The Issue Whether Respondent, Mildred Jones, doing business as Jones Family Day Care (Jones or Respondent), committed the violations alleged in the Administrative Complaint dated May 29, 2012, and, if so, what penalty should be imposed.
Findings Of Fact At all times material to this case, Respondent operated a licensed day care facility located in Orange County, Florida. On the date of the attempted inspection in this case, Respondent had six children enrolled in her day care program. Petitioner is the state agency charged with the responsibility of licensing and inspecting day care facilities throughout the State of Florida. As part of that responsibility, Petitioner routinely inspects day care facilities to assure compliance with rules and regulations that govern day care programs. On May 4, 2012, Petitioner’s agent, Luz Torres, inspected Respondent’s home. This was not Ms. Torres’ first visit to the home and, like all other visits, she approached the front door during regular business hours and knocked. Upon knocking, Ms. Torres was greeted by a female voice behind the door who advised that she could not let Ms. Torres into the home. The female, later identified as Christine Randall, refused Ms. Torres admission even after the inspector advised that it was required by law. Despite her efforts to enter the home, Ms. Torres was denied access. Ms. Torres could hear the sounds of children within the home but could not from outside the front door determine the identity or number of the voices. Ms. Randall did not advise Ms. Torres that Ms. Jones was in the rear of the property. Ms. Randall did not direct Ms. Torres to go to the rear of the property. Ms. Torres could not view the rear of the property from the front entrance. Ms. Torres’ efforts to reach Ms. Jones by telephone proved fruitless. Ms. Randall has not been screened or had a background check in years. Ms. Randall was not listed as a substitute caregiver for Respondent’s facility. Ms. Jones’ claim that only Ms. Randall’s two children were present on the date Ms. Torres attempted entrance has not been deemed credible. Ms. Jones also claimed Ms. Randall was present helping her prepare for her inspection. Had only two children been present, Ms. Randall could have easily admitted Ms. Torres, had her observe that the home was being prepared for inspection without other children present, and addressed her role as helper to Ms. Jones with only her own children present in the home. Instead, Ms. Randall denied access to the home and failed to direct Ms. Torres to the rear of the property (presuming Ms. Jones was, in fact, there). Ms. Wright’s suggestion that only Ms. Randall’s children were present on the date in question has not been deemed persuasive as Ms. Wright did not enter the home on that date, did not view the home for the entire time, and does not routinely know who is or is not in the home from her vantage as Respondent’s neighbor and friend.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that the Department of Children and Families enter a final order finding Respondent committed a Class I violation and imposing an administrative fine in the amount of $250.00. DONE AND ENTERED this 1st day of October, 2012, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S J. D. PARRISH Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 1st day of October, 2012. COPIES FURNISHED: Stefanie C. Beach, Esquire Department of Children and Families Suite S-1129 400 West Robinson Street Orlando, Florida 32801-1782 Mildred Jones Jones Family Day Care Home 5027 Caserta Street Orlando, Florida 32819 Gregory Venz, Agency Clerk Department of Children and Families Building 2, Room 204B 1317 Winewood Boulevard Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0700 David Wilkins, Secretary Department of Children and Families Building 1, Room 202 1317 Winewood Boulevard Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0700 Marion Drew Parker, General Counsel Department of Children and Families Building 2, Room 204 1317 Winewood Boulevard Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0700
Findings Of Fact CHS is an existing provider of home health care services in Pasco and Pinellas Counties, HRS District V, and has provided such services since 1981. CHS offers a wide range of nursing services including nurses specializing in I.V. therapy, oncology, geriatrics, obstetrics, pediatrics, and orthopedics; licensed practical nursing services; nursing assistants; home health care aides; and respiratory therapy services n the home. These services are offered solely to private payors. Only home health care providers who have been issued certificates of need are licensed and eligible to serve Medicare and Medicaid patients whose care is paid for under whose programs. CHS is applying for a certificate of need in order to be eligible to provide home health care which is paid for pursuant to Medicare and Medicaid procedures. At the time CHS' application was first considered Respondent found the application not to meet the requirements of a need methodology rule which was subsequently declared invalid. The present denial is alleged to be bared solely on statutory criteria. CHS presented one expert witness who calculated need for additional home health care services using a formula suggested by he U.S. Department of Human Services but which was never adopted as a rule by any agency. Pursuant to this formula, which takes into consideration the projected population of the service area, the age cohorts of the population, the population's historical and projected utilization of home health and related services, he service area's hospital discharge rate, and nursing home utilization data, an unmet need for services for 62,541 potential home bed health care patients in 1985, with 13,960 in Pasco and 49,581 in Pinellas Counties, was found. Based on the historical utilization of home health area services by patients in District V, the existing licensed home health agencies, of which there are 12, are projected to serve 25,424 patients in 1985 Exhibit 3). This would leave a potential unmet need for some 28,000 patients in District V. However, serious questions were raised as to the efficacy of the assumption in the formula since this methodology was never adopted by the U.S. Department of Health and Human Services, has not been tested by empirical verification, and the definition of home health services used in this formula is not limited to part-time or intermittent services. Home health care providers differ from other medical care providers principally in the fact that the capital outlay in establishing home health care is minimal. This is so because such care is personal service oriented with little tangible property required. As an example, CHS employs some four or five full-time employees and maintains a list of approximately 350 nurses and aides that can be called to provide the home health care services needed. Accordingly, there is no large fixed payroll to meet when work is slack and services can be increased by any home health care provider simply by employing nurses as the jobs arrive and stop their pay when the care is no longer needed. There is no large overhead to be concerned with in this type operation. CHS is financially capable and has the personnel resources to provide the proposed service. CHS has a line of credit with a commercial bank of $100,000, has the organizational ability to operate as a home health care provider, and has personnel available to provide all services needed. CHS proposes to serve all Medicaid patients who apply for services and to provide services throughout District V as needed. No evidence was presented that patients needing home health care are unable to get such care from existing providers. CHS presently serves private pay patients and holds itself out as able to provide all home health care required within District V. No evidence was presented that those 12 licensed home health care providers in District V are unable to provide all authorized Medicare and Medicaid home health care needed. Since any of them can increase the availability of services simply by employing additional personnel to provide such services as needed actual need for additional certificate of need holders will be difficult to prove. CHS presented evidence that when its private pay patients who are Medicare eligible are hospitalized and subsequently discharged from the hospital needing home health care, the hospital usually refers these patients to a licensed home health care provider who can be compensated by Medicare. This results in CHS losing these patients. Home health care providers get approximately one-half of their patients referred to them by a doctor and one-half referred by a hospital. This ratio is accurate for Petitioner and for the licensed home health care providers The advent of diagnostic relate groupings (DRGs) could impact on home health care providers, but no evidence was presented (if available) of the actual impact DRGs will have on nursing homes or on home health care providers.
The Issue The issue when this case commenced was whether the Respondents' emergency shelter home license (for temporary care of dependent children) should be revoked. During the pendency of the proceeding the license expired and the parties stipulated that the issue was whether HRS must consider a new application, with no prejudice as to the alleged grounds for revocation. This action arose from HRS' complaint dated May 30, 1985, alleging that the Woodards violated various statutes, rules and the HRS manual 175-10, by: maintaining dangerous pets (pit bulldogs); providing inadequate nourishment; providing inadequate sleeping arrangements; failing to provide appropriate care and supervision: and maintaining outside employment after telling HRS that the employment would discontinue. A timely request for formal hearing was filed by the Woodards. At the hearing, HRS presented three exhibits and the testimony of Dale Medina, Nancy Traad, Maxine Standiffer, Jean Majures and Peggy Ann Siegel. Louise Woodard testified on her own behalf and presented no other witnesses or exhibits. By stipulation, the testimony of an additional HRS witness, Alene Scott, was admitted by deposition taken and filed after the hearing. (Order dated February 3, 1986.) HRS filed proposed findings of fact and conclusions of law. A specific ruling on each proposed finding of fact is found in the Appendix attached to this Recommended Order. Based upon all of the evidence; the following findings of fact are determined:
Findings Of Fact Adopted in substance in paragraph 7. Adopted in part in paragraphs 6 and 7; otherwise rejected as unnecessary. Adopted in substance in paragraph 4. Adopted in substance in paragraph 7. Mrs. Woodard did not admit that the children were sleeping on pads on the floor. Adopted in substance in paragraph 7 and 8. Adopted in substance in paragraph 7. Adopted in paragraph 4.
The Issue Should Respondent’s annual renewal of her family day care home registration be denied?
Findings Of Fact Upon consideration of the oral and documentary evidence adduced at the hearing, the following relevant findings of fact are made: The Department is the agency of the State of Florida with whom a family day care home must register annually if that family day care home is not required to be licensed by the Department or the county within which the family day care home is located. Annie P. Smith owns and operates Smith Family Day Care Home, which is located in Highlands County, Florida. Respondent is not required to be licensed by the Department or Highlands County but must register annually with the Department. On or about October 28, 1999, Respondent applied to renew her annual family day care home registration. On or about November 10, 1999, the Department screened Florida Abuse Hotline Information System (FAHIS) which revealed report number 1998-094609, an alleged report of child abuse or neglect filed against Respondent. FAHIS report number 1998-094609 alleges that while the child D.W.H., aged 6 months, was under the care of Respondent the child received a large bruise on his upper, inside left thigh. The report characterizes Respondent's role as an alleged perpetrator of child abuse. On or about March 29, 2000, the Department received FAHIS report number 2000-050228, alleging that the child, K.L.B. was picked up from Respondent's day family care home with a broken arm. By an Amended Administrative Complaint dated April 28, 2000, the Department advised Respondent that it was denying her application for annual renewal of her family day care home registration. The Department's denial of Respondent's application for renewal of her registration for her family day care home was based on Respondent's: (a) failure to provide satisfactory proof of screening in accordance with Section 402.313(1)(a)5., Florida Statutes; (b) failure to protect and maintain the safety of the child, D.W.H. while the child was in her care; and (c) failure to protect and maintain the safety of the child, K.L.B. while the child was in her care. The Department presented no evidence concerning FAHIS report number 2000-050228 or the alleged abuse of the child, K.L.B. In fact, the Department announced at the hearing that it was dropping Count III of the Administrative Complaint concerning the alleged abuse of the child, K.L.B. After picking D.W.H. up from Respondent's family day care home on August 25, 1998, T.W., the child's mother, transported the child to Heartland Pediatrics of Avon Park for a scheduled appointment with Dr. Deshipande for the child's regular check-up. During the child's examination, Dr. Deshipande, discovered bruises on the inner thigh of the child's left leg. Dr. Deshipande described the bruises as a "large area on (l) inner thigh of bruising in various stages -- dark purple to pink. No tenderness. No other bruises elsewhere." (Emphasis furnished). Dr. Deshipande suspected possible child abuse and instructed one of his staff to notify the Department's abuse hotline. Subsequently, the Department conducted an investigation into the allegations of abuse. Ray Starr, a former Child Protective Investigator (CPI), with the Department, was the person primarily responsible for the Department's investigation and preparation of the abuse report. Starr's testimony that he contacted Respondent during his investigation by telephone concerning the alleged abuse is inconsistent with the abuse report and with Respondent's testimony. The abuse report indicates that Starr talked with Respondent in person concerning the alleged abuse. Respondent testified that neither Starr nor anyone else from the Department talked to her by telephone or in person concerning the alleged abuse during the time of the investigation. After discussing the background of the child's parents with local law enforcement and Department personnel, including one Department employee who was a "good friend" of the child's father, Starr determined that the child's parents were not responsible for the bruises. Without any further investigation (except possibly one telephone call to Respondent) Starr determined that the bruises were either the direct result of Respondent's action with the child or her inattention to the child which resulted in the bruises by whatever means. Starr made no effort to discuss Respondent's reputation as a caregiver with any of Respondent's present or past clients or to determine if there had been any problems with Respondent's care of other children. Based on the testimony of several of Respondent's present and past clients, Respondent enjoys a reputation of being an excellent caregiver for children, particularly younger children. On August 25, 1998, the child's mother, while giving the child's medical history to Dr. Deshipande, indicated that the child had been going to Respondent's family day care home for a period of 12 days and that bruising had been noted once before. However, at the hearing the child's mother testified that she could not recall how long the child went to Respondent's family day care home and that there had been no problem with the child's suffering any bruising at Respondent's day care home prior to the day of the alleged incident. The child's mother could not recall what time she left the child at Respondent's home or picked him up from Respondent's home on the day of the alleged incident or any other day. The child's mother could not recall virtually anything about the incident other than her assertion that she checked her child thoroughly before she took him anywhere and checked him thoroughly after picking him up, which she described as "a mother's thing." Based on this assertion, the mother concluded that the child must have been bruised between the time she left him in Respondent's care on August 25, 1998, and the time she picked him up from Respondent's day care home on August 25, 1998. Karen Babcock, a Licensed Practical Nurse, employed by Heartland Pediatrics of Avon Park saw the bruises on the child on August 25, 1998, while he was being examined by Dr. Deshipande. Babcock testified that although she was not present when the photographs were taken by a Department employee on August 26, 1998, the bruises on the child's leg as shown by the photographs depict a fair and accurate representation of the bruises as they appeared on August 25, 1998. Ray Starr was present when the photographs were taken on August 26, 1998, and testified that the bruises on the child's leg as shown by the photographs depict a fair and accurate representation of the bruises as they appeared on August 26,1998. Dr. Deshipande did not testify at the hearing and, other than his description of the bruises, did not state in his notes an opinion as to when he considered the bruises may have occurred. The fact that he noted bruises "in various stages" indicates that the bruises occurred at various times. Nothing in Ray Starr's testimony or the abuse report indicates that Ray Starr talked with Dr. Deshipande concerning the timing of the bruising. Likewise, none of the other witnesses talked with Dr. Deshipande concerning the timing of the bruising. Dr. Deshipande's description of child's bruises does not describe bruises that are alleged to have occurred earlier in the day on August 25, 1998, during the time the child was in the care of the Respondent. Likewise, the photographs, when viewed in light of Dr. Deshipande's description of the bruising as it appeared to him on August 25, 1998, do not depict bruising that is alleged to have occurred earlier in the day on August 25, 1998, during the time the child was under the care of Respondent. Therefore, although it is clear that the child was bruised, it is not at all clear that the child was bruised during the time he was under the care of Respondent on August 25, 1998, either by Respondent directly or as a result of Respondent's inattention, notwithstanding the testimony of the child's mother to the contrary, which I find lacks credibility.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is recommended that the Department enter a final order granting Respondent's application for renewal of her annual family day care home registration. DONE AND ENTERED this 9th of January, 2001, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. ___________________________________ WILLIAM R. CAVE Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6947 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 9th day of January, 2001. COPIES FURNISHED: Jack Emory Farley, Esquire Department of Children and Family Services 4720 Old Highway 37 Lakeland, Florida 33813-2030 Sidney M. Crawford, Esquire Sidney M. Crawford, P.A. Post Office Box 5947 Lakeland, Florida 33807 Virginia A. Daire, Agency Clerk Department of Children and Family Services 1317 Winewood Boulevard Building 2, Room 204B Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0700 Josie Tomayo, General Counsel Department of Children and Family Services 1317 Winewood Boulevard Building 2, Room 204 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0700
The Issue Was Petitioner properly disqualified from working in a position of special trust pursuant to Section 435.04, Florida Statutes, on the basis of a July 21, 1996, incident? If Petitioner was properly disqualified as a result of the July 21, 1996, incident, has she been sufficiently rehabilitated so as to be eligible for an exemption to work in a position of special trust, pursuant to Section 435.07(3), Florida Statutes?
Findings Of Fact Petitioner was licensed through Leon County as a family home day care provider in 1995. Since 1996, she has been operating her family day care home pursuant to an exemption from disqualification by a 1973 disqualifying felony (manslaughter). Petitioner is a high school graduate. She was schooled and certified in New York as a nurse technician. She is certified as a home health aide in Florida. When she sought to renew her license in 2000, Petitioner was required to sign an Affidavit of Good Moral Character. The 2000 Affidavit of Good Moral Character read: By signing this form, I am swearing that I have not been found guilty or entered a plea of guilty of nolo contendere (no contest), regardless of the adjudication, to any of the following charges under the provisions of the Florida Statutes or under any similar statute of another jurisdiction. I also attest that I do not have a delinquency record that is similar to any of these offenses. I understand I must acknowledge the existence of criminal records relating to the following list regardless of whether or not those records have been sealed or expunged. I understand that I am also obligated to notify my employer of any possible disqualifying offenses that may occur while employed in a position subject to background screening under Chapter 435, Florida Statutes. The 2000 Affidavit then listed a number of offenses and the corresponding statute numbers. Among the offenses listed were: Sections 741.30 domestic violence and injunction for protection. 784.03 battery, if the victim was a minor. The 2000 Affidavit is DCF's attempt to paraphrase Section 435.04, Florida Statutes, listing disqualifying offenses. It is flawed and could be misleading because domestic violence can occur without an injunction for protection. Petitioner signed the 2000 Affidavit on January 25, 2000, in the portion declaring herself free of any disqualifying statutory violations and also signed the Affidavit in the portion stating, "To the best of my knowledge and belief, my record may contain one or more of the foregoing disqualifying acts or offenses." Petitioner testified in the instant case that she did not divulge the July 21, 1996, incident on her 2000 Affidavit because she did not think it constituted domestic violence, but why she signed contradictory statements was not explained. Petitioner's day care license was renewed, despite Petitioner's contradictory declarations on her 2000 Affidavit. She was notified of her disqualification when the five-year background screening turned-up an offense that had occurred on July 21, 1996. The Year 2000 background screening results which DCF received from the Florida Department of Law Enforcement indicated that Petitioner had been found guilty of "battery," on the basis of the July 21, 1996, incident. The Department's Background Screening Coordinator then obtained additional documentation from the file of the Leon County Court. Based on the information in the court file, the Department's District II Office concluded that Petitioner was disqualified because of a "domestic battery" offense. Petitioner exhausted informal procedures and timely requested an evidentiary hearing pursuant to Section 120.57(1), Florida Statutes (2000). The instant case followed. The instant case is the second occasion Petitioner has appeared before the Division of Administrative Hearings requesting an exemption from disqualification to work in a position of special trust. The first occasion Petitioner appeared before the Division occurred in September 1996, when she sought an exemption because she had been disqualified due to her 1973 felony manslaughter conviction in New York. Petitioner had failed to disclose the 1973 felony conviction on her 1995 affidavit when she first applied to be a child care worker.1 That disqualifying offense showed-up in the initial screening procedures applicable to such applicants. Petitioner was granted an exemption for the 1973 manslaughter conviction in Harris v. Department of Health and Rehabilitative Services, DOAH Case No. 96-2010 (Recommended Order entered September 10, 1996; Final Order entered October 30, 1996), as more fully described below in Findings of Fact 34-36. She has been a licensed day care provider ever since. In 1996, Petitioner and Frank Fields had a romantic involvement bounded by Mr. Fields' keeping most of his belongings at his sister's apartment and merely sleeping over at Petitioner's home two to three nights per week, on a sporadic basis.2 On these occasions, he brought with him, and occasionally left in Petitioner's home, only his underwear and some music CDs. At all times material, Frank Fields was an adult male. Although younger than Petitioner, he was not a minor. On July 21, 1996, Petitioner, who was then 47 years old, was two months' pregnant with Frank Fields' child. She testified that at that time she was very upset and confused because of her pregnancy; because Mr. Fields was not helping with household expenses; and because she had heard that Mr. Fields was moving from his sister's apartment to an apartment of his own. On July 21, 1996, Petitioner was driving her car on Blountstown Highway. She noticed Mr. Fields' van and also noticed that there was a female in the passenger's seat of the van. Apparently, Petitioner believed that Mr. Fields was romantically involved with his female passenger. Petitioner had one adult daughter; the adult daughter's three children, all under the age of nine years, and her own eight-year-old daughter with her in her car. According to Petitioner's testimony, none of the four children in her car were young enough to require a car seat and none of her day care children were in her car. According to the police officer who later arrested Petitioner, there were six "children" in the back seat of Petitioner's car, not six people in the whole car. Regardless of this discrepancy in testimony, it is undisputed that there were no car seats and insufficient car safety belts for the number of passengers in Petitioner's car on July 21, 1996. Without approving either Petitioner's motivation or her reasoning, I find credible her testimony that she would not have taken her next actions had there been any day care children in her car because if day care parents found out about it, Petitioner could be "put in jeopardy"; she "could be in a lot of trouble"; and she would not have had day care children with her over a weekend. July 21, 1996 was, in fact, a Sunday. In making the immediately foregoing Finding of Fact, I have not overlooked Ms. Brantley's testimony that on occasion Petitioner has kept Ms. Brantley's children in Petitioner's home on nights and weekends while Ms. Brantley traveled. However, even assuming arguendo, but not ruling, that six rather than four children were in Petitioner's car on July 21, 1996, there is no direct evidence that any of them were also day care clients. Petitioner drove her car, filled with passengers, following Mr. Fields' van. Mr. Fields turned onto Nekoma Lane and pulled over to the side of the road. Petitioner pulled over and intentionally bumped her car into the back of Mr. Fields' van. Petitioner and Mr. Fields exited their respective vehicles, and Petitioner demanded to know who Mr. Fields' female passenger was, even though Petitioner knew the passenger was named "Melissa." Some screaming ensued, and Petitioner and Mr. Fields "tussled," hitting and scratching each other. Petitioner and her adult daughter testified that they did not know who struck the first blow. The non-hearsay evidence is insufficient to establish that on this occasion Petitioner left a bite mark on Mr. Fields' arm. When Mr. Fields began to wield a stick he had picked up from the side of the road, Petitioner's adult daughter got between him and her mother. Petitioner then drove her car, still containing its passengers, so as to follow Melissa, who had walked around the corner. Petitioner then "had a conversation" with Melissa. There is no evidence that the children were anywhere except inside Petitioner's car during either her confrontation with Mr. Fields or with Melissa. When the police arrived on the scene, Petitioner was arrested for battery and for driving with a suspended driver's license. The suspended license charge arose because, when questioned by the police, Petitioner gave her name as "Veronica L. Wynn." Petitioner's legal name was, in fact, "Veronica Harris." Petitioner also told the officer that her date of birth was September 19, 1959, and that she lived at 2106 Monday Street. Petitioner's true date of birth is September 19, 1949, and her true address was 1229 Elberta Street. When the officer could not find a driver's license record for "Veronica L. Wynn," Petitioner told him that the name on her license might be "Veronica Lee Harris Wynn." After she gave him the name "Veronica Lee Harris Wynn," the officer found Petitioner's driver's license record and learned that her driver's license had been suspended. Petitioner had recently been divorced and had "gone back" to her maiden name, but she testified herein that on July 21, 1996, she deliberately gave incorrect information to the police because she knew her driver's license was suspended and the police were going to check on it. Mr. Fields was provided with a pamphlet explaining his right to request domestic abuse protection and prosecution. Apparently, he did nothing about it. Petitioner was charged, in an Information which recited the statutory language of both Subsections 784.03(1) (a) and (b), Florida Statutes (1995), with "battery (M1)," meaning "first degree misdemeanor battery." The Information cited only "Section 784.03, Florida Statutes," for that offense. The Information also charged Petitioner with "driving while license suspended or revoked (M2)" also a misdemeanor, under Section 322.34(1), Florida Statutes (1995). On August 28, 2000, Petitioner entered a "no contest" plea to both charges. Petitioner was adjudicated guilty of misdemeanor battery and was ordered to serve 12 months of probation with the following conditions: (1) no contact with Frank Fields; (2) $155.00 court costs; and (3) $100.00 fine. She was also required to pay a monthly supervision fee while on probation and a fee for the services of the public defender. There was no charge, plea, or sentence stating "domestic violence" or citing a domestic violence statute. Petitioner was not required to attend a batterers' intervention program, pursuant to Section 741.281, Florida Statutes. No evidence was presented to show that the sentencing court had made written, factual findings that attendance at a batterers' intervention program would be an inappropriate condition for her probation. Petitioner's probation was terminated in December 1997. Petitioner miscarried her child conceived of Frank Fields before a live birth. Petitioner's emotional connection with Mr. Fields seems to have terminated with the July 21, 1996, incident. At the September 9, 1996, formal exemption hearing in Harris v. Department of Health and Rehabilitative Services, DOAH Case No. 96-2010 (see Finding of Fact No. 12) Petitioner and her witnesses did not divulge that six weeks earlier, on July 21, 1996, Petitioner had been arrested for her altercation with Frank Fields or that less than two weeks earlier, on August 28, 1996, Petitioner had pled "no contest" to battery of Frank Fields. Petitioner testified in the instant case that she did not divulge the July 21, 1996, incident during the 1996 formal exemption proceeding before the Division because "it was not part of my day care home and had nothing to do with day care children."3 The Recommended Order in DOAH Case No. 96-2010 observed that "Petitioner, now a grandmother, testified tearfully to her errant behavior at the age of 21, over 24 years ago in New York. Petitioner has never been charged with any legal violation since that time, with the exception of traffic tickets . . .since the [1973] incident, . . . Petitioner has lived an exemplary life . . . ." That Order recommended granting an exemption. The outcome of the Final Order, entered October 26, 1996, was that Petitioner was exempted from the 1973 felony disqualification.4 Petitioner contends that she never committed "domestic violence" and even if she did, she has been "rehabilitated" since July 21, 1996. She feels that she should be granted an exemption because she is sorry for what she did; because if she had been thinking, she would not have done it; and because she loves her day care children. Since 1996, Petitioner has operated her family day care home and has pursued her goal of becoming a Master Provider of day care. In order to become a Master Provider, one must have taken the Second Helping Course (a refresher course for experienced day care providers); have either a Child Development Associate Certificate or national accreditation; and have five years' experience. Currently, there are only two Master Providers in Leon County. In 1998, Petitioner received a $500.00 Caring for Kids Mini-Grant which she used to purchase day care toys. In March 2000, Petitioner received a scholarship from the T.E.A.C.H. Early Childhood Project, which she had planned to use to take classes at Tallahassee Community Hospital towards her Child Development Associate certification. Petitioner has put this project on "hold" during the pendancy of the instant case. In May 2000, Petitioner completed the Second Helping Course. In Leon County, only approximately 20 family home day care providers have taken this course. In 2000, Petitioner received a $275.00 Caring for Kids Mini-Grant which she used to help pay for her Second Helping Course. Petitioner was selected to receive a Kids Incorporated Infant/Toddler Initiative Grant of $3,000, which she intended to use to purchase toys and equipment for her day care home. Petitioner was hand-picked by Kids Incorporated because of her genuine love and concern for the children and because Kids Incorporated felt that Petitioner only needed additional toys and equipment in order to improve her day care home. However, because of the instant case, Kids Incorporated has not yet disbursed this money to Petitioner. Kids Incorporated wants to be assured the money will go to someone who will be a day care provider for the long-term. Petitioner has volunteered for the school readiness program sponsored by Kids Incorporated, which has resulted in additional visits and evaluations of her day care home. Her day care children have all scored "above average" in the program. Katherine Schmidt, a Family Child Care Specialist with Kids Incorporated, testified that she has evaluated and assessed Petitioner's day care home in her capacity with Kids Incorporated and during the period she was helping Petitioner obtain the grants mentioned above. Ms. Schmidt believes Petitioner is an excellent day care provider and would not be a danger to the children in her care. Ms. Schmidt also believes Petitioner would be a benefit to the children and their families. The Leon County Home Day Care Providers Association and Support Group meets monthly, and Petitioner regularly attends. Two day care providers wrote letters in support of Petitioner. Cicely Brantley is a professional music education teacher in Leon County's public school system. Ms. Brantley's two children attend Petitioner's family day care home. She has seen Petitioner briefly at least five days per week for the last two years. Ms. Brantley's older child is two and one-half years old and has been in Petitioner's day care home since he was nine months' old. Her younger child is 15 months old and has been in Petitioner's day care home since she was eight weeks old. Ms. Brantley testified that she trusts Petitioner with her children and that she trusts and values Petitioner's judgment when it comes to the children. Ms. Brantley often asks Petitioner's advice about parenting, discipline, and health issues involving her children. Ms. Brantley testified that other than her husband, Petitioner is the person she trusts the most with her children and that Petitioner goes above and beyond what most day care providers would do, both in education and care. Ms. Brantley was aware of the battery incident that occurred between Petitioner and Mr. Fields, but it did not change her opinion of Petitioner. She does not believe that Petitioner would ever be a danger to her children. Ms. Brantley really does not want to have to find other child care if Petitioner is unsuccessful in getting an exemption, and it is apparent that this concern has influenced her testimony. Versee Hoffman is a Pioneer with the Jehovah's Witnesses. This means that she has committed to serving 70 hours per month with her ministry. Ms. Hoffman met Petitioner approximately five years ago through church. Ms. Hoffman and Petitioner studied the Bible together periodically. At that time, Ms. Hoffman felt that Petitioner was not really committed to the church or its moral standards, and their studies ended. Thereafter, Ms. Hoffman did not see Petitioner for approximately two years. In early 1999, Petitioner approached Ms. Hoffman and told Ms. Hoffman that she wanted to renew their Bible studies. Ms. Hoffman agreed, and they have been studying the Bible together weekly ever since. Ms. Hoffman testified that the Jehovah's Witnesses expect their members to attend five weekly meetings and that Petitioner consistently attends those meetings. Ms. Hoffman testified that Petitioner has grown spiritually and personally since Ms. Hoffman first met her five years ago. Ms. Hoffman believes that Petitioner is truly committed to leading a spiritual life and to meeting the Jehovah's Witnesses' moral standards against violence. Ms. Hoffman believes that Petitioner will continue to meet these standards.
Recommendation Based upon the findings of fact and conclusions of law, it is RECOMMENDED: That the Department of Children and Family Services enter a final order determining that Petitioner is not disqualified from working in a position of special trust solely on the basis of her 1996 battery conviction. DONE AND ENTERED this 13th day of November, 2000, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. ELLA JANE P. DAVIS Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 13th day of November, 2000.
The Issue At issue in this case is whether Petitioner's application to register as a family day care home should be granted.
Findings Of Fact Based on the oral and documentary evidence adduced at the final hearing, and the entire record of this proceeding, the following findings of fact are made: This case involves Petitioner's application to operate a registered family child care home. Petitioner had been registered as a family child care home from April 1989 to June 1992 and again from February 1995 to August 1998. The Department received Petitioner's most recent application on September 6, 2000. The Department regulates three types of day care facilities. In descending order of regulatory oversight, they are a licensed child care facility, a licensed family child care home, and a registered family child care home. Sections 402.305 and 402.313, Florida Statutes. While the first two categories of facilities require annual on-site Department inspections, background screening for all personnel, training, and more extensive paperwork, a registered family day care center involves no Department inspections and only requires that the operator complete a training course and provide to the Department certain paperwork and that the operator and other household members undergo background screening. The operator of a registered family day care home may care for no more than five preschool children from more than one unrelated family. Subsection 402.302(7), Florida Statutes. The application requires disclosure of "other family/household members." Petitioner's application identified David Barcelona as a household member and stated that his family relationship was "friend (roommate)." During her previous periods of registration, Petitioner had been the subject of numerous complaints to the Department. In May 1989, the Department notified Petitioner that she had been found to be caring for more than five preschool children. Petitioner acknowledged that she was operating above capacity, but assured the Department that the situation would be rectified by June 1, 1989. Nonetheless, complaints regarding the number of children at Petitioner's home persisted through at least June 1991. The Department also received several complaints concerning drug use in Petitioner's home. In September 1995, a complaint alleged that Petitioner and several other adults were seen smoking marijuana in the home. A complaint filed by a parent in February 1996 stated that the parent could smell marijuana on his children when he picked them up from Petitioner's home. A complaint from November 1996 stated that Petitioner was seen smoking marijuana in the presence of the children in her care. In each instance, the Department wrote a letter to Petitioner. The Department's letter of February 26, 1996, is representative and is quoted in relevant part: As a registered family day care home, you are not statutorily required to meet all the child care standards established in [then] Rule 10M-12 or 10M-10 of the Florida Administrative Code. In addition, Chapter 402.302-313 of the Florida Statutes does not provide the department with any statutory authority to regulate complaints of this nature within registered family day care homes. However, in the interest of safety and proper child care, we wanted to bring the complaint to your attention so that you might correct the issues as appropriate. Providing care for any child is very important. It is our hope that you are not engaging in any illegal or inappropriate activities which [sic] operating your child care business. During the Department's investigations of these complaints, Petitioner consistently denied that she used any illegal drugs. On August 10, 1998, the Department received a complaint that an unsupervised child was seen outside in the rain at Petitioner's house. On the same date, the Department received another complaint regarding Petitioner's live-in boyfriend, David Barcellona, and whether his presence rendered her home an unsafe environment for children. The complaint stated that Mr. Barcellona had not undergone background screening and had admitted to hitting one of Petitioner's own children. The complaint also stated that children reported witnessing Petitioner's use of marijuana and crack cocaine in the home. These complaints were resolved when Petitioner ceased providing child care. She sold her house and voluntarily relinquished her registration. A child protective services investigation was also commenced on August 10, 1998, by investigator Daniel McLean. His investigation confirmed that Mr. Barcellona had hit Petitioner's ten-year-old son "upside the head with an open hand" because the boy had called him a "faggot." Petitioner had given Mr. Barcellona permission to physically discipline her children. The children expressed a fear of living in the home with Mr. Barcellona. No observable injuries were found on either Petitioner's son or her eight-year-old daughter. Mr. McLean testified that Petitioner told him at least twice that she had smoked marijuana for 15 years. Mr. McLean attempted several times to obtain a drug screen from Petitioner without success. At length, Mr. McLean informed Petitioner that the Department would begin legal proceedings if Petitioner did not voluntarily surrender custody of her children to their natural father. On August 13, 1998, Petitioner signed the papers giving custody of the children to their natural father. She testified that "I picked the drugs over my children at that time." The evidence admitted at hearing established that, despite her denials, Petitioner had been a long-time user of marijuana. By her own admission, Petitioner was addicted to crack cocaine for a period of at least three months in 1998. Petitioner's sister, Lisa Lucius, estimated Petitioner's crack usage lasted for six months. Mr. McLean testified that Petitioner told him she had been using crack for seven months. At some point in 1999, Petitioner shoplifted a pair of tennis shoes, was arrested, and placed on one year's probation for petit theft. Her probation was conditioned upon her entering a 28-day live-in drug rehabilitation and counseling program at the Ruth Cooper Center in Fort Myers. Petitioner successfully completed this program. Another condition of her probation was her attendance twice weekly at Alcoholics Anonymous meetings. She complied with this condition. Finally, Petitioner's probation was conditioned upon providing random urinalysis drug tests. She complied with this condition, and her tests were all drug free. Petitioner testified that she has been drug free since completing the program at the Ruth Cooper Center. Since the conclusion of her probation in 2000, she has discontinued attendance at Alcoholics Anonymous or Narcotics Anonymous meetings. She testified that she no longer has a drug problem. In the registration application at issue in this proceeding, Petitioner listed David Barcellona as a family/household member. Both Petitioner and Mr. Barcellona were required to undergo Level 2 background screening as set forth in Subsection 435.04(1), Florida Statutes. Petitioner successfully passed the background screening and was so notified by a letter from the Department dated October 24, 2000. The letter informed Petitioner that she had passed the screening, but expressly cautioned: "Receipt of this letter does not automatically qualify you for the employment, specific position or license you may be seeking. That determination will be made [by] either an employer or licensing department." The background screening disclosed potentially disqualifying offenses for David Barcellona. As of November 6, 2000, the Department had sent Mr. Barcellona a letter offering him the opportunity to provide documentation as to the disposition of those offenses, but Mr. Barcellona had not responded. On October 31, 2000, Petitioner phoned Sarah Jarabek of the Department to inquire as to the status of her application. Ms. Jarabek told Petitioner that the Department had concerns about her history of substance abuse and about the presence of Mr. Barcellona in the home. They made an appointment to meet in Ms. Jarabek's office on November 6, 2000. On November 6, 2000, Petitioner and Ms. Lucius met with Ms. Jarabek, Nancy Starr, and Patricia Richardson of the Department. Petitioner provided evidence of the drug abuse treatment she had received while on probation. She also produced documentation that she had completed the required 30- hour Family Child Care Training Course, documentation of her church attendance and completion of a single parenting program at her church, and documentation that she had taken a technical training course for legal secretaries. Ms. Jarabek testified that she accepted all of Petitioner's representations at the meeting regarding her treatment and other matters, but that concerns remained because of Petitioner's history of denying her drug use and because the lonely, pressure-filled business of family day care might prove a poor rehabilitative environment. Ms. Starr testified that she believed more time should pass for Petitioner to demonstrate that she was not subject to a relapse. Petitioner had only been off probation since March 2000, and had yet to demonstrate her stability when her activities were not being constantly monitored. Ms. Starr was also concerned because Petitioner was not currently involved in any organized program to maintain her recovery and because Petitioner had denied using drugs when the complaints were filed in 1996 through 1998. At the November 6 meeting, the Department's representatives also raised the question of Mr. Barcellona's continued presence in the house. Petitioner told them that she had broken up with Mr. Barcellona and ejected him from her house, because she thought he was smoking crack cocaine. She told them that Mr. Barcellona had continued to harass her. He would bang on her door late at night, screaming, "I love you." He would spray his cologne outside her house, to "leave his scent." Petitioner and her children were "terrified" of him, and Petitioner was in the process of obtaining a restraining order against him. Ms. Jarabek believed Petitioner's statement that Mr. Barcellona was no longer living in the house, but remained concerned for the safety of children who would be staying at Petitioner's home, given Mr. Barcellona's erratic behavior. By letter dated November 14, 2000, David Barcellona was notified that he was ineligible for a position subject to background screening. Mr. Barcellona had not responded to the prior agency letter offering him the opportunity to provide documentation regarding the disposition of the disqualifying offenses. As the applicant for registration, Petitioner received a copy of the letter to Mr. Barcellona. By letter dated December 1, 2000, the Department notified Petitioner that her application to operate a registered family child care home had been denied. The letter cited the following as grounds for the denial: the history of at least 13 complaints regarding the operation of the home during Petitioner's previous registration periods, including six complaints related to Petitioner's use of marijuana and/or cocaine in the presence of her own or other people's children; the unreported presence of Mr. Barcellona in the home during Petitioner's previous registration periods; and the lack of sufficient time and evidence to demonstrate that Petitioner was capable of providing a safe and healthy environment for children in her care. Petitioner contended that the Department waived its ability to hold her prior complaints against her now because it repeatedly allowed her to re-register during the relevant years despite those complaints. Ms. Jarabek testified that this apparent anomaly was due to a change in Department policy since Petitioner was last registered. The Department previously took the position that it was required to ignore drug usage in a registered family day care home, because Section 402.313, Florida Statutes, did not expressly provide authority to deny or revoke a registration on that ground. Ms. Jarabek testified that the Department's current interpretation of its statutory authority to supervise the provision of child care permits it to consider drug usage in the home. The December 1 letter took note of the "positive changes" in Petitioner's life, but also noted that these changes were too recent to overcome the concerns about Petitioner's past behavior and future stability.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing findings of fact and conclusions of law, it is, therefore, RECOMMENDED that the Department of Children and Family Services deny Petitioner's application for registration of her family day care home. DONE AND ENTERED this 18th day of May, 2001, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. ___________________________________ LAWRENCE P. STEVENSON Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 18th day of May, 2001. COPIES FURNISHED: Richard D. Lakeman, Esquire Law Office of Richard D. Lakeman, P.A. Post Office Box 101580 Cape Coral, Florida 33910 Eugenie G. Rehak, Esquire Department of Children and Family Services Post Office Box 60085 Fort Myers, Florida 33906 Virginia A. Daire, Agency Clerk Department of Children and Family Services Building 2, Room 204B 1317 Winewood Boulevard Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0700 Josie Tomayo, General Counsel Department of Children and Family Services Building 2, Room 204 1317 Winewood Boulevard Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0700
The Issue The issue in this case is whether Petitioner is entitled to issuance of a license to operate a family day care home, pursuant to chapter 402, Florida Statutes, and Florida Administrative Code Rule 65C-20.008.
Findings Of Fact The Parties Petitioner, Shaguandra Ruffin Bullock, is an applicant for a family day care home license for the Ruffin Bullock Family Day Care Home. Respondent is the state agency responsible for licensing family day care homes in Florida. § 402.312(1), Fla. Stat. Events Giving Rise to this Proceeding A "family day care home" is an occupied residence in which child care is regularly provided for children from at least two unrelated families and which receives a payment, fee, or grant for any of the children receiving care, whether or not operated for profit. § 402.302(8), Fla. Stat. On or about July 6, 2017, Petitioner filed an application to operate a family day care home. Respondent reviewed the application and determined that it was incomplete, pending completion of the background screening required by sections 402.313(3), 402.305, and 402.3055.2/ On or about December 8, 2017, Respondent sent Petitioner a Notice of Intent to Deny Family Day Care Home Licensure ("NOI"), informing her of Respondent's intent to deny her application for a family day care home. The NOI stated, in pertinent part: On October 10, 2017, the Department received background clearance letters from child care personnel at Respondent's Family Day Care Home. Pursuant to Section 402.313(3), Florida Stat., childcare personnel in family day care homes are subject to applicable screening provisions. Pursuant to Section 402.302(15), Florida Stat. and Section 39.201(6), Florida Stat., The Department assessed the background of child care personnel at Respondent's family day care home including, but not limited to information from the central abuse hotline. The Department's assessment revealed the Respondent did not meet minimum standards for child care personnel upon screening which requires personnel to have good moral character pursuant to Section 402.305(2)(a), Florida Stat. The foregoing violates Rule 65C- 22.008(3), Fla. Admin. Code,[3/] Section 402.305(2)(a), Fla. Stat. and Section 402.313(3), Florida Stat. Based on the foregoing, Ruffin Bullock Family Day Care Home's, [sic] pending licensure application will be denied. Evidence Adduced at the Hearing At the final hearing, Respondent acknowledged that the background screening for Petitioner and her husband, Marlon Bullock, did not reveal that either had ever engaged in any of the offenses identified in section 435.04, Florida Statutes, which establishes the level 2 screening standards applicable to determining good moral character in this proceeding, pursuant to section 402.305(2)(a).4/ Rather, Respondent proposes to deny Petitioner's license application solely based on two confidential investigative summaries ("CIS reports") addressing incidents—— one involving Petitioner that occurred over 11 years ago, and one ostensibly involving Marlon Bullock that allegedly occurred almost 11 years ago. The CIS report for Intake No. 2007-310775-01 addresses an incident that occurred on or about January 16, 2007. Petitioner acknowledges that the incident addressed in the CIS report for Intake No. 2007-310775-01 occurred. Petitioner testified, credibly and persuasively, that at the time of the incident, Petitioner and her then-husband, Bernard L. Johnson, were going through a very difficult, emotionally-charged divorce. Petitioner went to Johnson's home to retrieve their minor children. An argument between her and Johnson ensued, and she threw a car jack through the back window of Johnson's vehicle. As a result of this incident, Petitioner was arrested. However, she was not prosecuted, and the charges against her were dropped. Respondent's witnesses, Ann Gleeson and Suzette Frazier, both acknowledged that they did not have any independent personal knowledge regarding the occurrence, or any aspects, of the incident reported in the CIS report for Intake No. 2007-310775-01. The other CIS report, for Intake No. 2007-455485-01, addresses an incident that ostensibly took place on September 7, 2007, involving Marlon Bullock, who is now Petitioner's husband. Petitioner was not married to Bullock at the time of the incident reported in the CIS report for Intake No. 2007- 455485-01. She credibly testified that she was completely unaware of the incident, and had no knowledge of any aspect of it, until she saw the CIS report in connection with this proceeding. Gleeson and Frazier both acknowledged that they did not have any independent knowledge regarding the occurrence, or any aspects, of the incident addressed in the CIS report for Intake No. 2007-455485-01.5/ The CIS reports and their contents are hearsay that does not fall within any exception to the hearsay rule.6/ The CIS reports and the information contained therein consist of summaries of statements made by third parties to the investigators who prepared the reports. The investigators did not have any personal knowledge about the matters addressed in the reports. It is well-established that hearsay evidence, while admissible in administrative proceedings, cannot form the sole basis of a finding of fact in such proceedings. § 120.57(1)(c), Fla. Stat. Accordingly, the CIS reports do not constitute competent, substantial, or persuasive evidence in this proceeding regarding the matters addressed in those reports. Thus, Petitioner's testimony constitutes the only competent substantial evidence in the record regarding the matters addressed in the CIS report for Intake No. 2007-310775-01, and there is no competent substantial evidence in the record regarding the matters addressed in the CIS report for Intake No. 2007-455485-01. Respondent has not adopted a rule defining the term "good moral character." Therefore, it is required to determine an applicant's "good moral character" based on the definition of that term in statute. As noted above, section 402.305(2)(a) provides that "good moral character" is determined "using the level 2 standards for screening set forth in" chapter 435. Ann Gleeson reviewed Petitioner's application for a family day care home license. She testified that based on her review of the CIS reports for Intake No. 2007-310775-01 and Intake No. 2007-455485-01, she "didn't feel comfortable" recommending approval of Petitioner's application for a family day care home license, and she recommended that the license be denied. As noted above, Gleeson did not have any personal knowledge of any of the matters in the CIS reports. She relied on the reports and their contents in making her recommendation to deny Petitioner's application. Suzette Frazier, Gleeson's supervisor, made the ultimate decision to deny Petitioner's application for the license. At the final hearing, Frazier testified that she determined that Petitioner's license should be denied based on the matters addressed in the CIS reports. Frazier testified that Petitioner's application raised particular concerns because of the two CIS reports, even though the CIS report for Marlon Bullock contained a "Findings – No Indicator" notation.7/ Frazier testified that it is Respondent's "policy" to deny an application for a family day care home license in every case in which the background screening for the applicant reveals an incident addressed in a CIS report. According to Frazier, this policy applies even if the background screening shows that the applicant does not have a history involving any of the offenses listed in section 435.04. Further to this point, when Petitioner asked Frazier at the final hearing what she (Petitioner) could do to demonstrate that she has good moral character for purposes of obtaining her license, Frazier told her that although she could reapply, she would never qualify to get the license because of the CIS reports. Frazier testified that, in her view, the CIS reports contain information indicating that both Petitioner and Marlon Bullock have a "propensity" toward violent behavior. Webster's Collegiate Dictionary, 11th edition,8/ defines "propensity" as "a natural inclination or tendency." A "tendency" is "an inclination, bent, or predisposition to something." Id. An "inclination" is a "tendency toward a certain condition." Id. A "predisposition" is a "tendency to a condition or quality." Id. Frazier's view that Petitioner and Marlon Bullock have a "propensity" toward violent behavior is not supported by the competent, substantial, or persuasive evidence in the record. To the extent Frazier relies on the information contained in the CIS reports to conclude that Petitioner and Marlon Bullock have a "propensity" toward violent behavior, neither of these reports constitutes competent substantial evidence regarding the matters addressed therein. Furthermore, to the extent Petitioner acknowledges that she engaged in the conduct addressed in CIS report Intake No. 2007-310775-01, the competent, substantial, and persuasive evidence shows that this incident——which was an isolated event that occurred in the context of an extremely emotional and difficult personal event in Petitioner's life——simply does not establish that she has a "tendency" or "inclination" or "predisposition" toward violent behavior. To the contrary, the competent, persuasive evidence shows that this was a one-time event that happened over 11 years ago, that Petitioner did not have any instances of violent behavior before then, and that she has not had any instances of violent behavior since then. Far from showing a "propensity" toward violent behavior, the competent, persuasive evidence shows that Petitioner has exhibited an otherwise completely non-violent course of conduct throughout her life. Additionally, as previously noted, the evidence shows that neither Petitioner nor Marlon Bullock have any history involving any of the offenses listed in section 435.04. There is no competent substantial evidence in the record showing that Petitioner has engaged, during the past 11-plus years, in any criminal or other conduct that would present a danger to children, and there is no competent substantial evidence in the record establishing that Marlon Bullock has ever engaged in any criminal or other conduct that would present a danger to children. To the contrary, the competent substantial evidence establishes that Petitioner and Marlon Bullock are law-abiding citizens. Petitioner is employed as the manager of a department for a Wal-Mart store. Marlon Bullock is, and has worked for 23 years as, a chef. Petitioner credibly and persuasively testified that she is a Christian who attends, and actively participates in, activities with her church. Petitioner also credibly and persuasively testified that she has raised her four sons from her previous marriage to be law-abiding, upstanding citizens. None of them has ever been arrested or involved in any criminal behavior, and her three adult children are all gainfully employed. Petitioner posits, persuasively, that her children are testaments to the stability of her character and her ability to provide a safe, nurturing environment for the care of children. Frazier testified that Respondent's review of Petitioner's application showed that apart from the good moral character requirement, Petitioner's application met all other requirements to qualify for a family day care home license.9/ Findings of Ultimate Fact Although Respondent has adopted a rule, detailed in its Handbook, which establishes the background screening process for purposes of determining good moral character, Respondent has not adopted a rule defining "good moral character" or establishing, apart from the standards set forth in section 402.305(2)(a), any other substantive standards for determining "good moral character." Accordingly, pursuant to the plain language of section 402.305(2)(a), the level 2 screening standards set forth in section 435.04 are the standards that pertain in this proceeding to determine good moral character. Pursuant to the foregoing findings of fact, and based on the competent, substantial, and persuasive evidence in the record, it is found, as a matter of ultimate fact, that Petitioner and Marlon Bullock are of good moral character. Conversely, the competent, substantial, and persuasive evidence in the record does not support a determination that Petitioner and Marlon Bullock do not have good moral character. As noted above, Respondent determined, in its review of Petitioner's application, that other than the good moral character requirement, Petitioner met all other statutory and rule requirements for a family day care home license. Because it is determined, in this de novo proceeding under section 120.57(1), that Petitioner and Marlon Bullock meet the good moral character requirement, Petitioner is entitled to issuance of a family day care home license pursuant to sections 402.305(2)(a), 402.312, and 402.313 and rule 65C-20.008. Finally, it is noted that Respondent has not adopted as a rule pursuant to section 120.54(1)(a), its "policy" of denying applications for family day care home licenses in every case in which the background screening for the applicant reveals an incident addressed in a CIS report. Accordingly, pursuant to section 120.57(1)(e)1., Respondent cannot rely on or apply this "policy" to deny Petitioner's application for a family day care home license.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that Respondent enter a final order granting Petitioner's license for a family day care home. DONE AND ENTERED this 12th day of April, 2018, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S CATHY M. SELLERS Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 12th day of April, 2018.
The Issue Whether Petitioner is entitled to an exemption from disqualification to work in a position of special trust.
Findings Of Fact On June 6, 1979, Petitioner went into a public restroom and attempted to use a urinal. To do so, he had to remove his sexual organ from his clothing. An adult male dressed in beach clothing called to him, "Come here," so Petitioner turned around and took half a step. The man asked, "What do you like?" Petitioner responded, "Women. Excuse me," and faced the urinal again. The other man, a plain-clothes law-enforcement officer, arrested Petitioner. Petitioner was charged with Section 800.03, Florida Statutes, "exposure of a sexual organ (by masturbation) -- misdemeanor." This was a misdemeanor charge at the time committed. Despite there having been no masturbation, in his opinion, Petitioner pled nolo contendere, and adjudication was withheld; he was assigned six months unsupervised probation and paid a fine. It is only on the basis of the foregoing 1979 plea that Petitioner has been disqualified from working in a position of special trust. He was notified by an April 18, 1996 letter that, pursuant to Sections 402.302(8) and 435.04(2), Florida Statutes [1995], he is disqualified as a household member in a family day care home. (Agency Exhibit 1) Petitioner also was arrested in 1982. The record is unclear as to what statute he was charged under at that time, but he did plead guilty and was fined. The circumstances surrounding the 1982 incident were established solely by Petitioner's testimony. He was in a department store restroom. There was a hole cut in the wall between two stalls "and apparently there was someone on the other side, the next stall that prompted me to put my sex organ through the hole in the wall." The person in the next stall was not a law enforcement officer. (TR 37-41, 43-45)1 Petitioner was arrested upon exiting the restroom. He has not been arrested since 1982. Petitioner has been happily married for 27 years. He and his wife have three children and five grandchildren. He and his wife are well-loved by their own children and grandchildren. They have a history of welcoming the troubled friends of their children into their home. The neighborhood children and Petitioner's grandchildren have always affectionately called Petitioner, "Grand-daddy" and have called Petitioner's wife, "Nanny." Their home is, and always has been, a gathering place for the neighborhood children. Petitioner's wife runs a licensed family day care home out of the family home from 6:00 a.m. to 6:00 p.m., Monday through Friday. Although she did not know about Petitioner's 1979 incident before it was disclosed through the agency screening process, she does not believe Petitioner presents a danger to children. She believes the 1979 incident constituted "entrapment". By a second letter dated April 18, 1996, Petitioner's wife was notified that, pursuant to Sections 402.302(8) and 435.04(2) Florida Statutes [1995] (Agency Exhibit 2), Petitioner was forbidden from having contact with any children in her family day care home and that if he is allowed to have contact with children in her care, she would be subject to an administrative fine and possible criminal penalties. The four children currently paying to attend Petitioner's wife's day care home are respectively aged one, two, three, and four years of age. For the last eight years, due to his trade as a self- employed leather worker, Petitioner has traveled a wide circuit from flea market to flea market throughout the week. He is only present in the family home from 10:30 p.m. Fridays to 3:00 a.m. Mondays. His wife's day care home does not operate during those periods that Petitioner is typically at home. Petitioner is a devout Seventh Day Adventist and an elder of his local church. He is the church's Sabbath School Superintendent. Petitioner's daughter and former daughter-in-law wrote letters entered in evidence and also testified that the family home is warm and loving and that Petitioner is a great "Grand- daddy." They rely on Petitioner and his wife for baby-sitting services. In their mutual opinion, Petitioner is not a danger to children, however some of their testimony minimized Petitioner's problems as only being "past mistakes." Neighbors' letters to the effect that Petitioner does not pose a threat to children, is active in his church, and travels except on weekends were admitted in evidence without objection, as was a statement by his pastor that Petitioner is a man of "impeccable character." However, none of these persons was available for cross-examination, and their letters do not clearly show that they had knowledge of Petitioner's past lewd acts or any reason or opportunity to know if he had committed any subsequent ones.
Recommendation Upon the foregoing findings of fact and conclusions of law, it is , reluctantly, RECOMMENDED that the Department of Children and Families enter a Final Order removing Petitioner from the registry of disqualified persons.RECOMMENDED this 6th day of March, 1997, at Tallahassee, Florida. ELLA JANE P. DAVIS Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax FILING (904) 921-6847 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 6th day of March, 1997.
The Issue Whether Respondent's registration to operate a family day care home should be revoked.
Findings Of Fact At all times material to the allegations of this case, Respondent, Kathy Stone, d/b/a Stone Family Day Care, was registered by the Department to operate a day care facility in her home located at 272 Southwest Fairchild Avenue, Port St. Lucie, Florida. As part of the registration for such day care home, Respondent was required to complete forms on which Respondent was to identify all members of the household residing at the registered location. Specifically, Respondent was to disclose any person over twelve years of age residing at the home. None of the registration forms completed by Respondent disclosed that an individual named Kevin Schaffer resided at the registered home. On more than one occasion law enforcement authorities were called to Respondent's residence in order to intervene in domestic disputes between Respondent and an individual named Kevin Schaffer. On all such occasions, Mr. Schaffer listed his residence as that of the Respondent's day care home. Mr. Schaffer is a convicted felon. Respondent failed to disclose that Mr. Schaffer was a resident over the age of twelve years residing at the registered day care facility.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that the Department of Children and Family Services enter a Final Order revoking Respondent's registration as a home day care facility. DONE AND ENTERED this 29th day of May, 1998, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. J. D. Parrish Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 29th day of May, 1998. COPIES FURNISHED: Gregory D. Venz, Agency Clerk Department of Children and Family Services Building 2, Room 204 1317 Winewood Boulevard Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0700 Richard A. Doran, General Counsel Department of Children and Family Services Building 2, Room 204 1317 Winewood Boulevard Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0700 Sydney L. Schwartz, Esquire Department of Children and Family Services 1436-C Old Dixie Highway Vero Beach, Florida 32960 Katherine Stone, pro se 272 Southwest Fairchild Avenue Port St. Lucie, Florida 34984
The Issue Whether Petitioner's license to operate a family day care home should be renewed.
Findings Of Fact Based on the testimony and evidence received at the hearing, the following findings are made: The Parties Respondent is the state agency responsible for licensing and regulating child care facilities, including family day care homes. Respondent routinely conducts inspections of licensed family day care homes to determine whether the homes are in compliance with the applicable statutes and rules. Any problems found during the inspections are noted on a report, which is provided to the home's operator immediately following the inspection. When appropriate, the inspection report provides a time frame within which the problems must be corrected. Regular inspections are conducted approximately twice a year. More frequent inspections--monthly or every six weeks-- are conducted on family day care homes which have a provisional license rather than a standard license. Respondent also conducts inspections in response to complaints it receives, and it has the authority to inspect family day care homes at any time with or without notice. Petitioner is the owner and operator of a licensed family day care home located at 1502 North Kettles Avenue, Lakeland, Florida (hereinafter "Petitioner's facility" or "the facility"). Petitioner resides at that address as well. Petitioner has operated a day care home at the above address for approximately three years. Petitioner has taken all required training in order to be licensed. As a result, she is, or should be, familiar with the rules regulating family day care homes. Petitioner keeps children in her home, and children also play in Petitioner's backyard. This area is enclosed by a fence. Inspections and Resulting Actions by Respondent Petitioner's facility was inspected on February 4, 2003, by Respondent's inspector, Timothy Graddy, who found Petitioner caring for children. Several areas of noncompliance were identified during this inspection. Violations noted included unsafe and unsecured storage of materials dangerous to children, namely, bleach and other household cleaning chemicals were left out in the kitchen and a bathroom cleaning product was observed in the tub; paper and trash were littered around the home's back door which leads to the playground area; water that had collected in the sandbox, which presented a drowning hazard; no written evidence of a fire drill having been conducted on a monthly basis; and some of the children's immunization records were found to be out-of-date, which presented a health safety issue. A re-inspection was conducted on February 6, 2003, all violations had been corrected, and no fine or other penalty was imposed at that time. On August 26, 2004, Respondent's inspector, Tricia Step, went to Petitioner's family day care home to carry out a routine inspection, and she observed five children in the home at that time. Several areas of noncompliance were identified. The lock on a kitchen cabinet did not catch, allowing children access to household cleaning products stored there; the children's play area contained litter (empty chip bags and soda cans); an extension cord was lying on the ground in the playground area; the play areas in the home were not clean and stacked against a wall were toys and "stuff," which could fall on the children; at the time of the inspection, children were observed sleeping on blankets with no mats under them, which is in violation of the requirement that each child be provided with a mat, at least one inch thick, covered with an impermeable surface; Petitioner could not provide a record of fire drills being conducted within the previous six months; and an up-to- date and age-appropriate immunization record was missing for a child in her care. After Ms. Step completed her inspection, she discussed the results with Petitioner and provided Petitioner a copy of the inspection report. Petitioner made the corrections required prior to the due date listed on the report. Petitioner's premises were inspected for re-licensure by Mr. Graddy on January 15, 2004, and several areas of noncompliance were identified. Mr. Graddy observed a hammer, motor oil, and a plastic garbage bag on the front stoop area, which are hazardous and dangerous to children; litter, including aluminum cans and paper, was observed in areas where children play; a gap in the required 4-foot fence was observed, which would permit children in the outdoor play area access to a trafficked street; a written record of fire drills for the months of December 2003 and January 2004 were not provided; Petitioner was unable to produce a student health examination file on two children in her care; and the current enrollment information was incomplete on four children. The results of the inspection were discussed with Petitioner, and she was given a copy of the report. Graddy then went back to his office and discussed the results of the inspection with his supervisor, Patricia Hamilton. Based upon the results of the January 15, 2004, inspection and the prior incidents of noncompliance at Petitioner's facility, Ms. Hamilton determined that Petitioner's license should not be renewed. Although Petitioner attempted to do so, Respondent did not give Petitioner an opportunity to bring her home into compliance with the minimum standards in Respondent's licensing rules and standards before deciding to issue a letter of denial. Thereafter, on March 2, 2004, Mr. Graddy sent a letter to Petitioner informing her that her license was not being renewed and advising Petitioner of her right to "appeal" that decision through the administrative process. At the hearing, Ms. Hamilton testified that she was particularly concerned about Petitioner's repeat violations, namely Petitioner allowing the children access to toxic and other dangerous materials, repeated failure to conduct fire drills, and to keep health and enrollment records current. She characterized these as serious child safety violations. These were the primary reasons she recommended that Petitioner's child care license not be renewed. Petitioner, in her testimony, did not deny committing the violations noted in the inspections of February 4, 2003, August 26, 2003, and January 15, 2004. However, she did demonstrate that a re-inspection of her facility listed her to be in compliance with all violations listed in the report. Petitioner's testimony is credible, especially when bolstered by her friends, family, and client's testimonials, that she is a loving and caring person who goes out of her way to care for the children she keeps in her home. The evidence is clear and convincing that Petitioner violated several code provisions, including repeated violations of the rules regarding toxic and hazardous materials; trash and dangerous conditions in the children's play area; failure to conduct fire drills; and failure to have current health and enrollment records on file for each child. Respondent withdrew its allegation that Petitioner was not a person of good moral character. Petitioner has shown mitigating evidence that she is a concerned and loving caregiver and has demonstrated that her license for a family day care home should not be denied or revoked but that a lesser penalty should be imposed.
Recommendation Based upon the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that the Department of Children and Family Services issue a final order as follows: Finding Petitioner guilty of violating the provisions of Florida Administrative Code Rules 65C-20.010(1)(b) (three counts), 65C-20.010(1(e) (three counts), and 65C-20.010(3)(b)4. (three counts). Finding Petitioner not guilty of violating the provisions of Section 402.301, Florida Statutes. Issuing Petitioner a provisional license. DONE AND ENTERED this 30th day of July, 2004, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S DANIEL M. KILBRIDE Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 30th day of July, 2004.
