The Issue Whether the Department of Revenue (Department or Petitioner) may revoke the certificate of registration issued to Respondent for failure to comply with the terms of a compliance agreement.
Findings Of Fact The Department is the state agency charged with administering and enforcing Florida's revenue laws, including the laws related to the imposition and collection of sales and use taxes pursuant to chapter 212, Florida Statutes (2013).1/ Respondent is a Florida limited liability company doing business at 309 South Howard Avenue, Tampa, Florida, and is a “dealer” as defined at section 212.06(2). Respondent holds a certificate of registration issued by the Department (Certificate No. 39-8015401140-8) and is statutorily required to file tax returns and remit taxes to the Department. The Department is authorized to cancel a dealer's certificate of registration for failure to comply with state tax laws. Prior to such cancellation, the Department is required by statute to convene a conference with the dealer. The Department initiated the process of revoking Respondent’s certificate of registration by sending Respondent a Notice of Conference on Revocation of Certificate of Registration (Notice of Conference) via regular mail and certified mail on May 24, 2013. The Department then hand-delivered a copy of the Notice of Conference to Respondent’s principal place of business on June 21, 2013. The Notice of Conference advised that the informal conference would be held on June 26, 2013. The Notice of Conference also informed Respondent that revocation was being considered because of Respondent’s failure to submit sales and use tax and reemployment tax. The notice further advised that at the informal conference Respondent would have the opportunity to make payment or present evidence to demonstrate why the Department should not revoke Respondent’s certificate of revocation. Verna Bartlett and Aubrey Grantham appeared on behalf of Respondent, at the informal conference. Christopher Scott, Respondent’s manager and registered agent, entered into a Compliance Agreement with the Department on July 10, 2013. The compliance agreement states that, due to Respondent’s failure to timely file returns and pay all taxes due, Respondent admits to a past due sales and use tax liability of $43,586.23, consisting of tax, penalty, interest and fees. The compliance agreement also states that Respondent admits to a past due reemployment tax liability of $19,215.75, consisting of tax, penalty, interest and fees. The compliance agreement required Respondent to make a down payment of $15,000 by July 10, 2013, to make, beginning on August 10, 2013, monthly payments in the amount of $4,000 for one year, and to make a final balloon payment on July 10, 2014. The compliance agreement also provides that: IN CONSIDERATION for the Department refraining from pursuing revocation proceedings at this time, the taxpayer agrees: To accurately complete all past due tax returns and reports and file them no later than 7/10/13. To remit all past due payments to the Department as stated in the attached payment agreement. To accurately complete and timely file all required tax returns and reports for the next 12 months, beginning with the first return/report due following the date of this agreement. To timely remit all taxes due for the next 12 months, following the date of this agreement.2/ On July 10, 2013, Respondent made the down payment of $15,000 as required by the compliance agreement. Per the compliance agreement, all payments were to be made in certified funds, money order or cash and received by the close of business on the due date at the Department’s Tampa Service Center. Per the compliance agreement, Respondent’s second monthly payment in the amount of $4,000 was due by the close of business on September 10, 2013. The Department, as part of the process associated with the execution and implementation of the compliance agreement, provided Respondent with “Stipulation Agreement Payment Coupons” (Stipulation Coupons) to facilitate the processing of Respondent’s monthly payments. Although the compliance agreement indicates that payments are to be received by the close of business on the 10th calendar day of each month, the Stipulation Coupon for September 2013 showed that payment should be received “on or before September 12, 2013,” at the “Tampa Service Center.” Both the compliance agreement and the Stipulation Coupon clearly indicate that payments are to be sent to the Tampa Service Center. Nevertheless, Respondent sent its payment, by check dated and mailed on September 12, 2013, to the Department’s Tallahassee office. Not only was the payment mailed to the incorrect address, but it was also untimely. Furthermore, because Respondent did not include a note on the memo portion of the check or enclose a Stipulation Coupon with the check, the Department applied the payment to a different account. As a consequence of Respondent’s failure to submit the September 2013 payment in a manner consistent with either the compliance agreement or the Stipulation Coupon, the Department wrote Respondent and informed the company that effective October 12, 2013, the compliance agreement was voided. The compliance agreement was never reinstated by the parties. Due to the compliance agreement having been voided, all monies owed for past due tax payments became due as of October 12, 2013. At some point after the filing of the Administrative Complaint, and prior to the final hearing, Petitioner satisfied all past due tax liabilities covered by the compliance agreement. The Administrative Complaint alleges that “Respondent failed to file a tax return for the months of December 2013 and January 2014” which resulted in “an estimated tax liability of $13,854.32.”3/ Additionally, the Department, in its Proposed Recommended Order, argues that for the period July 2013 through July 2014 Respondent failed to electronically file returns and submit payment of sales and use tax and reemployment tax. According to the Department, Respondent’s omissions violated the terms of the compliance agreement. Respondent annually reports more than $20,000 in sales and use tax. For the months July and August 2013 (September is not included because the tax return and related payment were not due until October 20, 2013, which is after the date of termination of the compliance agreement), the undisputed evidence is that Respondent did not electronically file its returns when due.4/ The evidence also established that Respondent did not seek, nor did the Department grant, a waiver authorizing Respondent to file its returns via non-electronic means. The evidence is inconclusive regarding whether Respondent has paid any amounts owed for these months. The compliance agreement required Respondent “[t]o accurately complete . . . all required tax returns and reports.” The compliance agreement does not define the word “accurately.” The root word “accurate” is generally accepted to mean “conforming exactly to truth or to a standard.” Accurate Definition, Merriam-Webster.com, http://merriam- webster.com/dictionary/accurate (last visited Oct. 31, 2014). There is nothing in the compliance agreement suggesting that the parties intended a different meaning for this term. Section 213.755(1) and Florida Administrative Code Rule 12-24.003 establish the standard by which Respondent was to conduct itself and these provisions provide that any taxpayer that has paid tax in the prior state fiscal year in an amount of $20,000 or more is required to file returns and remit payments by electronic means, unless first obtaining a waiver. By not filing its returns by electronic means, as required, Respondent did not “accurately complete” the returns for July and August 2013 because the returns were not filed in accordance with “the standard” established by section 213.755 and Florida Administrative Code Rule 12-24.003. Respondent’s failure in this regard was in violation of the then-in-effect compliance agreement. The Department has issued and recorded against Respondent delinquent tax warrants and notices of lien in the public records of Hillsborough County, Florida, to secure collection of delinquent sales and use tax and reemployment tax liability, plus penalties, filing fees and interest. On April 6, 2013, the Department recorded against Respondent a tax warrant in the amount of $10,323.40, and on May 15, 2013, another tax warrant in the amount of $32,912.04 was also recorded. The tax liability, and related penalties, fees and interest for these two tax warrants were covered by the compliance agreement and have since been satisfied.5/
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that the Department of Revenue issue a final order that declines to revoke Dealer’s Certificate of Registration No. 39-8015401140-8 held by PNC LLC, d/b/a Cheap. DONE AND ENTERED this 3rd day of November, 2014, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S LINZIE F. BOGAN Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 3rd day of November, 2014.
Findings Of Fact 1. After an audit, the Department issued a Notice of Proposed Assessment (‘NOPA’) to Dever, Inc. (“Dever”) on April 7, 2009, finding Dever liable for additional documentary stamp taxes, plus interest. 2. Dever informally protested the Department’s NOPA as permitted by Department rules, and the Department issued a Notice of Decision on March 25, 2010, and, subsequently, a Notice of Reconsideration on July 23, 2010. The Notice of Reconsideration set forth the Department's final position regarding. the documentary stamp taxes assessed against Dever. Filed November 1, 2011 4:14 PM Division of Administrative Hearings © 3. The Notice of Reconsideration included a section titled “Taxpayer Appeal Rights,” which explained that the Notice of Reconsideration constituted the final decision of the department, prior to court action or administrative proceedings, and that, pursuant to Section 72.011, Florida Statutes, no court action or administrative proceeding could be brought to contest the assessment after sixty (60) days from the date of the assessment. This section further stated, in regard to any request for administrative hearing, Pursuant to Sections 72.011, 120.569, 120.57, and 120.80(14), F.S., and Rule Chapter 12-6, F.A.C., you may contest the assessment in an administrative forum by filing a _ petition for a Chapter_120 administrative hearing with the Department of Revenue, Office of General Counsel, Post Office Box 6668, Tallahassee, FL 32314-6668. THE PETITION MUST BE RECEIVED BY THE DEPARTMENT WITHIN SIXTY (60) DAYS OF THE DATE OF THIS NOTICE OF RECONSIDERATION. . . . The requirements of Section 72.011(2) and (3)(a), F.S., are jurisdictional for any action contesting an assessment or refund denial under Chapter 120, F.S. See id. at 5. (capitalization in original). 4. Dever did not file a petition or court action within 60 days of the July 23, 2010, Notice of Reconsideration, to contest the tax assessment. On or about January 18, 2011, the Department issued a Notice of Intent to Levy (“Intent to Levy”) on certain bank accounts held by Dever. 5. On or about January 21, 2011, Dever filed a one-page letter with the Department stating that it was “a petition/request for an administrative hearing.” This petition was dismissed, with leave to amend, for failure to comply with Chapter 120, Florida Statutes, and Rule 28-106.201, Florida Administrative Code. O 6. On March 23, 2011, Dever filed its “Amended Petition For Reconsideration” (“Petition”), which resulted in the instant proceeding. The Petition, however, did not dispute any material facts regarding the Department's Intent to Levy. Neither did the Petition provide any legal basis to contest the levy. Instead, the Petition sought to challenge the underlying basis for the assessment of the documentary stamp taxes, as set forth in the Notice of Reconsideration. 7. The Department, pursuant to Rule 28-106.204, Florida Administrative Code, moved for entry of an order relinquishing jurisdiction back to the Department for entry of a final order of dismissal. The Department asserted that the Division was " without jurisdiction over the matter. Dever did not file a response in opposition. The Division entered an order on August 29, 2011, granting the Department’s Motion to Dismiss, and it relinquished jurisdiction back to the Department. 8. Dever did not file any exceptions or otherwise challenge the order of the Division.
Conclusions This cause came before the State of Florida, Department of Revenue ("Department"), for the purpose of issuing a final order.
Other Judicial Opinions Any party who is adversely affected by this final order has the right to seek judicial review of the order under section 120.68, Florida Statutes, by filing a notice of appeal under Rule 9.190 of the Florida Rules of Appellate Procedure with the Agency Clerk of the Department of Revenue in the Office of the General Counsel, Post Office Box 6668, Tallahassee, Florida 32314-6668 [FAX (850) 488-7112], AND by filing a copy of the notice of appeal accompanied by the applicable filing fees with the District Court of Appeal, First District or with the District Court of Appeal in the appellate district where the party resides. The notice of appeal must be filed within 30 days from the date this order is filed with the clerk of the Department. C) NY COPIES FURNISHED : Hon. Diane Cleavinger Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 Timothy E. Dennis, Esquire Office of the Attorney General The Capital, Plaza Level 01 400 South Monroe Street Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1050
The Issue Whether Celtic Management Concepts, LLC, d/b/a Connolly’s Pub (CMC), violated section 561.29(1)(a), Florida Statutes (2017),1/ when it failed to remit proper taxes to the Division of Revenue (DOR); and, if so, the penalty that should be imposed.
Findings Of Fact CMC is the holder of a series 2-COP beverage license, number BEV6910406 (License), issued by the Division in 2011. CMC was required by chapter 212, Florida Statutes, to remit to DOR the taxes associated with alcoholic beverages sold pursuant to its License. It failed to do so. On May 23, 2017, DOR issued a tax warrant against CMC in the amount of $15,279.45 for the amount of taxes owed by CMC, along with interest, penalties, and fees pursuant to chapter 212. CMC acknowledges the tax warrant and that it owes DOR outstanding taxes. The undersigned rejects the testimony by Leonard Nolan, CMC’s president and stockholder, that CMC was unaware it was delinquent in paying state taxes because all of the DOR and Division paperwork was handled by its accounting firm. Mr. Nolan knew or should have known as of May 23, 2017 (the date of the tax warrant) that it had an outstanding tax obligation. Moreover, the claim that Mr. Nolan did not receive any correspondence from the Division is also not credible. He responded to the Complaint and the same address was used for other correspondence. CMC’s conduct of ignoring the notices of past due taxes and failing to address the delinquency in a more timely manner was intentional. CMC established, however, it has recently taken steps to become fully compliant. It entered into a Stipulation Agreement, Form DR-68, with DOR on August 6, 2018. The Stipulation Agreement provides that CMC will make three payments beginning August 27, 2018, and ending October 25, 2018. In total, CMC will pay $35,721.35; this is more than the amount of the 2017 tax warrant. This is CMC’s first violation of chapter 212.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that the Department of Business and Professional Regulation, Division of Alcoholic Beverages and Tobacco, enter a final order: Finding Respondent, Celtic Management Concepts, LLC d/b/a Connolly’s Pub, is subject to penalties pursuant to section 561.29 (1)(a), for violations of sections 212.14 and 212.15, related to delinquent taxes owed to the State Department of Revenue; and Requiring Respondent to comply with the terms of the Stipulation Agreement it entered into with the Department of Revenue dated August 6, 2018. DONE AND ENTERED this 25th day of September, 2018, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S HETAL DESAI Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 25th day of September, 2018.
The Issue The issue in the case is whether the allegations of the Administrative Complaint for Revocation of Certification of Registration are correct.
Findings Of Fact At all times material to this case, the Respondent operated a used car dealership at 1014 West Central Boulevard, Orlando, Florida, 32805. At all times material to this case, the Respondent's registered corporate agent was identified as Jennifer Hamilton, 3517 Domino Drive, Orlando, Florida, 32805. Florida law requires specified persons conducting business within the state to register with the Petitioner and to obtain a certificate of registration essentially for purposes of tax collection. As a dealer, the Respondent was required to register with the Petitioner and received Certificate of Registration No. 58-8011915294-5 from the Petitioner. As a dealer, the Respondent was required to collect sales and use taxes from purchasers and to submit monthly tax returns and collected taxes to the Petitioner. The Respondent filed proper tax returns, but failed to remit taxes received for the following months: September 2004, October 2004, December 2004, January 2005 through October 2005, December 2005, March 2007 through July 2007, and September 2007 through December 2007. The unremitted taxes totaled $21,194.32. Based on the Respondent's failure to remit the taxes, on July 22, 2008, the Petitioner assessed a penalty of $3,271.64 pursuant to Subsection 212.12(2), Florida Statutes. Based on the Respondent's failure to remit the taxes, the Petitioner assessed interest charges of $4,304.62 (as of July 22, 2008) pursuant to Subsection 212.12(3), Florida Statutes. The interest charges continue to accrue until they are paid. The Respondent failed to file tax returns for the months of January 2008 through July 2008. Pursuant to Subsection 212.12(5), Florida Statutes, the Petitioner assessed an estimated tax liability of $3,500.00 against the Respondent. Pursuant to Subsection 212.15(4), Florida Statutes, the Petitioner has recorded warrants in the public records of Orange County, Florida, for the unpaid taxes. Pursuant to Subsection 212.18(3)(d), Florida Statutes, the Petitioner issued a Notice of Conference of Revocation of Certificate of Registration dated July 30, 2008, and an informal conference was conducted on September 4, 2008. No one appeared at the conference on behalf of the Respondent. The Petitioner thereafter filed the Administrative Complaint underlying this proceeding.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that the Petitioner enter a final order revoking the certificate of registration held by the Respondent. DONE AND ENTERED this 3rd day of March, 2009, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S WILLIAM F. QUATTLEBAUM Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 3rd day of March, 2009.
The Issue Whether the Department of Revenue properly denied Petitioner's March 10, 2000, Application For Refund of Sales and Use Tax, Petitioner having asserted that the Department of Revenue obtained the Closing Agreement through misrepresentation and intimidation.
Findings Of Fact Petitioner, Tuskawilla Learning Center, is a Florida corporation which operates a private Montessori School in Oviedo, Seminole County, Florida. Petitioner has elected to be an "S" corporation for federal income tax reporting purposes. Tuskawilla Learning Center is owned by its shareholders, Thomas E. Phillips; his wife, Lois; his daughter, Terry Lynn DeLong; and his son-in-law, Daniel F. DeLong. At all times material to this matter, a partnership comprised of the above-named owners of the Tuskawilla Learning Center also owned the real property upon which the Tuskawilla Learning Center operated. In early July 1997, Respondent audited Petitioner's corporate transactions for the period from July 1, 1992, through June 30, 1997, for compliance with sales and use tax and the local government infrastructure surtax. During the audit Petitioner was requested to provide all information and documents which Petitioner felt supported its business activities. Respondent issued a Notice Of Intent To Make Audit Changes on September 25, 1997, which advised Petitioner that the audit revealed that Petitioner had failed to pay use tax on purchases Petitioner made from out-of-state vendors, which Petitioner acknowledged and paid. The audit also revealed that Petitioner failed to pay sales tax on the monthly rental charges that Petitioner paid to the property owner on which the Tuskawilla Learning Center operated. Petitioner did not agree with Respondent's position on the sales tax on monthly rental charges. On October 28, 1997, an audit conference was held in Orlando, Florida, where the tax assessment on the monthly rental charges was discussed. The parties were unable to resolve the issue, and Petitioner requested that the issue be referred to Tallahassee for further review. The review in Tallahassee essentially confirmed the original audit findings, and a Notice of Proposed Assessment was issued on January 26, 1998. Petitioner filed a protest and requested a further review of the Notice of Proposed Assessment. As a result, the entire audit was reviewed, and Petitioner was allowed to provide additional documentation to support its position. On August 4, 1998, Respondent issued a Notice of Decision which essentially confirmed the findings of the original audit. At this point, Petitioner had certain rights of appeal which had to be exercised within specific time limits, or Petitioner could elect to pay the taxes and interest as set forth in a Closing Agreement in which Respondent waived the penalties which had accrued for failure to pay the tax. The various time deadlines passed without Petitioner electing one of the avenues of appeal nor did Petitioner execute the Closing Agreement. After all deadlines for appeal had passed, Petitioner contacted Respondent through an attorney seeking relief. Respondent found no basis for relief but renewed the opportunity for Petitioner to sign the Closing Agreement. On February 5, 1999, Petitioner executed the Closing Agreement and paid $71,693.87 (a $285.31 overpayment). The Closing Agreement clearly states: The taxpayer waives any and all rights to institute any judicial or administrative proceedings, including the remedies provided by ss. 213.21(2)(a) and 72.011(1), F.S., to recover, compromise, or avoid any tax, penalty or interest paid or payable pursuant to this agreement. This agreement is for the sole purpose of compromising and settling taxpayer's liability to the State of Florida . . . This agreement is final and conclusive with respect to the audit assessment or specific transaction/assessment and period described . . . and no additional assessment may be made by the Department against the taxpayer for the specific liability referenced above, except upon showing of fraud or misrepresentation of material fact . . . . On March 10, 2001, Petitioner filed an Application for Refund of the taxes and interest paid with the Closing Agreement. Attached to the Application for Refund was Petitioner's four-page "position paper," which outlined facts and arguments related to the sales tax issue. Petitioner's Application for Refund states that "the State has misled us." The Application for Refund went through the review process. On May 5, 2000, Respondent issued a Notice of Proposed Denial for the refund claim. Petitioner sought an informal review of the proposed refund denial. After an informal review of the proposed refund denial, on June 16, 2000, Respondent issued a Notice of Decision denying Petitioner's Application for Refund. On August 12, 2000, Petitioner forwarded a letter to Respondent, which was interpreted as a request for an administrative hearing to review the decision to deny the Application for Refund which resulted in the instant administrative hearing. Thomas E. Phillips has a Ph.D. in accounting from the University of Nebraska, is a Certified Public Accountant, and had taught accounting at the University of Central Florida for 23 years prior to his retirement. He and his family founded the Tuskawilla Learning Center. On behalf of Petitioner, Dr. Phillips maintains that the tax audit and subsequent review process were "intimidating" and that Respondent "misled" Petitioner. Notwithstanding Dr. Phillips' assertion that the audit and review process were "intimidating," he testified that he found the auditor and her supervisor "not intimidating, but were very pleasant." Dr. Phillips testified about several aspects of the audit and review process and activities that occurred during the audit and review process that he found objectionable. For example, Dr. Phillips testified that Respondent failed to respond to his inquiries in an appropriate way and that Respondent had misinterpreted certain case law that he felt applicable. Nothing offered by Dr. Phillips suggests any impropriety or misrepresentation by Respondent.
Recommendation Based upon the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is recommended that Respondent enter a final order denying Petitioner's Application for Refund. DONE AND ENTERED this 26th day of April, 2001, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. JEFF B. CLARK Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 26th day of April, 2001. COPIES FURNISHED: Joseph C. Mellichamp, III, Esquire Office of the Attorney General Department of Legal Affairs The Capitol, Plaza Level 01 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1050 John Mika, Esquire Office of the Attorney General Department of Legal Affairs The Capitol, Tax Section Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1050 Thomas E. Phillips 1625 Montessori Point Oviedo, Florida 36527 Linda Lettera, General Counsel Department of Revenue 204 Carlton Building Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0100 James Zingale, Executive Director Department of Revenue 104 Carlton Building Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0100
Findings Of Fact Petitioner is employed as a Tax Auditor IV in Respondent's Property Tax Administration Program. He is assigned to work in Respondent's Regional Office in Jacksonville, Florida. The counties within the Jacksonville Region for Property Tax Administration are: Duval, Clay, Nassau, Putnam, St. John and Flagler. In January of 1996, Petitioner wrote to John Everton, Director of Respondent's Property Tax Administration Program requesting permission to run for Tax Collector of Clay County. In February of 1996, Petitioner talked to Mr. Everton's secretary. After making this call, Petitioner understood that Respondent's attorneys had his application to run for elective office and that he would soon receive an answer. Petitioner sent Mr. Everton an E Mail message on or about March 6, 1996. In this message, Petitioner asked Mr. Everton to check on his request to run for office and to expedite it immediately because time was of the essence. That same day, Mr. Everton responded to Petitioner's request with an E mail message. Expressing his apologies, Mr. Everton advised Petitioner that Respondent's attorneys had Petitioner's initial request. Mr. Everton stated that he would request that the attorneys respond immediately to Petitioner's inquiry. On or about March 13, 1996 Mr. Everton advised Petitioner that he would have to send his request for approval to run for local office directly to the agency head pursuant to the directive contained in Rule 60K-13.0031(1), Florida Administrative Code. By letter dated March 18, 1996 Petitioner requested that Larry Fuchs, Respondent's Executive Director, grant him permission to run for Tax Collector of Clay County. Mr. Fuchs received this letter on March 29, 1996. Mr. Fuchs responded to Petitioner's request by letter dated April 5, 1996. He reminded Petitioner that Rule 60K-13.0031(1), Florida Administrative Code, requires employees to apply directly to the agency head when requesting approval to become a candidate for local office. Mr. Fuchs then gave several reasons why he could not certify to the Department of Management Services that Petitioner's candidacy would involve no interest which conflicts or activity which interferes with his state employment. More specifically, Mr. Fuchs' April 5, 1996 letter stated in relevant part that: Under section 195.002, Florida Statutes, the Department of Revenue has supervision of the tax collection and all other aspects of the administration of such taxes. Your position with the Department may require you to review or audit the activities of the office you propose to seek. Also some of your duties in supervising other officials in the administration of property taxes may be affected by your proposed candidacy. Your job requires you to review appropriate tax returns, and other records to resolve complex issues related to taxing statutes administered by the Department of Revenue. It also requires you to identify and scrutinize transactions to ascertain whether taxpayers have escaped paying property taxes. In addition, it also requires you to review and audit procedures used by counties to identify and value tangible personal property and accomplish statutory compliance, to investigate taxpayer complaints, to conduct field review with county staff as appropriate, and to provide education an assistance to county taxing officials. Because of the Department's statutory super- vision of the office of tax collector, there cannot be a certification that your candidacy would involve "no interest which conflicts or activity which interferes " with your state employment within the definitions of section 110.233(4), Florida Statutes. The letter went on to say that: This letter is a specific instruction to you that you should not qualify or become a candidate for office while employed in your current position. If you wish to commence your campaign by performing the pre-filing requirements, the law requires that you first resign from the Department. Failure to do so shall result in disciplinary action to dismiss you from your position in accordance with the Department's disciplinary standards and procedures, and Rule 60K-4.010, F.A.C., the Department's Code of Conduct, Section 110.233, Florida Statutes, and Rule 60K-13.002(3), F.A.C. After receiving the above decision, Petitioner requested a formal hearing to challenge the denial of his request to run for Tax Collector of Clay County by letter dated April 10, 1996. Respondent received this letter on April 16, 1996. Respondent referred Petitioner's request for a formal hearing to the Division of Administrative Hearings on April 26, 1996. Petitioner responded to the Division of Administrative Hearings' Initial Order on May 7, 1996 advising the undersigned that he was unavailable for hearing May 28, 1996 through June 10, 1996 and July 5, 1996. He also included an initial pleading requesting, among other things, that Respondent immediately allow him to run for office and pay his filing fee because, in his opinion, it was too late for him to qualify using the alternative method of submitting petitions. On May 21, 1996 this matter was scheduled for hearing on July 9, 1996. Respondent filed a Unilateral Response to the Initial Order and a Prehearing Statement on May 30, 1996. On June 14, 1996 Petitioner filed a letter stating that it was impossible for him to be prepared for the hearing scheduled for July 9, 1996 for two reasons: (a) he had just returned to work after two weeks of vacation; and (b) he was overwhelmed by discovery associated with his upcoming hearing. Petitioner requested that this matter be continued until sometime after August 15, 1996. He represented that Respondent had no objection to his request. An order dated June 20, 1996 rescheduled the case for hearing on August 19, 1996. On July 18, 1996, Respondent sent Petitioner a letter granting him permission to qualify and file the necessary paperwork to become a candidate for Clay County Tax Collector. The letter also advised Petitioner of the conditions under which he could begin campaign activities while on Respondent's payroll. Respondent's change in position was due in part to the pending Final Order in Hendrick v. Department of Revenue, DOAH Case No. 96-2054. Respondent faxed its July 18, 1996 letter to Petitioner's office at 2:38 p.m. Petitioner's immediate supervisor contacted Petitioner at his home later that day at approximately 3:45 p.m. Petitioner did not request annual leave for the following day so that he could take whatever steps were necessary in order to qualify as a candidate for the office of Tax Collector. Instead, he opted to follow through with his previously arranged appointments for July 19, 1996. On July 22, 1996 Petitioner faxed a letter to Respondent indicating that Respondent had not given him sufficient time in which to meet all requirements to qualify as a candidate for elective office by noon on July 19, 1996. In order to qualify as a candidate for elective office in Clay County, Petitioner had to declare a bank depository for campaign purposes and designate a campaign treasurer. If Petitioner intended to use the alternative method of qualifying by filing petitions, he had to file an alternative affidavit and obtain petition forms from the Clay County Supervisor of Elections between January 3, 1996 and June 21, 1996. He had to submit the signed petitions (Democrats-688; Republicans-990, Independent-1,873) to the Supervisor of Elections on or before June 24, 1996. Regardless of whether Petitioner intended to qualify by paying a fee (Major Party-$5,876.40; Independent-$4,309.36) or by using the alternative petition method, he had to complete all paperwork on or before noon of July 19, 1996. Petitioner did not qualify by either method.
Recommendation Based on the Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law set forth above, it is recommended that Respondent enter a Final Order dismissing Petitioner's request for certification to the Department of Management Services that his candidacy for the office of Clay County Tax Collector would involve no interest which conflicts, or activity which interferes, with his state employment. DONE AND ENTERED this 15th day of October, 1996 in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. SUZANNE F. HOOD Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (904) 921-6847 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 15th day of October, 1996. COPIES FURNISHED: Patrick A. Loebig, Esquire Peter S. Fleitman, Esquire Department of Revenue Post Office Box 6668 Tallahassee, Florida 32314-6668 Floyd L. Hylton 103 Century 21 Drive, Suite 213 Jacksonville, Florida 32216 Linda Lettera, Esquire Department of Revenue 204 Carlton Building Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0100 Larry Fuchs, Executive Director Department of Revenue 104 Carlton Building Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0100
Findings Of Fact In the fall of 1992, there were several Democratic candidates for the office of Tax Collector for Walton County. Among the Democratic candidates was Sue Carter who had been employed in the Walton County Tax Collector's Office prior to resigning to run for tax collector. The first Democratic primary was held in September, 1992, resulting in a runoff primary between Sue Carter and Sue Rushing in October, 1992. Ms. Carter defeated Ms. Rushing. In November, 1992, Sue Carter won the general election. Respondent, Teresa Gomillion (Gomillion), was employed in the Walton County Tax Collector's Office in 1992. Pat Pollard, Tammy Day, Patty Lynch, and Sylvia Rushing were also employed in the tax collector's office during the 1992 election campaign. Ms. Lynch and Gomillion supported Ms. Carter. Ms. Day did not support Ms. Carter. Ms. Rushing was related to Sue Rushing, Ms. Carter's opponent. Ms. Pollard did not support any candidate for the office of tax collector. Pat Pollard's work station was located about three feet away from Gomillion's work station. She overheard Gomillion ask a customer of the tax collector's office for whom he was going to vote. This was the only time that Ms. Pollard heard Gomillion talk to a customer concerning the race for tax collector. Gomillion and other employees in the tax collector's office did discuss the race for tax collector during office hours. Pam Dyess has been employed at a car dealership in DeFuniak Springs for 16 years. During 1992, her job responsibilities required her to go to the tax collector's office to handle the tag and title work for the dealership. After the first primary, Ms. Dyess went to the tax collector's office during working hours and while she was there the subject of the first primary was discussed. Ms. Dyess stated that she had voted for Harley Henderson. Ms. Gomillion joined the conversation and asked Ms. Dyess why she had voted for Harley Henderson and made some disparaging remarks about Mr. Henderson's qualifications. Rodney Ryals is now and was an employee of the City of DeFuniak Springs during the fall of 1992. During the election, Mr. Ryals spent a great deal of time at the tax collector's office taking care of city business and visiting with his friend Ms. Pollard. While Ryals was at the tax collector's office Gomillion told him, "You better vote for Sue Carter, she's the only qualified candidate." Ryals had told Gomillion and Ms. Lynch that they should not campaign on the job because it was illegal. Both women told him that if they did not politick that they might lose their jobs. Both Jack Little, the tax collector, and Ms. Carter had advised Gomillion not to politick in the tax collector's office. Having judged the credibility and demeanor of the witnesses, I find that Gomillion did not hand out campaign literature while she was on the job at the tax collector's office.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that the Commission on Ethics enter a final order finding that Teresa Gomillion violated Section 112.313(6), Florida Statutes, and recommending a civil penalty of $500 and a public censure and reprimand. DONE AND ENTERED this 19th day of August, 1994, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. SUSAN B. KIRKLAND Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 19th day of August, 1994. APPENDIX TO RECOMMENDED ORDER, CASE NO. 94-2067EC To comply with the requirements of Section 120.59(2), Florida Statutes (1993), the following rulings are made on the parties' proposed findings of fact: Advocate's Proposed Findings of Fact. Paragraphs 1-10: Accepted in substance. Paragraph 11: Accepted to the extent that Ms. Gomillion had solicited Mr. Ryals' vote but rejected as far as Mr. Ryals observing Ms. Gomillion soliciting other customers. Paragraph 12: Having judged the credibility of the witnesses, I find that Mr. Ryals testimony that Ms. Gomillion handed out campaign literature not to be credible. Paragraph 13: Accepted in substance. Paragraph 14: Rejected as constituting recitation of testimony. Paragraphs 15-16: Rejected as subordinate to the facts actually found. Respondent's Proposed Findings of Fact. Paragraphs 1-2: Accepted in substance. Paragraph 3: The first sentence is rejected as unnecessary. The remainder of the paragraph is rejected as constituting recitation of testimony. Paragraph 4: The first sentence is accepted in substance. The second sentence is rejected as constituting both recitation of testimony and argument. Paragraph 5: The first sentence is accepted in substance. The remainder of the paragraph is rejected to the extent that it implies that Ms. Gomillion properly performed her duties. The greater weight of the evidence shows that Ms. Gomillion's actions were prohibited by the tax collector and were not part of her duties. Paragraphs 6-8: Rejected as constituting recitation of testimony. Paragraph 9: The first sentence is accepted in substance except as it relates to Ms. Gomillion's solicitation of Mr. Ryals. The remainder of the paragraph is rejected as unnecessary. Paragraph 10: Rejected as unnecessary. Paragraphs 11-12: Rejected as recitation of testimony. Paragraph 13: The first sentence is rejected as unnecessary. The remainder of the paragraph is rejected as constituting recitation of testimony. Paragraph 14: Rejected as subordinate to the facts actually found. Paragraphs 15-16: Rejected as constituting recitation of testimony. Paragraph 17: Rejected as unnecessary. Paragraphs 18-19: Rejected as constituting recitation of testimony. Paragraph 20: The first sentence is rejected as unnecessary. The remainder of the paragraph is rejected as constituting recitation of testimony. Paragraphs 21-22: Rejected as constituting recitation of testimony. Paragraph 23: The first sentence is rejected as constituting recitation of testimony. The remainder of the paragraph is rejected as subordinate to the facts actually found. Paragraph 24: The first sentence is rejected as unnecessary. The remainder of the paragraph is rejected as constituting recitation of testimony. Paragraph 25: The first sentence is rejected as constituting recitation of testimony. The remainder of the paragraph is accepted in substance. COPIES FURNISHED: Carrie Stillman Complaint Coordinator Commission on Ethics Post Office Box 15709 Tallahassee, Florida 32317-5709 Michael E. Ingram Assistant Attorney General Department of Legal Affairs, PL-01 The Capitol Tallahassee, Florida 32399 E. Allan Ramey, Esquire 13 Circle Drive Post Office Box 369 Defuniak Springs, Florida 32433-0369 Bonnie Williams Executive Director Florida Commission On Ethics Post Office Drawer 15709 Tallahassee, Florida 32317-5709 Phil Claypool, Esquire General Counsel Ethics Commission 2822 Remington Green Circle, Suite 101 Post Office Drawer 15709 Tallahassee, Florida 32317-5709
The Issue The central issue in this case is whether the Petitioner is entitled to a tax exemption for resource recovery equipment.
Findings Of Fact The Department conducted a sales and use tax audit (audit number 8926102725-010) of Drum for the audit period July 1, 1985 through August 31, 1989. As a result of the audit, the Department issued a Notice of Proposed Assessment for delinquent sales and use tax, penalty and interest against Drum. [Joint Prehearing Statement, paragraph 1] Drum timely protested the Notice of Proposed Assessment to the Department. On July 2, 1991, the Department issued a Notice of Decision upholding the proposed assessment. Drum timely petitioned the Department for reconsideration of the Notice of Decision. On January 15, 1992, the Department issued a Notice of Reconsideration denying the petition for reconsideration and upholding the Notice of Proposed Assessment. Drum timely filed a Petition for Formal Administrative Hearing with the Department protesting the proposed assessment. [Joint Prehearing Statement, paragraph 2] After the initiation of this proceeding, the Department and Drum entered into a partial settlement on the issue of the purchase of propane gas by Drum. The parties filed an Agreed Settlement with the Division of Administrative Hearings; accordingly, this issue is no longer part of this proceeding. Drum has paid the Department the settlement amount related to the propane gas issue. [Joint Prehearing Statement, paragraph 3] The amounts remaining in dispute are: $59,556.87 tax; $14,889.22 penalty; and $35,098.36 interest with interest continuing to accrue from 1/8/93 at the rate of $19.58 daily. [Joint Prehearing Statement, paragraph 4] There is no dispute between the parties as to the calculation of the tax, penalty and interest. [Joint Prehearing Statement, paragraph 5] During the audit period, Drum purchased certain resource recovery equipment ("equipment"). The equipment was certified by the Department of Environmental Regulation as resource recovery equipment pursuant to Section 403.715, Florida Statutes. Drum did not pay any sales tax on the equipment when it was purchased and Drum did not accrue any use tax on the equipment. [Joint Prehearing Statement, paragraph 6] Drum is in the business of reconditioning steel drums. Drum takes 55 and 30 gallon steel drums which have been used and emptied and reconditions them. This process involves cleaning the drums, restoring them to their original shape, testing them for leaks, and painting or coating the outside of the drums. As a secondary part of its business, Drum recycles drums that can no longer be reconditioned. Drum receives drums from over 1,000 sources in the state of Florida including private businesses and governmental agencies. Drum sells drums to both private businesses and governmental agencies. Greater than 50 percent of Drum's suppliers and customers are private businesses. Private customers and suppliers of Drum include the citrus industry, the motor oil industry, the painting industry, and the chemical industry. Among the governmental agencies who do business with Drum are: cities; state agencies, such as the Department of Transportation; counties; mosquito control divisions; and water control districts. Drum is a private, for profit corporation. Prior to building its facility, it did not enter into any contract with a county or municipality to cooperatively build its reconditioning facility, and Drum does not share its profits with any governmental entity. There is no evidence that Drum gives its governmental customers any price discount or other preferred service. Drum maintains that it provides a valuable service to the community in that it processes and recycles drums which might otherwise burden local waste facilities. Section 212.08(7)(p), Florida Statutes, provides a sales tax exemption on the purchase of resource recovery equipment "which is owned and operated by or on behalf of any county or municipality." Under the tax exemption procedure, the Department of Environmental Regulation (DER) certifies that the equipment in question is "equipment or machinery exclusively and integrally used in the actual process of recovering material or energy resources from solid waste." The Department then determines whether or not the equipment is otherwise eligible for the tax exemption. In this case there is no dispute that the equipment utilized by Drum is, in fact, resource recovery equipment as defined by the statute. Even though the equipment at issue is resource recovery equipment, the Department issued the sales tax assessment against Drum because the Department maintained that the equipment was not owned and operated by or on behalf of a county or municipality. The Department in its Notice of Decision setting forth its reasoning for denying the exemption to Drum specifically found: [The equipment] must be owned or (sic) operated by or on behalf of a county or municipality. This critical requirement has not been met. The machine is owned and operated by and on behalf of Drum Services Company, Inc. The county may benefit indirectly, but Drums' motivation for the use of the equipment is to earn profits. For purposes of determining whether or not an exemption is available, the Department developed a standard procedure in conjunction with DER for an owner or operator of a resource recovery facility to qualify for certification pursuant to Section 403.715, Florida Statutes, and to qualify for an exemption pursuant to Section 212.08(7)(p), Florida Statutes. Under the procedure, the owner/operator would apply to DER for a preliminary examination of its equipment. DER would hold a meeting attended by a representative of the Department and representatives of the owner/operator. Generally, representatives of the owner/operator were the county, the county engineers, and the contractors. Generally, the owner/operator would apply for certification of equipment that was going to be purchased for a ongoing county project. Examples of such projects include combustors, incinerators, and similar facilities. As a result of the meeting, the Department normally would examine the contract between the county and the owner/operator. Usually the contract contained language that the facility would be owned and operated exclusively by or on behalf of a county or municipality. Usually a sales tax exemption for a piece of resource recovery equipment was obtained by a contractor, subcontractor, owner/operator, or whoever actually purchased the equipment. Such entity registered for the special purpose of purchasing resource recovery equipment. The purchaser could then make the purchase without paying sales tax on the equipment. The Department sent a letter to all contractors and subcontractors explaining the exemption procedure. At all times material to this case, Drum was aware of the sales tax exemption procedure, and that the Department expected the resource recovery equipment purchased in this manner would be used exclusively by or on behalf of a county or municipality. Drum's president was aware of the Department's policy that the exemption was available only if the purchase were for equipment to be used exclusively by or on behalf of a county or municipality. Under the typical scenario, when the project construction was finished, DER would issue a final certification that the equipment was resource recovery equipment and notify the Department of the final certification. The Department would then notify all necessary Divisions of the Department that the final certification was issued. To verify that the project complied with the statute, the Department conducted audits. The audit would verify whether the equipment being reviewed was owned and operated exclusively by or on behalf of a county or municipality. In 1983, Drum applied to the Department for a refund of sales tax it paid on the purchase of resource recovery equipment. At that time, the Department denied Drum's request for a refund because the Department found Drum did not own and operate the equipment by or on behalf of a county or municipality. Drum was aware that the Department interpreted Section 212.08(7)(p), Florida Statutes, to require that the equipment must be owned and operated "exclusively" by or on behalf of a county or municipality. Drum knew of the Department's position that resource recovery equipment purchased by Drum was taxable, but chose to ignore this position and purchase equipment during the audit period without paying sales tax. Since its inception Section 212.08(7)(p), Florida Statutes, has been interpreted by the Department to mean equipment must be used "exclusively" by or on behalf of any county or municipality. By "exclusively" the Department means that a facility must operate for one county with which it has an agreement in the form of a contract. The facility cannot operate partially for a county and partially for itself or another entity. The Department based this interpretation on the plain meaning of the statute. The Department considers this statutory interpretation apparent from the words of the statute, and maintains that the addition of the word "exclusively" was not necessary to support this interpretation. Rule 12A-1.001(23)(a), Florida Administrative Code, effective January 2, 1989, states, in pertinent part: Resource recovery equipment and machinery used in a facility owned and operated exclusively by or on behalf of any county or municipality is exempt. Prior to January 2, 1989, this rule did not contain the word "exclusively." The addition of the word was a clarification of the Department's long-standing interpretation of Section 212.08(7)(p), Florida Statutes, and not a change in policy. Despite being aware of the rule and the policy, Drum did not challenge the rule. Additionally, no evidence was presented to establish Drum has continued its efforts to seek a refund of the sales tax amounts paid in the period prior to this audit. The amounts at issue in this case deal only with those items set forth in paragraph 4.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing, it is, hereby, RECOMMENDED: That the Department of Revenue enter a final order confirming the sales and use tax owed by the Petitioner DONE AND RECOMMENDED this 30th day of July, 1993, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. JOYOUS D. PARRISH Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 30th day of July, 1993. APPENDIX TO RECOMMENDED ORDER, CASE NO. 92-1729 Rulings on the proposed findings of fact submitted by the Petitioner: 1. Paragraphs 1-4, 17, 19, 20, 22, 23, 24, 27, 28, and 29 are accepted. The first sentence of paragraph 5 is accepted; the remainder rejected as irrelevant. Paragraphs 6 through 13 are rejected as irrelevant. In drafting the statute the legislature determined that facilities (regardless of the cost of construction) would be exempt only if operated on behalf of a county or municipality. Paragraph 14 is rejected as contrary to the weight of the credible evidence or unsupported by credible evidence. Paragraphs 15 and 16 are rejected as irrelevant as such arguments are outside the scope of the plain and ordinary language of the statute. Paragraph 18 is rejected as irrelevant. Paragraph 21 is rejected as irrelevant. No evidence was presented as to the status of Drum's suit for refund, if any, was filed. With the deletion of the word "only" paragraph 25 is accepted. Paragraph 26 is rejected as argument. Paragraph 30 is rejected as hearsay or not supported by credible evidence. Paragraph 31 is rejected as argument. 12.Paragraph 32 is rejected as argument. 13.Paragraph 33 is rejected as irrelevant. 14.Paragraphs 34 through 37 are rejected as irrelevant. Rulings on the proposed findings of fact submitted by the Respondent: Paragraphs 1 through 23, and 25 through 29 are accepted. Paragraph 24 is rejected as not supported by the record cited or irrelevant. COPIES FURNISHED: Larry Fuchs Executive Director Department of Revenue 104 Carlton Building Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0100 Linda Lettera General Counsel Department of Revenue 204 Carlton Building Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0100 Cynthia S. Tunnicliff David P. Burke Heidi E. Garwood Carlton, Fields, Ward, Emmanuel, Smith & Cutler, P.A. P.O. Drawer 190 Tallahassee, Florida 32302 Lealand L. McCharen C. Lynne Chapman Assistant Attorneys General Department of Legal Affairs Tax Section, The Capitol Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1050
The Issue The issues for determination are whether Petitioner paid sales and use tax on rental income from transient housing in Osceola and Polk counties, and whether Petitioner paid sales and use tax on the purchase of fixed assets in accordance with the requirements of Sections 212.03 and 212.06, Florida Statutes (1995). (Statutory references are to Florida Statutes (1995) unless otherwise stated.)
Findings Of Fact Petitioner is a Florida corporation with its principal place of business located at 3501 West Vine Street, Suite 387, Kissimmee, Florida. Petitioner primarily engages in the business of renting and managing transient property in the Orlando-Disney World area for absentee owners. Respondent is the state agency responsible for the administration of the Florida sales and use tax pursuant to Section 213.05. Respondent selected Petitioner for audit because Petitioner filed several sales and use tax returns reporting no taxable income (zero returns). Zero returns are unusual for a tourist-based business in the Orlando-Disney area. Osceola County, Florida (Osceola), also audited Petitioner for the period December 1994 through December 1999. Osceola is a political subdivision of the state and is responsible for administering and assessing the Tourist Development Tax authorized in Section 212.03 and Section 13-16, Osceola County Code of Ordinances (Code). Osceola audited Petitioner because Petitioner failed to file any tax returns with Osceola. Osceola correctly assessed Petitioner $394,378.39 for tax, penalty, and interest. The mathematical computations in the Osceola audit are correct. Osceola conducted its audit in accordance with generally accepted auditing principals. The Osceola audit revealed that Petitioner began doing business on January 1, 1995, but reported that it began doing business on both November 16, 1999, and March 12, 1998. The Osceola audit revealed that Petitioner failed to maintain required tax records, including guest registration forms; cash receipts; a general ledger; and documents necessary to verify amounts reported in tax returns. Petitioner did not reconcile its bank statements and did not maintain records necessary to verify that all receipts from guest registrations were properly entered into Petitioner's computer system of record keeping. Respondent began its audit on January 8, 2001. However, Respondent was unable to examine most of Petitioner's books and records due to a lack of cooperation from Petitioner. Respondent made several attempts to obtain Petitioner's books and records, but Petitioner provided Respondent with only consumable purchase invoices. Respondent and Osceola have an agreement to share information. Respondent relied on information obtained by Osceola in the course of the Osceola audit. Osceola provided Respondent with copies of Osceola's work papers including a spreadsheet of undeclared revenue compiled from Petitioner's books and records. Osceola also provided Respondent with a list of 102 properties managed by Petitioner during the audit period. Approximately 61 properties are located in Osceola County and 41 are located in Polk County. Respondent bases its assessment on an estimate derived from the Osceola assessment, records, and work papers. Respondent conducted its audit in accordance with applicable law. The mathematical computations in Respondent's audit are correct. Petitioner owes sales and use tax in the respective amounts of $218,152.88 and $125,680.72, due on rentals derived from transient housing in Osceola and Polk counties. Petitioner also owes sales and use tax in the amount of $2,100 from the sale of fixed assets. Interest accrues at the daily rate of $98.13.
Recommendation Based upon the findings of fact and the conclusions of law, it is RECOMMENDED that Respondent enter a Final Order assessing Petitioner for tax, penalty, and accrued interest. DONE AND ENTERED this 11th day of July, 2003, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S DANIEL MANRY Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 11th day of July, 2003. COPIES FURNISHED: Carrol Y. Cherry, Esquire Office of the Attorney General, Tax Section The Capitol, Plaza Level 01 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1050 Martha F. Barrera, Esquire Office of the Attorney General, Tax Section The Capitol, Plaza Level 01 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1050 A.C.E. Property Management of Orlando, Inc. 3501 West Vine Street, Suite 387 Kissimmee, Florida 34741 Bruce Hoffmann, General Counsel Department of Revenue 204 Carlton Building Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0100 James Zingale, Executive Director Department of Revenue 204 Carlton Building Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0100
The Issue The issue is whether the Application for Registration as an Associated Person filed by Petitioner should be granted.
Recommendation Based upon the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that the Respondent enter a final order denying Petitioner's application for registration as an associated person of Noble Investment Company of Palm Beach. DONE AND ORDERED in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida, this 17th day of February 1993. WILLIAM R. DORSEY, JR. Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 17th day of February 1993. COPIES FURNISHED: Karen M. Camechis H. Richard Bisbee Assistant General Counsels Department of Banking and Finance Suite 1302 The Capitol Tallahassee, Florida 32399 Ardith H. Steele 1639 South University Drive Plantation, Florida 33324 The Honorable Gerald Lewis Comptroller, State of Florida The Capitol, Plaza Level Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0350 William G. Reeves General Counsel The Capitol Room 1302 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0350
