work was then submitted to the Florida contractor but not the owner. At the same time, the owner learned of the subcontractor's unlicensed status and halted work on the project. The question asked the amount of money that the owner would "most likely (be) liable for at the time of the due date for the initial draw." According to the answer sheet received in evidence as hearing officer exhibit 1, the owner was liable for the initial draw request at that time, including allowable overhead, but did not owe for the cost of the second invoice not yet submitted to him by the contractor. This response was consistent with the cited reference material. Through his representative, petitioner claimed that the word "liable" most logically should be construed to mean the amount of money that the owner was ultimately liable to pay on the project although not necessarily at that point in time. Under this theory, the owner would have been responsible for a dollar amount at least equal to the contractors's cost in the initial draw plus the second but not yet submitted invoice for completion of the site work. If such an interpretation of the question was valid, petitioner's answer would have been correct. In this regard, it is noted that although there is no testimony as to the response given by Hujar on this question, it may be reasonably inferred that his answer was the same as that suggested by his representative. Koning contended further that in order to make correct the Board's response, the question should have asked for the owner's liability "at that time", thereby denoting that the ultimate liability was not in issue. It is noted that petitioner's representative is a licensed general, plumbing, roofing and underground utilities contractor and teaches the law manual as a preparatory course for the state examination. Petitioner is a former student. Respondent's consultant, George Bruton, who is a licensed general contractor and assists in the preparation of examination questions, considered the question to be clear and unambiguous. According to Bruton, the question required a student to recognize that 100% of a subcontractor's invoice plus allowable overhead are due and payable in full at the time of the first draw. However, because the owner had not yet been invoiced for the remaining amount of site work, he would not be liable for that amount. Bruton discounted petitioner's suggested answer as being nonresponsive on the grounds the words "ultimate liability" did not appear in the question, and petitioner was assuming a condition not called for in the question. Since the question did not use the words "ultimate liability", and petitioner's interpretation is not the most reasonable one, it is found that the question was not so "substantially misleading and insufficient" as to warrant the invalidation of the question or to justify a different response.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing findings of fact and conclusions of law, it is RECOMMENDED that a final order be entered denying petitioner's request to receive a passing grade on the examination. DONE and ENTERED this 26th day of October, 1989, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. DONALD R. ALEXANDER Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 26th day of October, 1989. APPENDIX TO RECOMMENDED ORDER, CASE NO. 89-4313 Petitioner: 1-2. Used in finding of fact 2. Used in findings of fact 2 and 4. Used in preliminary statement and conclusions of law. Used in preliminary statement and finding of fact 8. Used in finding of fact 7. Rejected since it can be inferred that petitioner's response was choice c. Respondent: Respondent's "summary of facts" has been treated as conclusions of law and therefore specific rulings have not been made. The document attached to the summary of facts is not of record and has accordingly been disregarded. COPIES FURNISHED: Mr. Robert Koning 8301 Joliet Street Hudson, Florida 34667 Mr. Dennis J. Hujar 1511 Brooker Road Brandon, Florida 33511 E. Harper Field, Esquire 1940 North Monroe Street, Suite 60 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0792 Fred Seely, Executive Director Construction Industry Licensing Board Post Office Box 2 Jacksonville, Florida 32202 Kenneth E. Easley, Esquire 1940 North Monroe Street, Suite 60 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0792
Findings Of Fact Respondent is the state agency charged with the duty of regulating general contractors in the State of Florida. An applicant for certification as a general contractor must pass the examination administered by Respondent as a prerequisite to, certification. Section 489.113(1), Florida Statutes. Petitioner sat for the certified general contractor's examination on October 14-15, 1988. Petitioner passed one part of the examination, but he did not pass the other two parts of the examination. Petitioner timely and properly challenged the grading of two examination questions for which he received no credit, to wit: Question Number PM 10 and Question CA 10. Petitioner abandoned any challenge he may have had to other questions. Question PM 10, a multiple choice question, required Petitioner to apply one of the sections of the Standard Building Code to a factual problem. The question required both a correct construction of the provision and a correct application of the provision. Petitioner misconstrued the provision and therefore missed the problem. Respondent gave Petitioner no credit for his answer to Question PM 10 because Petitioner gave the wrong answer to the question. Question CA 10, also a multiple choice question, required Petitioner to correctly construe the question presented and to respond accordingly. This question involved a change order and the payment therefor. In computing the amount that he would charge the owner, Petitioner included charges for the removal of certain materials that the contractor would have to remove in order to perform his contract. Those costs should be allocated to the contractor, not to the owner. Petitioner misconstrued the question and therefore missed the problem. Respondent gave Petitioner no credit for his answer to Question CA 10 because Petitioner gave the wrong answer to the question.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is: RECOMMENDED that Respondent, State of Florida, Department of Professional Regulation, enter a final order which finds that Petitioner abandoned his challenges to all questions except Question PM 10 and Question CA 10 and which denies Petitioner's challenges to Question PM 10 and to Question CA 10. It is further recommended that the two questions filed as exhibits in this proceeding be sealed. DONE AND ENTERED in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida, this 11th day of August, 1989. CLAUDE B. ARRINGTON Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 11th day of August, 1989. APPENDIX TO RECOMMENDED ORDER, CASE NO. 89-1859 The proposed findings of fact submitted on behalf of Petitioner are addressed as follows: The proposed findings found in the first full paragraph of Petitioner's proposed recommended order are addressed in paragraphs 1, 2, 3, and 4. The proposed findings found in the second and third full paragraphs of Petitioner's proposed recommended order are addressed, in part, in paragraph 5. The proposed findings are rejected, in part, as being subordinate to the findings made in paragraph 5. The proposed findings found in the fourth full paragraph of Petitioner's proposed recommended order are addressed, in part, in paragraph 7. The proposed findings are rejected, in part, as being subordinate to the findings made in paragraph 7. The proposed findings found in the fifth full paragraph of Petitioner's proposed recommended order are rejected as being recitation of testimony. The proposed findings of fact submitted on behalf of Respondent are addressed as follows: Addressed in paragraph 2 - 3. Addressed in paragraph 4. Addressed in part in paragraph 4. Rejected in part as being unnecessary to the conclusion reached. 4 - 10. Rejected as being recitation of testimony and as being subordinate to the findings made. 11. Rejected as being unnecessary to the conclusion reached. COPIES FURNISHED: George W. Harrell, Esquire Department of Professional Regulation 1940 North Monroe Street, Suite 60 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0792 Charles L. Neustein, Esquire 801 41st Street - 5th Floor Miami Beach, Florida 33140 Kenneth E. Easley, General Counsel Department of Professional Regulation 1940 North Monroe Street, Suite 60 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0792 Fred Seely, Executive Director Department of Professional Regulation Construction Industry Licensing Board Post Office Box 2 Jacksonville, Florida 32202
The Issue The issue to be determined in this matter is whether the Agency for Health Care Administration (“AHCA”) is entitled to recover its attorney’s fees and costs, pursuant to section 409.913(23), Florida Statutes, incurred prosecuting a matter pursuant to section 409.913.
Findings Of Fact AHCA is the state agency responsible for administering the Florida Medicaid Program. Medicaid is a joint federal/state program to provide health care and related services to qualified individuals, including hospice services. Covenant is a provider of hospice and end-of-life services and at all times relevant to this matter, the program was an authorized provider of Medicaid services pursuant to a valid Medicaid provider agreement with AHCA. AHCA is authorized to recover Medicaid overpayments, as deemed appropriate, pursuant to section 409.913. The U.S. Department of Health & Human Services, Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services (“CMS”), contracted with Health Integrity, a private vendor, to perform an audit of Covenant. Health Integrity retained a company called Advanced Medical Reviews (“AMR”) to provide peer physician reviews of claims to determine whether an overpayment occurred. Based on the audit findings in the Overpayment Case, AHCA prosecuted claims against Covenant for Medicaid overpayment. On August 9, 2016, AHCA provided a Final Audit Report (“FAR”) to Covenant seeking $715,518.14 in overpayments, $142,903.63 in fines, and $131.38 in costs. On August 29, 2016, Covenant timely filed a Petition for Formal Administrative Hearing. The undersigned conducted a final hearing on March 19 through 23, 2018, on Covenant’s Petition filed in the Overpayment Case. At the time of the final hearing, AHCA sought a modified overpayment of $677,023.44, and a fine of $135,404.68. On August 15, 2018, the undersigned issued a Recommended Order in the Overpayment Case finding AHCA is entitled to collect an overpayment of $637,632.15, and a fine of $127,526.43. The Recommended Order noted that AHCA reserved its right to amend its cost worksheet in this matter and, pursuant to section 409.913(23), file a request with the undersigned to recover all investigative and legal costs, if it prevailed. On October 17, 2018, AHCA issued a Final Order in the Overpayment Case finding AHCA is entitled to recover $637,973.10 in overpayments and to impose a fine of $127,594.62. The Final Order concluded, “[a]dditionally, since the Agency has prevailed in this matter, it is entitled to recover its investigative, legal, and expert witness costs it incurred in this matter. § 409.913(23), Fla. Stat.” Further, it provided that if the parties are unable to reach an agreement as to costs, either party may file a request with the Division requesting a final hearing within 30 days of the date of the rendition of the Final Order. On November 15, 2018, AHCA timely filed its Petition for Recovery of AHCA’s Legal Fees and Costs. On February 7, 2018, AHCA amended its Petition. Covenant opposed AHCA’s Petition and disputed whether AHCA is entitled to legal fees. Covenant has appealed the Final Order in the Overpayment Case, and the appeal is pending before the First District Court of Appeal in Covenant v. AHCA, Case No. 1D18-4797. The final hearing was held on a stipulated record, Petitioner’s Memorandum of Law in Support of Petitioner’s Amended Petition for Legal Fees, and Covenant’s Brief in Opposition to AHCA’s Petition for Recovery of Costs and Fees (with exhibits). Legal issues were framed by the Joint Stipulation. There was no testimony of any witnesses offered by either party. The exhibits constituting the record were exhibits to Respondent’s Brief and Petitioner’s Memorandum of Law. The parties have stipulated to the reasonableness of AHCA’s claimed attorney’s fees, in accordance with the parties’ agreement stated in the Joint Motion for Case Management Conference dated March 11, 2019. The issue that remains is whether AHCA is entitled to recovery of $330,186.14 in attorney’s fees under section 409.913(23). For the reasons explained below, the undersigned finds that Florida law does not support a finding that AHCA is entitled to the attorney’s fees in dispute.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that the Agency for Health Care Administration enter a final order that section 409.913(23)(a) does not authorize the Agency for Health Care Administration to recover its attorney’s fees under the guise of “legal costs” for the audit related to this matter. DONE AND ENTERED this 12th day of June, 2019, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S YOLONDA Y. GREEN Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 12th day of June, 2019.
Findings Of Fact The policy being challenged provides that: The hearing may be cancelled if a petitioner or intervenor fails to timely file its prehearing statement. This provision is routinely and customarily embodied in the notices issued by Respondent to parties before it in matters arising under Florida Statutes 447.307 and 447.503. The Respondent acknowledges that it did not adopt and promulgate the policy pursuant to Florida Statutes 120.54 or any other relevant provision of Chapter 120. On 12 July 1979 Petitioner filed a petition with Respondent in which Petitioner sought to represent certain employees employed by the Collier County Board of County Commissioners. This petition was accepted by Respondent and on 30 July 1979 Respondent issued a Notice of Representation Hearing and a Prehearing Order. This Prehearing Order directed the parties to that proceeding to file with Respondent at least seven (7) days prior to the date of the hearing, and serve upon each other, a prehearing statement, identifying: Those fact disputes to be presented for resolution. Any and all legal questions to be presented for resolution. The legal authority to be relied upon by each party in presenting its arguments. Those witnesses to be called at the hearing, except rebuttal witnesses. The approximate time necessary to present the party's case. Any outstanding motions or procedural questions to be resolved. This Pre-Hearing Order then provided: The hearing may be cancelled if a petitioner or intervenor fails to timely file its prehearing statement. Petitioner did not file its prehearing statement within the prescribed 7-day period and on 21 August 1979 Petitioner was notified that the hearing scheduled to commence 23 August had been cancelled. On 22 August Petitioner was advised that a written order cancelling the 23 August hearing had been entered by the Commission. Thereafter Petitioner filed the petition here under consideration contending that the policy of Respondent to enter the cancellation-of-hearing notice in prehearing orders is a rule and invalid by reason of not being promulgated pursuant to Chapter 120. Respondent takes the position that the provision in the prehearing order is not a rule, but even if it could otherwise be considered to be a statement of general applicability, it is exempt from being so found by 447.207(6), Florida Statutes.
The Issue The issues in this case are whether Respondent, Daniel F. Acevedo, committed the offenses alleged in a four-count Administrative Complaint filed with Petitioner, the Department of Business and Professional Regulation, on July 11, 2008, and, if so, what penalty should be imposed.
Findings Of Fact Petitioner, the Department of Business and Professional Regulation (hereinafter referred to as the "Department"), is the agency of the State of Florida charged with the responsibility for, among other things, the licensure of individuals who wish to engage in contracting in the State of Florida; and the investigation and prosecution of complaints against individuals who have been so licensed. See Chs. 455 and 489, Fla. Stat. Respondent, Daniel F. Acevedo, is and has been at all times material hereto a certified general contractor in Florida, having been issued license number CGC 1506071. Mr. Acevedo is also a Certified Roofing Contractor, having been issued license number CCC 1326888. Both licenses were issued by the Construction Industry Licensing Board (hereinafter referred to as the “Board) and are in “current active” status. At all times material, Mr. Acevedo was the primary qualifying agent for All Design Systems, Inc. (hereinafter referred to as “All Design”). All Design is a Florida corporation. Mr. Acevedo is an officer of the corporation. All Design’s certificate of authority, License Number QB 26737, was issued on September 4, 2003. The license expired on August 31, 2007, and was in delinquent status from September 1, 2007, to May 14, 2008. Mr. Acevedo remained the qualifying agent during the delinquent period. All Design employed three to four sales agents who “sold” construction projects to commercial and residential property owners on behalf of All Design. All Design utilized these individuals because it believed they had experience in the construction industry and that they held licenses or certifications which would allow them to perform estimates on construction projects and make appropriate bids. The sales agents were to find customers for All Design and enter into contracts with them on behalf and in the name of All Design. In August of 2005, Mr. Acevedo was approached by Eduardo Rodriguez. Mr. Rodriguez offered to locate potential home remodeling customers for All Design in exchange for a percentage commission. Mr. Acevedo agreed. At no time relevant to this matter was Mr. Rodriguez licensed in Florida to engage in contracting as a state certified or registered contractor. Nor was Mr. Rodriguez’s business entity, Eduardo’s Construction, Inc. (hereinafter referred to as “Eduardo’s Construction”), licensed with a certificate of authority as a contractor qualified business. Mr. Rodriguez was the president and sole officer of Eduardo’s Construction. Eduardo’s Construction was not incorporated in Florida. Some time during 2005, Grace Esposito obtained a business card for Eduardo’s Construction. She obtained the card after discussing with a neighbor construction work that was being performed by Eduardo’s Construction on the neighbor’s residence. The neighbor informed her that Mr. Rodriguez was the contractor performing the work. The business card incorrectly represented that Mr. Rodriguez was licensed and insured. Ms. Esposito called the number listed for Eduardo’s Construction and spoke with a man who identified himself as Eduardo Rodriguez. In August 2005, Mr. Rodriguez met with Ms. Esposito at her condominium residence, located at 20301 West Country Club Drive, Aventura, Florida (hereinafter referred to as the “Subject Property”). Ms. Esposito discussed with Mr. Rodriguez the work which she desired. Based upon representations from Mr. Rodriguez, Ms. Esposito believed that he was licensed to perform the work being discussed. The evidence failed to prove, as suggested by Mr. Acevedo, that Mr. Rodriguez “bid on the Esposito job, [and] orally agreed to essential terms with Esposito on behalf of All Design Systems, Inc., Respondent’s Firm.” Mr. Acevedo’s testimony in this regard was uncorroborated hearsay and was contradicted by the credible testimony of Ms. Esposito. On September 5, 2005, Ms. Esposito entered into a written contract with Mr. Rodriguez, doing business as Eduardo’s Construction, for the remodeling of the Subject Property (hereinafter referred to as the “Contract”). Ms. Esposito agreed in the Contract to pay $24,000.00 for the remodeling. Upon execution of the Contract, Ms. Esposito paid Eduardo’s Construction with three checks totaling $12,000.00 for the remodeling. Mr. Rodriguez informed Mr. Acevedo of the project in September 2005. At that time, without reviewing the Contract, Mr. Acevedo executed a building permit application which Mr. Rodriguez provided him for the project. The permit application had not been signed by Ms. Esposito. In October 2005, Mr. Rodriguez presented the building permit application to Ms. Esposito for her signature. The permit application was then submitted to the building department. The building permit was subsequently approved and issued under Mr. Acevedo’s license and in the name of All Design. Ms. Esposito had been told that part of the work would be completed in October. When this representation proved untrue, she began contacting Mr. Rodriguez. Mr. Rodriguez told her that it was taking time to get the permit due to delays at the building department. Eventually, when she was no longer able to contact Mr. Rodriguez, Ms. Esposito went directly to the building department where she learned that All Design was the contactor of record and not Eduardo’s Construction. On or about October 31, 2005, Ms. Esposito telephoned All Design and spoke with Mr. Acevedo. She informed Mr. Acevedo about the Contract. Mr. Acevedo agreed to meet with her. On November 1, 2005, Mr. Acevedo visited Ms. Esposito at the Subject Property. She showed him the work that had been performed and explained the details of the Contract and what had transpired with Mr. Rodriguez. Mr. Acevedo told Ms. Esposito that his relationship with Mr. Rodriguez was that he merely allowed Mr. Rodriguez to use his license to pull permits in exchange for $150.00. Mr. Acevedo told Ms. Esposito that he would attempt to get Mr. Rodriguez to complete the job. This meeting was memorialized in a letter to Mr. Acevedo written by Ms. Esposito. At some time in November, work recommenced on the project. Within approximately three days, however, work stopped. Ms. Esposito sent four emails to Mr. Acevedo describing the work performed and the cessation of the project. Ms. Esposito made a final request that the project be completed. Mr. Acevedo did not respond to the emails. On or about November 17, 2005, Ms. Esposito sent a letter to Mr. Acevedo outlining the events, requesting termination of the Contract, and the removal of Mr. Acevedo from the building permit. Mr. Acevedo did not respond to this letter. The building permit was cancelled by Mr. Acevedo in December 2005. The total investigation costs incurred by the Department, excluding those costs associated with any attorney’s time, was $381.83. Mr. Acevedo has not previously been disciplined by the Board.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that a final order be entered finding that Daniel F. Acevedo violated the provisions of Section 489.129(1)(d), (i), and (m), Florida Statutes, as alleged in Counts I, II, III, and IV of the Administrative Complaint; imposing fines of $250.00 for Count I, $1,000.00 for Count II, and $2,000.00 for Count III; requiring that Mr. Acevedo pay the costs incurred by the Department in investigating and prosecuting this matter; placing Mr. Acevedo’s licenses on probation for a period of two years, conditioned upon his payment of the fines, payment of the costs incurred by the Department; and any other conditions determined to be necessary by the Board. DONE AND ENTERED this 11th day of March, 2009, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. LARRY J. SARTIN Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 11th day of March, 2009. COPIES FURNISHED: Brian P. Coats, Esquire Department of Business and Professional Regulation Northwood Centre 1940 North Monroe Street, Suite 42 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-2022 Daniel Acevedo All Designs Systems, Inc. 2813 Executive Drive Weston, Florida 32388 Kenneth Stein, Esquire 8436 West Oakland Park Boulevard Sunrise, Florida 33351 G. W. Harrell, Executive Director Construction Industry Licensing Board Department of Business and Professional Regulation Northwood Centre 1940 North Monroe Street Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0792 Ned Luczynski, General Counsel Department of Business and Professional Regulation Northwood Centre 1940 North Monroe Street Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0792
The Issue Whether Petitioner is entitled to credit for his answers to questions 41 and 48 on the February 2000 Construction, Building Contractor (Contract Administration) examination.
Findings Of Fact Upon consideration of oral and documentary evidence received at the hearing, the following relevant findings of fact are made: The examination for licensure of a general contractor in the State of Florida is administered by the Department of Business and Professional Regulation, Division of Technology, Licensure and Testing. Chapter 455.217, Florida Statutes. A written examination is authorized by Rule 61G4-16.001, Florida Administrative Code. Respondent contracts with Professional Testing, Incorporated, 1200 East Hillcrest Street, Orlando, Florida, which develops tests for the Florida Construction Industry Licensing Board. This practice is approved by Section 455.217, Florida Statutes. Professional Testing, Incorporated, ensures that questions and answers are not ambiguous through a number of methodologies. Petitioner has been an "original" candidate for the construction, building contractor examination twice. The examination has three sections: business finance, project management, and contract administration. A candidate may retake any section three times before the entire examination has to be retaken. One of the questions Petitioner is challenging is the same question he had on the June 1999 examination, that is, the "S mortar" question. This question was repeated on the August 1999 and the February 2000 examination. The copies of the "S mortar" question and answers on the August 1999 and February 2000 examinations which were accepted into evidence were identical. Petitioner maintains that the August 1999 examination question and answers accepted into evidence is not the same as the one he had on his examination. Petitioner agrees that the answer he gave, 20.74, was an incorrect answer and that 46.67 (the "graded correct" answer) was correct. Petitioner maintains that the 20.74 answer he gave on the February 2000 examination was a result of having been advised that 46.67 was an incorrect answer on the August 1999 test. Petitioner examined his original answer sheet form both examinations (August 1999 and February 2000) at the hearing. Petitioner's original answer for the August 1999 examination showed his answer to be "B", an incorrect answer, not the "graded correct" answer "C" (which was 46.67). The second challenged question is question 48 which deals with a "critical activity list" also called a "critical activity interval" or "critical path." Petitioner's answer is 106 days; the "graded correct" answer is 86 days. Question 48 asked the test taker to identify "the latest day work must begin on the roofing activity." One-hundred and six is the number of days the roof must be completed by (not when work must begin). Since this roofing activity takes 21 days it must begin on the 86th day to be complete on the 106th day. The psychometrician expert witness testified that both questions (and answers) were within acceptable statistical ranges as valid. That opinion is accepted.
Recommendation Based upon the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that the Department of Business and Professional Regulation, Bureau of Testing, enter a final order denying Petitioner's challenge to questions 41 and 48. DONE AND ORDERED this 30th day of January, 2001, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. JEFF B. CLARK Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 30th day of January, 2001. COPIES FURNISHED: Charles F. Tunnicliff, Esquire Department of Business and Professional Regulation 1940 North Monroe Street Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0792 Jermado Emmanuel Turner 6511 John Aldan Way Orlando, Florida 32818 Cathleen O'Dowd, Executive Director Construction Industry Licensing Board Department of Business and Professional Regulation 7960 Arlington Expressway, Suite 300 Jacksonville, Florida 32211-7467 Barbara D. Auger, General Counsel Department of Business and Professional Regulation 1940 North Monroe Street Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0792
The Issue Whether proposed Rules 69O-175.003, 69O-170.005-007, 69O- 170.013, 69O-170.0135. 69O-170.014, 69O-170.0141, 69O-170.0142, and 69O-170.0155 are valid exercises of delegated rulemaking authority.
Findings Of Fact Section 20.05, Florida Statutes, addresses the structure and powers of the Department. Section 20.05 provides as follows, in pertinent part: 20.05 Heads of departments; powers and duties.-- (1) Each head of a department, except as otherwise provided by law, must: * * * (b) Have authority, . . ., to execute any of the powers, duties, and functions vested in the department or in any administrative unit thereof through administrative units . . . designated by the head of the department, . . . unless the head of the department is explicitly required by law to perform the same without delegation. * * * (e) Subject to the requirements of chapter 120, exercise existing authority to adopt rules pursuant and limited to the powers, duties, and functions transferred to the department. The Financial Services Commission (Commission) was created within the Department pursuant to Section 20.121, Florida Statutes. However, the Commission is not “subject to control, supervision or direction by the Department of Financial Services in any manner.” § 20.121(3), Fla. Stat. The Commission is composed of the Governor and Cabinet, who collectively serve as the agency head of the Commission. Action by the Commission can only be taken by majority vote “consisting of at least three affirmative votes.” Id. OIR is a structural unit of the Financial Services Commission. Section 20.121(3) states in relevant part, as follows: Structure.— The major structural unit of the commission is the office. Each office shall be headed by a director. The following offices are established: 1. The Office of Insurance Regulation, which shall be responsible for all activities concerning insurers and other risk-bearing entities . . . * * * * Organization.-- The commission shall establish by rule any additional organizational structure of the offices. It is the intent of the legislature to provide the commission with the flexibility to organize the offices in any manner they determine appropriate to promote both efficiency and accountability. Powers.— Commission members shall serve as the agency head for purposes of rulemaking . . . by the commission and all subunits of the commission. . . . (emphasis supplied) Clearly, under the Department’s, the Commission’s and the OIR’s organizational structures, only the Commission may promulgate rules for both itself and OIR. The Department does not have rulemaking authority over areas that have been given to the Commission. On the other hand, nothing in the statute prohibits OIR, as directed by the Commission, to perform steps, preliminary to proposing a rule, that often occur in the rule development process prior to the actual Notice of proposed rulemaking. See also § 120.54, Fla. Stat. To that end, the Commission, by non-rule policy, has delegated authority to OIR to engage in rulemaking activities on behalf of the Commission. However, this delegation is not limited to rule development activities that occur prior to the Notice of proposed Rules, but authorizes publication of the Notice prior to approval by the Commission of any proposed language or policy statement. As indicated, the Notices for the proposed Rules were published in the Florida Law Weekly in November 2004, with various changes made thereafter. The proposed Rules were published as OIR rules. Disturbingly and misleadingly, all the Notices for the proposed Rules state that the agency head approved the Rule that is the subject of the Notice on September 3, 2004 or November 2, 2004. However, none of the proposed Rules were approved by the Commission, the agency head, prior to their publication as a proposed rule in the Florida Administrative Weekly. The specific agency authority listed in the Notices for promulgating the proposed Rules was Section 624.308(1), Florida Statutes. Section 624.308(1) grants the Department of Financial Services (Department) and the Financial Services Commission (Commission) the general authority to adopt rules, pursuant to Sections 120.536(1) and 120.54 in order to implement laws that confer duties upon them. The statute does not confer the authority on the Office of Insurance Regulation (OIR) to adopt rules. See § 624.05, Fla. Stat. The statutes that confer a specific grant of rulemaking authority over the areas of the laws implemented in the proposed Rules are Sections 627.0651 and 627.331, Florida Statutes. These two statutes confer specific rulemaking authority over certain areas of insurance ratemaking only to the Commission; specific rulemaking authority is not granted to the Department or to OIR. Other than rulemaking authority, the various duties assigned in the laws implemented by proposed Rules are given to OIR.
