The Issue The issues to be determined in this case are whether Respondent has failed to maintain the qualifications required for a correctional officer pursuant to Section 943.1395(7), Florida Statutes (2006),1/ and Florida Administrative Code Rule 11B- 27.0011(4)(b), and if so, what penalty should be imposed?
Findings Of Fact At all times material to the allegations in the Administrative Complaint, Respondent was certified by the Department as a correctional officer in the State of Florida, having been issued Correctional Certificate #170241. Respondent and Candida Nowlin are engaged and live together. They have lived together since 2002. Ms. Nowlin has two children from a previous relationship and she and Mr. Saria have a child together. At the time of the events giving rise to these proceedings, the couple was under a great deal of stress because of a serious accident involving one of Ms. Nowlin's children. On the evening of November 6, 2006, Mr. Saria and Ms. Nowlin had an argument. She asked him to leave, and he refused. In his anger, he slammed a cordless phone in their home against the kitchen counter. However, there is no competent evidence that he struck or grabbed her, or threw her into a wall. The only competent testimony presented is that he touched her arms in order to move her out of his path as he went to another room in the home, but did not harm her in any way. Ms. Nowlin felt that she and Mr. Saria needed some time apart, so when Mr. Saria refused to leave their home, she went with her young daughter next door to her neighbor's home to call the police. Her neighbor, Ms. Epley, was having a dinner party. She noticed that Ms. Nowlin was crying and she let her use her phone, but was distracted by her hostess duties. She did not remember Ms. Nowlin being injured, and Ms. Nowlin did not tell her that Mr. Saria had beaten her up. Ms. Nowlin called the police from Ms. Epley's home. Two officers came to the home, then-officer Barraclough and Sergeant Spears. They interviewed Ms. Nowlin, Ms. Epley, and Mr. Saria, and arrested Mr. Saria and took him away. After they had removed Mr. Saria from the home, the two officers completed statements from both Ms. Epley and Ms. Nowlin. Officer Barraclough testified that he saw scratches and red marks on Ms. Nowlin's arms. However, his testimony was contradicted by all other witnesses who testified, and is not credited. Sergeant Spears, who did not testify, took Ms. Nowlin's statement. While she was doing so, Ms. Nowlin's mother came to the home. Her testimony, which is credited, is that Ms. Nowlin had no bruises or marks on her arms and that Ms. Nowlin was primarily upset at that point because Mr. Saria had been arrested. The only competent evidence of what happened between Ms. Nowlin and Mr. Saria during their argument is the testimony of the two of them. They both deny vehemently that he struck her or engaged in any unwanted touching. They both insist that they had an argument because of the amount of stress they were under, and that the police were called because Ms. Nowlin felt they needed some time away from each other.
Recommendation Upon consideration of the facts found and conclusions of law reached, it is RECOMMENDED: That a final order be entered dismissing the Administrative Complaint. DONE AND ENTERED this 24th day of November, 2009, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S LISA SHEARER NELSON Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 24th day of November, 2009.
The Issue At the commencement of the hearing, the parties stipulated that Petitioner had filed applications for Class "A" and Class "C" licenses and was qualified except for the failure to demonstrate good moral character. The bases for the dispute over Petitioner's character were: Petitioner's arrest record; Petitioner's alleged falsification of his applications as to his employment with the Pittsburgh Police Department; and Petitioner's check for the application fee was dishonored for insufficient funds.
Findings Of Fact The Petitioner duly filed applications with the Department of State, Division of Licensing for Class "A" and Class "C" licenses. Except for matters related to Petitioner's good moral character, Petitioner is qualified for licensure. Petitioner's application reflects that he answered the question whether he had been arrested affirmatively with the following comment: The Courts of the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania in all five cases from 1965 to 1974 - ruled that as a Police Officer, I acted within the scope of my authority - These cases stem from being an undercover Narcotics Officer. The Petitioner's arrest records as maintained by the Federal Bureau of Investigation reveal several juvenile offenses, not considered by the Department and not at issue. This record also reveals the following arrests of Petitioner as an adult: Date Place Charge Disposition 06/09/66* Pittsburgh VDD & CA Not guilty 08/15/66* Pittsburgh VUFA Not guilty 08/20/66* Allegheny County VDDCA 06/24/67* Allegheny County VUFA Unavailable per contra 06/30/70 *Only one offense with different charges made on different dates 09/05/74 Allegheny County Theft, VUFA Discharged 09/23/74 05/07/75 Allegheny County Fraud - imper- sonating a public servant 12/19/79 Office of Provost No charge No charge Martial Petitioner presented testimony and supporting documentary evidence that the arrests reported on the FBI criminal history for the dates 06/09/66 through 06/24/67 were all related to the same offense, and that these charges were resolved in favor of the Petitioner by a verdict of not guilty. See Petitioner's Exhibit #1. The judge arrested judgment of the two years' probation for the charge of 05/07/75. See Respondent's Exhibit #2. Petitioner stated that based upon his status as a capital police officer he was not guilty of fraud or impersonation of a public servant. The Petitioner's remaining arrest was on 09/05/74, and was discharged. Petitioner's explanation of these arrests is not consistent with the explanation stated on his application form. According to the resume accompanying his application, Petitioner was employed on the indicated dates in the following positions: Date Position 1963 to 1965 Globe Security 1965 to 1970 Pittsburgh Police Department, special patrolman 1970 to 1973 NAACP special investigator and Bucci Detective Agency 1972 to 1976 Commonwealth Property Police with State of Pennsylvania 1973 to 1974 Part-time security guard in addition to employment listed above May, 1976 January, 1977 Federal Civil Service guard March, 1977 September, 1977 Part-time security guard with A&S Security December, 1978 Sears, Roebuck and Company as to June, 1980 undercover security investigator February, 1979 Security guard to June, 1980 September, 1979 VA, guard at VA Hospital GS5 to June, 1980 June, 1980 Came to Florida Petitioner stated that his check for the application fee bounced because of his travel back and forth to Pennsylvania to try to develop the data to support his application, which depleted his bank account. He has since made the check good and paid the fees by money order.
Recommendation The Petitioner has failed to establish that he has the requisite good character for licensure; therefore, it is recommended that the Petitioner's applications for Class "A" and Class "C" licensure be denied. DONE and ORDERED this 19th day of April, 1982, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. COPIES FURNISHED: Mr. James Barnett 758 Woodville Road Milton, Florida 32570 James V. Antista, Esquire Assistant General Counsel Department of State Division of Licensing R. A. Gray Building, Room 106 Tallahassee, Florida 32301 STEPHEN F. DEAN, Hearing Officer Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The Oakland Building 2009 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32301 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 19th day of April, 1982. George Firestone, Secretary Department of State The Capitol Tallahassee, Florida 32301
The Issue Whether Petitioner entered a plea of nolo contendere to a felony thereby triggering the statutory mandate that the Department of State revoke his Security Officer's license for a period set by statute?
Findings Of Fact Chapter 493, Florida Statutes, governs the private security, investigative and recovery industries. The industries were found by the Legislature when it passed Chapter 90-364, Laws of Florida, in 1990, to be "rapidly expanding fields that require regulation to ensure that the interests of the public will be adequately served and protected." Section 493.6100, Florida Statutes. Among the findings announced by the Legislature in the enactment of the chapter was that "persons who are not of good moral character engaged in the private security, investigative or recovery industries are a threat to the welfare of the public if placed in positions of trust." Id. Petitioner, the Department of State, (the "Department") is the agency of the State of Florida conferred with administrative authority under Chapter 493, Florida Statutes. Among its duties are the receipt of applications for Security Officer licenses and their processing (including a background investigation) ultimately culminating in either issuance of the license or denial of the application. After issuance of a license to a new licensee, the Department has authority based on certain grounds to take disciplinary action against the licensee ranging from a reprimand to revocation of the license. Respondent, Louis Palmieri, holds a Class "D" Security Officer License issued by the Department. Bearing the license number D91-04959, the current license has been effective since March 25, 1997. On or about April 7, 1994, in Duval County, Florida, Respondent entered a plea of nolo contendere to the offense of "lewd and lascivious act upon a child," in the Circuit Court of Duval County, Florida, in Case No. 94-2507CF. An order of probation was rendered under which adjudication of guilt was withheld in favor of probation for five years under the supervision of the Department of Corrections. Neighbors and long-time friends of the family of Mr. Palmieri are aware that he entered the plea of nolo contendere to a felony. They are also aware of the nature of the felonious charges and his status as with regard to the criminal case as being "on probation." Still, they hold him in high regard. He is seen as reliable and a good worker. Those who occasionally drive him to work or have seen his workplace were quick to point out that there are no children present at the place where he is currently employed as a security officer. Mr. Palmieri has not shielded his neighbors from his misdeed. In fact, he has confided in them that the circumstances leading to his nolo plea involved exposing himself in public in the presence of a twelve-year old girl. Nonetheless, one of his neighbors, the grandmother of a five year-old girl who frequently cares for the child, stated that she would not hesitate to invite Mr. Palmieri over to her house for dinner in the presence of her granddaughter so long as Mr. Palmieri and the child were never left alone. Despite his neighbor's willingness to issue such an invitation, and to his credit, Mr. Palmieri informed his neighbor that he could not be in the child's presence consistent with the terms of his probation. Mr. Palmieri remains under the supervision of the Department of Corrections to this day. Absent a violation of probation, April 6, 1999, will be the last day of probationary supervision.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing findings of fact and conclusions of law, its is RECOMMENDED: That the Department of State enter a final order revoking the Class "D" Security Officer License of Louis Palmieri, License No. D91-04959, and that he not be able to reapply for a license pursuant to Chapter 493, Florida Statutes, until a period of three years has expired since his final release from supervision, whenever that may be. DONE AND ENTERED this 30th day of April, 1998, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. _ DAVID M. MALONEY Administrative Law Judge Hearings Division of Administrative The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 30th day of April, 1998. COPIES FURNISHED: Douglas D. Sunshine Assistant General Counsel Office of the General Counsel Department of State The Capitol, Mail Station 4 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0250 Cathleen B. Clarke, Esquire Melbourne Financial Centre, Suite 102 1990 West New Haven Avenue Melbourne, Florida 32904 Honorable Sandra B. Mortham Secretary of State The Capitol, Plaza Level 02 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0250 Don Bell, General Counsel Department of State The Capitol, Plaza Level 02 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0250 John M. Russi, Director Division of Licensing Department of State The Capitol, Plaza Level 02 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0250
The Issue The issue is whether Respondent's certification as a Firefighter II Compliance should be permanently revoked for the reasons stated in the Administrative Complaint (Complaint), dated June 6, 2018.
Findings Of Fact The Department is the state agency responsible for licensing and regulating firefighters in the State. Respondent is certified in Florida as a Firefighter II Compliance. He holds Certificate No. 139586. Until the incident underlying this controversy arose, Respondent was employed by the Sarasota County Fire Department as a firefighter/paramedic. He now is working in the emergency room of a local hospital. The parties have stipulated that on March 21, 2018, Respondent entered a plea of nolo contendere to aggravated assault with a weapon, a third-degree felony punishable by imprisonment of one year or more under Florida law. Adjudication was withheld, Respondent was placed on probation for a period of two years, and he was ordered to pay court costs, fines, and fees in the amount of $1,525.00. See also Dep't Ex. 19. In response to the Complaint, Respondent essentially argues that: (a) he should not have been charged with the underlying criminal offense because he was defending himself against an aggressor in a road rage incident, and (b) he entered a nolo contendere plea based on bad advice from his attorney. At hearing, Respondent gave his version of the events resulting in his arrest. Also, two police officers involved with his arrest testified to what they observed and reported. Their testimony conflicts in many respects with Respondent's testimony. The undersigned will not attempt to reconcile the conflicts, as this proceeding is not the appropriate forum in which to relitigate the criminal charge. During the criminal case, Respondent was represented by a criminal law attorney who presented him with two options: enter into a plea arrangement or go to trial and risk a harsher penalty if he were found guilty. Respondent says he accepted his counsel's recommendation that he enter a plea of nolo contendere on the belief that he would not have a felony arrest on his record. After the plea agreement was accepted by the court, Respondent learned that the plea required revocation of his certification and loss of his job. Respondent also testified that even though he paid counsel a $15,000.00 fee, his counsel did little or no investigation regarding what happened, as he failed to depose a single witness before making a recommendation to take a plea.1/ In hindsight, Respondent says he would have gone to trial since he now believes he had a legitimate claim to the "castle defense," and the so-called victim in the incident (the driver of the other car) has a long criminal history and is now incarcerated. At this point, however, if Respondent believes an error in the legal process occurred, his only remedy, if one exists at all, is through the court system and not in an administrative proceeding. A felony plea constitutes noncompliance with the certification statute and requires permanent revocation of a certification. According to a Department witness, however, five years after all requirements of the court's sentencing have been met, the Department has the authority "in a formal process" to make a "felony conviction review" that may result in the reissuance of a certification. Except for this incident, Respondent has no other blemishes on his record. He served in the United States Marine Corps, with combat tours of duty in Iraq and Afghanistan, he was honorably discharged, and he was honored for saving a life at a Target store while off-duty. He has apologized for his actions, taken an anger management course, and received further treatment for Post-traumatic Stress Disorder at a local Veteran's Administration facility.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that the Department of Financial Services enter a final order permanently revoking Respondent's certification. DONE AND ENTERED this 15th day of February, 2019, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S D. R. ALEXANDER Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 15th day of February, 2019.
The Issue The issue to be resolved in this proceeding concern whether, because of a prior regulatory and criminal history, the Petitioner is entitled to licensure in Florida as a nonresident life, health and variable annuity agent.
Findings Of Fact The Petitioner, Eugene P. Kent, at times pertinent hereto was a licensed insurance agent in South Dakota. He was apparently an agent or broker for the Independent Community Banker's Association of South Dakota and engaged in the insurance business with regard to the various group benefits coverage for that association. Apparently in 1995, he become involved in a dispute between the Independent Community Banker's Association of South Dakota and United of Omaha Life Insurance Company. This dispute, the exact nature of which is not of record in this case, resulted in the Petitioner being charged with mail fraud by the United States Attorney for the District of South Dakota. He was prosecuted for mail fraud and ultimately was convicted by jury verdict on or shortly after October 26, 1996. He was sentenced to two years' imprisonment. The Petitioner believed that evidence existed in the home office of United of Omaha Life Insurance Company, which would exonerate him, and that his counsel during the criminal prosecution had, for unknown reasons, failed to subpoena and obtain such evidence for use in his criminal trial. He obtained new counsel who was successful in obtaining the evidence in question, which indeed proved to be exculpatory. It resulted in the presiding judge in the criminal case vacating the order of conviction, resulting in the Petitioner's release from incarceration. Because of his conviction, the insurance departments of South Dakota, as well as North Dakota and Nebraska, had revoked his insurance licenses, based upon the criminal conviction. On October 26, 1996, during the progress of the criminal trial referenced above, the Petitioner and his wife became concerned that she would not have funds to pay for his counsel, to operate her home and the business and to pay for her son's alcohol rehabilitation expenses if the jury returned a guilty verdict resulting in his incarceration. Consequently, on that day, the Petitioner made a withdrawal from his business account, drawn upon the Kent Insurance, Inc., account in the amount of $9,900, by writing a check on that account. On the same day, the Petitioner went to a different branch of the same bank and negotiated a second check on this same account also made payable to him, again, in the amount of $9,900, drawn upon the Kent Insurance, Inc., business account. The bank officer upon the occasion of the second withdrawal that same day told him that a currency transaction report would have to be filed. The Petitioner readily agreed to file the report and assisted the bank officer in completing and executing the transaction report. Thereafter, the United States Attorney secured an indictment of the Petitioner, during his incarceration for the earlier criminal conviction, before it was vacated by the trial judge. He prosecuted the Petitioner for "attempting to cause a financial institution not to file a report." During the pendency of this second criminal proceeding, the Petitioner remained incarcerated from the earlier proceeding, which was later vacated. Because of this, his counsel in the second criminal proceeding advised him to plead guilty to the second charge in return for a light penalty, because his counsel believed that if he attempted to litigate the second criminal matter to trial, he would have difficulty convincing a jury of his innocence because he was already incarcerated on the earlier mail fraud charge. Consequently, on May 20, 1998, the Petitioner pled guilty to attempting to cause a financial institution not to file a report. He was sentenced to five months' imprisonment as a result of that plea, which ran concurrently with the sentence imposed on February 24, 1997, regarding the mail fraud charge. After release, he was sentenced to supervised release for a period of approximately two years. The preponderant evidence in this proceeding shows that the Petitioner did not attempt to defraud the federal government or to prevent the bank involved from filing the report. Upon being informed of the requirement of filing the report, he freely consented and helped execute the report form involved at his bank. The funds he withdrew with the two checks were his funds from an account over which he had ownership and signatory authority. There is no evidence that the funds in the account withdrawn by the Petitioner had been obtained through an criminal alleged enterprise or that the Petitioner contemplated using them for such a purpose. The post-conviction evidence that was obtained by the Petitioner and his counsel resulted in the judge vacating the first conviction for mail fraud. This new evidence was also the basis for the South Dakota Insurance Regulatory Agency reinstating his licensure. Ultimately, the other states which had revoked his licensure reinstated his licenses. The Petitioner is now similarly licensed in 17 or 18 states. He applied for licensure as a non-resident life, health, and variable annuity agent in Florida and that application was denied by the Department due to his criminal history and the prior administrative actions against his licensure in the other states. That denial resulted in this proceeding. The other states which have since either reinstated his licensure or licensed him did so with knowledge, as reported by the Petitioner, of his prior criminal and administrative proceedings. The Department has a rule listing various crimes (in Classes A, B, and C) such that, if a petitioner has been so convicted, then that petitioner cannot be licensed for periods of times stated in that rule. Class A crimes listed in that rule carry the longest period of time during which licensure is prohibited with a waiting period extending as much as 15 years. The Division of Licensing of the Department decided that the crime involved herein was a "Class A crime." The rule allows the Department to analogize the crime of which a petitioner or applicant has been convicted with one of the crimes listed in this rule if the crime, of which an applicant was convicted, is not itself listed in the rule. The Division of Licensing thus decided to classify the crime of "attempting to cause a financial institution not to file a report" as analogous to "defrauding the government" or "obstruction of justice." The Petitioner was not charged with either defrauding the government or obstruction of justice and was not convicted of those crimes. Although the stipulation of facts between the Petitioner and the United States Attorney, attendant to the Petitioner's plea in the second federal criminal case (Petitioner's Exhibit G), shows that the Petitioner knowingly attempted to avoid the reporting requirement imposed by Title 31 U.S.C. § 5313(a) on the bank for currency transactions of more than $10,000 in one day, there is no persuasive evidence that he did so for any illegal purpose or fraudulent intent, or intent to in any way "obstruct justice," or engage in dishonest conduct. There was no demonstrative harm to the public nor was there any "victim" of his purported crime. If the Petitioner had truly wanted to conceal the transaction or induce the bank to fail to report it, he could simply have presented the second $9,900 check on another day for cashing, or had his wife negotiate such a check on a different business day. Instead, when told by the bank employee, on presenting the second check, that a currency transaction report would have to be filed, he freely assented and assisted in the preparation of the report form; even the above-referenced stipulation of facts attendant to his criminal plea shows this. There was no requirement that a report be made until the second check was negotiated on the same day. The Petitioner's testimony in evidence, including the fact that 18 states have licensed him or re-instated his licensure since the criminal and administrative proceedings at issue herein, with knowledge of those proceedings, shows preponderantly that his crime did not "involve moral turpitude" and that he is fit and trustworthy for engagement in the practice of insurance. The crime to which he pled did not involve any significant, rational relationship or nexus to the two "analogized crimes" involving "obstruction of justice" or "defrauding the government" for purposes of the Department's rule cited below. Two affidavits, admitted as Petitioner's Exhibits J and K, as corroborative hearsay, in accordance with Section 120.57(1)(c), Florida Statutes, bear out this finding and are worthy of quotation. The first affidavit is that of attorney James L. Volling, the Petitioner's counsel for purposes of appeal and post-conviction challenge to his first conviction, and his counsel for purposes of the second criminal case. Mr. Volling practices in Minneapolis, Minnesota, and is admitted to practice by the Minnesota Supreme Court, as well as by the United States District Court for the District of Minnesota and for the District of North Dakota. He is also admitted to practice in the courts of appeal for the District of Columbia Circuit, the Eighth Circuit and the Fifth Circuit, as well as the United States Supreme Court. He testified in pertinent part as follows: Following Mr. Kent's conviction on two counts of mail fraud, I was retained to represent him for purposes of appeal and post-conviction challenge to the conviction as well as in connection with a second case brought against him. Upon reviewing the facts and the law in Mr. Kent's case, I became convinced that his conviction was defective and inappropriate. Ultimately, the trial court agreed and his petition for post-conviction relief was granted and his conviction and sentence were vacated. The government chose not to appeal that decision which I believe clearly would have been upheld by the United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit. During the pendency of post-conviction proceedings in Mr. Kent's case, the government brought a second case against Mr. Kent involving allegations of an attempt to avoid currency transaction reporting requirements. In my view, these allegations were petty at best, especially considering that the bank involved did file a currency transaction report and Mr. Kent expressly permitted them to do so. Mr. Kent was simply withdrawing his own money and there was no claim that those funds were the product of any illegal activity [or for any illegal purpose]. The government's second case was only technical in nature and, in my view, would not have been charged in any other jurisdiction with which I am familiar. Indeed, the assistant United States attorney representing the government told me that the only reason the government brought the second case was their concern that Mr. Kent's conviction in the first case would ultimately be overturned, which of course it was. With regard to the currency transaction reporting matter, Mr. Kent elected to enter a plea bargain to avoid further expense and burden, and which did not augment the punishment that had been given to him in the first case. I have no doubt that, if Mr. Kent, had not been convicted in the first case so that he would not have had that stigma at the time of the second case, he would have elected to try the currency transaction reporting case rather than to enter into a plea agreement. It was after that plea agreement, that the conviction and sentence in Mr. Kent's first case were vacated. I have known and dealt with Eugene Kent for approximately five years now. During that entire time, he has always been a man of his word. He has done exactly what he said he would do and has told me the truth in every respect. I have great respect and admiration for Mr. Kent as person and as a client. I believe he has suffered unfairly throughout this entire ordeal, but he has remained steadfast and persevered through some truly difficult times. I have been proud to serve as his legal counsel, and I would recommend him unhesitatingly to anyone in terms of employment or any business relationship. The second affidavit is by Mark F. Marshall. Mr. Marshall is now a lawyer and at times pertinent hereto has been admitted to the practice of law by the South Dakota Supreme Court. He has been in the active practice of law since 1981. At times pertinent hereto from January 1, 1996, until August 1, 2000, Mr. Marshall served as a United States Magistrate Judge for the District of South Dakota. Mr. Marshall testified pertinently as follows: From January 1, 1996 until August 1, 2000, I served as a United States Magistrate Judge for the District of South Dakota. In my capacity as a United States Magistrate Judge, I conducted the initial appearance and detention hearings in a matter styled the United States of America v. Eugene P. Kent, CR. 96-40002-01. Over the objection of the United States, I ordered Mr. Kent released on conditions. A copy of the Order Setting Conditions of Release, as well as Mr. Kent's Appearance Bond in the Amount of $100,000.00 is attached hereto as Exhibits A and B respectively. [released on a non-surety bond requiring no security.] In my capacity as a United States Magistrate Judge, I conducted a hearing on the Defendant's Motion to Dismiss in a matter styled the United States of America v. Eugene P. Kent, CR. 97-40111. [the currency transaction prosecution.] I denied the Defendant's Motion to Dismiss as I believed that an issue of fact existed as to the Defendant's intent. While I believed that it would be improper to dismiss the case because of that issue, I also know that if I had been the finder of fact I would have found the Defendant not guilty of all of charges in the indictment. Perhaps more so than any defendant who appeared before me, Mr. Kent comported himself with grace, dignity, and the utmost of integrity with regard to both criminal cases. Since being exonerated from all underlying criminal counts regarding this matter, Mr. Kent has asked me to submit an affidavit on his behalf. Initially, I was reluctant to do so not because Mr. Kent was unworthy of support, but because I was concerned about whether doing so would reflect adversely on my former judicial office. I have concluded that the interests of justice compel me to provide this affidavit on behalf of Mr. Kent. I am firmly of the belief that Mr. Kent committed no criminal acts in either of the cases venued in the United States District Court for the District of South Dakota and as such he should not bear the stigma of any criminal record. I have been a member of the South Dakota Board of Pardons and Paroles since July of 2002. During my tenure as a member of the Parole Board, I have reviewed hundreds of applications for pardons. I have reviewed all public filings in Mr. Kent's civil actions arising from his conviction as well as all filings in the criminal action itself. Based on my experiences as a Parole Board member, my knowledge of Mr. Kent individually and professionally, and as well as my knowledge of the role that pardons serve in the state and federal judicial system, I believe that Mr. Kent is an unusually worthy applicant for such extraordinary relief. It is my personal belief that Mr. Kent poses no threat to society whatsoever. Society's interests, as well as those of Mr. Kent, would be well served by granting him the relief he seeks . . . . Dated this 11th day of November, 2003.
Recommendation Having considered the foregoing findings of fact, conclusions of law, the evidence of record, the candor and demeanor of the witnesses and the pleadings and arguments of the parties, it is, therefore, RECOMMENDED that the Petitioner be granted licensure. DONE AND ENTERED this 3rd day of September, 2004, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S P. MICHAEL RUFF Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 3rd day of September, 2004. COPIES FURNISHED: Honorable Tom Gallagher Chief Financial Officer Department of Financial Services The Capitol, Plaza Level 11 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0300 Pete Dunbar, General Counsel Department of Financial Services The Capitol, Plaza Level 11 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0300 Ladasiah Jackson, Esquire Department of Financial Services 612 Larson Building 200 East Gaines Street Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0333 Eugene P. Kent 1209 West 37th Street Sioux Falls, South Dakota 57105
The Issue The issue presented is whether Respondent is guilty of the allegations contained in the Administrative Complaint filed against him, and, if so, what disciplinary action should be taken against him, if any.
Findings Of Fact At all times material hereto, Respondent Homer Rozier has been certified as a correctional officer in the State of Florida. On February 17, 2003, Respondent was employed at the South Bay Correctional Facility. He resigned from that employment on or about July 16, 2003. On February 17, 2003, Chad Pelham was employed as a loss prevention officer at the Wal-Mart located in Clewiston, Florida. As a law enforcement officer certified by the State of Florida for the five years previous, Pelham had been trained in law enforcement techniques, including observation, and was qualified to perform store security duties. On that date, Respondent and his wife entered the Wal- Mart to shop. Since other Wal-Mart employees told Pelham they suspected that Respondent had stolen items from the store on previous occasions, Pelham and his partner followed Respondent and his wife, watching them as they shopped. Respondent and his wife selected some baby shoes from the shelf, removed the tags, and placed the shoes on their infant. They continued walking through the store, stopping to remove a bottle of water from the Wal-Mart cooler, and drinking the water as they shopped. Respondent and his wife proceeded to the houseware section. Respondent removed two wallpaper borders and a bathroom tumbler from the displays and hid them in his baby's diaper bag that he had in the shopping cart. In the deli department of the store Respondent and his wife obtained a bag of chicken. They ate the chicken as they walked through the store and then discarded the bag. In the electronics section of the store Respondent took two magazines related to certain electronic games, such as Nintendo X-box, and put them in his shopping cart. These magazines were sold by Wal-Mart for approximately $15 and $13. When Respondent was in the housewares section he placed the magazines under some towels (or rugs), concealing them. Respondent and his wife then proceeded to the cashier and paid for some of the merchandise they had taken. They did not pay for the chicken they had eaten or the water they had drunk or the baby shoes they had placed on their baby's feet. After paying for the items in their cart and having those items placed in blue Wal-Mart bags, Respondent and his wife left the register area as they would do to exit the store. They did not exit, however. Instead, carrying the Wal-Mart bags containing the items they had paid for, they split up, with Respondent returning to the housewares section and his wife returning to the groceries section. In the housewares section, Respondent retrieved the gaming magazines he had hidden under the towels (or rugs) and placed them in the Wal-Mart bags containing items that had been purchased. He then rejoined his wife in the grocery aisles where they placed some small items in the bags containing the items that they had purchased. They then proceeded to exit the store without returning to a cashier to pay for the items they had not purchased. After Respondent and his wife exited through the first of two sets of exterior doors, Pelham and his partner detained them. Pelham and his partner retrieved the merchandise Respondent and his wife had not paid for and contacted the City of Clewiston Police Department. Officer Demetrius Scruggs responded to the call, coming to the store and arresting Respondent for retail theft.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that a final order be entered finding Respondent guilty of the allegations contained in the Administrative Complaint filed against him and suspending his certification as a correctional officer for a period of 90 days. DONE AND ENTERED this 23rd day of September, 2004, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S LINDA M. RIGOT Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 23rd day of September, 2004. COPIES FURNISHED: Rod Caswell, Program Director Division of Criminal Justice Standards and Training Department of Law Enforcement Post Office Box 1489 Tallahassee, Florida 32302-1489 Michael Ramage, General Counsel Division of Criminal Justice Standards and Training Department of Law Enforcement Post Office Box 1489 Tallahassee, Florida 32302-1489 Linton B. Eason, Esquire Department of Law Enforcement Post Office Box 1489 Tallahassee, Florida 32302-1489 Homer Rozier 633 Southwest Eighth Street, No. 5 Belle Glade, Florida 33430
Findings Of Fact The facts stated in the Joint Stipulation of the parties to the extent set forth below are hereby adopted as findings of fact: On December 21, 1990, Petitioners, each of which is a wholly-owned subsidiary of Dean Foods Company ("Dean"), were each convicted of a one-count felony charge brought under Section 1 of the Sherman Antitrust Act. On January 7, 1992, Respondent filed and Petitioners received notices of intent to each Petitioner pursuant to Section 287.133(3)(e)1, F.S. On January 28, 1992, Petitioners, pursuant to Section 287.133(3)(e)2, F.S., filed a petition, pursuant to Section 120.57(1), F.S., requesting an order determining that it is not in the public interest for Petitioners to be placed on the State of Florida Convicted Vendor List. Petitioners' convictions arose out of an investigation initiated by the Florida Attorney General into possible bid-rigging of school milk requirements contracts in Florida by dairies and distributors. In 1988, the Attorney General filed a civil action against these dairies and distributors, including Petitioners. Section 287.133(3)(e)3.c, F.S., establishes "[t]he degree of culpability of the person or affiliate proposed to be placed on the convicted vendor list" as a factor to be considered in the decision whether to place such person or affiliate on such list. The State of Florida's complaint alleged that the bid-rigging and contract allocation scheme began at least as early as 1978. According to the State's attorneys, the illegal activities actually started as early as the 1960's in southeastern Florida (McArthur Dairy's principal market area) and the 1970's in central and southwestern Florida (T.G. Lee Foods' principal market area). Dean purchased Petitioners in 1980. According to the State's attorneys, Jack Wells and James Clark, former sales managers at McArthur Dairy and T.G. Lee Foods, respectively, participated in such conspiracies during the 1960's and 1970's and fraudulently concealed their efforts from the former owners of T.G. Lee Foods and McArthur Dairy, from Dean and from the school boards. Thus, Dean unknowingly bought into these on-going conspiracies. While the fact that Dean bought into these preexisting schemes was not a legal defense, it is relevant to the issue of culpability. This fact and Dean's early settlement offer were given favorable consideration by the State of Florida during settlement discussions. Section 287.133(3)(e)3.d, F.S., establishes "[p]rompt or voluntary payment of any damages or penalty as a result of the conviction" as a factor mitigating against placement on the convicted vendor list. Dean promptly paid on behalf of Petitioners all civil damages owed the State arising out of such activities. In a press release dated August 1, 1988, the Attorney General confirmed Dean's payment in full settlement of the charges brought by the State of Florida against Petitioners. A federal grand jury sitting in Tampa, Florida also investigated this matter. Dean and Petitioners cooperated fully with that investigation. Pursuant to plea and settlement agreements dated September 12, 1990, entered into by each of Petitioners with the United States Department of Justice, Dean and Petitioners agreed to a comprehensive settlement. Said settlement required that Petitioner plead guilty to a one-count criminal information and pay $1 million each in criminal penalties and $175,000 each in civil damages to the federal government. Such civil liabilities and criminal penalties were paid to the federal government, as reflected in a letter from the federal prosecutor to officials of the United States Defense Logistics Agency dated February 21, 1991, which letter appears as Exhibit A to the Memorandum submitted by Dean to the Defense Logistics Agency. Section 287.133(3)(e)3.e, F.S., establishes "[c]ooperation with state or federal investigation or prosecution of any public entity crime" as a mitigating factor. Petitioners agreed to and did cooperate fully with the State of Florida in connection with its investigation. Petitioners also cooperated fully with the federal grand jury investigation. This cooperation was confirmed in the letter from the federal prosecutor referred to above, which states: We have found McArthur & T.G. Lee and their attorneys to have been most cooperative in this matter. We believe both the companies and their attorneys have shown a high degree of responsibility by agreeing to settle this matter in an expeditious manner. The negotiated settlement with these defendants resolves all matters relating to their operations in Florida. As a final point, we believe the early agreement by these companies and their counsel to settle this matter for a substantial sum gave the incentive for other corporate defendants to come forward and also offer substantial criminal and civil settlements. Several of those cases have now been favorably concluded. Section 287.133(3)(e)3.f., F.S., establishes "[d]isassociation from any other person or affiliate convicted of the public entity crime" as a mitigating factor. Jack Wells and James Clark, the only individuals at McArthur Dairy and T.G. Lee Foods implicated in the wrongdoing that give rise to the convictions in question, were terminated. The investigations conducted by the State of Florida and the Department of Justice disclosed no involvement or knowledge on the part of any other employee of Petitioners, Dean or any of Dean's other subsidiaries, as reflected in a letter form attorneys representing the State of Florida to Dean's attorney dated June 29, 1988. Section 287.133(3)(e)3.g, F.S., establishes "[p]rior or future self- policing by the person or affiliate to prevent public entity crimes' as a mitigating factor. All of Dean's subsidiaries, including Petitioners, have an active antitrust compliance program. Section 287.133(3)(e)3.k, F.S., establishes "demonstration of good citizenship" as a mitigating factor. Petitioners have been involved in civic and philanthropic affairs throughout the years. For example, T.G. Lee Foods and McArthur Dairy have spearheaded fundraising events for Edgewood Children's Ranch, a non-sectarian foundation for the support of under-privileged and abused children. T.G. Lee Foods and McArthur Dairy have also donated milk to the Ranch for a number of years. McArthur Dairy has made substantial contributions to organizations such as the University of Miami, and Miami Dade Junior College.
Findings Of Fact Petitioner completed an application for issuance of a Class "C" Private Investigator License. That license request was denied on October 30, 1991. On November 20, 1991, Petitioner challenged the denial leading to the formal hearing held pursuant to Section 120.57(1), Florida Statutes. The statement of denial was amended on December 23, 1991. The reasons in the amendment are associated with Petitioner's criminal law history. The amended statement of denial frames the dispute. Petitioner was charged in the case of United States of America v. Hugh Mattingly Padgett, Jr., No. 63-230-CR-J, in the United States District Court for the Middle District of Florida, Jacksonville Division, with having in his possession and custody, and under his control, a still and distilling apparatus set up, which had not been registered as required by law, in violation of Title 26 U.S.C., Section 5601(a)(1). He was convicted in that case upon a plea of guilty and fined $500. He was given a nineteen month sentence with was suspended upon service of probation for three years under supervision. The judgement and order of probation was entered on January 31, 1964. The probation was terminated after two years of service. That action by the Court shortening the probationary period was by order drawn on January 17, 1966. On May 8, 1981, in Hunterton County, New Jersey, Petitioner was convicted of distributing a controlled substance, methaqualone; possession of that controlled substance; possession of that controlled substance with intent to distribute and conspiracy to distribute that controlled substance. For this conviction he received a prison term totalling ten years and a $45,000 fine. Petitioner served the prison sentence in New Jersey. There was a Florida criminal law case which was basically the factual counterpart to the New Jersey prosecution. That case was State of Florida v. Hugh M. Padgett, Jr., No. CF880-2813A2-XX, in the Circuit Court, Tenth Judicial Circuit, in and for Polk County, Florida. On June 27, 1989, Petitioner plead guilty to the Florida case. That plea pertained to a violation of the Florida Racketeering Influence and Corrupt Organization Act, Section 943.462(3), Florida Statutes, and trafficking in methaqualone more than five kilograms but less than 25 kilograms, a lesser included offense, Section 893.135(1)(e)3, Florida Statutes. Part of the sentence which Petitioner was given in the Florida case involving the controlled substance methaqualone was a five year mandatory minimum sentence pursuant to Section 893.135(1), Florida Statutes. For entering his plea the court sentenced the Petitioner to a period of eight years concurrent time with 192 days credit for jail time served. Later by order of February 14, 1990, in connection with the case, Petitioner was given credit for 894 days of jail time served, reflecting credit for time spent in New Jersey awaiting return to Florida. The two cases involving controlled substances stem from activities by the Petitioner in 1980 in both Florida and New Jersey. Concerning the 1964 Federal conviction, Petitioner acknowledges that he knew of the operations of what he referred to as a "moonshine still" but denies that he received any money from that operation beyond rent money from the person to whom he had rented a house and upon which property the still had been found.
Recommendation Based upon a consideration of the facts found and the conclusions of law reached, it is, RECOMMENDED: That a Final Order be entered which denies the application for a Class "C" Private Investigator License. DONE and ENTERED this 21st day of April, 1992, in Tallahassee, Florida. CHARLES C. ADAMS, Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 21st day of April, 1992. Copies furnished: Ronald L. Jones, Esquire Jones and Koch 1200 East Lafayette Street, Suite 108 Tallahassee, FL 32301 Henri C. Cawthon, Esquire Department of State Division of Licensing The Capitol, MS #4 Tallahassee, FL 32399-0250 Honorable Jim Smith Secretary, Department of State The Capitol, MS #4 Tallahassee, FL 32399-0250
