Findings Of Fact The Florida Department of Insurance (Department) is responsible for regulation of insurance transactions in the State of Florida. In 1996, the United States Supreme Court held in Barnett Bank of Marion County, N. A. v. Nelson, 517 U.S. 25 (1996) that nationally chartered banks located in towns with populations of 5000 or less were authorized to own insurance agencies. In response, the 1996 Florida legislature revised Section 626.988, Florida Statutes (the "anti-affiliation" statute) to conform to the Court's ruling in the Barnett case The 1996 legislature also enacted Section 626.5715, Florida Statutes, informally identified as the "parity statute." Section 626.5715, Florida Statutes, provides as follows: The department shall adopt rules to assure the parity of regulation in this state of insurance transactions as between an insurance agency owned by or an agent associated with a federally chartered financial institution, an insurance agency owned by or an agent associated with a state- chartered financial institution, and an insurance agency owned by or an agent associated with an entity that is not a financial institution. Such rules shall be limited to assuring that no insurance agency or agent is subject to more stringent or less stringent regulation than another insurance agency or agent on the basis of the regulatory status of the entity that owns the agency or is associated with the agent. For the purposes of this section, a person is "associated with" another entity if the person is employed by, retained by, under contract to, or owned or controlled by the entity directly or indirectly. This section does not apply with respect to a financial institution that is prohibited from owning an insurance agency or that is prohibited from being associated with an insurance agent under state or federal law. (Emphasis supplied.) The 1996 legislature also amended to Chapter 120, Florida Statutes (the Administrative Procedures Act) to restrict agency authority to promulgate rules, so as to prohibit the adoption of rules which, although perhaps rationally related to the purpose of an implementing statute, were not specifically authorized by the legislature. In the summer of 1996, the Department began circulating a draft of rules intended to address issues related to the sale of insurance in financial institutions. Beginning in January 1997, the Department began the formal process of adopting rules intended to address the "parity" of insurance regulation between insurance agencies affiliated with financial institutions and agencies which are unaffiliated. The Petitioners challenged parts or all of the proposed rules as invalid exercises of delegated legislative authority. As set forth in the Final Order entered June 29, 1998, in the consolidated rule challenges, Proposed Rules 4-224.002, 4-224.004, 4-224.007, 4-224.012, 4-224.013 and 4-224.014, Florida Administrative Code, were determined to be invalid exercises of delegated legislative authority. Although the challenged rules were determined to be invalid exercises of delegated legislative authority for various reasons, all were determined to be outside the Department's specific statutory authority as set forth by the legislature. There was no appeal of the Final Order. Prior to the hearing on the fee issue, all parties signed and filed a Prehearing Stipulation. According to the Prehearing Stipulation, "[t]he Department disputes entitlement to fees as a matter of law. It does not dispute the reasonableness of the fees, as capped by statute. It disputes the reasonableness of the costs sought by Florida Bankers Association. " The applicable statute provides that "a judgment or order shall be rendered against the agency for reasonable costs and reasonable attorney's fees, unless the agency demonstrates that its actions were substantially justified or special circumstances exist which would make the award unjust." The Department asserts that the agency's actions in adopting the challenged rules were substantially justified and that special circumstances exist which make the award unjust. The greater weight of the evidence fails to support the assertion. The evidence establishes that, from the initiation of the rule drafting process, the issue of whether the Department had the authority to adopt the proposed rules was of concern to the parties in this case. In response to an early draft of the rule circulated by the Department, the Florida Bankers Association (FBA) in June 1996 asserted that the proposed rules were outside the Department's authority under the parity statute. The FBA continued to maintain this position throughout the rule-drafting process and the subsequent rule challenge cases. The Department was apparently also concerned about whether the agency had authority to adopt the rules. In response to a question raised by Department legal staff, a December 31, 1996, letter to the Department from an attorney at the Joint Administrative Procedures Committee on the issue of authority indicates that the Department's general authority to adopt rules was restricted by the 1996 APA amendment to Section 120.536(1), Florida Statutes, and that additional specific authority would be required to support the promulgation of rules. At the fee hearing, the Department conceded that the parity statute alone did not grant the agency with the specific authority to prescribe or proscribe specific acts or actions of an insurance agent. The Department asserted that the authority for the proposed rules was set forth by the combination of Section 626.988, Florida Statutes, under which pre-existing rules had been adopted, with the Department's previous legal actions related to insurance sales by agents affiliated with financial institutions, and the presumed effect of the parity statute on the Department's otherwise-existing authority. The evidence fails to establish that the Department's reliance on historical authority to promulgate rules and the authority provided under the parity statute was reasonable given legislative restrictions on agency rulemaking set forth in the 1996 legislature's amendments to the Administrative Procedures Act. There was no credible evidence presented at the rule challenge hearing or during the fee hearing which suggested that an emergency, either existing or potential, which required the Department to take immediate action to protect insurance consumers. There was no credible evidence presented at the rule challenge hearing or during the fee hearing that insurance consumers were threatened by an availability of insurance products in settings other than in insurance agencies. There are no special circumstances that make an award of fees and costs unjust. The Department apparently asserts that because the FBA participated in the rulemaking process, special circumstances exist which make an award of fees unjust. Although the FBA participated in the workshop process, the FBA consistently asserted, as stated earlier, that the proposed rules were outside the Department's authority under the parity statute. By letter of June 5, 1996, the FBA specifically filed written objections to the proposed rules, asserting that they were inconsistent with the APA amendments and the authority granted by the parity statute. Further, the FBA noted in the June letter and again in a letter of September 27, 1996, that the purpose and authority of the parity statute was met by a single proposed rule which, in essence, stated that the provisions of the Florida Insurance Code were applicable equally to all agents and agencies, regardless of ownership or affiliation. At the fee hearing, the Department acknowledged that the FBA had raised specific objections regarding the agency's lack of statutory authority during the rule process. The FBA consistently asserted during the rulemaking process that the proposed rules were outside the Department's authority under the parity statute. The FBA pursued the assertion throughout the rulemaking process and successfully challenged the rules on the same basis. There was no evidence presented during the rule challenge or the fee case suggesting that the FBA retreated from the objection at any point in the rulemaking process. According to the Prehearing Stipulation signed and filed by the parties, the disputed issues of fact are whether the expert witness fee paid to Dr. Michael White was reasonable and whether other costs sought to be recoverable are reasonable. The only specific challenge presented by the Department to costs is directed towards Dr. White's fees. The evidence establishes that under the circumstances of this matter, Dr. White's fee is reasonable. At the fee case hearing, the FBA presented the deposition testimony of William B. Graham, an attorney practicing in Tallahassee, Florida, in support of Dr. White's fees. Mr. Graham's testimony is accepted and credited as to the amount of Dr. White's fee and to the time required to prepare for and participate in this proceeding. Based on Mr. Graham's testimony, Dr. White's fee of $320 per hour is reasonable for an expert of Dr. White's credentials. There is no credible evidence to the contrary. According to the three dated invoices submitted to the FBA by Dr. White, Dr. White expended a total of 106 hours and five minutes in rule challenge-related activities on behalf of the FBA. Based on Mr. Graham's testimony, the time recorded by Dr. White of 106 hours and five minutes for his services is reasonable under the circumstances of the rule challenge. There is no credible evidence to the contrary. The total amount of time billed by Dr. White results in a fee of $33,946.66. The three invoices submitted by Dr. White also bill the FBA for expenses totaling $2,643.72. There is no credible evidence that the Dr. White's expense billings are unreasonable. The total amount of fees and expenses charged by Dr. White to the FBA is $36,590.38. The FBA paid to Dr. White the total amount reflected on his invoices. By comparison with the fees charged by its own expert, the Department asserts that Dr. White's fees are unreasonable. The fact that the Department paid its expert less than the FBA paid to its own does not establish that payments to Dr. White were unreasonable. The amount of the attorney's fees to which the successful parties are entitled is not at issue in this proceeding. According to the Prehearing Stipulation, the Department "while contesting entitlement to any award of fees . . . does not dispute that the fees sought, as capped by the statute, is reasonable for the efforts of all counsel in this proceeding." The FBA, by affidavit, identified attorney's fees totaling $145,683.01, and seeks an award of $15,000, the statutory limit. By stipulation of the parties, the FBA is entitled to an award of attorney's fees in the amount of $15,000. The FBA identified total costs of $40,537.53, including the fees and expenses paid to Dr. White. There is no evidence that the costs of $3,947.15 set forth in the attorney billing records (and unrelated to costs related to Dr. White) are unreasonable. Based on the foregoing, the FBA is entitled to receive a total of $55,537.53. The Community Bankers Association identified attorney's fees totaling $10,290.00, and costs of $806.23. By stipulation of the parties, the Community Bankers Association is entitled to an award of attorney's fees in the amount of $10,290.00. There is no evidence that the Community Bankers Association costs of $806.23 are unreasonable. Based on the foregoing, the Community Bankers Association is entitled to receive a total of $11,096.23. The Department asserts that, due to "untimeliness" of the Petitions for Fees filed in these cases, an award of fees in this case is unjust. There is no issue of timeliness to be addressed in this matter. The Petitions for Fees were filed approximately 60-90 days after the time for appeal of the Final Order in the rule challenge cases had passed. The Final Order entered in the rule challenge proceeding specifically retained jurisdiction for an award of fees. There is no evidence that the Department was adversely affected by any delay in filing the Petitions for Fees.
Conclusions Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, the Department of Insurance shall pay total fees and costs as follows: The Florida Bankers Association shall receive a total of $55,537.53 The Community Bankers of Florida shall receive a total of $11,096.23. DONE AND ORDERED this 6th day of December, 2000, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. WILLIAM F. QUATTLEBAUM Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 6th day of December, 2000. COPIES FURNISHED: Virginia B. Townes, Esquire Akerman, Senterfitt & Eidson, P.A. Post Office Box 231 Orlando, Florida 32802-0231 Counsel for Florida Bankers Association Michael H. Davidson, Esquire Department of Insurance 612 Larson Building 200 East Gaines Street Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0333 Counsel for Department Martha J. Edenfield, Esquire Pennington, Moore, Wilkinson & Dunbar, P.A. Post Office Box 10095 Tallahassee, Florida 32302-2095 Counsel for Community Bankers of Florida Eli S. Jenkins 3330 Overlook Drive, Northeast St. Petersburg, Florida 33703 Authorized Representative of Specialty Agents, Inc. Daniel Y. Sumner, General Counsel Department of Insurance The Capitol, Lower Level 26 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0300 Honorable Bill Nelson State Treasurer and Insurance Commissioner Department of Insurance The Capitol, Plaza Level 11 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0300
Other Judicial Opinions A party who is adversely affected by this Final Order is entitled to judicial review pursuant to Section 120.68, Florida Statutes. Review proceedings are governed by the Florida rules of Appellate Procedure. Such proceedings are commenced by filing one copy of a notice of appeal with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings and a second copy, accompanied by filing fees prescribed by law, with the District Court of Appeal, First District, or with the District Court of Appeal in the Appellate District where the party resides. The notice of appeal must be filed within 30 days of rendition of the order to be reviewed.
Findings Of Fact Based upon the stipulation of the parties, the following facts are found: Respondent, (hereafter HRS) notified Petitioner (hereafter Starke) of a disallowance in Starke's Medicaid cost report by a letter which was received by Starke on October 4, 1983. The disallowance letter informed the Petitioner that pursuant to Rule 10-2.35, Florida Administrative Code, any request for a formal hearing must be "received by" HRS within 30 days or the hearing shall be deemed waived. Starke mailed its petition for formal hearing on November 3, 1983, a Thursday. The petition was received by HRS on November 7, 1983, a Monday. HRS denied Starke's petition for hearing on the grounds that the request for the hearing had not been received by HRS within 30 days of the date Starke received notice. The date by which the Petition had to be received was November 3, 1983. If HRS had allowed three (3) days for filing by mail, the petition would have been timely filed.
Findings Of Fact Respondent is the state agency charged with the duty of regulating general contractors in the State of Florida. An applicant for certification as a general contractor must pass the examination administered by Respondent as a prerequisite to, certification. Section 489.113(1), Florida Statutes. Petitioner sat for the certified general contractor's examination on October 14-15, 1988. Petitioner passed one part of the examination, but he did not pass the other two parts of the examination. Petitioner timely and properly challenged the grading of two examination questions for which he received no credit, to wit: Question Number PM 10 and Question CA 10. Petitioner abandoned any challenge he may have had to other questions. Question PM 10, a multiple choice question, required Petitioner to apply one of the sections of the Standard Building Code to a factual problem. The question required both a correct construction of the provision and a correct application of the provision. Petitioner misconstrued the provision and therefore missed the problem. Respondent gave Petitioner no credit for his answer to Question PM 10 because Petitioner gave the wrong answer to the question. Question CA 10, also a multiple choice question, required Petitioner to correctly construe the question presented and to respond accordingly. This question involved a change order and the payment therefor. In computing the amount that he would charge the owner, Petitioner included charges for the removal of certain materials that the contractor would have to remove in order to perform his contract. Those costs should be allocated to the contractor, not to the owner. Petitioner misconstrued the question and therefore missed the problem. Respondent gave Petitioner no credit for his answer to Question CA 10 because Petitioner gave the wrong answer to the question.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is: RECOMMENDED that Respondent, State of Florida, Department of Professional Regulation, enter a final order which finds that Petitioner abandoned his challenges to all questions except Question PM 10 and Question CA 10 and which denies Petitioner's challenges to Question PM 10 and to Question CA 10. It is further recommended that the two questions filed as exhibits in this proceeding be sealed. DONE AND ENTERED in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida, this 11th day of August, 1989. CLAUDE B. ARRINGTON Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 11th day of August, 1989. APPENDIX TO RECOMMENDED ORDER, CASE NO. 89-1859 The proposed findings of fact submitted on behalf of Petitioner are addressed as follows: The proposed findings found in the first full paragraph of Petitioner's proposed recommended order are addressed in paragraphs 1, 2, 3, and 4. The proposed findings found in the second and third full paragraphs of Petitioner's proposed recommended order are addressed, in part, in paragraph 5. The proposed findings are rejected, in part, as being subordinate to the findings made in paragraph 5. The proposed findings found in the fourth full paragraph of Petitioner's proposed recommended order are addressed, in part, in paragraph 7. The proposed findings are rejected, in part, as being subordinate to the findings made in paragraph 7. The proposed findings found in the fifth full paragraph of Petitioner's proposed recommended order are rejected as being recitation of testimony. The proposed findings of fact submitted on behalf of Respondent are addressed as follows: Addressed in paragraph 2 - 3. Addressed in paragraph 4. Addressed in part in paragraph 4. Rejected in part as being unnecessary to the conclusion reached. 4 - 10. Rejected as being recitation of testimony and as being subordinate to the findings made. 11. Rejected as being unnecessary to the conclusion reached. COPIES FURNISHED: George W. Harrell, Esquire Department of Professional Regulation 1940 North Monroe Street, Suite 60 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0792 Charles L. Neustein, Esquire 801 41st Street - 5th Floor Miami Beach, Florida 33140 Kenneth E. Easley, General Counsel Department of Professional Regulation 1940 North Monroe Street, Suite 60 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0792 Fred Seely, Executive Director Department of Professional Regulation Construction Industry Licensing Board Post Office Box 2 Jacksonville, Florida 32202
The Issue The issue to be determined in this matter is whether the Agency for Health Care Administration (“AHCA”) is entitled to recover its attorney’s fees and costs, pursuant to section 409.913(23), Florida Statutes, incurred prosecuting a matter pursuant to section 409.913.
Findings Of Fact AHCA is the state agency responsible for administering the Florida Medicaid Program. Medicaid is a joint federal/state program to provide health care and related services to qualified individuals, including hospice services. Covenant is a provider of hospice and end-of-life services and at all times relevant to this matter, the program was an authorized provider of Medicaid services pursuant to a valid Medicaid provider agreement with AHCA. AHCA is authorized to recover Medicaid overpayments, as deemed appropriate, pursuant to section 409.913. The U.S. Department of Health & Human Services, Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services (“CMS”), contracted with Health Integrity, a private vendor, to perform an audit of Covenant. Health Integrity retained a company called Advanced Medical Reviews (“AMR”) to provide peer physician reviews of claims to determine whether an overpayment occurred. Based on the audit findings in the Overpayment Case, AHCA prosecuted claims against Covenant for Medicaid overpayment. On August 9, 2016, AHCA provided a Final Audit Report (“FAR”) to Covenant seeking $715,518.14 in overpayments, $142,903.63 in fines, and $131.38 in costs. On August 29, 2016, Covenant timely filed a Petition for Formal Administrative Hearing. The undersigned conducted a final hearing on March 19 through 23, 2018, on Covenant’s Petition filed in the Overpayment Case. At the time of the final hearing, AHCA sought a modified overpayment of $677,023.44, and a fine of $135,404.68. On August 15, 2018, the undersigned issued a Recommended Order in the Overpayment Case finding AHCA is entitled to collect an overpayment of $637,632.15, and a fine of $127,526.43. The Recommended Order noted that AHCA reserved its right to amend its cost worksheet in this matter and, pursuant to section 409.913(23), file a request with the undersigned to recover all investigative and legal costs, if it prevailed. On October 17, 2018, AHCA issued a Final Order in the Overpayment Case finding AHCA is entitled to recover $637,973.10 in overpayments and to impose a fine of $127,594.62. The Final Order concluded, “[a]dditionally, since the Agency has prevailed in this matter, it is entitled to recover its investigative, legal, and expert witness costs it incurred in this matter. § 409.913(23), Fla. Stat.” Further, it provided that if the parties are unable to reach an agreement as to costs, either party may file a request with the Division requesting a final hearing within 30 days of the date of the rendition of the Final Order. On November 15, 2018, AHCA timely filed its Petition for Recovery of AHCA’s Legal Fees and Costs. On February 7, 2018, AHCA amended its Petition. Covenant opposed AHCA’s Petition and disputed whether AHCA is entitled to legal fees. Covenant has appealed the Final Order in the Overpayment Case, and the appeal is pending before the First District Court of Appeal in Covenant v. AHCA, Case No. 1D18-4797. The final hearing was held on a stipulated record, Petitioner’s Memorandum of Law in Support of Petitioner’s Amended Petition for Legal Fees, and Covenant’s Brief in Opposition to AHCA’s Petition for Recovery of Costs and Fees (with exhibits). Legal issues were framed by the Joint Stipulation. There was no testimony of any witnesses offered by either party. The exhibits constituting the record were exhibits to Respondent’s Brief and Petitioner’s Memorandum of Law. The parties have stipulated to the reasonableness of AHCA’s claimed attorney’s fees, in accordance with the parties’ agreement stated in the Joint Motion for Case Management Conference dated March 11, 2019. The issue that remains is whether AHCA is entitled to recovery of $330,186.14 in attorney’s fees under section 409.913(23). For the reasons explained below, the undersigned finds that Florida law does not support a finding that AHCA is entitled to the attorney’s fees in dispute.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that the Agency for Health Care Administration enter a final order that section 409.913(23)(a) does not authorize the Agency for Health Care Administration to recover its attorney’s fees under the guise of “legal costs” for the audit related to this matter. DONE AND ENTERED this 12th day of June, 2019, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S YOLONDA Y. GREEN Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 12th day of June, 2019.
The Issue The issue is whether Respondent should have a civil penalty in the amount of $1,500.00 imposed for failing to timely correct five violations of administrative regulations, as alleged in the Administrative Complaint filed by Petitioner on September 2, 1999.
Findings Of Fact Based upon all of the evidence, the following findings of fact are determined: When the events herein occurred, Respondent, Gene A. Grier (Respondent), was licensed to operate an assisted living facility (ALF) under the name of El-Amins Shelter & Care Center at 2035 Baldwin Street, Jacksonville, Florida. As an ALF, Respondent is subject to the regulatory jurisdiction of Petitioner, Agency for Health Care Administration (AHCA). Although the facility was licensed to handle up to 11 residents, Respondent had only 5 or 6 residents when the events occurred. When it receives a complaint from a third party about a licensed facility, AHCA has the regulatory responsibility of conducting an inspection to ensure that the facility is complying with certain standards embodied in Chapter 58A-5, Florida Administrative Code. If standards are not being met, depending on their nature and severity, the deficiencies are classified as Class I, II, and III violations, with Class III being the least serious violation. After the deficiencies are noted in a Summary of Deficiencies, the facility is given a time certain in which to correct those violations. If no correction is made, AHCA normally imposes a civil penalty upon the erring facility. Respondent is charged with having failed to timely correct five Class III violations. That class of deficiency is one which the agency determines to have an indirect or potential relationship to the health, safety, or security of the nursing home residents. On an undisclosed date, the Jacksonville office of the Human Rights Advocacy Committee (Committee), an independent organization which monitors residents in ALFs, filed a complaint against Respondent and certain other ALFs in the Jacksonville area alleging that the facilities were not in compliance with AHCA regulations in various respects. In response to that complaint, on June 25, 1999, an AHCA health facilities evaluator, Robert A. Cunningham (Cunningham), conducted an unannounced inspection of Respondent's facility. During his inspection, Cunningham noted, among other things, that Respondent "did not ensure that there [was] at least one staff member on duty at all times who [had] certification in an approved first-aid and CPR course"; that Respondent's menus were not "reviewed, signed, and dated by a Registered Dietician"; that Respondent's menus "were not dated and planned at least one week in advance for regular and therapeutic diets"; that the facility's "dry and canned foods were not dated"; and that "the interior and exterior of the buildings and grounds were not kept reasonably attractive" in various respects, including a "broken mirror in the hall and peeling ceilings." Each of these deficiencies contravened an agency rule and constituted a Class III violation. After the inspection was completed, Respondent was given a copy of the Summary of Deficiencies and advised that the deficiencies must be corrected by July 25, 1999. On August 11, 1999, or approximately six weeks after the first inspection, Cunningham conducted a second inspection of Respondent's facility. While some of the violations had been remediated, Cunningham noted that none of the deficiencies cited in paragraph 5 had been corrected. At hearing, Respondent admitted that except for the violations pertaining to dated canned goods and a broken mirror, to which he takes "strong exception," the remaining violations were uncorrected. Therefore, the allegations pertaining to the remaining violations have been established. As to the two violations which Respondent has denied, the more persuasive evidence supports a finding that they were also uncorrected as of August 11, 1999. Even so, Respondent contended that he was only given one follow-up inspection, while two other ALFs, one in Jacksonville and the other in Hilliard, were given at least two follow-up inspections in which to correct violations discovered during their initial inspection. According to Respondent, he "got the treatment" from the inspector, while the others did not, and his facility was labeled a "hell hole." At the same time, Respondent suggested that if he had been given additional time like the others, he would have eventually corrected the deficiencies. While it is true that two other facilities were given more than one follow-up visit, the number of follow-up visits is a discretionary matter on the part of the evaluator, depending on the nature and severity of the violations and other circumstances. Here, there was no abuse of discretion shown on the part of the inspector, and Respondent presented no compelling reason why he was unable to correct the violations within the six-week period between the first and second inspections, or why he needed more than a normal period of time to correct a particular violation. It is noteworthy that both of the facilities which were given two follow-up inspections were also fined. Respondent further contended that the Committee which filed the complaint was biased against him and unjustly singled him out. Even if this is true, however, AHCA is legally required to investigate all complaints, even if anonymous and no matter what their underlying motivation, to determine if the allegations are true. This is because ALFs are entrusted with the care of elderly persons and require special oversight by AHCA. In this case, the evidence shows that Respondent was not singled out, and that the Committee triggered inspections of several other area ALFs. While one of the two deficiencies alleged by the Committee to be present in Respondent's facility was later determined to be unfounded, one was substantiated, and during the inspection, the evaluator found a number of other violations at the facility. The fact that the Committee also filed complaints against Respondent with the Department of Children and Family Services, City Code Enforcement Board, and County Health Department regarding alleged violations is of no concern here. At hearing, Respondent also contended that he was denied due process because the Committee failed to honor its own procedural rules (regarding notice and the use of a check list) and it has no expertise in operating an ALF. However, AHCA (and not the Committee) is the agency which has regulatory jurisdiction over Respondent's facility, and there is no evidence that AHCA's inspections failed to comport with the law. Therefore, the concerns about the Committee have no relevance here. Respondent further contended that the Committee's complaint, and the inspector's evaluation, were based on a 1999 version of administrative rules, even though the rules did not become effective until after the recommendation for sanctions was made. The evidence shows, however, that the evaluator used the then-effective 1995 version of rules, and the later-adopted rules were never considered nor used during the inspection. According to Respondent, he has been licensed for 27 years, first by the Department of Health and Rehabilitative Services, and then AHCA. This was not contradicted. There is no evidence that he has ever violated any rules prior to this proceeding. Finally, there is no evidence that the residents were placed in jeopardy by the violations not being corrected by August 11, 1999. These circumstances should be taken intoaccount when determining the amount of a civil penalty to be imposed upon Respondent.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that the Agency for Health Care Administration enter a final order determining that the charges in the Administrative Complaint have been sustained, and that Respondent should have a $750.00 civil penalty imposed. DONE AND ENTERED this 12th day of June, 2000, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. DONALD R. ALEXANDER Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 12th day of June, 2000 COPIES FURNISHED: Sam Power, Agency Clerk Agency for Health Care Administration Building 3, Suite 3431 2727 Mahan Drive Tallahassee, Florida 32308-5403 Michael O. Mathis, Esquire Agency for Health Care Administration Building 3, Suite 3431 2727 Mahan Drive Tallahassee, Florida 32308-5403 Gene A. Grier El-Amins Shelter & Care Center 2035 Baldwin Street Jacksonville, Florida 32209 Julie Gallagher, General Counsel Agency for Health Care Administration Building 3, Suite 3431 2727 Mahan Drive Tallahassee, Florida 32308-5403
Findings Of Fact Pursuant to Section 310.011, Florida Statutes, the Board of Pilot Commissioners (Board) was established within the Department of Professional Regulation (Department). The Board, in conformance with Section 310.061, has the authority to determine the number of pilots needed for a given port. To fill those numbers, the Department examines all applicants for the position of pilot or deputy pilot and, if found qualified, appoints and licenses as a pilot or appoints and certifies as a deputy pilot the number prescribed by the Board. See: Section 310.081, Florida Statutes. On December 8, 1986, the Department held an examination to fill two deputy pilot positions at Port Canaveral. Petitioner and Intervenors, Captain John M. Boltz and Captain Earl R. McMillin were among the candidates examined. A total of twenty-two candidates took the examination. The facets of the examination were as required by Rule 21SS-5.13(1), Florida Administrative Code. That rule requires that the examination include the following subject areas: International Rules of the Road. Inland Rules of the Road and the Pilot Rules. Seamanship, Shiphandling and other Subjects Relating to Piloting. Aids to Navigation. Local or specific knowledge of the port area for which being examined. Chartwork of the port area for which being examined, with detailed information of the port area required to be charted. A general examination concerning matters pertaining to a candidates knowledge of federal and state pilotage, fitness and ability to undertake the duties of a certified deputy pilot in the port for which being examined, and such other related information as may be deemed pertinent to the examination process, to determine whether the applicant is qualified to pilot all classes of vessels liable to enter the port and is familiar with the waters, the channels, the harbor and the port. Rule 21SS-5.13(2), Florida Administrative Code, mandates that: In order to achieve a passing grade on the examination a candidate must score 90 percent on the subject areas in subsections (1)(a) and (b), and a score of 75 percent on the subject areas in subsection (1)(c), (d), (e), (f) and (g). A failure to attain the required percentage in any of the seven subject areas renders the candidate unsuccessful. Of the twenty-two candidates who took the examination, only four candidates attained a passing score on each of the seven subject areas. Of these four, Captain McMillin was first with an overall score of 94.74 percent, Captain Boltz was second with an overall score of 92.76 percent, and Petitioner was third with an overall score of 92.62 percent. The Department, in accordance with standard practice, ranked the candidates by overall score, and appointed the top two candidates, Captain McMillin and Captain Boltz, to the two available positions. Following disclosure of his score, Petitioner reviewed his examination and offered a timely objection to question 117. That question reads: The reaction of a ship known as "squat" results in a change in trim. generally varies in direct proportion to the speed. Only I is a correct statement. Only II is a correct statement. Both I and II are correct statements. Neither I nor II is a correct statement. As originally keyed, the only correct response to question 117 was answer A. However, after reviewing the test results, the Department decided to rekey the acceptable responses to the question and accord credit for answer A and C. Petitioner objects to the Department's decision to accord credit for answer C, which he asserts is a technically incorrect response. Significantly, had the Department not rekeyed the responses to the question, Petitioner, who elected response A, would have achieved a better overall score than Captain Boltz, who elected response C. Question 117 was developed by Captain John C. Hanson, the Department's consultant, from Shiphandling For The Mariner, by MacElrevey; a source recommended to all candidates prior to the examination. Pertinent to this case, MacElrevey teaches: As a ship begins to make way through the water she undergoes a change in mean draft known as sinkage. This change may occur equally forward and aft or may be greater at the bow or the stern, the resulting change in trim being known as "squat." When passing through the water the ship displaces an amount of water equal to her own weight. This water must move outward from and around the hull in all directions. The water so displaced moves primarily along and under the hull and returns astern of the ship to "fill" the space left by the ship as she moves on. Naturally, the faster the ship is moving the greater the velocity of this flow under and along her hull, and the greater the corresponding pressure drop as a result of that increased velocity. Depending upon where the greatest drop in pressure occurs along the length of the hull, this reduced pressure will result in greater sinkage (increase in draft) at the bow or stern, although the draft increases to some degree all along the length of the ship. As the ship enters shallow water the flow of water becomes increasingly restricted due to the reduced clearance both under and on one or both sides of the hull. The degree of restriction or "blockage factor" is dependent upon several variables . . . Consider first the effect of ship's speed since this is the factor over which the mariner has the greatest control. It has been found, based upon observations of both actual ships and models, that squat varies in proportion to the square of the speed. If ship's speed is doubled, squat increased by a factor of four. With today's large ships and minimal underkeel clearances it becomes immediately obvious why speed and resulting squat must be very much on the shiphandler's mind. (Emphasis added) The question developed by Captain Hanson was designed to test the candidate's knowledge of squat and the effect of speed on squat, which is important information for a pilot who must navigate through shallow waters or confined channels. The correct technical response to question 117 as posed, and as intended by Captain Hanson, was answer A. Answer C was an incorrect response because squat does not technically vary in direct proportion to speed but, rather, in proportion to the square of the speed. 1/ Notwithstanding the fact that answer A was the intended and only technically correct response to question 117, the Department's Office of Examination Services decided to also afford credit for answer C. This decision was predicated on its conclusion, after a review of the responses to the question, that the phrase "direct proportion" could logically have been interpreted by the candidates in a non-technical sense to mean: that squat is directly related to speed (i.e., if speed increases/decreases, squat increases/decreases). If so interpreted, answer C would also have been a correct response to question 117. Accordingly, the Department concluded that it would afford credit for answer C, as well as answer A. The proof accords logic and reason to the Department's decision. The twenty-two candidates who took the examination were experts in seamanship and shiphandling. A review of the responses to question 117 by these twenty-two candidates revealed that: three chose answer A, one chose answer B, and 18 chose answer C. Of the four who attained a passing score, two chose answer A and two chose answer C. Notably, 82 percent of the candidates in both the upper and lower half of the class chose answer C. Because of its poor statistical performance, Ms. Lila Quero-Munoz of the Office of Examination Services, an expert in psychometrics, was of the opinion that the question needed close review. In Ms. Quero-Munoz' opinion, which is credited, when 18 of 22 qualified people select a response other than the one that was keyed, there is good reason to suspect that there is something in the phrasing of the question that is subject to misinterpretation. Upon review of question 117, Ms. Quero-Munoz and Martin Persampieri, also of the Office of Examination Services, were of the opinion, which opinion is credited, that the phrase "direct proportion" could have logically been interpreted as meaning that squat is directly related to speed, instead of its technical or mathematical definition. Therefore, the Department's decision to afford credit for answer C had a logical and reasonable basis. /2 The testimony of Captain Hanson, Petitioner, Captain McMillin and Captain Boltz lends support to the conclusion that the Department acted logically and reasonably when it decided to rekey the answers to question 117. Captain Hanson, when he prepared the question, did not intend it to be a trick question. Yet, Petitioner and Captain McMillin, both of whom responded with answer A, thought the question to be tricky and applied the technical or mathematical definition of "direct proportion." Captain Boltz was not familiar with the technical definition of "direct proportion" and ascribed to it the general proposition that squat is directly related to speed. Notably, the term "direct proportion" was not defined anywhere in the sources recommended by the Department to the candidates. The Department, in carrying out the examination process, is charged with the responsibility of ensuring that the examination for deputy pilot adequately and reliably measures a candidate's ability to practice the profession of deputy pilot. Further, it must ensure that the examination questions are a reliable measurement of the general areas of competence specified in Rule 21SS-5.13(1), Florida Administrative Code. These responsibilities were adequately addressed by the Department in this case.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing findings of fact and conclusions of law, it is RECOMMENDED that the examination challenge filed by Petitioner be DISMISSED. DONE AND ENTERED this 21st day of October, 1987, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. WILLIAM J. KENDRICK Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The Oakland Building 2009 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 (904)488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 21st day of October, 1987.
The Issue Whether Petitioner's Petition Seeking an Administrative Determination of the Invalidity of an Existing Rule (Petition) should be dismissed on the ground that the "challenged rule in this proceeding has been effectively repealed by the Florida Legislature by Section 626.854(11), Florida Statutes, effective October 1, 2008," as requested by Respondent.
