The Issue The issue in this case is whether Petitioner is entitled to issuance of a license to operate a family day care home, pursuant to chapter 402, Florida Statutes, and Florida Administrative Code Rule 65C-20.008.
Findings Of Fact The Parties Petitioner, Shaguandra Ruffin Bullock, is an applicant for a family day care home license for the Ruffin Bullock Family Day Care Home. Respondent is the state agency responsible for licensing family day care homes in Florida. § 402.312(1), Fla. Stat. Events Giving Rise to this Proceeding A "family day care home" is an occupied residence in which child care is regularly provided for children from at least two unrelated families and which receives a payment, fee, or grant for any of the children receiving care, whether or not operated for profit. § 402.302(8), Fla. Stat. On or about July 6, 2017, Petitioner filed an application to operate a family day care home. Respondent reviewed the application and determined that it was incomplete, pending completion of the background screening required by sections 402.313(3), 402.305, and 402.3055.2/ On or about December 8, 2017, Respondent sent Petitioner a Notice of Intent to Deny Family Day Care Home Licensure ("NOI"), informing her of Respondent's intent to deny her application for a family day care home. The NOI stated, in pertinent part: On October 10, 2017, the Department received background clearance letters from child care personnel at Respondent's Family Day Care Home. Pursuant to Section 402.313(3), Florida Stat., childcare personnel in family day care homes are subject to applicable screening provisions. Pursuant to Section 402.302(15), Florida Stat. and Section 39.201(6), Florida Stat., The Department assessed the background of child care personnel at Respondent's family day care home including, but not limited to information from the central abuse hotline. The Department's assessment revealed the Respondent did not meet minimum standards for child care personnel upon screening which requires personnel to have good moral character pursuant to Section 402.305(2)(a), Florida Stat. The foregoing violates Rule 65C- 22.008(3), Fla. Admin. Code,[3/] Section 402.305(2)(a), Fla. Stat. and Section 402.313(3), Florida Stat. Based on the foregoing, Ruffin Bullock Family Day Care Home's, [sic] pending licensure application will be denied. Evidence Adduced at the Hearing At the final hearing, Respondent acknowledged that the background screening for Petitioner and her husband, Marlon Bullock, did not reveal that either had ever engaged in any of the offenses identified in section 435.04, Florida Statutes, which establishes the level 2 screening standards applicable to determining good moral character in this proceeding, pursuant to section 402.305(2)(a).4/ Rather, Respondent proposes to deny Petitioner's license application solely based on two confidential investigative summaries ("CIS reports") addressing incidents—— one involving Petitioner that occurred over 11 years ago, and one ostensibly involving Marlon Bullock that allegedly occurred almost 11 years ago. The CIS report for Intake No. 2007-310775-01 addresses an incident that occurred on or about January 16, 2007. Petitioner acknowledges that the incident addressed in the CIS report for Intake No. 2007-310775-01 occurred. Petitioner testified, credibly and persuasively, that at the time of the incident, Petitioner and her then-husband, Bernard L. Johnson, were going through a very difficult, emotionally-charged divorce. Petitioner went to Johnson's home to retrieve their minor children. An argument between her and Johnson ensued, and she threw a car jack through the back window of Johnson's vehicle. As a result of this incident, Petitioner was arrested. However, she was not prosecuted, and the charges against her were dropped. Respondent's witnesses, Ann Gleeson and Suzette Frazier, both acknowledged that they did not have any independent personal knowledge regarding the occurrence, or any aspects, of the incident reported in the CIS report for Intake No. 2007-310775-01. The other CIS report, for Intake No. 2007-455485-01, addresses an incident that ostensibly took place on September 7, 2007, involving Marlon Bullock, who is now Petitioner's husband. Petitioner was not married to Bullock at the time of the incident reported in the CIS report for Intake No. 2007- 455485-01. She credibly testified that she was completely unaware of the incident, and had no knowledge of any aspect of it, until she saw the CIS report in connection with this proceeding. Gleeson and Frazier both acknowledged that they did not have any independent knowledge regarding the occurrence, or any aspects, of the incident addressed in the CIS report for Intake No. 2007-455485-01.5/ The CIS reports and their contents are hearsay that does not fall within any exception to the hearsay rule.6/ The CIS reports and the information contained therein consist of summaries of statements made by third parties to the investigators who prepared the reports. The investigators did not have any personal knowledge about the matters addressed in the reports. It is well-established that hearsay evidence, while admissible in administrative proceedings, cannot form the sole basis of a finding of fact in such proceedings. § 120.57(1)(c), Fla. Stat. Accordingly, the CIS reports do not constitute competent, substantial, or persuasive evidence in this proceeding regarding the matters addressed in those reports. Thus, Petitioner's testimony constitutes the only competent substantial evidence in the record regarding the matters addressed in the CIS report for Intake No. 2007-310775-01, and there is no competent substantial evidence in the record regarding the matters addressed in the CIS report for Intake No. 2007-455485-01. Respondent has not adopted a rule defining the term "good moral character." Therefore, it is required to determine an applicant's "good moral character" based on the definition of that term in statute. As noted above, section 402.305(2)(a) provides that "good moral character" is determined "using the level 2 standards for screening set forth in" chapter 435. Ann Gleeson reviewed Petitioner's application for a family day care home license. She testified that based on her review of the CIS reports for Intake No. 2007-310775-01 and Intake No. 2007-455485-01, she "didn't feel comfortable" recommending approval of Petitioner's application for a family day care home license, and she recommended that the license be denied. As noted above, Gleeson did not have any personal knowledge of any of the matters in the CIS reports. She relied on the reports and their contents in making her recommendation to deny Petitioner's application. Suzette Frazier, Gleeson's supervisor, made the ultimate decision to deny Petitioner's application for the license. At the final hearing, Frazier testified that she determined that Petitioner's license should be denied based on the matters addressed in the CIS reports. Frazier testified that Petitioner's application raised particular concerns because of the two CIS reports, even though the CIS report for Marlon Bullock contained a "Findings – No Indicator" notation.7/ Frazier testified that it is Respondent's "policy" to deny an application for a family day care home license in every case in which the background screening for the applicant reveals an incident addressed in a CIS report. According to Frazier, this policy applies even if the background screening shows that the applicant does not have a history involving any of the offenses listed in section 435.04. Further to this point, when Petitioner asked Frazier at the final hearing what she (Petitioner) could do to demonstrate that she has good moral character for purposes of obtaining her license, Frazier told her that although she could reapply, she would never qualify to get the license because of the CIS reports. Frazier testified that, in her view, the CIS reports contain information indicating that both Petitioner and Marlon Bullock have a "propensity" toward violent behavior. Webster's Collegiate Dictionary, 11th edition,8/ defines "propensity" as "a natural inclination or tendency." A "tendency" is "an inclination, bent, or predisposition to something." Id. An "inclination" is a "tendency toward a certain condition." Id. A "predisposition" is a "tendency to a condition or quality." Id. Frazier's view that Petitioner and Marlon Bullock have a "propensity" toward violent behavior is not supported by the competent, substantial, or persuasive evidence in the record. To the extent Frazier relies on the information contained in the CIS reports to conclude that Petitioner and Marlon Bullock have a "propensity" toward violent behavior, neither of these reports constitutes competent substantial evidence regarding the matters addressed therein. Furthermore, to the extent Petitioner acknowledges that she engaged in the conduct addressed in CIS report Intake No. 2007-310775-01, the competent, substantial, and persuasive evidence shows that this incident——which was an isolated event that occurred in the context of an extremely emotional and difficult personal event in Petitioner's life——simply does not establish that she has a "tendency" or "inclination" or "predisposition" toward violent behavior. To the contrary, the competent, persuasive evidence shows that this was a one-time event that happened over 11 years ago, that Petitioner did not have any instances of violent behavior before then, and that she has not had any instances of violent behavior since then. Far from showing a "propensity" toward violent behavior, the competent, persuasive evidence shows that Petitioner has exhibited an otherwise completely non-violent course of conduct throughout her life. Additionally, as previously noted, the evidence shows that neither Petitioner nor Marlon Bullock have any history involving any of the offenses listed in section 435.04. There is no competent substantial evidence in the record showing that Petitioner has engaged, during the past 11-plus years, in any criminal or other conduct that would present a danger to children, and there is no competent substantial evidence in the record establishing that Marlon Bullock has ever engaged in any criminal or other conduct that would present a danger to children. To the contrary, the competent substantial evidence establishes that Petitioner and Marlon Bullock are law-abiding citizens. Petitioner is employed as the manager of a department for a Wal-Mart store. Marlon Bullock is, and has worked for 23 years as, a chef. Petitioner credibly and persuasively testified that she is a Christian who attends, and actively participates in, activities with her church. Petitioner also credibly and persuasively testified that she has raised her four sons from her previous marriage to be law-abiding, upstanding citizens. None of them has ever been arrested or involved in any criminal behavior, and her three adult children are all gainfully employed. Petitioner posits, persuasively, that her children are testaments to the stability of her character and her ability to provide a safe, nurturing environment for the care of children. Frazier testified that Respondent's review of Petitioner's application showed that apart from the good moral character requirement, Petitioner's application met all other requirements to qualify for a family day care home license.9/ Findings of Ultimate Fact Although Respondent has adopted a rule, detailed in its Handbook, which establishes the background screening process for purposes of determining good moral character, Respondent has not adopted a rule defining "good moral character" or establishing, apart from the standards set forth in section 402.305(2)(a), any other substantive standards for determining "good moral character." Accordingly, pursuant to the plain language of section 402.305(2)(a), the level 2 screening standards set forth in section 435.04 are the standards that pertain in this proceeding to determine good moral character. Pursuant to the foregoing findings of fact, and based on the competent, substantial, and persuasive evidence in the record, it is found, as a matter of ultimate fact, that Petitioner and Marlon Bullock are of good moral character. Conversely, the competent, substantial, and persuasive evidence in the record does not support a determination that Petitioner and Marlon Bullock do not have good moral character. As noted above, Respondent determined, in its review of Petitioner's application, that other than the good moral character requirement, Petitioner met all other statutory and rule requirements for a family day care home license. Because it is determined, in this de novo proceeding under section 120.57(1), that Petitioner and Marlon Bullock meet the good moral character requirement, Petitioner is entitled to issuance of a family day care home license pursuant to sections 402.305(2)(a), 402.312, and 402.313 and rule 65C-20.008. Finally, it is noted that Respondent has not adopted as a rule pursuant to section 120.54(1)(a), its "policy" of denying applications for family day care home licenses in every case in which the background screening for the applicant reveals an incident addressed in a CIS report. Accordingly, pursuant to section 120.57(1)(e)1., Respondent cannot rely on or apply this "policy" to deny Petitioner's application for a family day care home license.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that Respondent enter a final order granting Petitioner's license for a family day care home. DONE AND ENTERED this 12th day of April, 2018, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S CATHY M. SELLERS Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 12th day of April, 2018.
The Issue The issue in this case is whether Petitioner's application for a license to operate a family day care center should be granted.
Findings Of Fact DCF is the state agency responsible for, inter alia, the approval and monitoring of family day care homes. Petitioner Karen G. Flanders ("Flanders") has been working in the child care field for several years. On or about April 21, 2006, Flanders submitted a Family Day Care Home Registration form, which is an application seeking approval to operate a small day care home. As part of the application process, Flanders agreed to allow DCF to conduct a Central Abuse Hotline Record search to determine the existence of any complaints or actions against her. The consent form Flanders signed allowing the search included a provision that the department would see any investigation resulting in "verified indicators." During its processing of the application, DCF determined the existence of an investigative report concerning Flanders. The incident in the report allegedly occurred on September 1, 2005. Flanders was alleged to have grabbed, slapped, and punched a child, C.S., while working as a day care worker for Kids Together day care facility. Flanders was immediately terminated from employment by her employer. The Central Abuse Hotline was contacted immediately. By her own admission, Flanders was the caller. Pursuant to its duty, DCF conducted an investigation the day after the alleged incident. The investigation found there were "some indicators" of excessive corporal punishment. The term "some indicators" advises DCF that some adverse incident has happened, but it could have been a one-time issue that may never happen again. In this case, the primary concern of DCF was that the alleged incident occurred in a child care facility. Flanders had an excessive history of prior reported incidents, which was taken into consideration by the investigators. Based on those findings, the safety of the child victim became a concern. DCF found, however, that Flanders' termination from employment was sufficient to alleviate further concern for the child. Flanders has been involved in child care for many years and considers it her occupation. Her pending application to operate a small child care facility is consistent with her work history. However, she has had an adverse incident resulting in some indicators of abusive behavior.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that a final order be entered by the Department of Children and Family Services denying the application by Karen Flanders to operate a day care facility. DONE AND ENTERED this 22nd day of September, 2006, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S R. BRUCE MCKIBBEN Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 22nd day of September, 2006. COPIES FURNISHED: Karen Flanders 14924 Lady Victoria Boulevard Orlando, Florida 32826 Stacy N. Robinson Pierce, Esquire Department of Children and Family Services 400 West Robinson Street, Suite S-1114 Orlando, Florida 32801 Gregory Venz, Agency Clerk Department of Children and Family Services Building 2, Room 204B 1317 Winewood Boulevard Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0700 John Copelan, General Counsel Department of Children and Family Services Building 2, Room 204 1317 Winewood Boulevard Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0700 Luci D. Hadi, Secretary Department of Children and Family Services Building 1, Room 202 1317 Winewood Boulevard Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0700
The Issue The issue in the case is whether the Petitioner's application for renewal of a family day care home license should be granted.
Findings Of Fact At all times relevant to this case, the Petitioner owned and operated a licensed family day care home in Lakeland, Florida. On March 26, 2003, representatives of the Respondent arrived at the Petitioner's facility to assist in distributing materials that had been obtained by the facility. There were six children in the facility on March 26, 2003. The Petitioner was the only adult present and available to supervise the children. Upon arriving at the facility, one of the Respondent's representatives discovered an unsupervised "toddler" playing in the bathroom. The child's hands were in a toilet that was unclean and unflushed. One of the Respondent's representatives removed the child's hands from the toilet intending to wash the child's hands, but there was no soap or toweling available. It is unclear whether the Petitioner was aware that the child was in the bathroom, but in any event the child was unsupervised. Subsequently during the same visit, the Petitioner took the children outside into a play area and then returned inside to talk to the Respondent's representatives, leaving all of the children outside and unsupervised. The Respondent's representatives terminated their visit after advising the Petitioner to return outside and supervise the children. On March 27, 2003, a child protective investigator (CPI) employed by the Respondent arrived at the facility to investigate a report of inadequate supervision received on the previous day. Upon arriving, the CPI asked the Petitioner, who was the only adult present in the facility, as to the census and was advised that there were five children in the facility. The CPI observed the five children in a playroom. A few minutes later, the CPI responded to noise coming from the bathroom and discovered a sixth child, unsupervised and playing in the apparently-clean toilet water. The CPI removed the child's hands from the water. At one point, the Petitioner took another child into the bathroom and left him there. At another point, the Petitioner put infants into a room to nap, leaving the other children unsupervised while she did so, and then leaving the infants unsupervised while they napped. One child ran into an enclosed garage area without the Petitioner's knowledge. The Petitioner was unable to properly identify all of the children by name when requested to do so by the CPI. When asked to retrieve files on the children, the Petitioner left all the children unsupervised while she went to her automobile to get the files. The Petitioner asserted that the CPI had offered to watch the children while she went outside to get the files. The CPI denied having agreed to supervise the children. The greater weight of the evidence fails to support the Petitioner's assertion that the CPI offered to supervise the children during the visit.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that the Respondent enter a Final Order denying the Petitioner's application for renewal of licensure as a family day care home. DONE AND ENTERED this 24th day of September, 2003, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S WILLIAM F. QUATTLEBAUM Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 24th day of September, 2003. COPIES FURNISHED: Jack Emory Farley, Esquire Department of Children and Family Services 4720 Old Highway 37 Lakeland, Florida 33813-2030 Wanda Williams Williams Family Daycare Home 1630 Fruitwood Drive Lakeland, Florida 33805 Paul Flounlacker, Agency Clerk Department of Children and Family Services 1317 Winewood Boulevard Building 2, Room 204B Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0700 Josie Tomayo, General Counsel Department of Children and Family Services 1317 Winewood Boulevard Building 2, Room 204 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0700 Jerry Regier, Secretary Department of Children and Family Services 1317 Winewood Boulevard Building 1, Room 202 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0700
The Issue The issue in this case is whether Petitioner is entitled to a license to operate a family day care home under the provisions of Chapter 402, Florida Statutes (2003).
Findings Of Fact On February 16, 2004, the Department notified Petitioner that her application for a license to operate a family day care home was denied. The denial was based on information obtained by the Department as part of the background check it conducted in review of Petitioner's application. The denial letter advised Petitioner that the family day care home license was denied based on information contained in Abuse Hotline Report No. 2002-132739 (2002 Abuse Report). According to the 2002 Abuse Report, Petitioner failed to take her daughter to the doctor for a follow-up visit three weeks after he removed a cast from her arm, so that the doctor could insure that the injury was healing properly. As a result of the foregoing allegations, the 2002 Abuse Report concluded that there were "some indicators" of medical neglect by Petitioner. The Department's background investigation revealed that Petitioner's husband, Darrell Faniel, who resided with her, pled nolo contendre to the charge of selling cocaine, a felony offense, and was adjudicated guilty of that offense in 1991 in Case No. CF90-5739 in the Circuit Court of the Tenth Judicial Circuit in and for Polk County, Florida, Criminal Division. As a result of this felony conviction on July 25, 1991, Mr. Faniel was placed on probation for five years, but was discharged from probation about 16 months early pursuant to a court order which stated that Mr. Faniel "has complied with the rules and regulation of probation and is no longer in need of supervision." The family day care home license for which Petitioner applied would allow her to care for up to ten children in her home. Given the foregoing information obtained by the Department as part of its background investigation, the Department had doubts about whether Petitioner could provide a safe day care home for children. Accordingly, the Department denied Petitioner's application. The foregoing facts have not been refuted by Petitioner, nor did she present any evidence to demonstrate that she is eligible for licensure as an operator of a family day care home. As noted in the Preliminary Statement, Petitioner did not appear at hearing, and no evidence was presented on her behalf.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that the Department of Children and Family Services enter a final order denying Petitioner a license to operate a family day care home. DONE AND ENTERED this 20th day of July, 2004, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S CAROLYN S. HOLIFIELD Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 20th day of July, 2004. COPIES FURNISHED: Jack Emory Farley, Esquire Department of Children and Family Services 4720 Old Highway 37 Lakeland, Florida 33813-2030 Cutina Faniel 2404 Temple Circle Haines City, Florida 33884 Paul F. Flounlacker, Agency Clerk Department of Children and Family Services 1317 Winewood Boulevard Building 2, Room 204B Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0700 Josie Tomayo, General Counsel Department of Children and Family Services 1317 Winewood Boulevard Building 2, Room 204 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0700
The Issue Was Petitioner properly disqualified from working in a position of special trust pursuant to Section 435.04, Florida Statutes, on the basis of a July 21, 1996, incident? If Petitioner was properly disqualified as a result of the July 21, 1996, incident, has she been sufficiently rehabilitated so as to be eligible for an exemption to work in a position of special trust, pursuant to Section 435.07(3), Florida Statutes?
Findings Of Fact Petitioner was licensed through Leon County as a family home day care provider in 1995. Since 1996, she has been operating her family day care home pursuant to an exemption from disqualification by a 1973 disqualifying felony (manslaughter). Petitioner is a high school graduate. She was schooled and certified in New York as a nurse technician. She is certified as a home health aide in Florida. When she sought to renew her license in 2000, Petitioner was required to sign an Affidavit of Good Moral Character. The 2000 Affidavit of Good Moral Character read: By signing this form, I am swearing that I have not been found guilty or entered a plea of guilty of nolo contendere (no contest), regardless of the adjudication, to any of the following charges under the provisions of the Florida Statutes or under any similar statute of another jurisdiction. I also attest that I do not have a delinquency record that is similar to any of these offenses. I understand I must acknowledge the existence of criminal records relating to the following list regardless of whether or not those records have been sealed or expunged. I understand that I am also obligated to notify my employer of any possible disqualifying offenses that may occur while employed in a position subject to background screening under Chapter 435, Florida Statutes. The 2000 Affidavit then listed a number of offenses and the corresponding statute numbers. Among the offenses listed were: Sections 741.30 domestic violence and injunction for protection. 784.03 battery, if the victim was a minor. The 2000 Affidavit is DCF's attempt to paraphrase Section 435.04, Florida Statutes, listing disqualifying offenses. It is flawed and could be misleading because domestic violence can occur without an injunction for protection. Petitioner signed the 2000 Affidavit on January 25, 2000, in the portion declaring herself free of any disqualifying statutory violations and also signed the Affidavit in the portion stating, "To the best of my knowledge and belief, my record may contain one or more of the foregoing disqualifying acts or offenses." Petitioner testified in the instant case that she did not divulge the July 21, 1996, incident on her 2000 Affidavit because she did not think it constituted domestic violence, but why she signed contradictory statements was not explained. Petitioner's day care license was renewed, despite Petitioner's contradictory declarations on her 2000 Affidavit. She was notified of her disqualification when the five-year background screening turned-up an offense that had occurred on July 21, 1996. The Year 2000 background screening results which DCF received from the Florida Department of Law Enforcement indicated that Petitioner had been found guilty of "battery," on the basis of the July 21, 1996, incident. The Department's Background Screening Coordinator then obtained additional documentation from the file of the Leon County Court. Based on the information in the court file, the Department's District II Office concluded that Petitioner was disqualified because of a "domestic battery" offense. Petitioner exhausted informal procedures and timely requested an evidentiary hearing pursuant to Section 120.57(1), Florida Statutes (2000). The instant case followed. The instant case is the second occasion Petitioner has appeared before the Division of Administrative Hearings requesting an exemption from disqualification to work in a position of special trust. The first occasion Petitioner appeared before the Division occurred in September 1996, when she sought an exemption because she had been disqualified due to her 1973 felony manslaughter conviction in New York. Petitioner had failed to disclose the 1973 felony conviction on her 1995 affidavit when she first applied to be a child care worker.1 That disqualifying offense showed-up in the initial screening procedures applicable to such applicants. Petitioner was granted an exemption for the 1973 manslaughter conviction in Harris v. Department of Health and Rehabilitative Services, DOAH Case No. 96-2010 (Recommended Order entered September 10, 1996; Final Order entered October 30, 1996), as more fully described below in Findings of Fact 34-36. She has been a licensed day care provider ever since. In 1996, Petitioner and Frank Fields had a romantic involvement bounded by Mr. Fields' keeping most of his belongings at his sister's apartment and merely sleeping over at Petitioner's home two to three nights per week, on a sporadic basis.2 On these occasions, he brought with him, and occasionally left in Petitioner's home, only his underwear and some music CDs. At all times material, Frank Fields was an adult male. Although younger than Petitioner, he was not a minor. On July 21, 1996, Petitioner, who was then 47 years old, was two months' pregnant with Frank Fields' child. She testified that at that time she was very upset and confused because of her pregnancy; because Mr. Fields was not helping with household expenses; and because she had heard that Mr. Fields was moving from his sister's apartment to an apartment of his own. On July 21, 1996, Petitioner was driving her car on Blountstown Highway. She noticed Mr. Fields' van and also noticed that there was a female in the passenger's seat of the van. Apparently, Petitioner believed that Mr. Fields was romantically involved with his female passenger. Petitioner had one adult daughter; the adult daughter's three children, all under the age of nine years, and her own eight-year-old daughter with her in her car. According to Petitioner's testimony, none of the four children in her car were young enough to require a car seat and none of her day care children were in her car. According to the police officer who later arrested Petitioner, there were six "children" in the back seat of Petitioner's car, not six people in the whole car. Regardless of this discrepancy in testimony, it is undisputed that there were no car seats and insufficient car safety belts for the number of passengers in Petitioner's car on July 21, 1996. Without approving either Petitioner's motivation or her reasoning, I find credible her testimony that she would not have taken her next actions had there been any day care children in her car because if day care parents found out about it, Petitioner could be "put in jeopardy"; she "could be in a lot of trouble"; and she would not have had day care children with her over a weekend. July 21, 1996 was, in fact, a Sunday. In making the immediately foregoing Finding of Fact, I have not overlooked Ms. Brantley's testimony that on occasion Petitioner has kept Ms. Brantley's children in Petitioner's home on nights and weekends while Ms. Brantley traveled. However, even assuming arguendo, but not ruling, that six rather than four children were in Petitioner's car on July 21, 1996, there is no direct evidence that any of them were also day care clients. Petitioner drove her car, filled with passengers, following Mr. Fields' van. Mr. Fields turned onto Nekoma Lane and pulled over to the side of the road. Petitioner pulled over and intentionally bumped her car into the back of Mr. Fields' van. Petitioner and Mr. Fields exited their respective vehicles, and Petitioner demanded to know who Mr. Fields' female passenger was, even though Petitioner knew the passenger was named "Melissa." Some screaming ensued, and Petitioner and Mr. Fields "tussled," hitting and scratching each other. Petitioner and her adult daughter testified that they did not know who struck the first blow. The non-hearsay evidence is insufficient to establish that on this occasion Petitioner left a bite mark on Mr. Fields' arm. When Mr. Fields began to wield a stick he had picked up from the side of the road, Petitioner's adult daughter got between him and her mother. Petitioner then drove her car, still containing its passengers, so as to follow Melissa, who had walked around the corner. Petitioner then "had a conversation" with Melissa. There is no evidence that the children were anywhere except inside Petitioner's car during either her confrontation with Mr. Fields or with Melissa. When the police arrived on the scene, Petitioner was arrested for battery and for driving with a suspended driver's license. The suspended license charge arose because, when questioned by the police, Petitioner gave her name as "Veronica L. Wynn." Petitioner's legal name was, in fact, "Veronica Harris." Petitioner also told the officer that her date of birth was September 19, 1959, and that she lived at 2106 Monday Street. Petitioner's true date of birth is September 19, 1949, and her true address was 1229 Elberta Street. When the officer could not find a driver's license record for "Veronica L. Wynn," Petitioner told him that the name on her license might be "Veronica Lee Harris Wynn." After she gave him the name "Veronica Lee Harris Wynn," the officer found Petitioner's driver's license record and learned that her driver's license had been suspended. Petitioner had recently been divorced and had "gone back" to her maiden name, but she testified herein that on July 21, 1996, she deliberately gave incorrect information to the police because she knew her driver's license was suspended and the police were going to check on it. Mr. Fields was provided with a pamphlet explaining his right to request domestic abuse protection and prosecution. Apparently, he did nothing about it. Petitioner was charged, in an Information which recited the statutory language of both Subsections 784.03(1) (a) and (b), Florida Statutes (1995), with "battery (M1)," meaning "first degree misdemeanor battery." The Information cited only "Section 784.03, Florida Statutes," for that offense. The Information also charged Petitioner with "driving while license suspended or revoked (M2)" also a misdemeanor, under Section 322.34(1), Florida Statutes (1995). On August 28, 2000, Petitioner entered a "no contest" plea to both charges. Petitioner was adjudicated guilty of misdemeanor battery and was ordered to serve 12 months of probation with the following conditions: (1) no contact with Frank Fields; (2) $155.00 court costs; and (3) $100.00 fine. She was also required to pay a monthly supervision fee while on probation and a fee for the services of the public defender. There was no charge, plea, or sentence stating "domestic violence" or citing a domestic violence statute. Petitioner was not required to attend a batterers' intervention program, pursuant to Section 741.281, Florida Statutes. No evidence was presented to show that the sentencing court had made written, factual findings that attendance at a batterers' intervention program would be an inappropriate condition for her probation. Petitioner's probation was terminated in December 1997. Petitioner miscarried her child conceived of Frank Fields before a live birth. Petitioner's emotional connection with Mr. Fields seems to have terminated with the July 21, 1996, incident. At the September 9, 1996, formal exemption hearing in Harris v. Department of Health and Rehabilitative Services, DOAH Case No. 96-2010 (see Finding of Fact No. 12) Petitioner and her witnesses did not divulge that six weeks earlier, on July 21, 1996, Petitioner had been arrested for her altercation with Frank Fields or that less than two weeks earlier, on August 28, 1996, Petitioner had pled "no contest" to battery of Frank Fields. Petitioner testified in the instant case that she did not divulge the July 21, 1996, incident during the 1996 formal exemption proceeding before the Division because "it was not part of my day care home and had nothing to do with day care children."3 The Recommended Order in DOAH Case No. 96-2010 observed that "Petitioner, now a grandmother, testified tearfully to her errant behavior at the age of 21, over 24 years ago in New York. Petitioner has never been charged with any legal violation since that time, with the exception of traffic tickets . . .since the [1973] incident, . . . Petitioner has lived an exemplary life . . . ." That Order recommended granting an exemption. The outcome of the Final Order, entered October 26, 1996, was that Petitioner was exempted from the 1973 felony disqualification.4 Petitioner contends that she never committed "domestic violence" and even if she did, she has been "rehabilitated" since July 21, 1996. She feels that she should be granted an exemption because she is sorry for what she did; because if she had been thinking, she would not have done it; and because she loves her day care children. Since 1996, Petitioner has operated her family day care home and has pursued her goal of becoming a Master Provider of day care. In order to become a Master Provider, one must have taken the Second Helping Course (a refresher course for experienced day care providers); have either a Child Development Associate Certificate or national accreditation; and have five years' experience. Currently, there are only two Master Providers in Leon County. In 1998, Petitioner received a $500.00 Caring for Kids Mini-Grant which she used to purchase day care toys. In March 2000, Petitioner received a scholarship from the T.E.A.C.H. Early Childhood Project, which she had planned to use to take classes at Tallahassee Community Hospital towards her Child Development Associate certification. Petitioner has put this project on "hold" during the pendancy of the instant case. In May 2000, Petitioner completed the Second Helping Course. In Leon County, only approximately 20 family home day care providers have taken this course. In 2000, Petitioner received a $275.00 Caring for Kids Mini-Grant which she used to help pay for her Second Helping Course. Petitioner was selected to receive a Kids Incorporated Infant/Toddler Initiative Grant of $3,000, which she intended to use to purchase toys and equipment for her day care home. Petitioner was hand-picked by Kids Incorporated because of her genuine love and concern for the children and because Kids Incorporated felt that Petitioner only needed additional toys and equipment in order to improve her day care home. However, because of the instant case, Kids Incorporated has not yet disbursed this money to Petitioner. Kids Incorporated wants to be assured the money will go to someone who will be a day care provider for the long-term. Petitioner has volunteered for the school readiness program sponsored by Kids Incorporated, which has resulted in additional visits and evaluations of her day care home. Her day care children have all scored "above average" in the program. Katherine Schmidt, a Family Child Care Specialist with Kids Incorporated, testified that she has evaluated and assessed Petitioner's day care home in her capacity with Kids Incorporated and during the period she was helping Petitioner obtain the grants mentioned above. Ms. Schmidt believes Petitioner is an excellent day care provider and would not be a danger to the children in her care. Ms. Schmidt also believes Petitioner would be a benefit to the children and their families. The Leon County Home Day Care Providers Association and Support Group meets monthly, and Petitioner regularly attends. Two day care providers wrote letters in support of Petitioner. Cicely Brantley is a professional music education teacher in Leon County's public school system. Ms. Brantley's two children attend Petitioner's family day care home. She has seen Petitioner briefly at least five days per week for the last two years. Ms. Brantley's older child is two and one-half years old and has been in Petitioner's day care home since he was nine months' old. Her younger child is 15 months old and has been in Petitioner's day care home since she was eight weeks old. Ms. Brantley testified that she trusts Petitioner with her children and that she trusts and values Petitioner's judgment when it comes to the children. Ms. Brantley often asks Petitioner's advice about parenting, discipline, and health issues involving her children. Ms. Brantley testified that other than her husband, Petitioner is the person she trusts the most with her children and that Petitioner goes above and beyond what most day care providers would do, both in education and care. Ms. Brantley was aware of the battery incident that occurred between Petitioner and Mr. Fields, but it did not change her opinion of Petitioner. She does not believe that Petitioner would ever be a danger to her children. Ms. Brantley really does not want to have to find other child care if Petitioner is unsuccessful in getting an exemption, and it is apparent that this concern has influenced her testimony. Versee Hoffman is a Pioneer with the Jehovah's Witnesses. This means that she has committed to serving 70 hours per month with her ministry. Ms. Hoffman met Petitioner approximately five years ago through church. Ms. Hoffman and Petitioner studied the Bible together periodically. At that time, Ms. Hoffman felt that Petitioner was not really committed to the church or its moral standards, and their studies ended. Thereafter, Ms. Hoffman did not see Petitioner for approximately two years. In early 1999, Petitioner approached Ms. Hoffman and told Ms. Hoffman that she wanted to renew their Bible studies. Ms. Hoffman agreed, and they have been studying the Bible together weekly ever since. Ms. Hoffman testified that the Jehovah's Witnesses expect their members to attend five weekly meetings and that Petitioner consistently attends those meetings. Ms. Hoffman testified that Petitioner has grown spiritually and personally since Ms. Hoffman first met her five years ago. Ms. Hoffman believes that Petitioner is truly committed to leading a spiritual life and to meeting the Jehovah's Witnesses' moral standards against violence. Ms. Hoffman believes that Petitioner will continue to meet these standards.
Recommendation Based upon the findings of fact and conclusions of law, it is RECOMMENDED: That the Department of Children and Family Services enter a final order determining that Petitioner is not disqualified from working in a position of special trust solely on the basis of her 1996 battery conviction. DONE AND ENTERED this 13th day of November, 2000, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. ELLA JANE P. DAVIS Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 13th day of November, 2000.
The Issue The issue in this proceeding is whether the Department of Children and Family Services should revoke the family day care license of Respondents.
Findings Of Fact Respondent has been registered with the Department as a family home day care provider since September of 2001. A registered family home day care does not have to meet all of the requirements that a licensed day care home must meet. However, the same background screening and training requirements must be met. Registered family day care homes are not inspected as often as licensed homes. Each year, the registered provider must complete a renewal application that, among other things, identifies household members and substitute care-givers. The operator of the home and all household members are required to pass a Level 2 background screening. Additionally, registered family home applicants must pass a 30-hour family day care home training, a five-hour early literacy course, and each year, complete 10 hours of in-service of continuing education. Operators of the registered homes must designate a substitute care provider who is also required to go through the background screening. Ms. Huewitt designated Teresa Clary as her substitute care provider on her 2007, 2008, and 2009 applications. Previous Disciplinary Action On three occasions in the fall of 2008 and on one occasion in February 2009, Respondent was found to be out of compliance with ratio requirements, i.e., caring for more children than allowed. Additionally, in November 2008, the Family Services Counselor from the Department called the home and the phone was answered by one of Ms. Huewitt’s adult daughters. That daughter informed the Family Services Counselor that Ms. Huewitt was not home and would be back shortly. The Department then determined that this violated the substitute care requirement as Teresa Clary was designated as the substitute care provider. As a result, the Department issued an Administrative Complaint on January 12, 2009, regarding two incidents of being out-of-ratio and for violation of “listed substitute requirements.” A $300 fine was imposed and the registration was placed on probationary status in February 2009. In a letter dated August 27, 2009, the Department informed Ms. Huewitt that the Probationary Registration was lifted effective August 9, 2009, because “the Operator has been in compliance with ratio and capacity requirements during periodic monitoring/inspections while on probationary registration.”2/ Facts concerning the Amended Notice of Administrative Action Ms. Huewitt has three adult children: Jennifer Oliver, Stephanie Oliver, and Anthony Oliver. Jennifer Oliver was listed as an “other family/household member” on the 2007, 2008, and 2009 applications. As a result, a background screening was conducted on Jennifer. The background screening revealed a disqualifying offense. Jennifer requested an exemption from disqualification, but was denied. Consequently, Jennifer Oliver was not permitted to be in the home during the operational hours of the day care. On February 2, 2009, Ms. Huewitt entered into a safety plan in which she agreed not to allow her daughter, Jennifer, to supervise the children while in her care, or even to allow Jennifer to be in the residence while children are in her care during business hours. Despite this, on August 11, 2009, at approximately 9:25 a.m., the Family Services Counselor, Miatta Jalaber, went to Ms. Huewitt’s home and saw Jennifer in the home. Jennifer exited the home as Ms. Jalaber did her walk-through. As a result, Ms. Jalaber called her supervisor, who instructed Ms. Jalaber to write another safety plan for Ms. Huewitt. The August 11, 2009, safety plan was hand-written by Ms. Jalaber while at Ms. Huewitt’s home day care and states, “I Alisa Huewitt understand that my daughter, Jennifer Oliver, must not be present in my residence [address] during operating hours 7:30 a.m.-6:00 p.m. M-F while I have children in care.” The safety plan was signed by both Ms. Jalaber and Ms. Huewitt. Ms. Jalaber made subsequent visits to Ms. Huewitt’s home on October 30, 2009, December 29, 2009, January 29, 2010, February 5, 2010, February 19, 2010, and March 30, 2010. No other persons were present and Ms. Huewitt’s home was in ratio during those visits. She did observe Jennifer in the home on April 16, 2010, but the day care was closed that day. Stephanie Oliver is not listed on any of the applications as a person residing in the home, but has been seen at Ms. Huewitt’s during hours when the day care is open. While there was some testimony that both Stephanie and Ms. Huewitt’s son Anthony have some sort of criminal background and that they have been seen at the day care during business hours, the record is insufficient to establish that their criminal records contain disqualifying offenses, or that they actually live in the home. What is clear is that Ms. Huewitt is of the belief that it is not necessary to list persons who do not actually reside in the home, but who frequently visit the home, on her applications under the category “Other Family/Household Members.” There were instances in which Ms. Jalaber went to the day care home and was led to believe that Jennifer Oliver was Stephanie Oliver. Ms. Jalaber only learned that the daughter she saw and spoke to at the home was Jennifer, who was not supposed to be there during working hours, when she attended Jennifer’s exemption from disqualifying fact-finding meeting. While the record is insufficient to clearly support a finding that Ms. Huewitt lied to Ms. Jalaber about her daughter’s identity, she was not forthcoming with clarifying the confusion. In July 2009, the Department received an abuse report that Ms. Huewitt’s grandson, Kory Hill, Jr., sustained a skull fracture in her residence during business hours. Ms. Jalaber went to Ms. Huewitt’s home, not to investigate the abuse report, but because there was concern that Kory Hill, Sr., who reportedly was taking care of Kory Hill, Jr., on the day of the incident, was residing in the home. Kory Hill, Jr., is Jennifer’s son. Ms. Jalaber addressed her concerns with Ms. Huewitt.3/ During this visit, Ms. Jalaber learned that there was a separate structure in back of Ms. Huewitt’s house. Ms. Jalaber describes it as being just three steps in back of the main house. The structure contains a large room, a closet, and a bathroom and will hereinafter be referred to as “the apartment.” Ms. Jalaber observed clothes in the apartment’s closet and throughout the apartment, and sofa cushions on the floor. It appeared to Ms. Jalaber that someone was residing in the apartment. Ms. Huewitt denies that Mr. Hill, Sr., resided in her home. However, Ms. Huewitt acknowledges that her infant grandson, Kory Hill, Jr., was injured while in the care of his father, Kory Hill, Sr., and that the injury took place in the apartment in back of her house. The injury took place during the day while children were in her care in the main part of her house. Jhaismen Collins is a Child Protective Investigator with the Department. She was assigned to investigate the abuse report regarding this incident. Her investigation began July 1, 2009, at the emergency room where Kory Hill, Jr., had been taken. While there, she spoke to Ms. Huewitt and other family members present in the emergency room. She then made several visits to Ms. Huewitt’s home to follow-up, after the baby was discharged from the hospital. During the follow-up visits, Ms. Collins observed Stephanie in the home and observed Kory Hill, Sr., packing his belongings to leave the home. While the evidence is inconclusive as to whether Mr. Hill actually resided in the apartment behind Ms. Huewitt’s home, it is clear that he frequented the home and the apartment behind the home to visit his son. His son, Kory, Jr., and another son, Kentavious, who is also Ms. Huewitt's grandson, are now attending Ms. Huewitt’s day care. Ayuana Hale is a Dependency Case manager for the Department. Her job is to provide needed services to the child and family in the case of a verified finding of abuse, neglect, or abandonment. She was assigned to the case involving Kory Hill, Jr., after the abuse investigation was closed as verified. Ms. Hale testified that Mr. Hill is currently incarcerated. She has knowledge of this because she is obligated to try to offer Mr. Hill services while he is incarcerated. Parents of children who attend Ms. Huewitt’s home day care are extremely complimentary of the care their children receive, and are not concerned with the safety of their children while there.
Recommendation Based upon the Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED: That the Department of Children and Family Services enter a final order placing the license on probation, requiring Respondent to attend further training in the requirements of applicable statutes and rules regarding who must be listed on her applications, requiring those listed to undergo background screening, and requiring successful completion of such training, with no further incidents, prior to approval of Respondent's application for renewal of her registration. DONE AND ENTERED this 24th day of June, 2010, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S BARBARA J. STAROS Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 24th day of June, 2010
The Issue The issue is whether Respondent should have granted Petitioner a license to operate a family day care home.
Findings Of Fact In January 1992, Petitioner operated a foster home for dependent children. The foster home was licensed by Respondent's predecessor, the Department of Health and Rehabilitative Services (hereinafter referred to as Respondent). In January 1992, Respondent received a report that Petitioner and her husband, Jim Shell, had meted out bizarre and excessive punishments to the children in their foster home. The report also alleged that Petitioner tied the younger foster children into their cribs at night. This report resulted in an investigation by Respondent. In the year prior to the initiation of the investigation, the following children stayed in Petitioner's foster home: H.S. (d.o.b. 4-6-89); S.S. (d.o.b. 10-1-86); T.H. (d.o.b. 5-3-89); S.A.C. (d.o.b. 9-18-88); B.Y. (d.o.b. 11-2-80) and G.Y. (d.o.b. 12-2-82. H.S. and S.S. were sisters. S.A.C., B.Y. and G.Y. were siblings. T.H. was mentally retarded. Petitioner gave B.Y. more household duties in the home than would be expected as chores for a child of her age. These responsibilities included housecleaning, laundry and child care. Additionally, Petitioner often kept B.Y. home from school to do housework. To excuse B.Y.'s absence, Petitioner would write notes to the school, falsely stating that B.Y. had a doctor's note and stayed home sick. B.Y. and G.Y. were forced to do push-ups as punishment for minor infractions. Petitioner's testimony that the children were required to do these push-ups as a joke or game is not persuasive. Mr. Shell spanked G.Y. for mis-reciting spelling words. This occurred once a week. On one occasion, B.Y. observed Mr. Shell hit G.Y. on the buttocks with a two by four. On another occasion, Mr. Shell jerked S.A.C. off a trampoline in the backyard, spanked her and threw her onto the ground. As a result of this rough treatment, S.A.C.'s head struck a tree. Petitioner regularly tied H.S.; S.S.; T.H.; and S.A.C. into their cribs at night because they would get up after being put down for the night. When B.Y. untied the children, Petitioner told her that when the children are tied up, they are supposed to remain that way. There was great strife in the Shell household. Petitioner and her husband often argued. For example, on B.Y's first night in the home, Petitioner hit Mr. Shell on the head with a frying pan. It is contrary to Department policy to physically restrain or punish children in foster care. Foster parents learn this in the training they receive before receiving their foster care licenses. Notwithstanding Petitioner's claim that she is separated from her husband, they continue to live under one roof. The house they live in is on the same property where Petitioner intends to operate a family day care home. The foregoing facts, among others, were set forth in the Respondent's final investigative report, Florida Protective Services System Abuse Report Number 92-007405. On April 22, 1992, the Respondent sent a certified letter to Petitioner informing her that the investigative report had been classified as proposed confirmed, that she had the right to request that Respondent amend or expunge the report, and that any such request would be considered only if received by Respondent within sixty days of her receipt of the April 22, 1992 letter. The letter contained the following language: If you do nothing, your right to appeal the classification of the report will be completely barred. By not choosing [to ask for amendment or expungement], this report will automatically be classified as CONFIRMED. This means that you do not contest the department's right to maintain the report findings as stated, including your identification as a perpetrator. A perpetrator in a confirmed report of abuse, neglect or exploitation may be disqualified from working in certain positions of trust, including working with children, disabled adults or aged persons. (Emphasis supplied). Petitioner signed the acknowledgment of receipt for the April 22, 1992, letter on April 27, 1992. She never requested amendment or expungement of the investigative report. Because neither amendment nor expungement of the report was sought, the confirmed classification became final agency action sixty days after Petitioner's receipt of the letter on April 27, 1992. In other words, the agency action became final on June 26, 1992. No appeal was taken from this action.1 In 1994, the Agency for Health Care Administration granted Petitioner an exemption from disqualification from employment in positions covered by Section 400.512, Florida Statutes. That section discusses the requirement for employment screening, using level 1 standards, for home health agency personnel, persons referred for employment by nurse registries, and persons employed by sitter, companion, or homemaker services registered under Section 400.509, Florida Statutes. The record does not indicate whether the Agency for Health Care Administration conducted an evidentiary hearing before making its decision to grant Petitioner the exemption.
Recommendation Based upon the findings of fact and conclusions of law, it is RECOMMENDED: That the Department of Children and Family Services enter a Final Order denying the application of Petitioner Patricia Shell to operate a registered family day care home. DONE AND ENTERED this 2nd day of November, 1998, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. SUZANNE F. HOOD Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 2nd day of November, 1998.
